Cetaceans are likely candidates for social learning and culture. Meager experimental evidence suggests that some cetaceans possess the requisite cognitive skills for social learning. Equally sparse ethnographic data provide clues about possible outcomes of social learning. Although the available evidence is consistent with the notion of culture in cetaceans, caution is warranted due to the many gaps in the data.

Rendell and Whitehead have drawn attention to some striking cetacean behaviour patterns. However, the claims for are premature. Weak examples of cetacean social learning do not, in sum, provide strong evidence for culture. Other terms, such as social learning, vocal learning, imitation, and tradition may be applied in some cases without resorting to more complex and controversial terms.

One of the mammalian groups absent from the Finlay et al. study is cetaceans (dolphins, whales, and porpoises). Inclusion of cetaceans would be useful for assessing the generalizability of the authors' conclusions. Recent findings suggest dolphins may differ from the general pattern observed by Finlay et al. I encourage Finlay and her colleagues to include developmental neurobiological data on cetaceans, when available.

Sainsbury argues that the nineteenth century case of Maurice v. Judd, in which the jury apparently ruled that whales are fish, presents a paradox whose ‘resolution will require carefully formulated metasemantic principles’ (2014: 5). I argue that Sainsbury misconstrues what is fundamentally at issue in the court room. The substantive disagreement (and so verdict) does not concern whether whales are fish but rather the intended meaning of the phrase ‘fish oil’ as employed in a statute authorizing the appointment of ‘fish (...) oil’ inspectors. So conceived, Maurice v. Judd contains no paradox. (shrink)

Studies on captive dolphins have shown that they are capable of social learning. However, ethnographic data are less conclusive and many examples given for social learning can be explained in other ways. Before we can claim that cetacean culture is unique we need more rigorous studies which are fortunately not as difficult as Rendell and Whitehead seem to think.

Rendall and Whitehead overstate the weak evidence for social learning in cetaceans as a group, including the current evidence for vocal learning in killer whales. Ethnographic techniques exist to test genetic explanations of killer whale calling behavior, and additional captive experiments are feasible. Without such tests, descriptions of learning could be considered pseudo-scientific, ad hoc auxiliary assumptions of an untested theory.

Assessments of cetacean behavior has been hampered by popular misconceptions and mythic imagery. Rendell and Whitehead argue persuasively for accepting the idea of cetacean culture. Approaches to however, must resist positivist approaches that reaffirm the observable. Culture is also comprised of when organisms choose to resist or avoid behavioral patterns.

Rendell and Whitehead adopt a weak definition of culture to allow low standards of evidence for marine mammals, but they do not adequately rule out genetic factors or individual versus social learning. They then use these low standards to argue that some whales have unique cultures only matched by humans. It would have been more helpful to specify data gaps and suggest critical tests.

The evidence of high cognitive abilities in cetaceans does not stand up to close scrutiny under the standards established by laboratory researchers. This is likely to lead to a sterile debate between laboratory and field researchers unless fresh ways of taking the debate forward are found. A few suggestions as to how to do this are proposed.

Demonstrating cetacean communicative cultures requires documenting vocal differences among conspecific groups that are socially learned and stable across generations. Evidence to date does not provide strong scientific support for culture in cetacean vocal systems. Further, functional analyses with playbacks are needed to determine whether observed group differences in vocalizations are meaningful to the animals themselves.

Twisting definitions of a concept to serve one's purposes is rarely a fruitful exercise and the demonstration of culture is, necessarily, a two-step procedure: (1) documenting a behavioral difference between populations, (2) demonstrating that this difference has spread through the group by means of social learning. This will avoid putting the cart before the horse.

