The aim of the paper is to determine how metaphors tackle the probable nature of information and uncertainty in the structure of the communication process. Since the cognitive theory of conceptual metaphors holds that metaphoric thinking and doing are unavoidable, they are employed often in explaining the communicating domains. The metaphorical conceptualizing is recognized in Shannon and Weaver’s Mathematical Theory of Communication where such abstract concepts as freedom of choice, choosing probabilities, and uncertainty ware conceived in that way. It is (...) described in accord with Reddy’s conduit metaphor and Ritchie’s toolmakers paradigm. In the paper the issue of both the advantages and disadvantages of metaphors is considered: mainly, how they can explain and predict ways in which people communicate their expectations or uncertainties as well as, more practically, how the probable/informational metaphors enable the management of knowledge in libraries or databases. (shrink)

After reviewing the papers in this special issue, I must conclude that brains are not syntactic engines, but control systems that orient to biological, interindividual, and cultural norms. By themselves, syntactic constraints both underdetermine and overdetermine cognitive operations. So, rather than serving as the basis for general cognition, they are just another kind of empirically acquired constraint. In humans, symbols emerge from a particular sensorimotor activity through a process of contextual broadening that depends on the coordination of conscious and nonconscious (...) processing. This process provides the representational freedom and stability that constitute the human brain’s solution to the frame problem and symbol grounding problem. Symbol formation and grounding is an ongoing process of generalising constraints from particular contexts, selectively enlisting their use, and re-automating them. This process is central to the self-creation of a language-using person with beliefs, agency, and identity. (shrink)

Dans cet article, je présente une approche sémantique de l’analyse de la fonction de la métaphore du paysage dans la biologie de l’évolution. Le concept de paysage adaptatif a suscité une attention considérable dans la philosophie de la biologie récente. La plupart des auteurs ont considéré ce concept de l’une des deux manières suivantes: en tant qu’outil heuristique, comme partie intrinsèque de modèles mathématiques robustes, ou comme un ensemble définissable d’analogies sur lesquelles les modèles sont basés et testés. Chacune de (...) ces visions conduit à la conclusion que la valeur de la métaphore du paysage dépend seulement du succès des modèles que sous-tend la métaphore, en vue de représenter adéquatement la dynamique de l’évolution. J’essaie de montrer que cette conclusion, ainsi que les visions qui y conduisent, ne tiennent pas compte d’épisodes importants dans l’histoire de la métaphore du langage. Ces visions proviennent plutôt de thèses générales, en philosophie des sciences, quant au rôle des métaphores dans les théories scientifiques. L’analyse sémantique que je propose met en lumière le fait que la fonction première du concept de relief adaptatif, au cours de la synthèse évolutionniste, a été de servir de cadre général d’unification conceptuelle, qui a rendu possible la conciliation de phénomènes empiriques hétérogènes. De ce point de vue, la métaphore du paysage est un outil linguistique-théorique qui ne doit pas être abandonné (et qui ne l’est de fait pas) suite à la falsification des modèles construits et interprétés au moyen de la métaphore. (shrink)

Des Anglophones peuvent éprouver quelques difficultés à comprendre la différence entre « langue » et « langage », car en anglais il existe un seul mot pour les deux, à savoir « language ». L’œuvre de Pierre-Yves Raccah est caractérisé par une très grande précision et rigueur ; cela est bien illustré par la terminologie qu’il a établi selon laquelle le terme « langue » correspond à une langue naturelle comme le Français ou l’Anglais ; alors que le terme « (...) langage » renvoie à un langage formel, le langage de la logique. Les énoncés dans une langue naturelle sont généralement des « phrases », ce qui signifie que leur interprétation appelle toujours une négociation et dépend fortement de la situation contextuelle. Par contre, les énoncés dans un langage formel prennent la forme de propositions logiques, qui possèdent apparemment une seule interprétation – quoique, il convient de le préciser, cette apparence dépend en réalité d’un contexte bien particulier, celui qui est établi par la communauté des logiciens. Raccah a déployé cette distinction importante dans un article qui constitue le point focal de cette contribution. Raccah y présente un argument bien structuré, qui le conduit à conclure que « la métaphore n’existe pas ». La raison est que dans les langues naturelles, tous les mots sont normalement des métaphores ; il s’ensuit que « la métaphore », comme trope particulier qui appelle une explication, n’existe effectivement pas. Dans ma contribution, je propose de présenter une approche complémentaire, prenant comme cadre le paradigme de l’Énaction en Sciences Cognitives, qui conduit à une conclusion sensiblement identique. Finalement, je propose de formuler une nouvelle question qui se pose si l’on considère que « la métaphore » est normale ; il s’agit du statut des « énoncés littéraux » qui, par une ironie du sort suite au renversement de la situation, deviennent à leur tour problématiques. (shrink)

Most current theoretical models of dreaming are built around an assumption that dream reports collected on awakening provide unbiased sampling of previous cognitive activity during sleep. However, such data are retrospective, requiring the recall of previous mental events from sleep on awakening. Thus, it is possible that dreaming occurs throughout sleep and differences in subsequent dream reports are owing to systematic differences in our ability to recall mentation on awakening. For this reason, it cannot be concluded with certainty that sleep (...) cognition is more predominant or in any way different during REM compared to NREM sleep. It is our contention that REM sleep and ponto-geniculo-occipital (PGO) waves do not necessarily represent stimulation of the cortex in the generation of dreams, but might rather represent enhanced arousal of attention mechanisms during sleep, which results in the subsequent recall of attended mentation on awakening. (shrink)

An ongoing assumption made by sleep researchers is that since dreams are more often recalled on awakening from rapid eye movement sleep, dreams must occur more often during this stage of sleep. An alternative hypothesis is that cognition occurs throughout sleep, but the recall of this mentation differs on awakening. When a dream is not reported on awakening, there is no method of establishing whether it did not happen or was forgotten. The aim of the present study was to investigate (...) this issue using an eye movement signal verification technique. Participants were instructed to produce an EM signal whenever they heard a tone. Tones were presented at increasing volume during Stage 2 and REM sleep until EM signal verification was observed. Ninety seconds after signal verification, participants were awakened and asked if they remembered hearing the tone or responding with the EM signal. Such recollection of signal verified tone presentations was significantly less after Stage 2 sleep compared to REM sleep presentations. Furthermore, SVT recall was significantly correlated with reported dream recall frequency, suggesting the same processes involved in recalling SVTs might also underlie dream recall. (shrink)

