John von Neumann (1903-1957) was undoubtedly one of the scientific geniuses of the 20th century. The main fields to which he contributed include various disciplines of pure and applied mathematics, mathematical and theoretical physics, logic, theoretical computer science, and computer architecture. Von Neumann was also actively involved in politics and science management and he had a major impact on US government decisions during, and especially after, the Second World War. There exist several popular books on his personality and various (...) collections focusing on his achievements in mathematics, computer science, and economy. Strangely enough, to date no detailed appraisal of his seminal contributions to the mathematical foundations of quantum physics has appeared. Von Neumann's theory of measurement and his critique of hidden variables became the touchstone of most debates in the foundations of quantum mechanics. Today, his name also figures most prominently in the mathematically rigorous branches of contemporary quantum mechanics of large systems and quantum field theory. And finally - as one of his last lectures, published in this volume for the first time, shows - he considered the relation of quantum logic and quantum mechanical probability as his most important problem for the second half of the twentieth century. The present volume embraces both historical and systematic analyses of his methodology of mathematical physics, and of the various aspects of his work in the foundations of quantum physics, such as theory of measurement, quantum logic, and quantum mechanical entropy. The volume is rounded off by previously unpublished letters and lectures documenting von Neumann's thinking about quantum theory after his 1932 Mathematical Foundations of Quantum Mechanics. The general part of the Yearbook contains papers emerging from the Institute's annual lecture series and reviews of important publications of philosophy of science and its history. (shrink)

Conventional wisdom holds that the von Neumann entropy corresponds to thermodynamic entropy, but Hemmo and Shenker (2006) have recently argued against this view by attacking von Neumann's (1955) argument. I argue that Hemmo and Shenker's arguments fail due to several misunderstandings: about statistical-mechanical and thermodynamic domains of applicability, about the nature of mixed states, and about the role of approximations in physics. As a result, their arguments fail in all cases: in the single-particle case, the finite particles case, and the (...) infinite particles case. (shrink)

Der Band enthält Beiträge von Juristen, Medizinern und Philosophen aus Australien, Estland, Polen, Rußland, Tschechien, den U.S.A. und Deutschland zu Themen der Ethik und Wissenschaftstheorie der Medizin. Die Mehrzahl der Beiträge sind von Nachwuchswissenschaftlern des College for Advanced Central European Studies an der Europa-Universität Viadrina erarbeitet worden. Sie wurden im Rahmen der Jahrestagung des Arbeitskreises für Ethik und Wissenschaftstheorie der Medizin in Ostmitteleuropa neben weiteren Beiträgen, die hier zum Abdruck kommen, zur Diskussion gestellt. Der Arbeitskreis beruht auf einer Kooperationsvereinbarung des (...) Interdisziplinären Zentrums für Ethik der Europa-Universität Viadrina Frankfurt (Oder) und des Instituts für Geschichte und Ethik der Medizin der Universität Halle-Wittenberg. Die Beiträge befassen sich u. a. mit der Gesundheitsreform in Polen, mit ethischen und rechtlichen Problemen bei der künstlichen Befruchtung, der Abtreibung, medizinischen Experimenten an Menschen, der Gentechnik, der Patientenautonomie, Außenseitermethoden in der Medizin, dem Patiententestament, dem Todesbegriff, Drogenkonsum, der Sterbehilfe und der Gentechnik. (shrink)

According to a popular narrative, in 1932 von Neumann introduced a theorem that intended to be a proof of the impossibility of hidden variables in quantum mechanics. However, the narrative goes, Bell later spotted a flaw that allegedly shows its irrelevance. Bell’s widely accepted criticism has been challenged by Bub and Dieks: they claim that the proof shows that viable hidden variables theories cannot be theories in Hilbert space. Bub’s and Dieks’ reassessment has been in turn challenged by Mermin and (...) Schack. Hereby I critically assess their reply, with the aim of bringing further clarification concerning the meaning, scope and relevance of von Neumann’s theorem. I show that despite Mermin and Schack’s response, Bub’s and Dieks’ reassessment is quite correct, and that this reading gets strongly reinforced when we carefully consider the connection between von Neumann’s proof and Gleason’s theorem. (shrink)