Cetaceans show high cognitive abilities and strong social bonds. Their primary sensory modality to communicate and sense the environment is acoustics. Research on their echolocation and social vocalizations typically uses visual and tactile systems adapted from research on primates or birds. Such research would benefit from a purely acoustic communication system to better match their natural capabilities. We argue that a full duplex system, in which signals can flow in both directions simultaneously is essential for communication research. We designed (...) and implemented a full duplex system to acoustically interact with cetaceans in the wild, featuring digital echo-suppression. We pilot tested the system in Arctic Norway and achieved an echo suppression of 18 dB. We discuss the limiting factors and how to improve the echo suppression further. The system enabled vocal interaction with the underwater acoustic scene by allowing experimenters to listen while producing sounds. We describe our motivations, then present our pilot deployment and give examples of initial explorative attempts to vocally interact with wild orcas and humpback whales. (shrink)

The frame/content theory of speech production is restricted to output mechanisms in the target article; we suggest that these ideas might best be viewed in the context of language production proceeding as a coordinated dynamical whole. The role of the medial premotor system in generating frames matches the important role it may play in the internally dependent timing of motor acts. The proposed coevolution of cortical architectonics and language production mechanisms suggests a significant divergence between primate and cetacean species corresponding (...) to major differences in areal differentiation trends in cerebral cortex. (shrink)

Three main ethical issues involved in the management of whales and small cetaceans are examined: ethical values concerning extinction and their implications for consumptive management regimes, the humaneness of current and feasible future harvesting techniques, and the ethical propriety of killing cetaceans for various uses. I argue that objections to human-caused extinction are primarily ethical, and that the ethical discussion must be expanded to include greater consideration of acceptable risks and problems associated with extinction due to human-caused genetic (...) selection. Whaling methods are objectively described including death times for whales. I show that the debate on humaneness is not about the facts of the hunt, but about the appropriate standard for judging whether or not a technique ishumane. Economic and ecological arguments which attempt to preempt the ethical questions are discussed and dismissed as specious. Arguments which attempt to distinguish ethically human relations with cetaceans from relations with other wildlife species are reviewed critically. (shrink)

Social learning and imitation is central to culture in cetaceans. The training technology used with cetaceans facilitates reinforcing imitation of one dolphin's behavior by another; the same technology, now widely used by pet owners, can lead to imitative learning in such unlikely species as dogs and horses. A capacity for imitation, and thus for cultural learning, may exist in many species.

Three main ethical issues involved in the management of whales and small cetaceans are examined: ethical values concerning extinction and their implications for consumptive management regimes, the humaneness of current and feasible future harvesting techniques, and the ethical propriety of killing cetaceans for various uses. I argue that objections to human-caused extinction are primarily ethical, and that the ethical discussion must be expanded to include greater consideration of acceptable risks and problems associated with extinction due to human-caused genetic (...) selection. Whaling methods are objectively described including death times for whales. I show that the debate on humaneness is not about the facts of the hunt, but about the appropriate standard for judging whether or not a technique ishumane. Economic and ecological arguments which attempt to preempt the ethical questions are discussed and dismissed as specious. Arguments which attempt to distinguish ethically human relations with cetaceans from relations with other wildlife species are reviewed critically. (shrink)

Vocal imitation does not imply an ability to imitate nonvocal motor patterns. Exponential growth in frequency of a behaviour in a population does not imply diffusion by social learning. Distinguishing analogues from homologues of human culture will avoid confusion in discussion of evolution of culture. Original sources do not demonstrate social learning, imitation, or teaching of intentional beaching or lobtail feeding in cetaceans.

We agree with Rendell and Whitehead that cetaceans acquire knowledge from caretakers and peers, and that a clear understanding of this process can provide insight into the evolution of mammalian cognition. The passive observational methods they advocate, however, are inadequate for determining what cetaceans know. Only by experimentally investigating the cognition of cetaceans can we hope to understand what they learn through social interactions.

Recent evidence suggests imitation is more developed in some cetaceans than the authors imply. Apart from apes, only dolphins have so far shown a grasp of what it is to imitate; moreover dolphins ape humans more clearly than do apes. Why have such abilities not been associated with the kind of progressive cultural complexity characteristic of humans?

