A scientific community cannot practice its trade without some set of received beliefs. These beliefs form the foundation of the "educational initiation that prepares and licenses the student for professional practice". The nature of the "rigorous and rigid" preparation helps ensure that the received beliefs are firmly fixed in the student's mind. Scientists take great pains to defend the assumption that scientists know what the world is like...To this end, "normal science" will often suppress novelties which undermine its foundations. (...) Research is therefore not about discovering the unknown, but rather "a strenuous and devoted attempt to force nature into the conceptual boxes supplied by professional education". (shrink)

Thomas S. Kuhn's classic book is now available with a new index.

Thomas Kuhn's The Structure of Scientific Revolutions has sold more than one million copies since its publication in 1962, is one of the most cited academic books of all time, and continues to be read and studied today. This volume of new essays evaluates the significance of Kuhn's classic book in its changing historical context, including its initial reception and its lasting effects. The essays explore the range of ideas which Kuhn made popular with his influential philosophy (...) of science, including paradigms, normal science, paradigm changes, scientific revolutions, and incommensurability; and they also look at less-studied themes in his work, including scientific measurement, science education, and science textbooks. Drawing on the latest scholarship as well as unpublished material in the Thomas Kuhn Archives at MIT, this volume offers a comprehensive way into Kuhn's philosophy and demonstrates the continuing relevance of his ideas for our understanding of science. (shrink)

Thomas S. Kuhn’s The Structure of Scientific Revolutions was a watershed event when it was published in 1962, upending the previous understanding of science as a slow, logical accumulation of facts and introducing, with the concept of the “paradigm shift,” social and psychological considerations into the heart of the scientific process. More than fifty years after its publication, Kuhn’s work continues to influence thinkers in a wide range of fields, including scientists, historians, and sociologists. It is (...) clear that The Structure of Scientific Revolutions itself marks no less of a paradigm shift than those it describes. In Kuhn’s “Structure of Scientific Revolutions” at Fifty, leading social scientists and philosophers explore the origins of Kuhn’s masterwork and its legacy fifty years on. These essays exhume important historical context for Kuhn’s work, critically analyzing its foundations in twentieth-century science, politics, and Kuhn’s own intellectual biography: his experiences as a physics graduate student, his close relationship with psychologists before and after the publication of Structure, and the Cold War framework of terms such as “world view” and “paradigm.”. (shrink)

A good book may have the power to change the way we see the world, but a great book actually becomes part of our daily consciousness, pervading our thinking to the point that we take it for granted, and we forget how provocative and challenging its ideas once were—and still are. _The Structure of Scientific Revolutions _is that kind of book. When it was first published in 1962, it was a landmark event in the history and philosophy (...) of science. Fifty years later, it still has many lessons to teach. With _The Structure of Scientific Revolutions, _Kuhn challenged long-standing linear notions of scientific progress, arguing that transformative ideas don’t arise from the day-to-day, gradual process of experimentation and data accumulation but that the revolutions in science, those breakthrough moments that disrupt accepted thinking and offer unanticipated ideas, occur outside of “normal science,” as he called it. Though Kuhn was writing when physics ruled the sciences, his ideas on how scientific revolutions bring order to the anomalies that amass over time in research experiments are still instructive in our biotech age. This new edition of Kuhn’s essential work in the history of science includes an insightful introduction by Ian Hacking, which clarifies terms popularized by Kuhn, including paradigm and incommensurability, and applies Kuhn’s ideas to the science of today. Usefully keyed to the separate sections of the book, Hacking’s introduction provides important background information as well as a contemporary context. Newly designed, with an expanded index, this edition will be eagerly welcomed by the next generation of readers seeking to understand the history of our perspectives on science. (shrink)

For historical epistemology to succeed, it must adopt a defensible set of categories to characterise scientific activity over time. In historically orientated philosophy of science during the twentieth century, the original categories of theory and observation were supplemented or replaced by categories like paradigm, research program and research tradition. Underlying all three proposals was talk about conceptual systems and conceptual structures, attributed to individual scientists or to research communities, however there has been little general agreement on the nature of (...) these structures. Recent experimental research in cognitive science has considerably refined the theory of concepts. Drawing upon the results of that research, philosophers can construct more concrete and empirically defensible representations of conceptual systems. I will suggest that this research supports a modest and useful sense of both normal and revolutionary science, not as epistemological continuities or discontinuities, but as particular patterns of conceptual change. (shrink)