Von Neumann argued by means of a thought experiment involving measurements of spin observables that the quantum mechanical quantity is conceptually equivalent to thermodynamic entropy. We analyze Von Neumann's thought experiment and show that his argument fails. Over the past few years there has been a dispute in the literature regarding the Von Neumann entropy. It turns out that each contribution to this dispute addressed a different special case. In this paper we generalize the discussion and examine the full matrix (...) of possibilities that are relevant for the evaluation and understanding of Von Neumann’s argument. (shrink)

This is the classic work upon which modern-day game theory is based. What began as a modest proposal that a mathematician and an economist write a short paper together blossomed, when Princeton University Press published Theory of Games and Economic Behavior. In it, John von Neumann and Oskar Morgenstern conceived a groundbreaking mathematical theory of economic and social organization, based on a theory of games of strategy. Not only would this revolutionize economics, but the entirely new field of scientific inquiry (...) it yielded--game theory--has since been widely used to analyze a host of real-world phenomena from arms races to optimal policy choices of presidential candidates, from vaccination policy to major league baseball salary negotiations. And it is today established throughout both the social sciences and a wide range of other sciences. (shrink)

John von Neumann's proof that quantum mechanics is logically incompatible with hidden varibales has been the object of extensive study both by physicists and by historians. The latter have concentrated mainly on the way the proof was interpreted, accepted and rejected between 1932, when it was published, and 1966, when J.S. Bell published the first explicit identification of the mistake it involved. What is proposed in this paper is an investigation into the origins of the proof rather than the aftermath. (...) In the first section, a brief overview of the his personal life and his proof is given to set the scene. There follows a discussion on the merits of using here the historical method employed elsewhere by Andrew Warwick. It will be argued that a study of the origins of von Neumann's proof shows how there is an interaction between the following factors: the broad issues within a specific culture, the learning process of the theoretical physicist concerned, and the conceptual techniques available. In our case, the ‘conceptual technology’ employed by von Neumann is identified as the method of axiomatisation. (shrink)

According to what has become a standard history of quantum mechanics, von Neumann in 1932 succeeded in convincing the physics community that he had proved that hidden variables were impossible as a matter of principle. Subsequently, leading proponents of the Copenhagen interpretation emphatically confirmed that von Neumann's proof showed the completeness of quantum mechanics. Then, the story continues, Bell in 1966 finally exposed the proof as seriously and obviously wrong; this rehabilitated hidden variables and made serious foundational research possible. It (...) is often added in recent accounts that von Neumann's error had been spotted almost immediately by Grete Hermann, but that her discovery was of no effect due to the dominant Copenhagen Zeitgeist. We shall attempt to tell a more balanced story. Most importantly, von Neumann did not claim to have shown the impossibility of hidden variables tout court, but argued that hidden-variable theories must possess a structure that deviates fundamentally from that of quantum mechanics. Both Hermann and Bell appear to have missed this point; moreover, both raised unjustified technical objections to the proof. Von Neumann's conclusion was basically that hidden-variables schemes must violate the "quantum principle" that all physical quantities are to be represented by operators in a Hilbert space. According to this conclusion, hidden-variables schemes are possible in principle but necessarily exhibit a certain kind of contextuality. As we shall illustrate, early reactions to Bohm's theory are in agreement with this account. Leading physicists pointed out that Bohm's theory has the strange feature that particle properties do not generally reveal themselves in measurements, in accordance with von Neumann's result. They did not conclude that the "impossible was done" and that von Neumann had been shown wrong. (shrink)

This book represents the views of one of the greatest mathematicians of the twentieth century on the analogies between computing machines and the living human brain.