Corporate volunteering is known to be an effective employee engagement initiative. However, despite the prominence of corporate social responsibility in academia and practice, research is yet to investigate whether and how CV may influence consumer perceptions of CSR image and subsequent consumer behaviour. Data collected using an online survey in Australia show perceived familiarity with a company’s CV programme to positively impact CSR image and firm image, partially mediated by others-centred attributions. CSR image, in turn, strengthens affective and cognitive loyalty (...) as well as word-of-mouth. Further analysis reveals the moderating effect of perceived leveraging of the corporate volunteering programme, customer status and the value individuals place on CSR. The paper concludes with theoretical and managerial implications, as well as an agenda for future research. (shrink)

David Bohm's interpretation of quantum mechanics yields a quantum potential, Q. In his early work, the effects of Q are understood in causal terms as acting through a real (quantum) field which pushes particles around. In his later work (with Basil Hiley), the causal understanding of Q appears to have been abandoned. The purpose of this paper is to understand how the use of certain metaphors leads Bohm away from a causal treatment of Q, and to evaluate the use of (...) those metaphors. (shrink)

Problematizamos o conceito de informação, sob a perspectiva da Linguística Sociocognitiva, em especial da teoria da metáfora conceptual e da teoria dos frames semânticos, a fim de verificar se a terminologia predominante da Ciência da Informação (CI) é próxima do “senso comum”, como querem alguns autores da área. De fato, pudemos descrever o esquema cognitivo em que o conceito de informação é produtivo. Identificamos um componente da metáfora do canal, a metáfora INFORMAÇÃO É CONTEÚDO, capaz de confirmar a suspeita dos (...) epistemólogos da CI e ir além: ela revela uma maneira mecânica de “falar sobre comunicação” que é de um “senso comum” desde há muitos séculos. Qual “senso comum”? Argumentando que a metáfora INFORMAÇÃO É CONTEÚDO faz mais sentido no contexto da comunicação escrita do que na falada, sugerimos uma revisão crítica dos efeitos que o letramento em massa aos seis anos poderia estar provocando na mentalidade ocidental: ao valorizar a escrita, tecnologia fundamental para a sustentabilidade das “sociedades da informação”, estaremos negligenciando a oralidade e, em consequência, negando nossa humanidade? THE COMMONSENSE OF INFORMATION: TEMPESTIVE QUESTIONSAbstractWe problematize the concept of information, from the perspective of socio-cognitive linguistics, especially that from the conceptual metaphor and semantic frames theories, in order to check whether the prevailing terminology of the Information Science (IS) is close to the “commonsense”, as some authors whish. In fact, we describe a cognitive scheme in which the concept of information is productive. A component of the conduit metaphor, INFORMATION IS CONTENT, seems to confirm the suspicion of IS epistemologists and more: it reveals a mechanical way to “speek about communication” that is a “commonsense” for centuries. Which “commonsense”? Arguing that the metaphor INFORMATION IS CONTENT makes more sense in the context of written language than in spoken one, we suggest a critical review of the effects that mass literacy at age six could be causing in Western mind: giving prestige to the writing language, a key technology for the sustainability of “information societies”, are we neglecting orality and therefore denying our humanity? (shrink)

Numerous species use different forms of communication in order to successfully interact in their respective environment. This article seeks to elucidate limitations of the classical conduit metaphor by investigating communication from the perspectives of biology and artificial neural networks. First, communication is a biological natural phenomenon, found to be fruitfully grounded in an organism’s embodied structures and memory system, where specific abilities are tied to procedural, semantic, and episodic long-term memory as well as to working memory. Second, the (...) account explicates differences between non-verbal and verbal communication and shows how artificial neural networks can communicate by means of ontologically non-committal modelling. This approach enables new perspectives of communication to emerge regarding both sender and receiver. It is further shown that communication features gradient properties that are plausibly divided into a reflexive and a reflective form, parallel to knowledge and reflection. (shrink)

Le processus qui a conduit aux événements d’octobre 2019 au Chili a généralement été interprété comme l’effet explosif d’une « accumulation » de troubles, qui s’est développée au cours des trois décennies qui ont suivi la fin de la dictature de Pinochet. Avec le résultat négatif du plébiscite du 4 septembre 2022 la métaphore de l’« accumulation » est tombée. Qu’est-ce désormais que cette révolte sans révolution? La révolte est-elle un moment interne au néolibéralisme?

Le tissu comme support, matériau ou modèle traverse l'histoire de l'art, et se manifeste également sous la forme d'analogies ou de métaphores dans d'autres disciplines artistiques. La racine étymologique qui lie la notion de texte au champ lexical du tissage établit un jeu d'échos entre la patience de Pénélope à défaire et refaire son ouvrage et le travail même du poète et l'image du tissage surgit encore, tout naturellement, dans la terminologie de Derrida pour définir ce qui fait l'essence même (...) d'un texte. La diversité des hantises exercées par la notion de texture et par l'objet tissu conduit à un questionnement mettant en jeu la connaissance des textiles aussi bien que l'analyse des pratiques artistiques et des formes esthétiques auxquelles le tissage a pu donner lieu. Ce volume se fonde donc sur une approche croisant histoire de l'art, esthétique et littérature pour interroger la façon dont l'image de la chose tissée travaille le monde de la création artistique. La recherche collective qui prend forme dans ces pages propose d'explorer les prouesses d'une métaphore peut-être irremplaçable, et peut-être nécessaire à la survie de l'oeuvre d'art en son essence. (shrink)

In her influential article published in 2016, Alexandra Walsham, Professor of Modern History at the University of Cambridge, coined the metaphor that ‘Archives are the factories and laboratories of the historian’. Traditionally viewed as neutral storehouses of official records passively awaiting historians’ scrutiny, conceptions of archives have expanded in recent decades. Archives are now understood as complex social and cultural entities that actively participate in shaping understandings of the past. This paper examines shifting perspectives on the nature and functions (...) of archives through a critical analysis of key debates. Specifically, this paper adopts a hermeneutic lens to critically engage Walsham’s metaphor and move beyond its potential limitations through situated analysis and interpretation. This paper explores how archives are actively implicated in knowledge construction through their contents, organisational frameworks, and interactions with historians. Recognising archives as fragmented, culturally contingent remnants that mediate engagement with the past, the paper calls for collaborative, reflective approaches between archivists and historians. The paper also acknowledges historians’ subjective interpretive roles while advocating consultation of archivists’ contextual expertise. Ultimately, it advances methodological discussions on writing history through a nuanced appreciation of archives as dynamic mediators within historical research, not transparent conduits neutrally supplying facts. (shrink)