Thomas Kuhn's Structure of Scientific Revolutions became the most widely read book about science in the twentieth century. His terms 'paradigm' and 'scientific revolution' entered everyday speech, but they remain controversial. In the second half of the twentieth century, the new field of cognitive science combined empirical psychology, computer science, and neuroscience. In this book, the theories of concepts developed by cognitive scientists are used to evaluate and extend Kuhn's most influential ideas. Based on case studies (...) of the Copernican revolution, the discovery of nuclear fission, and an elaboration of Kuhn's famous 'ducks and geese' example of concept learning, this volume, first published in 2006, offers accounts of the nature of normal and revolutionary science, the function of anomalies, and the nature of incommensurability. (shrink)

Kuhn’s Structure of Scientific Revolutions has been attacked for many reasons. Key analytic terms, most importantly “paradigm,” were widely regarded as poorly defined. To many readers Structure seemed to suggest that the process of theory change is irrational, or at least non-rational. And even his characterization of normal science seemed to some readers to paint a very unflattering picture of scientists as excessively dogmatic and uncritical. More recently, Lorraine Daston has argued that the notion of “ (...) class='Hi'>structure” that figures in the title of the book, as well as in the analysis of the history of science discussed throughout the book, is “dusty and dated”. Historians of science tend to focus on the particular, in recognition that the sorts of events they study are unique. My aim in this paper is to defend Kuhn’s appeal to the notion of structure. First, I argue that Structure of Scientific Revolutions is not primarily a contribution to the history of science, despite the fact that it cites many historical sources and articles in the history of science. Consequently, it is a mistake to regard Kuhn’s appeal to the notion of structure as a case of badly written history of science. Second, I argue that insofar as the book is a contribution to philosophy, the sort of thing Kuhn means by “structure” is perfectly respectable, and is often presupposed in many philosophical studies, especially in general philosophy of science. Third, I defend Kuhn’s analysis of science, especially the enterprise of identifying the structure of scientific revolutions. (shrink)

Kuhn’s Structure of Scientific Revolutions is one of the most cited books of the twentieth century. Its iconic and controversial nature has obscured its message. What did Kuhn really intend with Structure and what is its real significance? -/- 1 Introduction -/- 2 The Central Ideas of Structure -/- 3 The Philosophical Targets of Structure -/- 4 Interpreting and Misinterpreting Structure -/- 4.1 Naturalism -/- 4.2 World-change -/- 4.3 Incommensurability -/- 4.4 Progress and (...) the nature of revolutionary change -/- 4.5 Relativism, rationality, and realism -/- 4.6 History and sociology of science -/- 4.7 Wittgenstein -/- 5 After Structure. (shrink)

1.—Some years ago we were indebted to Mr Kuhn for a refreshing work on the philosophical interpretation of Copernican astronomy. Now he has launched into a more ambitious programme: he has sketched the ground-work for a veritable aggiornamento in our appraisal of the physico-mathematical sciences. The author works in historical depth but on a very narrow front. This latter contraction is responsible for much of the force and clarity of the thesis. But the reader should be sensible from the start (...) of this restriction in the field of acute attention. Although the author tends to use the term ‘science’ without qualification, in truth what he has to say is of only minor relevance to the descriptive or classificatory sciences. The persuasive power of his thesis is virtually confined to the exact operations of the physicist, the astronomer, and the chemist. Kuhn and Canon Raven, in his biologically oriented Gifford Lectures, are both concerned with the appraisal of the history of the natural sciences. Yet their treatments are bewilderingly different, until we understand how each has restricted his canvas. (shrink)

The present paper argues that there is an affinity between Kuhn's "The Structure of Scientific Revolutions" and Wittgenstein's philosophy. It is maintained, in particular, that Kuhn's notion of paradigm draws on such Wittgensteinian concepts as language games, family resemblance, rules, forms of life. It is also claimed that Kuhn's incommensurability thesis is a sequel of the theory of meaning supplied by Wittgenstein's later philosophy. As such its assessment is not fallacious, since it is not an empirical hypothesis (...) and it does not have the relativistic implications Kuhn's critics repeatedly indicated. Although concepts are indeed relative to a language game or paradigm, interparadigmatic intelligibility is preserved through the standard techniques of translation or praxis. The impossibility of radical translation which is captured by the claim of incommensurability lies with that which cannot be said but only shown. (shrink)

