C. S. Peirce argued that inductive reasoning and probability judgments are adequately secure only in the indefinitely long run, and that therefore it is illogical to employ these modes of inference unless one's chief devotion is to the interests of an ideal community of all rational beings, past, present, and future. He thought of this devotion as a "social sentiment", involving self-sacrifice. An examination of his argument shows that the attitude presupposed by his conceptions of induction and probability is in (...) fact not self-sacrificial and is social only in a very special sense. Furthermore, it seems doubtful that this attitude is characteristic of practicing scientists; and this is a reason for questioning Peirce's analysis of induction and probability. (shrink)

Many critics of religion insist that believing in a future life makes us less able to value our present activities and distracts us from accomplishing good in this world. In Augustine's case, this gets things backwards. It is while Augustine seeks to achieve happiness in this life that he is detached from suffering and dismissive of the body. Once Augustine comes to believe happiness is only attainable once the whole city of God is triumphant, he is able to compassionately engage (...) with present suffering and see material and social goods as part of our ultimate good. (shrink)

The final part of Schopenhauer’s argument in The World as Will and Representation concerns “affirmation and negation of the will”. He argues, with a fervor that borders on the religious, that “negation of the will” is a condition of unique value, the only state that enables “true salvation, redemption from life and from suffering”. Some commentators have asserted without qualification that this condition is his “highest good.” However, Schopenhauer in fact claims that there cannot be a highest good, because 'good' (...) is always relative to sstisfaction of a will, and there is no possible final satisfaction of the will. It is only figuratively the will-lessness is the highest good. The article examines the coherence of Schopenhauer's position. Because of the relation of 'good' to willing, he appears reluctant to call will-lessness 'good' at all, despite rating it a state of superior value. The article suggests that Schopenhauer should either abandon his univocal account of 'good' as related to willing, or accept that things can be good in relation to different kinds of willing, namely egoistic and non-egoistic willing. It is argued that the latter resolution if preferable. (shrink)

In his major philosophical opus, Kevod Elohim , written in Hebrew, Joseph ben Shem Tov investigates the summum bonum of man, which consists in the similarity to God's perfection called the "Glory of God" insofar as it can be realized by human nature. Opinions are divided, however, as to the nature of this greatest good. Some Jewish scholars claim that man's final purpose is in the observance of the 613 commandments of the Torah. According to the philosophers, the (...) proofs of Aristotle show irrefutably that man's highest happiness is in the grasping of cognition through reason. Other Jewish scholars assert that the mysteries of the Torah can be explored through philosophy and therefore the Torah and the sciences fulfill in principle the same purpose. This position, however, is objectionable to some believers on the ground that it denies the divine character of religion. On the other hand, to deny the proofs of Aristotle would be to coerce the findings of reason. If religion is the supreme good, it cannot contradict reason. Since the truth cannot be in conflict with the truth, Joseph's task is to compare, for the first time, the Nicomachean Ethics of Aristotle with the Torah to determine to what extent they agree or conflict. His method is to assemble all statements of Aristotle and his commentators on this subject and to submit them to critical analysis. Joseph's motivation is to justify the pursuit of Greek science, especially in view of his father Shem Tov ibn Shem Tov's virulent repudiation of philosophy, and to guide the perplexed of his generation who could not reconcile Greek wisdom with their faith. Joseph finds that the speculative eudemonia of Aristotle accords with the Torah. In an innovative interpretation of the Ethics, he reveals that Aristotle believed in individual providence over those who perfected their intellect and over those who practiced the ethical virtues. Joseph also identifies the study of Torah with the activity of speculation similar to the activity of the Separate Intellects. He finds no basis, however, in Aristotle's writings for the immortality of reason. Since the religious imperative grants immortality, it is infinitely greater than the eudemonia of reason. Thus, from a position of rapprochement between science and faith, Joseph considers them under the aspect of eternity and emerges with a complete denial of any ultimate resemblance between the two spheres. (shrink)