Human hyperculture appears to have been produced by the amplification of the kind of normal culture shared by cetaceans and other animals and presumably by our ancestors. Is there any possibility that cetaceans could be subject to these amplifying processes, which may include: sexual selection; within-group moral behavior; culling of low- cultural-capacity individuals through predation or self-predation; and reciprocal positive feedback between culture and the capacity for culture.

Open water encounters of swimming and wading humans with wild cetaceans have increased worldwide. Behaviors being self-initiated by cetaceans during encounters and addressed towards humans still have received little study and their structure and function mostly remain unclear. This study reviews the scientific literature describing such behaviors. Unhabituated, habituated, lone and sociable and food-provisioned cetaceans from 10 odontocete and one mysticeti species were reported to show altogether 53 different behaviors which were affi liative, aggressive/threatening and sexual in (...) nature. Behaviors are listed in an ethogram. Due to varying research designs, observational biases cannot be excluded and comparability of results is sometimes hindered. Aggressive/threatening behaviors were reported mainly for food-provisioned and lone and sociable dolphins and these might be responses to inappropriate human behaviors. Sexual behaviors were only described for lone and sociable dolphins. Keywords: human–dolphin interactions; ethogram; swim-with-dolphin programs; whale watching. (shrink)

Open water encounters of swimming and wading humans with wild cetaceans have increased worldwide. Behaviors being self-initiated by cetaceans during encounters and addressed towards humans still have received little study and their structure and function mostly remain unclear. This study reviews the scientific literature describing such behaviors. Unhabituated, habituated, lone and sociable and food-provisioned cetaceans from 10 odontocete and one mysticete species were reported to show altogether 53 different behaviors which were affiliative, aggressive/threatening and sexual in nature. (...) Behaviors are listed in an ethogram. Due to varying research designs, observational biases cannot be excluded and comparability of results is sometimes hindered. Aggressive/threatening behaviors were reported mainly for food-provisioned and lone and sociable dolphins and these might be responses to inappropriate human behaviors. Sexual behaviors were only described for lone and sociable dolphins. (shrink)

Herman Melville’s Moby Dick (1851) may have set the lengthy standard for books treating whales, but D. Graham Burnett has more than matched that standard with his hefty, almost eight-hundred page tome, The Sounding of the Whale. The requisite explanatory subtitle specifies the author’s intent to write the history of what he refers to as “whale science” spanning the twentieth century. The book divides rather naturally into three complementary sections. The opening two chapters discuss early conservation efforts aimed at managing (...) the whale industry. Next, two more chapters investigate the formation of the International Whaling Commission (IWC). A final chapter argues that dolphin research in the 1960s and 1970s led to the strident environmental concerns of the late twentieth century, including the drive to “save the whale” (the five chapters are bracketed by a lengthy introduction and conclusion).The most compelling features of Burnett’s book are delivered in the first four chapters. As .. (shrink)

Studies of animal culture have not normally included a consideration of cetaceans. However, with several long-term field studies now maturing, this situation should change. Animal culture is generally studied by either investigating transmission mechanisms experimentally, or observing patterns of behavioural variation in wild populations that cannot be explained by either genetic or environmental factors. Taking this second, ethnographic, approach, there is good evidence for cultural transmission in several cetacean species. However, only the bottlenose dolphin (Tursiops) has been shown experimentally (...) to possess sophisticated social learning abilities, including vocal and motor imitation; other species have not been studied. There is observational evidence for imitation and teaching in killer whales. For cetaceans and other large, wide-ranging animals, excessive reliance on experimental data for evidence of culture is not productive; we favour the ethnographic approach. The complex and stable vocal and behavioural cultures of sympatric groups of killer whales (Orcinus orca) appear to have no parallel outside humans, and represent an independent evolution of cultural faculties. The wide movements of cetaceans, the greater variability of the marine environment over large temporal scales relative to that on land, and the stable matrilineal social groups of some species are potentially important factors in the evolution of cetacean culture. There have been suggestions of gene-culture coevolution in cetaceans, and culture may be implicated in some unusual behavioural and life-history traits of whales and dolphins. We hope to stimulate discussion and research on culture in these animals. (shrink)

