This new edition of Aristotle s De interpretatione provides an improved text compared to the 1949 Oxford edition, based upon an evaluation of the seven earliest surviving medieval manuscripts as well as many translations and commentaries from late antiquity. A text-critical apparatus provides information about the different readings.".

This volume, including sixteen contributions, analyses ancient and medieval theories of intentionality in various contexts: perception, imagination, and intellectual thinking. It sheds new light on classical theories and examines neglected sources, both Greek and Latin.

The paper attempts to show that Kant's criticism of eudaemonism does not affect Plato's moral theory, because the kind of eudaemonism which Plato embraces is different from that rejected by Kant. Whereas the target of Kant's criticism is the view that virtuous actions are an instrumental means to becoming happy, Plato regards virtue as a constitutive part of happiness and is, thus, committed to what Gregory Vlastos has called a "noninstrumentalist form of eudaemonism".

Both the title of this treatise and its traditional placement as the second of Aristotle's logical writings are highly misleading. What, on the one hand, De Interpretatione deals with is not, as its title suggests, a theory of interpretation, but rather a theory of statement-making sentences of different sorts and the logical relations that obtain between them; and what, on the other hand, this theory aims at is not, as suggested by the place which De Interpretatione traditionally occupies in the (...) Organon between the Categories and the Prior Analytics, providing preliminaries to the study of syllogistic by analyzing statement-making sentences as possible parts of syllogisms, but rather underpinning the study of dialectical debates by examining such sentences as possible members of contradictory pairs. Among other things, De Interpretatione deals with symbols or signs, truth, bivalence, determinism, modal logic, and modal statements. (shrink)

The present article is devoted to the second part of chapter 10 of Aristotle’s De interpretatione (20 a 16-40), which mainly deals with the logical relations between statements whose predicate is finite (i. e., of the affirmative form “is P”) and statements whose predicate is infinite (i. e., of the negative form “is not-P”). I attempt to show that this part of the chapter contains both a section the text of which is corrupt (20 a 20-23) and a section which (...) is misplaced (20 a 37-40). In the former section the likely false reading of the manuscripts τῇ δὲ … ἡ ἀντι- κειμένη ὅτι … (“while from ‘…’ the opposite [statement follows] that …”) should be corrected into ἡ δὲ … τῇ ἀντικειμένῃ ὅτι … (“while ‘…’ [follows] from the opposite [statement] that …”), and the latter section should be placed immediately after the former, with which it is intimately connected. (shrink)

Journal Name: Philologus Issue: Ahead of print.

The passage 18a34-⁠b5 of Aristotle’s famous sea-battle chapter has often been misunderstood. My aim is to show, firstly, that Aristotle in this passage attempts to prove that the unrestricted validity of the Principle of Bivalence entails, in the case of singular statements, the validity of the Principle of Truth-value Distribution for the contradictory pairs they are members of. According to the latter principle either the affirmative member of a contradictory pair of statements must be true and the negative false or (...) vice versa. Secondly, I want to show what consequences the correct understanding of the passage in question has for the understanding of the introductory passage of the chapter (18a28-⁠33) and for the dispute over whether Aristotle exempts singular statements about contingent future events from the domain of the Principle of Bivalence. The thesis, advanced by some modern interpreters, that Aristotle refrains from doing so even though he exempts the contradictory pairs such statements are members of from the domain of the Principle of Truth-value Distribution will be rebutted as resulting from a fallacious line of reasoning. (shrink)

The numerous manuscript fragments which were rediscovered in Saint Catherine’s Monastery, Sinai, in 1975 include eleven parchment folios inscribed with parts of all but one of Aristotle’s logical writings. As C. Brockmann has shown, the Organon codex to which these folios belong is the exemplar from which in the Codex Parisinus gr. 1843 the Prior and the Posterior Analytics were copied. In the present article it is shown that, in the latter manuscript, the Sinai manuscript also served as exemplar for (...) a small part of Aristotle’s Peri hermeneias (De interpretatione) and for his Topics, and that, in two other manuscripts, namely in the Codex Escorialensis Φ. III. 10 and the Codex Monacensis 222, the Categories and the whole of Peri hermeneias were copied from it. (shrink)