The Stoics maintained that virtue was the only good; everything else, therefore, was not-good. On the other hand, regarded by itself, this huge class was not equally valueless. Vice, of course, was bad; but everything else was thought to be ‘indifferent’: wealth, health, for example; indifferent, that is, with regard to the summum bonum. Of these Intermediates, men, from human nature, had a leaning to some; these were , had value, were called , that is, preferred, and virtue (...) itself lay in choice exercised among them. (shrink)

The Stoics maintained that virtue was the only good; everything else, therefore, was not-good. On the other hand, regarded by itself, this huge class was not equally valueless. Vice, of course, was bad; but everything else was thought to be ‘indifferent’: wealth, health, for example; indifferent, that is, with regard to the summum bonum. Of these Intermediates, men, from human nature, had a leaning to some; these were, had value, were called, that is, preferred, and virtue itself lay (...) in choice exercised among them. (shrink)

In the current paper I rely on two outstanding studies. The one, by Warren Zev Harvey, draws a portrait of Spinoza as Maimonidean, stressing the continuity between Maimonides and Spinoza on the issue of morality and the highest good. The other is the magisterial study by Steven Shmuel Harvey of the reception of the Nicomachean Ethics in medieval Jewish philosophy, from its being subject to almost complete indifference in the period before Maimonides until it became “the best known and most (...) cited work of Aristotle” in sixteenth-century Jewish philosophy. In the first part of this paper I will discuss some main junctions in the medieval Jewish reception of the notion of the highest good. This discussion will be cursory and will mostly focus on matters that will help us approach Spinoza’s views on the issue, views which will be examined closely in the second part of the paper. (shrink)

Neste e no próximo artigo, buscamos articular a visão compreensiva arquitetônica de Peirce a respeito do fenômeno da retórica relacionando sua abordagem em Ideas, Stray or Stolen, about Scientific Writing com seu tratamento na classificação muito negligenciado das ciências práticas. Neste artigo, primeiro, reconstruímos o principal eixo conceitual de Ideas, Stray or Stolen, que é erguido pelos termos ‘arte universal da retórica’, ‘retórica ordinária’, e ‘retórica especulativa’. Na medida em que este eixo nos guia para a classificação dos estudos especiais (...) da retórica que Peirce propõe na seção final de Ideas, Stray or Stolen, a cuidadosa reconstrução deste eixo constitui um dever hermenêutico, a negligência do qual impediria uma compreensão adequada do que Peirce está classificando no fim de sua abordagem mais madura da Retórica Especulativa. Em seguida, procedemos à exposição das raízes aristotélicas da concepção de Peirce da arte universal da retórica e analisamos a relação intrínseca que a semiose retórica tem com o summum bonum como uma de suas formas evolutivas históricas. Se esta interpretação da concepção de retórica do Peirce é adequado, no entanto, devemos esperar que ele nos dê em algum lugar uma descrição da capacidade de evolução da retórica – e portanto, de crescer – antes de tudo. Será a tarefa de um segundo artigo subsequente mostrar que e de que maneira a concepção de Peirce da a retórica como ciência prática e faculdade instintiva enraizado no “instinto gráfico” responde pela sua capacidade para o crescimento. (shrink)

These, Bishop Kirk's Bampton Lectures of 1928, have been recognised as amongst the most important and readable works of moral theology published in the ...

I am primarily concerned here with C. I. Lewis’s suggestion in a letter to me that some admitted defects in his ethical views might be removed by appealing to Peirce’s views on the summum bonum, which Peirce identified as the evolutionary process whereby the universe becomes more and more orderly. Since Lewis held in his published writings that what is morally obligatory can never be determined by empirical facts alone, I argue that since the alleged growing orderliness of (...) the universe must be established empirically, Lewis cannot analyze an obligatory action as one that contributes to that process without abandoning his view that obligatoriness cannot be established empirically. I also argue that if Lewis were to abandon his opposition to a naturalistic theory of obligation, appealing to Peirce’s summum bonum would not help Lewis out of what he called his predicament in ethics. (shrink)