The idea of quantum logic first appears explicitly in the short Section 5 of Chapter III. in von Neumann’s 1932 book on the mathematical foundations of quantum mechanics [31]; however, the real birthplace of quantum logic is commonly identified with the 1936 seminal paper co-authored by G. Birkhoff and J. von Neumann [5]. The aim of this review is to recall the main idea of the Birkhoff-von Neumann concept1 of quantum logic as this was put forward in the 1936 (...) paper. The review is motivated partly by two facts related to quantum logic: one, peculiar, is that the 1936 von Neumann concept is an almost totally neglected2 topic in the enormous quantum logic literature [17]; the other, not very well-known, is that von Neumann was never completely satisfied with how he had worked out quantum logic. (shrink)

Shortly after Kurt Gödel had announced an early version of the 1st incompleteness theorem, John von Neumann wrote a letter to inform him of a remarkable discovery, i.e. that the consistency of a formal system containing arithmetic is unprovable, now known as the 2nd incompleteness theorem. Although today von Neumann’s proof of the theorem is considered lost, recent literature has explored many of the issues surrounding his discovery. Yet, one question still awaits a satisfactory answer: how did von Neumann (...) achieve his result, knowing as little as he seemingly did about the 1st incompleteness theorem? In this article, I shall advance a conjectural argument to answer this question, after having rejected the argument widely shared in the literature and having analyzed the relevant documents surrounding his discovery. The argument I shall advance strictly links two of the three letters written by von Neumann to Gödel in the late 1930 and early 1931 (i.e. respectively that of November 20, 1930 and that of January 12, 1931) and finds the key for von Neumann’s discovery in his prompt understanding of the Gödel sentence A – as the documents refer to it – as expressing consistency for a formal system that contains arithmetic. (shrink)

This paper surveys John von Neumann's work on the mathematical foundations of quantum theories in the light of Hilbert's Sixth Problem concerning the geometrical axiomatization of physics. We argue that in von Neumann's view geometry was so tied to logic that he ultimately developed a logical interpretation of quantum probabilities. That motivated his abandonment of Hilbert space in favor of von Neumann algebras, specifically the type II1II1 factors, as the proper limit of quantum mechanics in infinite dimensions. Finally, we present (...) the reasons why his axiomatic program remained an “unsolved problem” in mathematical physics. A recent unpublished result by Huzimiro Araki, proving that no algebra with a tracial state defined on it, such as the type II1II1 factors, can support any (regular) representation of the canonical commutation relations, is also reviewed and its consequences for von Neumann's projects are discussed. (shrink)

As interpreted by Pattee, von Neumann’s Theory of Self-Reproducing Automata has proved to be a useful tool for understanding some of the difficulties and paradoxes of molecular biosemiotics. But is its utility limited to molecular systems or is it more generally applicable within biosemiotics? One way of answering that question is to look at the Theory as a model for one particular high-level biosemiotic activity, human language. If the model is not useful for language, then it certainly cannot be (...) generally useful to biosemiotics. Beginning with the Universal Turing Machine and continuing with von Neumann’s Theory and Pattee’s interpretation, the properties of universality, programmability, underspecification, complementarity of description/construction, and open-ended evolutionary potential are shown to be usefully applicable to language, thus opening a new line of inquiry in biosemiotics. (shrink)

Since the analysis by John Bell in 1965, the consensus in the literature is that von Neumann’s ‘no hidden variables’ proof fails to exclude any significant class of hidden variables. Bell raised the question whether it could be shown that any hidden variable theory would have to be nonlocal, and in this sense ‘like Bohm’s theory.’ His seminal result provides a positive answer to the question. I argue that Bell’s analysis misconstrues von Neumann’s argument. What von Neumann proved (...) was the impossibility of recovering the quantum probabilities from a hidden variable theory of dispersion free (deterministic) states in which the quantum observables are represented as the ‘beables’ of the theory, to use Bell’s term. That is, the quantum probabilities could not reflect the distribution of pre-measurement values of beables, but would have to be derived in some other way, e.g., as in Bohm’s theory, where the probabilities are an artefact of a dynamical process that is not in fact a measurement of any beable of the system. (shrink)