C. W. A. Whitaker, Aristotle?s De Interpretatione. Contradiction and Dialectic. Oxford:Clarendon Press, 1996. x + 235 pp., £30. ISBN 0 19 823619 0 Ulrich Nortmann, Modale Syllogismen, mögliche Welten, Essentialismus. Eine Analyse der aristotelischen Modallogik (Perspektiven der Analytischen Philo-sophie/Perspectives in Analytical Philosophy, 9). Berlin and New York:Walter de Gruyter, 1996. x + 427 pp. DM 260.00 (for members of the Society for Analytical Philosophy DM 98.00). ISBN 3-11-014660-6.

ULRICH NORTMANN, Modale Syllogismen, mögliche Welten, Essentialismus. Eine Analyse der aristotelischen Modallogik (Perspektiven der Analytischen Philosophie/ Perspectives in Analytical Philosophy, vol. 9). Berlin and New York:Walter de Gruyter, 1996. x +427 pp. DM 260.00 (for members of the Society for Analytical Philosophy DM 98.00). ISBN 3-1 1-014660-6.

C. W. A. Whitaker, Aristotle’s De Interpretatione. Contradiction and Dialectic. Oxford:Clarendon Press, 1996. x + 235 pp., £30. ISBN 0 19 823619 0 Ulrich Nortmann, Modale Syllogismen, mögliche Welten, Essentialismus. Eine Analyse der aristotelischen Modallogik (Perspektiven der Analytischen Philo-sophie/perspectives in Analytical Philosophy, 9). Berlin and New York:Walter de Gruyter, 1996. x + 427 pp. DM 260.00 (for members of the Society for Analytical Philosophy DM 98.00). ISBN 3-11-014660-6.

Richard Swinburne is one of the most influential contemporary proponents of the analytical philosophy of religion. He is, above all, a traditional theist. However, his interests are very wide-ranging. He has written about nearly all central theological and philosophical issues such as epistemology, metaphysics, theory of mind and ethics. During the “Münstersche Vorlesungen 2007” students and faculty members of the Department of Philosophy at Münster University entered into a skilful and interesting discussion concerning most of Swinburne’s positions. This volume presents (...) their contributions as well as Swinburne's replies. (shrink)

Stress induction reduces people's ability to modify their instrumental choices following changes in the value of outcomes, but the mechanisms underpinning this effect have not been specified because previous studies have lacked crucial control conditions. To address this, the current study had participants learn two instrumental responses for food and water, respectively, before water was devalued by specific satiety. Choice between these two responses was then measured in extinction, reacquisition and Pavlovian to instrumental transfer tests. Concurrently during these tests, a (...) negative emotional appraisal group evaluated aversive images, whereas a control group evaluated neutral images, at the same time as choosing between the two instrumental responses. Negative emotional appraisal abolished the impact of water devaluation on instrumental choice in the extinction test, but did not affect instrumental choice in the reacquisition or PIT tests. These findings suggest that negative emotional appraisal selectively impaired participants’ ability to retrieve the expected value of outcomes required to make goal-directed instrumental choices in the extinction test, and that this effect was not due to task disengagement, nullification of the devaluation treatment or impaired knowledge of response-outcome relationships. (shrink)

In dem von Aristoteles zur Bezeichnung dessen, was wir einen Aussage- oder Behauptungssatz nennen, gewählten Ausdruck logos apophantikos hat das Wort logos eine Bedeutung, die weiter ist als die Bedeutung des deutschen Wortes ›Satz‹. Der Definition zufolge, die Aristoteles in De interpretatione 4 aufstellt, ist ein logos nämlich »eine etwas bedeutende stimmliche Äußerung, von deren Teilen einer eigenständig etwas bedeutet, und zwar als ein Ausdruck, der etwas sagt, nicht als einer, der etwas aussagt «. Unter den in dieser Weise definierten (...) Begriff des logos fallen außer Sätzen einerseits auch Wortgruppen von der Art des Ausdrucks »schönes Pferd« oder des den Begriff des Menschen definierenden Ausdrucks »zweifüßiges Land-Lebewesen« und andererseits auch ganze Texte, wie z. B. die Ilias. (shrink)