Merleau-Ponty characterizes the poetic or literary use of language as bringing forth of sense as if it is a being that is an interlocutor with its readers. Sense will be explored as interwoven with a deeper imagination that works within the temporality of institution to become more fully manifest. Throughout the essay will be seen the overlap with Claudel’s ontology as expressed in L’Art poetique and Claudel’s approach to language. Why Merleau-Ponty’s articulation of embodiment and perception must culminate in the (...) poetic expression of the flesh ontology will be seen in: 1) how the phenomenology of sense leads to the flesh ontology as closely tied to the literary dimension of language, 2) that the analysis of sense leads to the vital importance of the physiognomic or vertical imagination as opening the latent depths of perception by its expression within poetic language, and also tracing the link between metaphor and the flesh ontology, and that 3) the expression of the latent sense of perception as the interplay of lateral relations as access to Being is the reversibility of the flesh, also articulated by Claudel as co-naissance, and calls for an “interrogative knowing,” a “question-savior.” The articulation of the texture of Being is an overlapping endeavor with Claudel as the poetic articulation of a stream of sense below our reflective life.Merleau-Ponty caractérise l’usage poétique ou littéraire du langage, en tant que producteur de sens, comme s’il s’agissait d’un être qui est un interlocuteur pour ses lecteurs. Le sens sera exploré comme entrelacé à une imagination plus profonde qui opère dans la temporalité de l’institution pour devenir pleinement manifeste. Dans cet article nous étudierons l’empiètement avec l’ontologie de Claudel telle qu’elle est exprimée dans l’Art poétique et avec l’approche de Claudel au langage. Les raisons pour lesquelles l’articulation merleau-pontienne de l’incorporation et de la perception doit aboutir à l’expression poétique de l’ontologie de la chair seront alors recherchées : 1) dans la manière dont la phénoménologie du sens conduit à une ontologie de la chair si étroitement liée à la dimension littéraire du langage ; 2) dans le fait que l’analyse du sens conduit à l’importance vitale d’une imagination physionomique ou verticale qui ouvrirait les profondeurs latentes de la perception par son expression dans le langage poétique, et aussi en traçant le lien entre la métaphore et l’ontologie de la chair, et 3) dans le fait que l’expression du sens latent de la perception, tout comme l’interaction des relations latérales et comme l’accès à l’Être, consiste dans la réversibilité de la chair, aussi décrite par Claudel comme co-naissance, et qui invite à une « connaissance interrogative », à une « question-savoir ». Ainsi, la tentative d’articuler la texture de l’Être s’entrecroise avec les réflexions de Claudel, comme l’articulation poétique d’un flux de sens au-dessous de nos vies réflexives.Merleau-Ponty caratterizza la poetica o l’uso letterario del linguaggio come portatore di senso, come se si trattasse di un essere che interloquisce con i suoi lettori. Il senso verrà esplorato come intrecciato con un’immaginazione più profonda che opera nella temporalità dell’istituzione per diventare pienamente manifesta. In questo articolo si esaminerà la sovrapposizione tra l’ontologia di Claudel, espressa nell’Arte poetica, e il suo approccio al linguaggio. Al fine di evidenziare i motivi che portano l’articolazione merleau-pontiana dell’essere incarnato e della percezione a culminare nell’espressione poetica dell’ontologia della carne si vedrà: 1) come la fenomenologia del senso conduca all’ontologia della carne in quanto strettamente legata alla dimensione letteraria del linguaggio ; 2) che le analisi del senso conducono all’importanza vitale della fisiognomica o dell’immaginazione verticale in quanto schiudenti le profondità nascoste della percezione, attraverso la sua espressione all’interno del linguaggio poetico e rintracciando, altresì, il legame tra la metafora e l’ontologia della carne; 3) che l’espressione del senso latente della percezione, sia come intreccio di relazioni laterali sia come accesso all’Essere, è la reversibilità della carne, che Claudel articola attraverso la nozione di co-naissance, ed esige un “sapere interrogativo”, un “sapere domandante”. Così il tentativo di articolare la trama dell’Essere si sovrappone all’articolazione poetica in Claudel di un flusso di senso che sottende la nostra vita riflessiva. (shrink)

What does it mean to say that “I am always on the same side of my body” if the body is understood as flesh? This question of sidedness, and specifically of perspectival unilaterality, in Merleau-Ponty’s ontology leads to a careful sorting of the various relational metaphors that he deploys across his oeuvre, including reversibility, intertwining, possession, encroachment, incorporation, promiscuity, and many others. Curiously, each of these notions implicates a different image of sidedness, from sides that are impermeable in themselves but (...) nonetheless interwoven with those of other bodies, to sides that are porous, interpenetrated, incorporable, and yielding. Ultimately, it is suggested with reference to Merleau-Ponty’s ontologically anticipatory concept of le schèma corporel that unilaterality is not a necessary feature of incarnate subjectivity after all, but is instead one of the last specters of modern metaphysics, haunting Merleau-Ponty’s thinking still. Insofar as perspectival individuation is a function of the dynamic operations of actual body schemas rather than a logical, topological, or ontological given, subjectivity will be essentially promiscuous rather than merely reversible, moving in and out of bodies, overflowing its own body, taking in the bodies of others, leaking into and absorbing the flesh of the world, at times to the point of indivision.Quel est le sens de cet énoncé : « Je suis toujours du même côté de mon corps » lorsque le corps est compris comme chair? Cette question de l’unilatéralité, en particulier celle de l’unilatéralité perspectivale, dans l’ontologie de Merleau-Ponty, conduit à une utilisation précise d’un ensemble de métaphores variées qu’il déploie dans son oeuvre, telles que la réversibilité, l’entrelacement, la possession, l’empiètement, l’incorporation, la promiscuité et bien d’autres encore. Curieusement, chaque notion implique une image d’unilatéralité différente, depuis les côtés qui sont imperméables en eux-mêmes mais néanmoins entrelacés avec ceux des autres corps, jusqu’aux côtés qui sont poreux, interpénétrés, incorporables, malléables. En définitive, il semble que la référence anticipée au concept de schéma corporel montre que l’unilatéralité n’est pas, après tout, un élément nécessaire de la subjectivité incarnée, mais plutôt un des derniers spectres de la métaphysique moderne qui hante le style de la pensée de Merleau-Ponty. Dans la mesure où l’individuation perspectivale est une fonction des opérations dynamiques des schémas corporels actuels et non un donné logique, topologique ou ontologique, la subjectivité sera essentiellement promiscuité plutôt que simplement réversible, entrant et sortant des corps, débordant son propre corps, prenant le corps des autres, laissant filtrer la chair du monde et l’absorbant, parfois jusqu’au point de l’indivision.Che cosa significa dire che “io mi trovo sempre dallo stesso lato del mio corpo” se il corpo è compreso come carne? Questa questione della lateralità e in particolare di una unilateralità nell’ontologia di Merleau-Ponty ci porta a discernere attentamente le diverse metafore relazionali che il filosofo impiega nel corso della sua opera, tra cui reversibilità, intreccio, sconfinamento, incorporazione, promiscuità, per citarne solo alcune. È interessante notare che ciascuna di queste nozioni implica una differente immagine della lateralità, da lati che sono impermeabili in se stessi e ciononostante intrecciati con quelli di altri corpi, fino a lati che sono invece porosi, interpenetrati gli uni con gli altri, incorporabili e cedevoli. In definitiva, la nozione merleau-pontiana – ontologicamente anticipatrice – di schema corporeo suggerisce che l’unilateralità non è un carattere necessario della soggettività incarnata, ma invece uno degli spettri residuali della metafisica moderna, che ancora incombono sul pensiero di Merleau-Ponty. Nella misura in cui l’individuazione prospettica è una funzione delle operazioni dinamiche di schemi corporei piuttosto che un dato logico, topologico o ontologico, la soggettività sarà essenzialmente promiscua e non semplicemente reversibile, muovendo verso l’interno e l’esterno dei corpi, sconfinando i limiti del corpo, lasciando entrare i corpi altrui, concedendo l’ingresso e assorbendo la carne del mondo, talvolta fino a raggiungere l’indiscernibilità. (shrink)