In spite of the many efforts made to clarify von Neumann’s methodology of science, one crucial point seems to have been disregarded in recent literature: his closeness to Hilbert’s spirit. In this paper I shall claim that the scientific methodology adopted by von Neumann in his later foundational reflections originates in the attempt to revaluate Hilbert’s axiomatics in the light of Gödel’s incompleteness theorems. Indeed, axiomatics continues to be pursued by the Hungarian mathematician in the spirit of Hilbert’s school. (...) I shall argue this point by examining four basic ideas embraced by von Neumann in his foundational considerations: a) the conservative attitude to assume in mathematics; b) the role that mathematics and the axiomatic approach have to play in all that is science; c) the notion of success as an alternative methodological criterion to follow in scientific research; d) the empirical and, at the same time, abstract nature of mathematical thought. Once these four basic ideas have been accepted, Hilbert’s spirit in von Neumann’s methodology of science will become clear. (shrink)

Much of the recent discussion of problematic aspects of quantum-mechanical measurement centers around that feature of quantum theory which is called "the projection postulate." This is roughly the claim that a change of a certain sort occurs in the state of a physical system when a measurement is made on the system. In this paper an argument for the projection postulate due to von Neumann is considered. Attention is focused on trying to provide an understanding of the notion of "the (...) state of a physical system" which is compatible with the argument von Neumann offers. An attempt is made to formulate the argument in terms of an objectivistic interpretation of probability concepts. It is seen that such an interpretation does not provide a suitable way of understanding the argument. An attempt is made to illustrate the source of this failure in terms of a non-quantum-mechanical example. (shrink)

In a series of lectures written around 1952, Schrödinger refers to von Neumann’s account of measurement in quantum mechanics as follows:I said quantum physicists bother very little about accounting, according to the accepted law, for the supposed change of the wave-function by measurement. I know of only one attempt in this direction, to which Dr. Balazs recently directed my attention. You find it in John von Neumann’s well-known book. With great acuity he constructs one analytical example. It does (...) not refer to any actual experiment, it is purely analytical. He indicates in a simple case a supplementary operator which, when added to the internal wave operator, would with any desired approximation turn the wave function as time goes on into an eigenfunction of the observable that is measured. He found it necessary to show that such a mechanism is analytically possible. The idea has not been taken up and worked out since — in about twenty years or more. Indeed I do not think it would pay. I do not believe any real measuring device is of this kind. (shrink)

The invitation of the Organizing Committee for me to speak about “Unsolved problems in mathematics” fills me as it should with considerable trepidation and a prevailing feeling of personal inadequacy. Hilbert gave a talk on this subject at the similar congress about 50 years ago and this is a very formidable precedent. He stated about a dozen unsolved problems in another widely separated areas of mathematics, and they proved to be prototypical for much of the development that followed in the (...) next decades. It would be absolutely foolish, if I tried to emulate this quite singular feat. In addition I do not know the future and the future at any rate can only be predicted ex post with any degree of reliability. I will, therefore, define what I am trying to do in a much more narrow way, hoping that in this manner I have a better chance of not failing. I will limit myself to a particular area of mathematics which I think I know and I will talk about it and about what its open ends appear to be, particularly in some directions which are not the ones that the evolution so far has mainly emphasized and which are, I think, quite important. (shrink)

We review the famous no-hidden-variables theorem in von Neumann’s 1932 book on the mathematical foundations of quantum mechanics. We describe the notorious gap in von Neumann’s argument, pointed out by Hermann and, more famously, by Bell. We disagree with recent papers claiming that Hermann and Bell failed to understand what von Neumann was actually doing.