I am primarily concerned here with C. I. Lewis’s suggestion in a letter to me that some admitted defects in his ethical views might be removed by appealing to Peirce’s views on the summum bonum, which Peirce identified as the evolutionary process whereby the universe becomes more and more orderly. Since Lewis held in his published writings that what is morally obligatory can never be determined by empirical facts alone, I argue that since the alleged growing orderliness of (...) the universe must be established empirically, Lewis cannot analyze an obligatory action as one that contributes to that process without abandoning his view that obligatoriness cannot be established empirically. I also argue that if Lewis were to abandon his opposition to a naturalistic theory of obligation, appealing to Peirce’s summum bonum would not help Lewis out of what he called his predicament in ethics. (shrink)

I am primarily concerned here with C. I. Lewis's suggestion in a letter to me that some admitted defects in his ethical views might be removed by appealing to Peirce's views on the summum bonum, which Peirce identified as the evolutionary process whereby the universe becomes more and more orderly. Since Lewis held in his published writings that what is morally obligatory can never be determined by empirical facts alone, I argue that since the alleged growing orderliness of (...) the universe must be established empirically, Lewis cannot analyze an obligatory action as one that contributes to that process without abandoning his view that obligatoriness cannot be established empirically. I also argue that if Lewis were to abandon his opposition to a naturalistic theory of obligation, appealing to Peirce's summum bonum would not help Lewis out of what he called his predicament in ethics. (shrink)

I argue that Before Sunrise, Before Sunset, and Before Midnight are best seen as an example of memento mori art. Memento mori, the admonition to remember death, can take many forms, but the idea remains the same, namely that an awareness of our inevitable end should bear on how we live. I show how Richard Linklater’s warning works in each of the movies and argue that with the Before trilogy he makes a Frankfurt-style case that romantic love is life’s (...) class='Hi'>summum bonum--i.e. "the ultimate ground of practical rationality.". (shrink)

: As Spinoza presents it, the knowledge of God is knowledge, primarily, of oneself and, secondarily, of other things. Without this know‐ledge, a mind may not consciously desire to persevere in being. That is why Spinoza claims that the knowledge of God is the most useful thing to the mind at IVP28. He claims that the knowledge of God is the highest good, however, not because it is instrumental to perseverance, but because it is also the best among those goods (...) that we seek for their own sakes. It is acquiescentia in se ipso, the highest form of laetitia. (shrink)

The philosophy of Aristotle remains a beacon of our culture. But no part of Aristotle's work is more alive and compelling today than his contribution to ethics and political science — nor more relevant to the subject of the present volume. Political science, in his view, begins with ethics, and the primary task of ethics is to elucidate human flourishing. Aristotle brings to this topic a mind unsurpassed in the depth, keenness, and comprehensiveness of its probing.

As Spinoza presents it, the knowledge of God is knowledge, primarily, of oneself and, secondarily, of other things. Without this know‐ledge, a mind may not consciously desire to persevere in being. That is why Spinoza claims that the knowledge of God is the most useful thing to the mind at IVP28. He claims that the knowledge of God is the highest good, however, not because it is instrumental to perseverance, but because it is also the best among those goods that (...) we seek for their own sakes. It is acquiescentia in se ipso, the highest form of laetitia. (shrink)