Dans cet article, nous analyserons la conception de la fonction de la “figurabilité” en psychanalyse développée par Paul Ricœur, à travers sa lecture de la “découverte psychanalytique” selon laquelle le langage lui-même travaille au niveau figuratif. L’intérêt de cette lecture, c’est qu’elle fournit une autre notion d'image pour son herméneutique dans la mesure où Ricœur remet ici en cause la soumission de l’image par rapport au langage sur laquelle il avait principalement insisté dans La Métaphore vive. À partir de cette (...) lecture, nous défendons la thèse selon laquelle la prise en compte du lien entre le “travail de l'image,” dans sa lecture de la psychanalyse, et le “travail” de la métaphore, dans sa théorie de la métaphore, conduit à un élargissement de sa conception de la métaphore dans la mesure où ce lien révèle un niveau de visualisation dans lequel la maîtrise du langage sur l’image n’opère pas encore. (shrink)

La théorie lockienne de la perception a été lue tantôt comme une forme de représentationnalisme, tantôt comme relevant d'un réalisme direct n'impliquant pas d'entité intermédiaire entre l'esprit et les choses. Cet article entreprend de clarifier cette question à partir des analyses de l'Essai sur la distinction et la confusion des idées. Celles-ci interrogent à la fois la nature de l'idée comme image et le fait qu'elle n'est déterminée que lorsque l'esprit lui donne un nom. Pour faire comprendre ce dernier point, (...) Locke utilise la métaphore de l'anamorphose en peinture, et plus particulièrement de l'anamorphose cylindrique. En reliant cette métaphore aux théories de la perspective du XVIIe siècle, à la camera obscura de l'esprit, et enfin à l'optique du XVIIe siècle, l'article parvient à plusieurs conclusions. Faire de l'idée une image ne conduit jamais Locke à voir en elle un objet qui s'interpose entre l'esprit et les choses. Une idée comme celle de sense data est étrangère à sa pensée. Si Locke ne met jamais en doute la réalité du monde extérieur, c'est que pour lui l'idée nous donne d'emblée accès à une extériorité, qu'il s'agit de déterminer. Enfin, la perception lockienne ne relève pas d'un modèle sémantique dont l'origine serait à trouver dans Descartes et qui préparerait celui de l'empirisme du XVIIIe siècle, faisant de l'idée un signe. Elle se rapprocherait plutôt, paradoxalement, de l'idée austinienne du silence des sens. (shrink)

La théorie lockienne de la perception a été lue tantôt comme une forme de représentationnalisme, tantôt comme relevant d'un réalisme direct n'impliquant pas d'entité intermédiaire entre l'esprit et les choses. Cet article entreprend de clarifier cette question à partir des analyses de l'Essai sur la distinction et la confusion des idées. Celles-ci interrogent à la fois la nature de l'idée comme image et le fait qu'elle n'est déterminée que lorsque l'esprit lui donne un nom. Pour faire comprendre ce dernier point, (...) Locke utilise la métaphore de l'anamorphose en peinture, et plus particulièrement de l'anamorphose cylindrique. En reliant cette métaphore aux théories de la perspective du XVIIe siècle, à la camera obscura de l'esprit, et enfin à l'optique du XVIIe siècle, l'article parvient à plusieurs conclusions. Faire de l'idée une image ne conduit jamais Locke à voir en elle un objet qui s'interpose entre l'esprit et les choses. Une idée comme celle de sense data est étrangère à sa pensée. Si Locke ne met jamais en doute la réalité du monde extérieur, c'est que pour lui l'idée nous donne d'emblée accès à une extériorité, qu'il s'agit de déterminer. Enfin, la perception lockienne ne relève pas d'un modèle sémantique dont l'origine serait à trouver dans Descartes et qui préparerait celui de l'empirisme du XVIIIe siècle, faisant de l'idée un signe. Elle se rapprocherait plutôt, paradoxalement, de l'idée austinienne du silence des sens. (shrink)

RásuméLes incidences sur la réflexion théologique des principes méthodologiques et épistémologiques gonséthiens sont aussi considérables que suggestives. Dans un domaine où le recours continuel à des métaphores empêche de tenir des discours univoques, le principe ? idonéité trouve toute sa signification. Les conduites ? un dogmatisme non critique sont exclues par le principe de révisibilité. Ľ opposition entre les voies de l'altérité et de intimité précise les différences que l'on observe entre les procédures scientifiques et spirituelles , la théologie s'efforçant (...) de traiter objectivement les données canoniques par des démarches qu'avérent les expériences vécues .SummaryThe effects of Gonseth's methodological and epistemological principles on theological reflection are as extensive as they are evocative. In this field, in which the frequent use of metaphors precludes unambiguous discourse, the full importance of the principle of idoneity is revealed. Uncritical dogmatism is prevented by the principle of revisability. The opposition between the ways of otherness and of innerness underscores the differences observed between scientific procedures and spiritual ones ; theology seeks to treat canonical facts objectively by means that are confirmed by actual experience. (shrink)