I wish to discuss some rather incomplete ideas concerning difficulties that arise in some parts of quantum mechanics. In general there have been no serious difficulties when we are dealing with a finite number of particles, but very essential difficulties arise as soon as we treat a system having an infinite number of degrees of freedom; for example, the theory of holes, which, because of the pair generation, requires an indefinite number of particles; also the Dirac non-relativistic theory of light (...) and the Pauli-Heisenberg relativistic quantum electro-dynamics, these being equivalent to systems consisting of an infinite number of particles. (shrink)

We discuss the content and significance of John von Neumann’s quantum ergodic theorem (QET) of 1929, a strong result arising from the mere mathematical structure of quantum mechanics. The QET is a precise formulation of what we call normal typicality, i.e., the statement that, for typical large systems, every initial wave function ψ0 from an energy shell is “normal”: it evolves in such a way that |ψt ψt| is, for most t, macroscopically equivalent to the micro-canonical density matrix. The (...) QET has been mostly forgotten after it was criticized as a dynamically vacuous statement in several papers in the 1950s. However, we point out that this criticism does not apply to the actual QET, a correct statement of which does not appear in these papers, but to a different (indeed weaker) statement. Furthermore, we formulate a stronger statement of normal typicality, based on the observation that the bound on the deviations from the average specified by von Neumann is unnecessarily coarse and a much tighter (and more relevant) bound actually follows from his proof. (shrink)

This article addresses the ability of Parallel Distributed Processing (PDP) networks to generate stagewise cognitive development in accordance with Piaget's theory of cognitive epigenesis. We carried out a replication study of the simulation experiments by McClelland (1989) and McClelland and Jenkins (1991) in which a PDP network learns to solve balance scale problems. In objective tests motivated from catastrophe theory, a mathematical theory of transitions in epigenetical systems, no evidence for stage transitions in network performance was found. It is concluded (...) that PDP networks lack the ability to recover the positive outcomes of analogous catastrophe analyses of real cognitive developmental data. In an attempt to further characterize the learning behaviour of PDP networks, we carried out a second simulation study using the discrimination‐shift paradigm. The results thus obtained indicate that PDP learning is compatible with the learning of stimulus‐response relationships, not with the acquisition of mediating rules such as conceived in (neo‐)Piagetian theory. In closing, we speculate about the feasibility of simulating stagewise development with alternative network architectures. (shrink)

God’s being is becoming – the title is the thesis. The first section of this paper will be dedicated to the problem of radical historicity in sketching three dogmatic approaches dealing with the relation between God and history. After critically introducing the concept of relational – in contrast to intrinsic – properties in the second section I will apply a revised version of this concept theologically in integrating it into the architecture of Trinitarian thinking. Accordingly, and on that basis, (...) the last section can address the ambivalent as well as precarious question in which sense God’s ultimate being is in real coming. (shrink)

Von Neumann's theory of measurement in quantum mechanics is reinterpreted so that the experimental arrangement specifies the location of the “cut” by calling for the separate observation of the object and the measuring apparatus after the initial measurement interaction. The measurement ascertains which element of the mixture describing the final state of the apparatus is actually present. The relevance and feasibility of observing the final coherent state of the object plus apparatus is criticized and the paradoxes of “Schrödinger's cat” and (...) “Wigner's friend” are discussed. (shrink)

The meanings of temporal adverbials seem easy to describe, but the compositional interaction with tense and aspect is notoriously difficult to analyse because we (more accurately: I) do not understand yet the principles governing the tense/aspect architecture of natural languages well enough. One of the most difficult areas of temporal structure is the perfect, and the literature quoted in this article shows that there is little agreement on its meaning(s). I believe that we will make progress only by a (...) careful investigation of the meanings of temporal adverbials and by stating their formal semantics in a way which is precise enough to test empirical predictions. This is what the present article wants to do. It studies the interaction of the German durative temporal PP seit a ‘since a’ with tense, in particular with the perfect. (shrink)