This article focuses on practical, ethical and political issues that arise in the context of cetacean conservation. Our point of departure is the controversy surrounding plans to assist J50, an ailing member of the southern resident orca population, during the summer of 2018. A brief history of cetacean captivity provides context for the current backlash against captivity. We then argue that, in many cases, interventions aimed at capture, rehabilitation and release are practically feasible and that such interventions are ethically justifiable. (...) Moreover, the political context highlights the importance of engaging a broad range of stakeholders in conservation decision making. (shrink)

Macphail’s comparative approach to intelligence focused on associative processes, an orientation inconsistent with more multifaceted lay and scientific understandings of the term. His ultimate emphasis on associative processes indicated few differences in intelligence among vertebrates. We explore options more attuned to common definitions by considering intelligence in terms of richness of representations of the world, the interconnectivity of those representations, the ability to flexibly change those connections, knowledge, and individual differences. We focus on marine mammals, represented by the amphibious pinnipeds (...) and the aquatic cetaceans and sirenians, as animals that transitioned from a terrestrial existence to an aquatic one, experiencing major changes in ecological pressures. They adapted with morphological transformations related to streamlining the body, physiological changes in respiration and thermoregulation, and sensory/perceptual changes, including echolocation capabilities and diminished olfaction in many cetaceans, both in-air and underwater visual focus, and enhanced senses of touch in pinnipeds and sirenians. Having a terrestrial foundation on which aquatic capacities were overlaid likely affected their cognitive abilities. Vocal and behavioral observational learning capabilities in the wild and in laboratory experiments suggest versatility in group coordination. Empirical reports on aspects of intelligent behavior like problem-solving, spatial learning, and concept learning by various species of cetaceans and pinnipeds, suggest rich cognitive abilities. The high energy demands of the brain suggest brain-intelligence relationships might be fruitful areas for the study when specific hypotheses are considered, e.g., brain mapping indicates hypertrophy of specific sensory areas in marine mammals. Modern neuroimaging techniques provide ways to study neural connectivity, and the patterns of connections between sensory, motor, and other cortical regions provide a biological framework for exploring how animals represent and flexibly use information in navigating and learning about their environment. At this stage of marine mammal research, it would still be prudent to follow Macphail’s caution that it is premature to make strong comparative statements without more empirical evidence, but an approach that includes learning more about how animals flexibly link information across multiple representations could be a productive way of comparing species by allowing them to use their specific strengths within comparative tasks. (shrink)

Why do humpback whales sing? This paper considers the hypothesis that humpback whales may use song for long range sonar. Given the vocal and social behavior of humpback whales, in several cases it is not apparent how they monitor the movements of distant whales or prey concentrations. Unless distant animals produce sounds, humpback whales are unlikely to be aware of their presence or actions. Some field observations are strongly suggestive of the use of song as sonar. Humpback whales sometimes stop (...) singing and then rapidly approach distant whales in cases where sound production by those whales is not apparent, and singers sometimes alternately sing and swim while attempting to intercept another whale that is swimming evasively. In the evolutionary development of modern cetaceans, perceptual mechanisms have shifted from reliance on visual scanning to the active generation and monitoring of echoes. It is hypothesized that as the size and distance of relevant events increased, humpback whales developed adaptive specializations for long-distance echolocation. Differences between use of songs by humpback whales and use of sonar by other echolocating species are discussed, as are similarities between bat echolocation and singing by humpback whales. Singing humpback whales are known to emit sounds intense enough to generate echoes at long ranges, and to flexibly control the timing and qualities of produced sounds. The major problem for the hypothesis is the lack of recordings of echoes from other whales arriving at singers immediately before they initiate actions related to those whales. An earlier model of echoic processing by singing humpback whales is here revised to incorporate recent discoveries. According to the revised model, both direct echoes from targets and modulations in song-generated reverberation can provide singers with information that can help them make decisions about future actions related to mating, traveling, and foraging. The model identifies acoustic and structural features produced by singing humpback whales that may facilitate a singer’s ability to interpret changes in echoic scenes and suggests that interactive signal coordination by singing whales may help them to avoid mutual interference. Specific, testable predictions of the model are presented. (shrink)