" L'expérience esthétique, n'est autonome, écrit Adorno, que lorsqu'elle se débarrasse du goût culinaire, la voie qui y conduit passe par le désintéressement.... ", à ce lointain écho de la rupture transcendantale au sein de l'Esthétique du goût, à ce déni pur et simple de la sensibilité et du plaisir " sensuel et grossier ", comme principes du goût, on préfèrera, ici, une présentation non morale, ou non kantienne, de la notion de goût ; une réflexion qui, de Voltaire (...) et Montesquieu à Brillat-Savarin, prend en compte le goût " lui-même " et non seulement sa métaphore ; on cherchera le raffinement et la délicatesse du goût non seulement dans les sphères supérieures de l'existence, mais aussi dans les relations primordiales de la vie, celle de la consommation, de la préparation et de la production, ainsi que le voulait Charles Fourier, (beau) frère de Brillat-Savarin. Dans les deux essais, ici étudiés, s'impose, en effet, la dimension organique et sensuelle mais néanmoins esthétique du goût, dans les choses de la nature et de l'art. L'Essai sur le goût de Montesquieu et La Physiologie du goût de Brillat-Savarin, témoignent, dans des domaines distincts mais étroitement liés, de l'Esthétique comme " science de la sensibilité ". Par leur rapprochement, on entend montrer que le goût n'est pas une " chose mentale " mais l'affaire de tous les sens, que l'âme qui goûte est l'âme qui sent. On cherchera à dépasser le divorce, qui semble s'être installé, entre le jugement esthétique et le plaisir esthétique, on tentera par là, de restaurer la continuité entre les deux pôles de la sensibilité gustative et de redonner, par une réévaluation du goût culinaire, une assise réelle, vitale et réconfortante à la notion de goût, comme sentiment délicat. (shrink)

Dans sa démarche interprétative, l’herméneutique de Ricœur se sert du concept de distanciation, qui implique la sortie de soi-męme du lecteur, de l’auditeur ou du spectateur et la recherche nécessaire d’une sorte d’altérité. On peut reconnaître dans cette altérité la « différance » de Derrida, qui conduit au final dans une direction tout ŕ fait différente que le concept ricśurien de distanciation. Ces deux auteurs peuvent ętre comparés notamment au niveau de leurs recherches respectives sur la métaphore. Si, pour (...) Ricœur, la vraie métaphore est la métaphore vivante, celle qui génčre des significations nouvelles, comme le postulent Richards et Black, pour Derrida de La mythologie blanche, toute la philosophie n’est qu’un ensemble de métaphores oubliées qui conduit d’abord ŕ sa propre mort et ensuite ŕ la mort de la philosophie. Dans ce monde de plus en plus globalisé, oů, d’une part, les frontičres et les différences s’effacent progressivement, on voit, d’autre part, émerger des fondamentalismes qui s’efforcent de montrer ŕ tout prix que les différences sont insurmontables. Dans l’actuel concept européen d’unification, comme dans tout processus de maturation humaine, l’éducation et la formation ont une grande importance pour la préservation de son identité, la compréhension d’autrui et l’action commune. Il nous semble que le concept ricśurien de distanciation pourrait aider ŕ unifier cette double exigence. Or, comme une telle approche de l’éducation et de la formation pourrait s’égarer dans une « nouvelle mythologie », génératrice de cloisonnement fondamentaliste, il est nécessaire de suivre ce processus en mettant ŕ contribution la critique de Derrida. (shrink)

À la négligence théologique de la loi, faiblesse de la tradition éthique protestante, l’auteur propose un remède : un « sensus aestheticus legis ». Il établit d’abord comment l’opposition de la Loi à l’Évangile a conduit à en retenir surtout les connotations négatives. Mais ce caractère unilatéral, montre-t-il aussitôt, dérive d’une interprétation étroite de la théologie de Luther, ignorant que le réformateur reconnaît dans la loi un don divin avant la chute. En second lieu, à partir d’une relecture du (...) psaume 119, l’auteur attire l’attention sur le rapport sensuel du psalmiste à la Torah. La parole divine n’est pas objet d’interprétation mais sujet vivant dans un dialogue ; elle est « voix » plutôt que « texte ». La métaphore de la loi en tant que « lampe des pieds » invite donc à « promener » les commandements de Dieu dans le but d’explorer le monde grâce à la lumière qu’ils donnent. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Fear of Formalism: Kant, Twain, and Cultural Studies in American LiteratureElizabeth Maddock Dillon (bio)I begin with what we might call a bipolar disturbance in literary criticism. Caught between the materialism of cultural studies and the formalism of philosophy, literary criticism is construed, on the one hand, as useless—struck dumb by its lack of purpose in the face of real politics and real bodies—and, on the other hand, as singularly (...) efficacious, the only tool through which to reveal the essentially discursive character of all forms of culture, including bodies and politics. While this rhetorical model of criticism is regularly posited as politically bankrupt, as having no purchase on the facticity of the world, the model of materialist cultural criticism is just as regularly unmasked as, at base, rhetorically constructed and thus guilty of concealing its own formalist dimensions. 1 This “disturbance,” as I’ve described it, tends to be acted out as a debilitating dialectic: caught between formalism and materialism, literary criticism is left without any ground to stand on. Yet this peculiar bipolarity within literary criticism is intimately linked to the strange status of literature itself. Language becomes recognizably literary at the moment it assumes a rhetorical or formal dimension rather than serving as the invisible conduit of mimetic representation. 2 Whence, evidently, the allure of formalism for literary criticism: form would seem to be exactly what demarcates the literary from the nonliterary, what defines the exclusive territory of literature. Yet formalism, as has been widely and persuasively argued, tends to turn literature into precisely the kind of artifact that means little in relation to the world and tends to obscure the worldly relations that inform the text and its production. Indeed, in the field of Cultural Studies—a field whose defining gesture is political engagement—“formalist” is a term whose meaning often comes to approximate “apolitical.” “Formalist,” fashioned as opprobium, speaks chidingly of hermeticism or more acerbically of the insidious erasures enacted by universalism.In contemporary criticism, formalism has thus come to occupy an important antipodal position which encompasses far more than the New Critical practices of the 1940s and ‘50s. In emphasizing the formal, intrinsic qualities of the literary work, New [End Page 46] Critics closeted the text away from the world and from the possibility of social action: their agenda has thus been construed as politically quietist and inherently conservative. 3 Yet the term “formalism,” used as a charge of conservatism, has been applied more broadly to poststructuralist criticism as well. Paul Lauter, for instance, uses the term “formalist” to describe deconstruction as an avatar of New Criticism: both emphasize textual relations to the exclusion of extratextual considerations. Poststructuralism, Lauter and others have argued, continues an aestheticization of literature which turns literary criticism over to an elitist and ultimately irrelevant “priesthood.” ‘“Formalist,’” writes Lauter, “suggests that the whole enterprise of literary theorizing subsists behind dense academic walls, where de Man speaks only to Heidegger, and Heidegger speaks only to God” [138]. While Lauter bases his analogy between poststructuralism and New Criticism on the charge of hermeticism as well as a lack of historical engagement, the notion of “form” as it appears in poststructuralism is nonetheless significantly different than the “form” that animated New Critical endeavors. Where New Critical “form” concerns specifically literary structures—irony, metaphor, tension, unity—the poststructural referent for these rhetorical terms is often the “form” of language or subjectivity itself. Accordingly, the meaning of “form” (and, indeed, “formalism”) undergoes a marked shift from specific rhetorical articulations to larger theoretical claims about language and identity.This second, broader articulation of form has been critiqued less for hermeticism or quietism than for its implied universalism—that is, for fashioning subjects and discursive forces in uniform shapes without regard for political and historical specificity. Stuart Hall, for example, whilst defining the practice of Cultural Studies, warns against theories of the subject (in this case psychoanalysis) that tend toward universalism: “The manner in which this ‘subject’ of culture is conceptualized is of a trans-historical and ‘universal’ character: it addresses the subject-in-general, not an historically-determinate social subject, or socially determinate particular language” [Hall 70]. On this reading, formalist theories of poststructuralism... (shrink)