This paper represents such an amateur approach; hence any comments backed up by professional erudition will be highly appreciated. Let me start from an attempt to sketch a relationship between professionals’ and amateurs’ contributions. The latter may be compared with the letters to the Editor of a journal, written by perceptive readers, while professionals contribute to the very content of the journal in question. Owing to such letters, the Editor and his professional staff can become more aware of the responses (...) of educated public to the journal’s output. (shrink)

Name der Zeitschrift: Klio Jahrgang: 100 Heft: 2 Seiten: 580-585.

1. The theory of classes presented in this paper is a simplification of that presented by J. von Neumann in his paper Die Axiomatisierung der Mengenlehre. However, this paper is written so that it can be read independently of von Neumann's. The principal modifications of his system are the following.(1) The idea of ordered pair is defined in terms of the other primitive concepts of the system. (See Axiom 4.3 below.)(2) A much simpler proof of the well-ordering theorem, based on (...) von Neumann's equivalence axiom (Axiom 2.2 below) is given. (More exactly, the theory of ordinal numbers, on which the proof of the well-ordering theorem is based, is simplified—see §8.)(3) Functions are not assumed to be defined for all arguments. In place of “ = A” we have “is undefined.” This makes possible a constructive interpretation of the system. (See §2.)2. We wish first to give a rough picture of the system which we are trying to construct. Suppose that we have the idea “class,” but no material from which to construct classes. Nevertheless, we can construct the class 0 having no elements. And then the class 1 having 0 as its only element. And then the classes {1}, and {0, 1}, etc., using always the previously constructed classes as elements. To extend this method to infinite classes, we must give rules telling what elements are to be included. Since the nature of the rules which we can use is not altogether clear, we try to formalize the whole system; that is, to set up a system of axioms which seems to characterize this system of classes. Now in this set of axioms we find it necessary to use the idea of function (in the “Axiom of Replacement”). (shrink)

The renewed interest in the foundations of quantum statistical mechanics in recent years has led us to study John von Neumann’s 1929 article on the quantum ergodic theorem. We have found this almost forgotten article, which until now has been available only in German, to be a treasure chest, and to be much misunderstood. In it, von Neumann studied the long-time behavior of macroscopic quantum systems. While one of the two theorems announced in his title, the one he calls (...) the “quantum H-theorem,” is actually a much weaker statement than Boltzmann’s classical H-theorem, the other theorem, which he calls the “quantum ergodic theorem,” is a beautiful and very non-trivial result. It expresses a fact we call “normal typicality” and can be summarized as follows: For a “typical” finite family of commuting macroscopic observables, every initial wave function ψ0 from a micro-canonical energy shell so evolves that for most times t in the long run, the joint probability distribution of these observables obtained from ψt is close to their micro-canonical distribution. (shrink)

In the centenary year of Turing’s birth, a lot of good things are sure to be written about him. But it is hard to find something new to write about Turing. This is the biggest merit of this article: it shows how von Neumann’s architecture of the modern computer is a serendipitous consequence of the universal Turing machine, built to solve a logical problem.

This paper reviews some major episodes in the history of the spatial isomorphism problem of dynamical systems theory. In particular, by analysing, both systematically and in historical context, a hitherto unpublished letter written in 1941 by John von Neumann to Stanislaw Ulam, this paper clarifies von Neumann's contribution to discovering the relationship between spatial isomorphism and spectral isomorphism. The main message of the paper is that von Neumann's argument described in his letter to Ulam is the very first proof that (...) spatial isomorphism and spectral isomorphism are not equivalent because spectral isomorphism is weaker than spatial isomorphism: von Neumann shows that spectrally isomorphic ergodic dynamical systems with mixed spectra need not be spatially isomorphic. (shrink)