This book is the first monograph in German dealing exclusively with F.C.S. Schiller, until now and even given today‘s "Renaissance of Pragmatism" the most neglected of the classical pragmatists. It tries for the first time to analyse aspects of his oeuvre as a "twofold Humanism": consisting of a more descriptive "methodical humanism" on the one side and a more normative "prophetic humanism" on the other side. These two and irreducible perspectives of Schiller's writing allow him to take into account the (...) human condition not, as most of the interpreters suggest, in a radical but in a holistic manner: man existing as an individual and as a member of society, as an I in relation to God, as a biological fact and as a still not yet realized ideal in the light of multiple forms of criticism and reform. Thus it becomes clear that Schiller's complex thought - logical, ethical, social, educational and metaphysical - cannot be confined to individual aspects, particularly not to the topos of the "theory of truth" as the common "reading" of his writing stereotypically insinuates. Rather, it revolves around the most fundamental question of philosophy as such: concerned with the meaning of life in its entirety, especially in the light of the modern threat of nihilism and pessimism. -/- Table of Contents (translated) -/- 1. Oversight 2. The Philosophically Designated Path into the Abyss 2.1. Agnosticism 2.2. Scepticism 2.3. Pessimism 3. The Methodical Humanism as Possibilism – The Conversion of Thought from Destinity to Possibility 3.1. In the Antechamber of Practice 3.2. Excursion: William James' Concept of the "Will to Believe" 3.3. "All that has become has History" 3.4. The Ethical Unmasking of Knowledge 3.5. Bertrand Russell's Critique of Pragmatism – Ennobling the Human by Degrading him 3.6. "Problems of Belief" – The Complexity of the Person 3.7. The Bilocal Fixation of Philosophy – as Public Office and Private Poetry 3.8. On the Half-Way – Retrospect and Prospect 4. The Prophetic Humanism Consisting in Personalistic Speculation and Genetic Manipulation 4.1. The Speculative Humanism 4.1.1. Naturalizing the Human as Humanizing the Nature 4.1.2. Excursion: The "Personal Idealism" of George Holmes Howison 4.1.3. Schiller's Theatrum Mundi – The World as a Pedagogical Play between God and Man 4.2. The Eugenical Humanism 4.2.1. Putting it on its Feet – Schiller's Political Diagnosis 4.2.2. The Eugenically Reformist March Through the Institutions 4.2.3. Excursion: The Humanistic Mobilization of Religious Reserves in John Dewey's "A Common Faith" 5. Follow-up. (shrink)

This paper presents an outline of the way Boethius conceived the human path to the Supreme Good. In order to achieve this goal one has first to specify the way he construed this Supreme Good, and this discussion is naturally related to the much-discussed problem concerning the Christian identity of Boethius: was he indeed a Christian? does his Consolation, from which any overt allusions to Christian faith are absent, provide us with any clue as to whether the Supreme Good of (...) Boethius can be identified with the God of the Gospel? In the course of the analysis we propound a hypothesis that the message that Boethius puts forward through the means of his Consolation and the utterances he puts in the mouth of his dame Philosophy are not far removed from the advice offered by Fulgentius to Proba. She, too, was encouraged to acknowledge her own weakness and lack of sufficiency, to be contrite, and to have humble trust in wisdom and guidance of God, who is the best of all doctors. Is dame Philosophy’s message not very similar? did not Alcuin, who regarded himself as a faithful «disciple» of Boethius, share a conception of philosophy as being the «teacher of virtues» and wisdom, as the one who leads man along the path of wisdom towards the divine light? (shrink)

The article revisits the originality of Hobbes's concept of happiness on the basis of Hobbes's two accounts found respectively in Thomas White's De Mundo Examined and Leviathan. It is argued that Hobbes's claim that happiness consists in the unhindered advance from one acquired good to another ought to be understood against the background of Hobbes's theory of sensation and the imagination, on the one hand, and Hobbes's doctrine of conatus, on the other. It is further claimed that the account of (...) happiness in White's De Mundo differs from that in Leviathan. In the former work, happiness is defined not as the mere progression from one good to another but as the joy/mental pleasure derived from the awareness of one's unhindered advance. The traditional claim that Hobbes is an ethical subjectivist is examined in connection with Hobbes's view of the subjectivity of happiness and the rejection of the summum bonum. Lastly, Hobbes's distinction between worldly and everlasting happiness is discussed. (shrink)

Kant is clear that the concept of the 'highest good' involves both a demand, that we follow the moral law, as well as a promise, that happiness will be the outcome of being moral. The latter element of the highest good has troubled commentators, who tend to find it metaphysically extravagant, involving, as it does, belief in God and an afterlife. Furthermore, it seems to threaten the moral purity that Kant demands: that we obey the moral law for its own (...) sake, not out of interest in the consequences. Those commentators brave enough to tackle the issue look to the concept of the highest good either to add content to the moral law (Silber), or to provide rational motivation, in a way that does not violate moral purity (Beiser and Wood). I argue that such interpretations, although they may be plausible reconstructions, are unable to account for certain conceptual and textual problems. By placing Kant's thought against the background of medieval theology, I argue that the hope for the summum bonum is irreducibly important for Kant, even where its function is not that of providing the content or motivational force of the moral law. Kant is not only concerned with the shape of our duties and motivations, but the shape of the universe within which these emerge. (shrink)