L'article commence une analyse de la vertu théologique de l'espérance par une phénoménologie de l'espérance. En plus d'un regard donné aux considérations philosophiques sur l'espérance chez des auteurs tels Gabriel Marcel et Ernst Bloch, il étudie les oeuvres dramatiques de Marcel ainsi qu'un certain nombre d'auteurs utopistes tels Thomas More, Henry David Thoreau et Charles Péguy. Des métaphores de la situation humaine, tels l'emprisonnement et l'exil, sont examinées ainsi que la lumière que les auteurs concernés trouvent dans des expériences d'obscurité. (...) La crise de l'histoire est aussi examinée particulièrement dans les écrits de l'auteur italien, Sergio Quinzio: comment pouvons-nous continuer à espérer deux mille ans après la mort du Christ tandis que l'histoire de la souffrance humaine continue, apparemment sans solution ? Après avoir posé la question de l'espérance, la réponse chrétienne est examinée surtout à travers les oeuvres de Jürgen Moltmann qui base sa théologie sur le Dieu qui vient à nous comme futur, le Dieu qui renouvelle toutes choses, le Dieu créateur qui fait être a partir de rien et ressuscite les morts. Tandis que l'optimisme se base sur les resources humaines et la croyance que les choses iront inévitablement mieux, l'espérance s'enracine en ce que Dieu peut faire dans une situation de souffrance, de mort et de destruction. Une telle espérance ne nous conduit cependant pas à fuir le monde. Au contraire, notre espé. (shrink)

The Japanese poet-scholar John Solt is perhaps best known in the United States for his excellent biocritical study (Harvard, 1999) of the avant-garde poet Kitasono Katue, who served, from the mid-1930s on, as Ezra Pound's primary conduit to the stylization of Japanese poetics that he so admired. “Kit Kat,” as Pound fondly called the poet he knew only via their extensive correspondence, was Pound's translator, editor, and sometime collaborator; in return, Pound (who did not read Japanese) wrote admiringly of (...) Katue's work in Guide to Kulchur and elsewhere.Solt has now published a beautifully produced volume of his own distinctive poetry—a poetry that fuses the concision of Japanese tanka and haiku with very up-to-date explorations of what Pound called moeurs contemporaines: riddling short lyrics laced with humor and a telling irony that makes the reader smile with a shock of recognition. In the spirit of Kenneth Rexroth, with whom he studied in Santa Barbara, Solt's seemingly “simple” free verse is carefully structured. The minimalist poems are placed, one per page, in different spatial positions, with the Japanese translation en face. The volume contains a sprinkle of elegies and occasional poems, but Solt's signature poems are epigrams or aphorisms in the vein of the Zen koan: i held my tongueas if it werea ticketThe pun on the word held and the ticket metaphor can be read quite variously: I said nothing, saving my “ticket” for future gain. Or I “held” my tongue as one holds on to a precious ticket for some form of entrance, perhaps erotic. Indeed, Solt excels at the erotic poem—one that is never directly confessional or even personally expressive but that gives the reader a strong sense of a particular moment, as inice cubes meltin the crackleof your nakednessyou roll down your lace stockingsexposing the same designin tattoo... where it is the imprint the lace leaves on the skin that produces arousal. We never know who the “you” of these poems is, nor does it matter. We only know—in the case of a neighboring poem—that the lovers have “met again / and again / like spinning tops,” until “with centrifugal force / we easily slipped / outside the windows / of our eyes.” Caught up in the moment of ecstasy, they no longer see one another.In this complex and subtle poetry, comparisons come readily, only to be given an ironic twist: the mind is a kitehe thoughtletting goof both stringsAnd things are never quite what they seem: you toasted“happiness to usand confusionto our enemies”and I laughedsecureuntil a cloud formedin my mindWe have all had this experience of group approval only to wonder—the next minute—whether we really agree. Solt's minimalist lyrics not only make us smile: they also make us think. (shrink)

Dans cet essai, je me propose d’analyser l’interprétation que fait Ricœur de la théorie frégéenne du sens et de la référence des noms et des propositions. Contre les structuralistes, Ricœur présente dans La Métaphore vive ce qu’il appelle une théorie référentielle de la métaphore et puise dans le texte frégéen pour la défendre en se basant sur la distinction sens-référence. Toutefois, les analyses qu’il présente de la théorie frégéenne ne sont pas fidèles au texte de ce logicien, qu’elles mélangent avec (...) ceux de Wittgenstein et Benveniste entre autres, ce qui conduit à une vision faussée de la théorie frégéenne. Pour cette raison, son analyse le conduit à des résultats qui sont aux antipodes de ceux de Frege pour qui ni le discours poétique ni le discours fictif en général n’ont une portée référentielle. (shrink)