Long-term studies of whales, dolphins, and porpoises (the cetaceans) in nature abruptly began about 50 yr ago, preceded by several decades of terrestrial animal studies, often of charismatic large mammals. Fifty years ago, intensive whaling was still occurring, and arguments against whaling largely centered around impending extinctions due to over-hunting, not the idea that cetaceans should not be killed due to natural or inherent goodness. In the 1970s, several USA and other government agencies promulgated rules to help control (...) pollution and other insults to nature, often effective in the short term but not in stopping an overall decline in the health of nature. While there appeared a general societal awakening towards greater appreciation of nature and intrinsic animal rights, researchers largely stayed focused on their research, with little attention to using knowledge to increase ecosystem and animal health. Attitudes of direct scientific involvement in calling for environmental action have changed, as it is becoming increasingly (but not universally) appreciated that researchers who know the problems are well-suited to alert governments, industry, and society to them, and loudly call for action. I have no good answers for how to accomplish large-scale rapid reversals of environmental declines. One laudable action is to be an active vocal part of appropriate web-based conservation advocacy groups. Involving the young of all genders and races for a groundswell of support is likely most effective in generating a new world view of so much respect for nature that we radically alter our present ways of subjugating and diminishing it in the name of supposed human progress. Above all, we scientists must no longer dither with opinions on environmental problems and urgent needs for action; we must proclaim them intelligently, forcefully, and as broadly as possible. (shrink)

Cetacean cultural transmission is associated with lengthened postmenopausal life histories and relatively stable matrilineal social structures. Although Homo erectus was not marine adapted, broadly comparable selection pressures, life history profiles, and social structures can be inferred.

While cetaceans clearly show social learning in a wide variety of contexts, to label this as hides more than it reveals: we need a taxonomy of culture to tease apart the differences rather than hiding them in a catch-all category.

Singing humpback whales (Megaptera noavaengliae) collectively and progressively change the sounds and patterns they produce within their songs throughout their lives. The dynamic modifications that humpback whales make to their songs are often cited as an impressive example of cultural transmission through vocal learning in a non-human. Some elements of song change challenge this interpretation, however, including: (1) singers often incrementally and progressively morph phrases within and across songs as time passes, with trajectories of change being comparable across multiple time (...) scales; (2) acoustically isolated subpopulations singing similar songs morph the acoustic properties of songs in similar ways; and (3) complex sound patterns, including phrases, themes, and whole songs, recur across years and populations. These properties of song dynamics suggest that singing humpback whales may be modulating song features in response to local conditions and genetic predispositions rather than socially learning novel sound patterns by copying other singers. Experimental and observational tests of key predictions of these alternative hypotheses are critical to identifying how and why singing humpback whales constantly change their songs. (shrink)

Empirical studies of the social lives of non-human primates, cetaceans, and other social animals have prompted scientists and philosophers to debate the question of whether morality and moral cognition exists in non-human animals. Some researchers have argued that morality does exist in several animal species, others that these species may possess various evolutionary building blocks or precursors to morality, but not quite the genuine article, while some have argued that nothing remotely resembling morality can be found in any non-human (...) species. However, these different positions on animal morality generally appear to be motivated more by different conceptions of how the term “morality” is to be defined than by empirical disagreements about animal social behaviour and psychology. After delving deeper into the goals and methodologies of various of the protagonists, I argue that, despite appearances, there are actually two importantly distinct debates over animal morality going on, corresponding to two quite different ways of thinking about what it is to define “morality”, “moral cognition”, and associated notions. Several apparent skirmishes in the literature are thus cases of researchers simply talking past each other. I then focus on what I take to be the core debate over animal morality, which is concerned with understanding the nature and phylogenetic distribution of morality conceived as a psychological natural kind. I argue that this debate is in fact largely terminological and non-substantive. Finally, I reflect on how this core debate might best be re-framed. (shrink)

While the evidence that cetaceans exhibit behaviours that are every bit as cultural as those recognised in chimpanzees is unequivocal, I argue that it is unlikely that either taxon has the social cognitive mechanisms required to underpin the more advanced forms of culture characteristic of humans (namely those that depend on shared meaning).