Kant's final conception of the relation of God and morality, and the fullest development of the metaphysical context of morality is to be found in the large collection of notes and jottings written down by Kant between about 1790‐1803, which have been collected as the Opus Postumum. There is a development in the Opus Postumum from the Critical doctrine that ‘God’ is a postulate which can have no direct influence on the moral life, an unknown, unexperiencable somewhat which makes the (...) summum bonum possible. The basic problem is that Kant has left a deeply religious ethics expressed in a radically humanistic terminology. He propounds a view of man as involved in an impersonal but purposive nature. In trying to replace speculative rationalism by a voluntaristic rationalism, Kant attempts to find a via media between the rationalism of Wolff and the stress on individual moral freedom of Pietism. (shrink)

Although Charles S. Peirce, strictly speaking, never formulated a ‘full-blown’ normative theory—a single over-all architectonic system—we believe that there lies within his work a valuable sketch of the ideal for feeling, action, and thought, and how this ideal should be followed, and in connection to this, Peirce offered a model for rational behaviour, including self-control. In the following essay we will try, modestly, to draw a rough outline of this sketch. Firstly, we will focus on the three normative sciences, their (...) relationship and their task of finding out how feeling, action and thought ought to be controlled. Then, we will take a look at the sign-universe. The very universe is a sign-universe and within this evolutionary universe feeling, matter and thought incessantly melt together into ‘concrete reasonableness’; according to Peirce, rendering the world more reasonable. This is the Summum Bonum that man can and indeed should pursue. Hence it makes absolutely no sense to speak of the three normative sciences out of this metaphysical or cosmological context. Finally, we will try to see in what way rationality can be said to fall within the spheres of self-control, bearing in mind that self-control is directly related to conditional purpose. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Jesse Kai.in THE INTENT OF ROMANTICISM: KANT, WORDSWORTH, AND TWO FILMS Great Kant, As a believer calls to his God, I call upon you for help, for solace, or for counsel to prepare me for death. The reasons you gave in your books were sufficient to convince me of a future existence — that is why I have recourse to you — only I found nothing at all for (...) this life, nothing that could replace the good I have lost.... my heart splits into a thousand pieces. If I hadn't read so much of your work I would certainly have taken my own life by now. But the conclusion I had to draw from your theory stops me — it is wrong for me to die because my life is tormented, and I am instead supposed to live because of my being. Now put yourself in my place and either damn me or give me solace. Maria von Herbert, August, 1791 ' This ESSAY is an attempt to describe a kind of thoughtfulness that has its origins in the beginnings of the Romantic movement and is of ethical relevance today. I will first locate the moral problematic that this thoughtfulness responds to as it arises within the framework established by Kant's moral philosophy. It is that of despair in the face of life and, while this is a problematic Kant himself would consider invalid, the solution it calls for, were he to try to provide it, involves the kind of thinking he considers in the Critique of Judgement, though not in quite the way he understands it. I will then suggest that the Wordsworth of the 1802 "Preface" can be taken as sketching out the sort of response to this problematic that Kant himself refuses to give or even recognize as philosophically needed. This will be a kind of artwork which is at the same time a certain process of thinking. The intent of Romanticism referred to in my title is thus both the concern to resolve this Kantian problem and the goal of achieving this Wordsworthian artwork. What I shall finally propose is that this kind of artwork is ofcurrent interest to moral philosophy and will 121 122Philosophy and Literature elaborate this claim through the discussion of two recent instances, both films — Margarethe von Trotta's The SecondAwakening ofChrista Klages and J.J. Murphy's Print Generation. I Kant sets a complicated and multifaceted background for both Romanticism and modern moral philosophy. His positions are complex and even convoluted and some of his most important ideas are both obscure and presented only obliquely. The problem ofdespair which comes to be at the heart of Romanticism develops out of the two Kantian themes of thoughtful autonomy (enlightenment) and the purposive unity of man and the world. Kant argues that practical reason must affirm these ideas as the Postulates of Freedom and God. In taking this position, however, Kant is implicitly committed to the existence of things good in themselves other than, and finally coordinate to, the Good Will, though he gives no direct account of such goods. Despair in the face of life is grounded in the inability or failure to appreciate these goods, and while Kant provides hints, he is never able to recognize or articulate a means of evidential access to them. Both the need of such goods and the appropriation of them remain submerged and latent themes in his writings. Let us begin with the question ofGod and the wholeness of all things. It would be a disaster, Kant says, if we could not, no matter how hard we tried, accomplish the purpose set for us by the Moral Law which is happiness in accord with virtue. It would be intolerable if the virtuous were always to be unhappy, or the vicious always to have their peace. However, since happiness is only marginally in our control, we need to postulate both immortality of the soul and existence of God as moral author of the world to assure that this purpose, or the summum bonum, can be achieved. What we cannot do, God will. This is the so-called moral argument for the existence of God and its outcome... (shrink)