The paper deals with the question of how the claim that nothing impossible follows from what is possible, which serves as the second premise of Diodorus' Master Argument, should be properly understood. In the first part I attempt to show that the interpretation of the thesis in the form of the following implication as suggested by R. Gaskin is not tenable: "If A and non-A follows from {A} plus the set Sigma, then not possible A follows from Sigma alone" In (...) the second part I discuss a reconstruction of the Master Argument which adopts A. N. Prior's interpretation of the said thesis in form of the modal-logical theorem "If it is necessary that , then " but modifies Prior's suggested reconstruction in a way which should make it more plausible. (shrink)

Gegenüber der verbreiteten Auffassung, daß unter einem Sachverhalt das zu verstehen ist, was Frege einen Gedanken nennt, wird die Auffassung verteidigt, daß der in einem Satz ausgesagte Sachverhalt als eine extensionale Größe von dem in dem Satz ausgedrückten Gedanken als einer intensionalen Größe zu unterscheiden ist, wobei diese Unterscheidung auf folgenden Identitätskriterien beruht: Die in zwei Sätzen ausgesagten Sachverhalte sind genau dann identisch, wenn die beiden Sätze unter denselben Bedingungen wahr sind. Die in zwei Sätzen ausgedrückten Gedanken (oder Propositionen) hingegen (...) sind genau dann identisch, wenn demjenigen, der die beiden Sätze versteht, die Bedingungen ihrer Wahrheit in derselben Weise gegeben sind. Diese Auffassung erlaubt es, anstelle des Wahrheitswertes, den ein Satz hat, den Sachverhalt, dessen Bestehen oder Nicht-Bestehen die Wahrheit bzw. Falschheit des Satzes bedingt, als das zu betrachten, was Frege zur Unterscheidung vom Sinn des Satzes dessen Bedeutung nennt. (shrink)

Gegenüber der verbreiteten Auffassung, daß unter einem Sachverhalt das zu verstehen ist, was Frege einen Gedanken nennt, wird die Auffassung verteidigt, daß der in einem Satz ausgesagte Sachverhalt als eine extensionale Größe von dem in dem Satz ausgedrückten Gedanken als einer intensionalen Größe zu unterscheiden ist, wobei diese Unterscheidung auf folgenden Identitätskriterien beruht: Die in zwei Sätzen ausgesagten Sachverhalte sind genau dann identisch, wenn die beiden Sätze unter denselben Bedingungen wahr sind. Die in zwei Sätzen ausgedrückten Gedanken (oder Propositionen) hingegen (...) sind genau dann identisch, wenn demjenigen, der die beiden Sätze versteht, die Bedingungen ihrer Wahrheit in derselben Weise gegeben sind. Diese Auffassung erlaubt es, anstelle des Wahrheitswertes, den ein Satz hat, den Sachverhalt, dessen Bestehen oder Nicht-Bestehen die Wahrheit bzw. Falschheit des Satzes bedingt, als das zu betrachten, was Frege zur Unterscheidung vom Sinn des Satzes dessen Bedeutung nennt. (shrink)