The types of cetacean cultural behavior patterns described (primarily food-related and communication-related) reflect a very different research focus than that found in primatology, where dietary variation and food processing is emphasized and other potentially patterns have (until recently) been relatively neglected. The lack of behavioral research in all but a few cetacean species is also notable, as it mirrors a bias in primatology towards only a few genera.

Traditionally, discussions of moral participation – and in particular moral agency – have focused on fully formed human actors. There has been some interest in the development of morality in humans, as well as interest in cultural differences when it comes to moral practices, commitments, and actions. However, until relatively recently, there has been little focus on the possibility that nonhuman animals have any role to play in morality, save being the objects of moral concern. Moreover, when nonhuman cases are (...) considered as evidence of moral agency or subjecthood, there has been an anthropocentric tendency to focus on those behaviors that inform our attributions of moral agency to humans. For example, some argue that the ability to evaluate the principles upon which a moral norm is grounded is required for full moral agency. Certainly, if a moral agent must understand what makes an action right or wrong, then most nonhuman animals would not qualify (and perhaps some humans too). However, if we are to understand the evolution of moral psychology and moral practice, we need to turn our attention to the foundations of full moral agency. We must first pay attention to the more broadly normative practices of other animals. Here, we begin that project by considering evidence that great apes and cetaceans participate in normative practices. (shrink)

An expanding body of research aims to identify culture in cetaceans, often positing killer whales as an exemplar species. To this end, gene-culture coevolutionary theory provides a conceptual language with which whales are discussed in raciological terms. It renders killer whale ecotypes as discrete cultures that are intrinsically xenophobic and evolutionarily divergent. Such research on whale culture intends to substantiate theories of divergent natural selection between human cultures as well. This effort furthers the essentialism, simultaneously biological and cultural, that (...) has long impelled colonial technoscientific projects of racial typologization. The exchange between the raciologies of humans and killer whales is facilitated by the infrahumanizing frameworks of gene-culture coevolutionary theory that locate whale populations alongside indigenous peoples on a spectrum of cultural simplicity and complexity. At this convergence of the animal and the human, gene-culture coevolutionary theory posits indigenous peoples and killer whales as evidence for social Darwinist theories that dehistoricize and naturalize intercultural conflict and ethnicization. The extension of raciology beyond the human species signals an urgent need to decolonize the biological sciences. (shrink)

Conducting marine mammal research can raise several important ethical issues. For example, the continuation of whaling for commercial purposes despite the international moratorium provides opportunities for scientists to obtain data and tissue samples. In 2021 we analysed 35 peer-reviewed papers reporting research based on collaborations with Icelandic whalers. Results highlighted little consideration or understanding of the legal and ethical issues associated with the deliberate killing of whales amongst those researchers, funding bodies, universities and journals involved. Ethical statements were rarely provided. (...) Those that were written were incomplete. Whilst research using whaling data may seem acceptable to some, it often becomes hard to justify when subject to scrutiny by the media and the public. Thus, there is a particular danger of reputational harm for early career researchers who may become unwittingly involved in such activities. Here we also consider the broader variety of ethical issues raised by non-lethal research (both historical and recent) on marine mammals including tagging and biopsy. We discuss instances where study animals were harmed or even killed and where the public mistook tags for harpoons. Without clear guidelines, reviewers and journal editors are put in an impossible position when considering whether to reject papers on ethical grounds. We propose that for such studies, universities, funders, journals, and permit issuers must require ethical assessments and that journals more effectively implement their existing policies on publishing ethical statements. The professional marine mammal societies need to work together to produce modern ethical guidance. Such guidance should require transparency in the provenance of data and samples while including advice on law, welfare issues, involvement of local scientists, and offshoring. Furthermore, it should require appraisal of and justification for the absolute necessity of invasive procedures. As is already the case in biomedical disciplines, ethical statements should be required in marine mammal science. (shrink)