In his Sermo 150, Augustine argues that the desire to attain the vita beata has been the motivation for all types of philosophy, and that it is also the reason that people would give if asked why they became Christians; the quest is common to all human beings, whether good or evil. Appetitio...beatae vitae philosophis Christianisque communis est.The truth of Augustine’s claims is illustrated in a variety of Latin Christian works from the fourth century, which take up the traditional philosophical (...) theme of happiness and the summum bonum. Lactantius relates the highest good to the immortality of the soul, and calls upon his readers to find their destiny by devoting themselves to the worship of the true God; the worship of God is the greatest virtue, and it wins the blessedness of eternal reward. (shrink)

The moral argument for the existence of God is really a family of arguments. What they have in common is Kant’s insistence that philosophical theology proceed by drawing out the presuppositions of moral reasoning. Kant’s own favorite version of the argument is widely rejected today. Kant maintained that the summum bonum, the perfect unison of virtue and happiness, is the aim of rational action. Because it ought to be achieved it is possible, as the ought implies the ability (...) to bring it about. The moral faith is that God’s existence and human immortality enable continued moral progress after death and the enjoying of happiness appropriate to it, thus making the arrival at the summum bonum possible. Kant also urged that the categorical commands of the moral conscience suggested the existence of a cosmic lawgiver and commander, and there are a number of nineteenth-century arguments which proceed along those lines. (shrink)

There is yet one more proposed solution to the argument from evil which merits attention. Though it does have elements in common with other proposed solutions in that it postulates a justifying end to account for the existence of all evil, it is different in that evil is viewed as nothing more than a polluting by-product of the proper functioning of the laws of nature in their industrious manufacture of the summum bonum. The unimpeded functioning of the laws (...) of nature is seen as necessary for the production and creation of a justifying (indiscernible) end and evil or suffering is merely a foreseen but unfortunate by-product of this natural machinery. The place and function of evil in this solution is what is novel: it is not a greatness-making property, nor is it a punishment or warning from on high, nor is its usefulness an aesthetic or contrasting one, nor is it the result of free will. Evil is admitted as just plain evil; it itself plays no role to serve the valuable end, which is precipitated by the unimpeded operation of natural laws upon the universe. Evil here is seen to play the same role that pollution might: it is a foreseen and unfortunate consequence of the means used to produce the coveted final product. -/- Professor Clement Dore, in his book entitled Theism,[1] introduces this solution in which evil itself plays no role to serve an enormously valuable end, yet is necessitated by this end. However, in order for the theist to be in a position to defend Dore's claim, a viable interpretation of the justifying, indiscernible end, must be proposed. To assess the validity of Dore's schema, four apparently exhaustive interpretations of the justifying end will be presented. It will be argued here that each of these possible interpretations is, in one respect or another, inadequate. The result is that the concept of the justifying, indiscernible end and its relation to Dore's overall schema lacks lucidity. In addition, other problems with this solution will be discussed in order to show that severe flaws exist in the solution as a whole. (shrink)