It is the aim of the present article to show that, on the one hand, John L. Mackie's concept of an INUS condition lends itself to a modern reconstruction of Aristotle's theory of accidental causation which brings the indeterministic character of this theory to the fore, and that, on the other hand, in the light of this theory the concept of an INUS condition can be enriched by distinguishing between synchronic INUS conditions and diachronic ones. This distinction, which Mackie fails (...) to make, proves to coincide with the distinction between two different types of accidental causes recognized by Aristotle. German Im vorliegenden Aufsatz wird zu zeigen versucht, daß man einerseits mit Hilfe des von John L. Mackie eingeführten Begriffs der INUS-Bedingung die Aristotelische Theorie der akziden tellen Verursachung in einer Weise rekonstruieren kann, die deutlich den indeterministischen Charakter dieser Theorie erkennen läßt, und daß man andererseits im Lichte dieser Theorie dem Begriff der INUSBedingung einen differenzierteren Inhalt geben kann, indem man zwischen synchronen und diachronen INUS-Bedingungen unterscheidet. Diese Unterscheidung, die man bei Mackie vermißt, erweist sich als deckungsgleich mit der Unterscheidung zwischen zwei verschiedenen Arten akziden teller Ursachen, die sich bei Aristoteles findet. (shrink)

Die von Aristoteles so genannte praktische Wahrheit besteht nach ihm in der Übereinstimmung des praktischen Verstandes mit dem richtigen Streben, d. h. darin, daß die Mittel, die jemand nach dem Urteil seines praktischen Verstandes zur Erreichung eines bestimmten Zieles wählen soll, die richtigen Mittel zur Erreichung des richtigen Zieles sind. Da man nicht nur das, was ein praktisches Urteil demjenigen, der es sich bildet, zu tun vorschreibt, sondern auch das, was jemand, der sich ein theoretisches Urteil bildet, damit tut, als (...) eine Handlung betrachten kann, läßt sich die Art und Weise, in der Aristoteles den Begriff der praktischen Wahrheit bestimmt, für ein besseres Verständnis derjenigen Wahrheit fruchtbar machen, die einem wahren theoretischen Urteil zukommt. Man kann nämlich sagen, daß ein solches Urteil genau dann im theoretischen Sinne wahr ist, wenn das praktische Urteil, dem zufolge man es sich bilden soll, im praktischen Sinne wahr ist. Die Wahrheit einer Aussage, wie man ein theoretisches Urteil gewöhnlich nennt, besteht somit darin, daß die betreffende Aussage als ein Mittel, mit dem man das Ziel, die Wirklichkeit in einer bestimmten Hinsicht so zu beschreiben, wie sie ist, erreichen will, mit derjenigen Aussage übereinstimmt, mit der man dieses Ziel tatsächlich erreicht. (shrink)

As the author of the first book on general hermeneutics Johann Conrad Dannhauer occupies a place in the pantheon of philosophy. The Lutheran theologian wo...

In this paper I shall attempt to show that the difference which Boethius has in mind when distinguishing between conditional and simple necessity in the fifth book of Philosophiae Consolatio is not, as already Thomas Aquinas presumed, the difference between a necessitas consequentiae and the corresponding necessitas consequentis, but rather the difference between the necessity of a given state of affairs which is necessary in the sense that at the moment of its existence its present existence is unchangeable, and the (...) necessity of a given state of affairs which is necessary in the sense that even prior to the moment of its existence its future existence is unavoidable. (shrink)

In the present article, proposed corrections to two passages of Cicero’s treatise De fato are examined. It is shown that, on the one hand, a widely accepted correction for §27 that replaces the well attested reading vera fuerunt instantia... vera erunt instantia with vera fuerit instantia... vera erit instantia is unnecessary, and that, on the other hand, my recently suggested correction for §48, which replaces the obviously false reading Nam si atomis..., illud quoque... with Aut num, si atomis..., illud quoque...?, (...) is deficient and should be improved to Nam si atomis..., num illud quoque...? (shrink)

The section 18b16–⁠25 of the famous chapter 9 of Aristotle’s De interpretatione presents two objections against the assumption that both members of a contradictory pair of future singular statements might be false. This section is unlikely to be genuine, because (1) the first objection is either directly begging the question or misusing a previous argument in a question-begging way, (2) the second objection includes irrelevant observations, and (3) the rebuttal of the said assumption interrupts the intimate connection between the immediately (...) preceding and following sections. (shrink)