It has become increasingly clear that social learning and culture occur much more broadly, and in a wider variety of animal communities, than initially believed. Recent research has expanded the list to include insects, fishes, elephants, and cetaceans. Such diversity allows scientists to expand the scope of potential research questions, which can help form a more complete understanding of animal culture than any single species can provide on its own. It is crucial to understand how culture and social learning (...) present in different communities, as well as what influences community structure and culture may have on one another, so that the results across these different studies may most effectively inform one another. This review presents an overview of social learning in species across a spectrum of community structures, providing the necessary infrastructure to allow a comparison of studies that will help move the field of animal culture forward. (shrink)

In this essay I explore the resources Thomas Aquinas provides for enquiries concerning the psychological abilities of nonhuman animals. I first look to Aquinas’s account of divine, angelic, human, and nonhuman animal naming, to help us articulate the contours of a ‘critical anthropocentrism’ that aims to steer clear of the mistakes of a na¨ıve anthropocentrism and misconceived avowals to entirely eschew anthropocentrism. I then address the need for our critical anthropocentrism both to reject the mental-physical dichotomy endorsed by ‘folk psychology’ (...) and to articulate a more adequate ‘commonsense psychology’ that acknowledges most embodied animal behavior is observable psychological behavior. Next, I argue that we can develop Aquinas’s doctrine of estimation and conation to formulate an account of nonhuman animal action that more adequately characterizes the purposeful behaviors of nonhuman animals. To do so, we first need to recognize a wider range of nonhuman animal behaviors that are captured by Aquinas’s ‘estimative sense’, and that all of these behaviors are specified by a finite variety of particular goods confined to the animals’ environmental niches. But we also need to supplement Aquinas’s account of human and nonhuman animal agency by exploring the ontogeny and ecology of how humans and other animals become attuned to affordances within these different environmental niches. I argue that we should look to Aquinas’s account of nonhuman animal capacities in ST I-II 6-17 for subtle insights that can expand our understanding of how nonhuman animals engage in purposeful behavior by exercising analogous nonrational and imperfectly voluntary forms of intention, deliberation, choice, execution, and enjoyment. I conclude with an outline for how future enquiry can seek to explain the nonrational purposeful problem-solving competencies of chimps, canines, corvids, cetaceans, cephalopods, and other nonhuman animal species. (shrink)

We argue that at least some corvids morally ought to be granted a right to bodily liberty in the US legal system and relevantly similar systems. This right would grant immunity to frivolous captivity and extermination. Implementing this right will require new legislation or the expansion of existing legislation including the elimination of various "pest" clauses. This paper proceeds in three parts. First, we survey accounts of the moral grounds of legal rights. Second, to establish an overlapping consensus supporting corvid (...) bodily liberty rights, we survey the empirical literature on corvid cognition. Third, we illustrate what a corvid right to bodily liberty might look like, by looking to recent developments in animal law, as well as previous advocacy on behalf of primates and cetaceans. (shrink)

Rendell and Whitehead argue persuasively that individual foraging specializations, if socially learned, are examples of cetacean culture. However, they discount ecological variation experienced by individuals within a population as a factor in such behavior. I suggest that ecological variation may play an important role in individual foraging specializations and describe several ecological parameters that may help us understand the high frequency of this interesting behavior in the marine habitat.

We disagree with two of Rendell and Whitehead's assertions. Culture may be an ancestral characteristic of terrestrial cetacean ancestors; not derived via marine variability, modern cetacean mobility, or any living cetacean social structure. Furthermore, evidence for vocal behavior as culture, social stability, and cognitive ability, is richer in birds than Rendell and Whitehead portray and comparable to that of cetaceans and primates.