The two basic forms of action distinguished in the preceding articles, viz., moral action, where praxis is for praxis sake, and action for a good, where praxis is for the sake of theôria, are found in close relationship to one another in human life. The part they play is rather that of abstract moments in a practical process than that of self-contained and isolable bits of conduct. No philosopher is likely to discount the importance of thus analysing the concrete into (...) its factors before he rectifies the abstraction by showing how they co-operate in actual experience. In any individual biography we can find acts and courses of action in which duty is the dominant motive, and others in which the dominant motive is desire of good. Similarly, when we compare different biographies with one another, some exemplify most strikingly the struggle for righteousness against unruly passion, others the spontaneous aspiration of the soul to attain the goal of its desire. But neither the moral law nor the summum bonum wields an exclusive sovereignty. St. Paul and Luther, in their warfare against carnal desire, drew strength from the ideal vision; nor were St. Bernard or Spinoza, for all their absorption upon union with the divine, strangers to the call of moral obligation. In the lives of ordinary men, the types of conduct are, perhaps, more evenly balanced; yet here also the distinction is discernible. Moreover, it is easy to see how, despite their intrinsic difference, they come to be associated and “by just exchange” to effect a mutual enrichment. (shrink)

The two basic forms of action distinguished in the preceding articles, viz., moral action, where praxis is for praxis sake, and action for a good, where praxis is for the sake of theôria, are found in close relationship to one another in human life. The part they play is rather that of abstract moments in a practical process than that of self-contained and isolable bits of conduct. No philosopher is likely to discount the importance of thus analysing the concrete into (...) its factors before he rectifies the abstraction by showing how they co-operate in actual experience. In any individual biography we can find acts and courses of action in which duty is the dominant motive, and others in which the dominant motive is desire of good. Similarly, when we compare different biographies with one another, some exemplify most strikingly the struggle for righteousness against unruly passion, others the spontaneous aspiration of the soul to attain the goal of its desire. But neither the moral law nor the summum bonum wields an exclusive sovereignty. St. Paul and Luther, in their warfare against carnal desire, drew strength from the ideal vision; nor were St. Bernard or Spinoza, for all their absorption upon union with the divine, strangers to the call of moral obligation. In the lives of ordinary men, the types of conduct are, perhaps, more evenly balanced; yet here also the distinction is discernible. Moreover, it is easy to see how, despite their intrinsic difference, they come to be associated and “by just exchange” to effect a mutual enrichment. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Journal of the History of Philosophy 40.4 (2002) 551-552 [Access article in PDF] Book Review The Limits of Doubt: The Moral and Political Implications of Skepticism Petr Lom. The Limits of Doubt: The Moral and Political Implications of Skepticism. Albany: The State University of New York Press, 2001. Pp. xiv + 138. Cloth, $49.50. Paper, $16.95. Since the appearance in 1960 of Richard Popkin's The History of Skepticism from (...) Erasmus to Descartes (later extended to Spinoza and, in a forthcoming edition, to Bayle) skepticism has been acknowledged as a powerful intellectual force in modern philosophy. Lom's The Limits of Doubt corroborates this view by showing the relevance of this ancient tradition in the political and moral thought of a number of major modern philosophers.The major thesis of the book is that skepticism in itself, that is, conceived as the epistemological position of raising doubts about any knowledge claim, has no moral or political implications. According to Lom, the moral and political positions that have been associated with skepticism (either tyranny and other forms of political oppression or toleration and liberalism in general) derive not from skepticism itself but from what he calls "the limits of doubt": beliefs left untouched by skeptical doubt. To establish this thesis Lom examines the moral and political aspects of skepticism in Nietzsche (chapter 1), Sextus Empiricus (chapter 2), Hobbes (chapter 3), Diderot (chapter 4), and Montaigne (chapter 5), showing in each case the (value) beliefs responsible for the different moral and political positions held.Lom's analysis of these thinkers' relation to skepticism is comprehensive, detailed, and engaged with an extended secondary literature. I can here just briefly indicate some results of Lom's investigation. He shows Nietzsche's esteem for the ancient skeptics in whom alone Nietzsche saw a plain exhibition of intellectual integrity or honesty. This integrity implies, according to Lom, a demand for justice often unnoticed by superficial readings of Nietzsche. The illiberal aspects of Nietzsche's political philosophy, related to his doctrine of the will to power, derive, according to Lom, not from Nietzsche's skepticism but from the limits of his doubt, namely, his dogmatic nihilism (belief that there is no value, a position that Lom carefully distinguishes from skepticism). Lom also finds limits in Sextus Empiricus's skepticism. He follows Martha Nussbaum ("Skeptic Purgatives...," Journal of the History of Philosophy 29 [1991], 1-33) in claiming that Sextus's skepticism does not extend to the principle of non-contradiction and to the end of tranquility (ataraxia). The [End Page 551] latter is mainly responsible for what Lom considers the ancient Pyrrhonians' political indifference. This indifference, coupled with the Pyrrhonians' attempt to destroy reason (a polemical interpretation of ancient Pyrrhonism) "may also allow political nightmares to breed in the night" (45). In Hobbes, Lom identifies a kind of methodical doubt whose aim is not that of Descartes's of finding certain truth but to combat the pride of men. This pride leads to different and conflicting views of the summum bonum that disturb the civil order. Its destruction through skepticism facilitates the acceptance of the sovereign's decisions and thus the attainment of peace. Lom notes the similarity of Hobbes's position on doubt with Sextus's (the subordination of the skepsis to the goal of tranquility) and points out a number of interesting and still little explored parallels between Hobbes and Montaigne, whose skeptical and moral views are examined in chapter 5. According to Lom, Montaigne, like Sextus, is little interested in politics and his attack on cruelty and defense of toleration do not issue from his skepticism but from moral values that remain outside the scope of doubt, notably Montaigne's desire for peace. Lom's analysis of Diderot is interesting and original. He places the French philosophe in the tradition of "constructive skepticism" (expression labeled by Popkin to characterize the skepticism of Gassendi and Mersenne about knowledge of essences but opened to a hypothetical science of phenomena). Lom focuses on Diderot's Rameau Nephew, where he... (shrink)