The concept of metaphor as primarily a vehicle for conveying ideas, even if unusual ones, seems to me as wrong as the parent idea that a metaphor has a special meaning. I agree with the view that metaphors cannot be paraphrased, but I think this is not because metaphors say something too novel for literal expression but because there is nothing there to paraphrase. Paraphrase, whether possible or not, inappropriate to what is said: we try, in paraphrase, to (...) say it another way. But if I am right, a metaphor doesn't say anything beyond its literal meaning . This is not, of course, to deny that a metaphor has a point, nor that that point can be brought out by using further words. . . . My disagreement is with the explanation of how metaphor works its wonders. To anticipate: I depend on the distinction between what words mean and what they are used to do. I think metaphor belongs exclusively to the domain of use. It is something brought off by the imaginative employment of words and sentences and depends entirely on the ordinary meanings of those words and hence on the ordinary meanings of the sentences they comprise. Donald Davidson is University Professor of philosophy at the University of Chicago. He is the author of many important essays, including "Actions, Reasons and Causes," "Causal Relations," and "Truth and Meaning," coauthor of Decision-Making: An Experimental Approach, and coeditor of Words and Objections, Semantics of Natural Language, and The Logic of Grammar. (shrink)

This book provides a philosophical theory explicating the cognitive contribution of metaphor. Metaphor effects a transference of meaning, not between two terms, but between two structured domains of content, or ‘semantic fields’. Semantic fields, construed as necessary to a theory of word-meaning, provide the contrastive and affinitive relations that govern a term’s literal use. In a metaphoric use, these relations are projected into a second domain which is thereby reordered with significant cognitive effects. The book provides a revision (...) and refinement of ‘the semantic theory of metaphor’. Taking into account pragmatic considerations and recent linguistic and psychological studies, the book aims to forge a new understanding of the relation between metaphoric and literal meaning. It illustrates the thesis with sensitive and systematic analyses of metaphors found in literature, philosophy, science, and everyday language. Keywords:,, . (shrink)

We discuss the difference between formal and natural languages, and argue that should the language metaphor have any foundation, it’s analogy with natural languages that should be taken into account. We discuss how such operation like reading, writing, sign, interpretation, etc., can be applied in the realm of the living and what can be gained, by such an approach, in order to understand the phenomenon of life.

This paper investigates the issue whether metaphors have a metaphorical or secondary meaning and how this question is related to the borderline between philosophy and linguistics. On examples by V. Woolf and H. W. Auden, it will be shown that metaphor accomplishes something more than its literal meaning expresses and this “more” cannot be captured by any secondary meaning. What is essential in the metaphor is not a secondary meaning but an internal relation between a metaphorical proposition and (...) a description of its effects. In order to understand metaphors, we have to share an ability to construe metaphorical meanings at once. The aim of this ability is to uncover an internal relation, which lies behind a particular metaphor. (shrink)

I compare two of Davidson's main discussions of metaphor. I argue, first, that despite some puzzling inconsistencies, the overall thrust of “What Metaphors Mean” is a radical form of noncogitivism, on which speakers of metaphors merely cause their hearers to perceive certain features in the world, but do not claim or implicate that things are any particular way. By contrast, in “A Nice Derangement of Epitaphs,” Davidson endorses a neo‐Gricean account of metaphor as a form of speaker's meaning. (...) However, he also now advocates a radical anticonventionalism about linguistic meaning in general, which threatens to undermine his new view of metaphor. Finally, I articulate and evaluate a neo‐Davidsonian view of metaphor, which retains as much as possible from both papers. (shrink)

The now-classic Metaphors We Live By changed our understanding of metaphor and its role in language and the mind. Metaphor, the authors explain, is a fundamental mechanism of mind, one that allows us to use what we know about our physical and social experience to provide understanding of countless other subjects. Because such metaphors structure our most basic understandings of our experience, they are "metaphors we live by"--metaphors that can shape our perceptions and actions without our ever noticing (...) them. In this updated edition of Lakoff and Johnson's influential book, the authors supply an afterword surveying how their theory of metaphor has developed within the cognitive sciences to become central to the contemporary understanding of how we think and how we express our thoughts in language. (shrink)

Metaphorical statements surprise us as literal falsehoods, but the interpretation reveals a special motive for the figurative use of the language. Donald Davidson objects to nonliteral meaning: “to suppose a metaphor can be effective only by conveying a coded message is like thinking a joke or a dream makes some statement which a clever interpreter can restate in plain prose.” Taking this remark as my starting point I analyze interpretative strategies for metaphors, jokes, riddles and counterfactual conditionals – all (...) of them involve an initial incongruity and most of them require a certain blending of two different domains. I suggest that the ability to interpret metaphors is based on our ability to apprehend a special cognitive content associated with metaphors. (shrink)

Western scholarship on early Chinese thought has tended to either dismiss the foundational role of metaphor or to see it as a uniquely Chinese mode of apprehending the world. This article argues that, while human cognition is in fact profoundly dependent on imagistic conceptual structures, such dependence is by no means a unique feature of Chinese thought. The article reviews empirical evidence supporting the claims that human thought is fundamentally imagistic; that sensorimotor schemas are often used to structure our (...) understanding of abstract concepts; that these schemas can be selectively combined to result in novel structures; and that there are inextricable connections between body, emotion, and thought in both everyday and philosophical cognition. It also provides a review of a recent trend where, explicitly or not, scholars from a variety of backgrounds have begun to take metaphor more seriously as a foundational bearer of philosophical meaning in early China. (shrink)

The present study analyzes metaphors of life, self, emotional states, and relationships in forty life stories that differ in their communicative situations and narrative goals. Twenty interviews were conducted with people who were seeking psychological help. Another twenty interviews were conducted with Russian celebrities for publication in popular psychology magazines. Metaphors in happy stories were more numerous and diverse than in unhappy stories. Some conceptual metaphors (e.g., “LIFE IS A CONTAINER,” “LIFE IS A JOURNEY,” and “EMOTION IS A PHYSICAL IMPACT”) (...) were found in both happy and unhappy narratives. More specific metaphors demonstrated significant differences between the two types of narratives. The metaphors of life as a “purposeful journey,” self as “alive and flexible object,” and emotional states as “internal and controlled forces” were used more often in happy narratives. This may reflect higher levels of activity, responsibility, and awareness of the authors of happy narratives. Specific for unhappy stories were metaphors “LIFE IS DEATH” and “SELF IS A DEAD OBJECT,” which may indicate a low level of personal well-being and serve as specific markers of personal unhappiness. The results of our study suggest that metaphors may help to construct the subjective reality of happy and unhappy life. By telling their life stories people are able to redefine their past experiences and future perspectives. Specific metaphors play an important part in defining subjective happiness or unhappiness. (shrink)

The enigmatic thought of Charles S. Peirce (1839-1914), considered by many to be one of the great philosophers of all time, involves inquiry not only into virtually all branches and sources of modern semiotics, physics, cognitive sciences, and mathematics, but also logic, which he understood to be the only useful approach to the riddle of reality. This book represents an attempt to outline an analytical method based on Charles Peirce's least explored branch of philosophy, which is his evolutionary cosmology, and (...) his notion that the universe as made of an 'effete mind.' The chief argument conceives of human discourse as a giant metaphor in regard to outside reality. The metaphors arise in our imagination as lightning-fast schemes of acting, speaking, or thinking. To prove this, each chapter will present a well-known metaphor and explain how it is unfolded and conceptualized according to the new method for revealing meaning. This original work will interest students and scholars in many fields including semiotics, linguistics and philosophy. (shrink)