Abstract:In Charles Peirce on Ethics, Esthetics and the Normative Sciences, I argue that Peirce was motivated to develop a normative science of ethics because of his growing concern with the corruption of science in the Gilded Age, and the recognition that the pragmatic maxim entailed an amoral instrumentalism. Rather than taking a Kantian approach to resolve the latter issue, he adopts an Aristotelian one, engaging in a search for an ultimate end that could order all other ends. What is right (...) is what would be conducive to that end. As such he sees the necessity of a science of esthetics which would study such an end. However, rather than eudaimonia as the highest end, Peirce sees reasonableness as the summum bonum. Although barely sketched by Peirce, I argue that its principal sense is that of an ongoing process of self-correction away from error. In regard to this end, what is most important is the design of practices and the establishment of habits of conduct and sentiment most conducive to self-correction. For this reason, a proper community of inquiry with these features ought to be established, armed with the general methodology of science to assess the norms that guide the experiments of living together. Assurance that communities of inquiries are moving away from error and toward improvement is based on a convergence theory of truth. (shrink)

The following article starts by summarising how much modern capitalism is characterised by its religious structure. The world of branding — consumer goods becoming religiously attractive — and religious metaphors that have become necessary to describe contemporary neoliberalism are key examples. A second step consists in describing four typical aspects of religious capitalism in the following of Walter Benjamin's fragment `Capitalism as Religion' from 1921. Against this background I thirdly summarise Hans G. Ulrich's theological ethics concerning the economy. At the (...) centre of Ulrich's ethics we find his emphasis on God's economy that relieves us from all our worries enabling us thereby to become cooperators of God acting and working in an ethical way. A final step discusses Ulrich's rejection of an ethics of striving for God as the summum bonum by showing that desire or will do not necessarily contradict with the priority of God's grace. (shrink)