To be able to produce and understand metaphorical statements is nothing much to boast about: these familiar skills, which children seem to acquire as they learn to talk, are perhaps no more remarkable than our ability to tell and to understand jokes. How odd then that it remains difficult to explain what we do in grasping metaphorical statements. In a provocative paper, "What Metaphors Mean,"1 Donald Davidson has recently charged many students of metaphor, ancient and modern, with having committed (...) a "central mistake." According to him, there is "error and confusion" in claiming "that a metaphor has, in addition to its literal sense or meaning, another sense or meaning." The guilty include "literary critics like Richards, Empson, and Winters; philosophers from Aristotle to Max Black; psychologists from Freud and earlier to Skinner and later; and linguists from Plato to Uriel Weinreich and George Lakoff." Good company, if somewhat mixed. The error to be extirpated is the "idea that a metaphor has a special meaning" . If Davidson is right, much that has been written about metaphor might well be consigned to the flames. Even if he proves to be wrong, his animadversions should provoke further consideration of the still problematic modus operandi of metaphor. · 1. In "What Metaphors Mean," Critical Inquiry 5 : 31-47. All further references in text. Max Black is Susan Linn Sage professor of philosophy and humane letters emeritus at Cornell University and senior member of the Cornell program on science, technology, and society. His many influential works include Models and Metaphors, A Companion to Wittgenstein's Tractatus, and, most recently, Caveats and Critiques. During the fall of 1978 he was Tarner Lecturer at Cambridge University and is currently preparing a book on rationality based on those lectures. (shrink)

In this paper, I explore ways in which metaphors contribute to hermeneutical resistance, that is, to practices that overcome and/or ameliorate hermeneutical injustice. I distinguish two aspects of hermeneutical injustice and two corresponding kinds of resistance: exoteric and esoteric hermeneutical injustice/resistance. The former injustice consists in unjust harm due to an inability to make one's experience understood to others. The latter consists in such a harm due to an inability to fully understand one's own experiences. In exoteric hermeneutical resistance, metaphors (...) can overcome resistances in others to understand oppressed agents' contributions because of its automatic processing and anti-deniability. In esoteric hermeneutical resistance, metaphors may highlight common structures in various aspects of marginalised agent's experiences, they can provide means of denoting social properties obscured by hermeneutical injustice and they can exhibit hermeneutical injustice by resisting interpretation. I illustrate these practices through works by Emily Dickinson, Ralph Ellison, Frantz Fanon, Paul Celan and Nelly Sachs. Those examples show the power of metaphors in hermeneutical resistance. (shrink)

The concept of metaphor as primarily a vehicle for conveying ideas, even if unusual ones, seems to me as wrong as the parent idea that a metaphor has a special meaning. I agree with the view that metaphors cannot be paraphrased, but I think this is not because metaphors say something too novel for literal expression but because there is nothing there to paraphrase. Paraphrase, whether possible or not, inappropriate to what is said: we try, in paraphrase, to (...) say it another way. But if I am right, a metaphor doesn't say anything beyond its literal meaning. This is not, of course, to deny that a metaphor has a point, nor that that point can be brought out by using further words.... My disagreement is with the explanation of how metaphor works its wonders. To anticipate: I depend on the distinction between what words mean and what they are used to do. I think metaphor belongs exclusively to the domain of use. It is something brought off by the imaginative employment of words and sentences and depends entirely on the ordinary meanings of those words and hence on the ordinary meanings of the sentences they comprise. Donald Davidson is University Professor of philosophy at the University of Chicago. He is the author of many important essays, including "Actions, Reasons and Causes," "Causal Relations," and "Truth and Meaning," coauthor of Decision-Making: An Experimental Approach, and coeditor of Words and Objections, Semantics of Natural Language, and The Logic of Grammar. (shrink)

Jusqu’à présent, les discussions au sein de la communauté universitaire et dans la littérature scientifique sur la conduite responsable en recherche (CRR), incluant l’intégrité scientifique et l’éthique de la recherche, ont principalement été menées par les chercheurs en sciences de la santé et en sciences fondamentales. Préoccupés, à juste titre, par des problèmes d’inconduite, leurs effets négatifs sur la rigueur scientifique et la confiance du public dans l’entreprise de la recherche, ces débats ont conduit à l’élaboration et à la (...) mise en œuvre de lignes directrices nationales et de politiques institutionnelles. Ces lignes directrices visent entre autres à promouvoir la CRR, notamment dans le but de prévenir ces inconduites. Cependant, pour garantir la pertinence et une application appropriée de ces normes à tous les domaines universitaires, il est nécessaire que les sciences humaines et sociales (SHS) contribuent plus directement à ces discussions. Un tel engagement devrait permettre d’exprimer les particularités disciplinaires et méthodologiques des SHS, dont certaines peuvent être très différentes des sciences appliquées et fondamentales. Cela permettrait également de s’assurer que la littérature sur la CRR ainsi que les politiques et les directives qui en découlent soient à la fois fondées sur des principes universellement généralisables, mais aussi appliquées avec nuance afin de refléter la diversité des pratiques disciplinaires. Dans ce chapitre, nous explorons trois grands domaines dans lesquels les SHS pourraient contribuer à façonner les discussions dans la littérature sur la CRR, tout en informant les chercheurs en SHS des meilleures pratiques en matière de CRR : l’autorat/paternité, la collaboration et l’autorégulation. (shrink)

Studies of conceptual and neural mapping in cognitive linguistics, while posing a fundamental challenge for religious belief, also suggest new ways of understanding how people conceptualize God and make theological inferences. This book, inspired by that research and attentive to the distinctive insights of Christian theology, elaborates an innovative explanation of God-talk, better able to credibly address confusion and controversies that trouble the church, academic theology, and broader culture. The first part analyzes both cognitive linguistics' challenge to standard theological depictions (...) of metaphorical, analogous, symbolic, and literal language, and the discipline's promise for providing a more satisfactory account. The second half examines six case studies to illustrate how clarifying the conceptual mapping in God-talk and theological inferences provides a powerful tool for advancing religious understanding. The illustrations include the hypothesis that religion is an epiphenomenon of evolution, the so-called new atheism, Black theology, and controversies between theologians and Church authorities. (shrink)