The present paper argues that there is an affinity between Kuhn's "The Structure of Scientific Revolutions" and Wittgenstein's philosophy. It is maintained, in particular, that Kuhn's notion of paradigm draws on such Wittgensteinian concepts as language games, family resemblance, rules, forms of life. It is also claimed that Kuhn's incommensurability thesis is a sequel of the theory of meaning supplied by Wittgenstein's later philosophy. As such its assessment is not fallacious, since it is not an empirical hypothesis (...) and it does not have the relativistic implications Kuhn's critics repeatedly indicated. Although concepts are indeed relative to a language game or paradigm, interparadigmatic intelligibility is preserved through the standard techniques of translation or praxis. The impossibility of radical translation which is captured by the claim of incommensurability lies with that which cannot be said but only shown. (shrink)

A provocative contribution to the new approach to the history and philosophy of science which emphasizes the role of radically new paradigms in scientific revolutions. While normal science proceeds as puzzle-solving within a relatively fixed paradigm, scientific crises lead to new paradigms where data, scientific problems, procedures, and standards for solutions are all altered. Scientific revolutions do not simply modify our understanding of a world which exists independently--they change the data and the world in (...) which the scientist works. The essay is filled with fascinating historical interpretations, though the analysis of the concept of a paradigm and scientific revolution is more suggestive than rigorous.--R. J. B. (shrink)

In 1962, the publication of Thomas Kuhn’s Structure ‘revolutionized’ the way one conducts philosophical and historical studies of science. Through the introduction of both memorable and controversial notions, such as paradigms, scientific revolutions, and incommensurability, Kuhn argued against the traditionally accepted notion of scientific change as a progression towards the truth about nature, and instead substituted the idea that science is a puzzle solving activity, operating under paradigms, which become discarded after it fails to respond accordingly (...) to anomalous challenges and a rival paradigm. Kuhn’s Structure has sold over 1.4 million copies and the Times Literary Supplement named it one of the “Hundred Most Influential Books since the Second World War.” Now, fifty years after this groundbreaking work was published, this volume offers a timely reappraisal of the legacy of Kuhn’s book and an investigation into what Structure offers philosophical, historical, and sociological studies of science in the future. (shrink)

I examine the value and limitations of Kuhn’s Structure of Scientific Revolutions. In the interests of developing a social epistemology of science, I argue that we should draw on Kuhn’s later work, published in The Road since Structure. There, Kuhn draws attention to the important role that specialty formation plays in resolving crises in science, a topic he did not discuss in Structure. I argue that we need to develop a better understanding of specialty research (...) communities. Kuhn’s later work provides a research agenda for those who want to study scientific specialization. I briefly discuss some recent studies that promise to provide valuable insight into the social structure of science. (shrink)

In a case study Kuhn's morphology of scientific revolutions is put to the test in confronting it with the contemporary developments in physics. It is shown in detail, that Kuhn's scheme is not compatible with the situation in physics today.

I examine the value and limitations of Kuhn’s Structure of Scientific Revolutions. In the interests of developing a social epistemology of science, I argue that we should draw on Kuhn’s later work, published in The Road since Structure. There, Kuhn draws attention to the important role that specialty formation plays in resolving crises in science, a topic he did not discuss in Structure. I argue that we need to develop a better understanding of specialty research (...) communities. Kuhn’s later work provides a research agenda for those who want to study scientific specialization. I briefly discuss some recent studies that promise to provide valuable insight into the social structure of science. (shrink)

[First paragraph of article] Among historians of science in the U.S.S.R., discussion of the nature of scientific revolutions has been deeply influenced by Thomas Kuhn's The Structure of Scientific Revolutions. First published in 1962 and translated into Russian in 1975, Kuhn's book has been the subject of many articles in Soviet journals, and many of his arguments have found concurrence among Soviet writers. Kuhn's postulated sequence of "normal science-anomalies-crisis/revolution-normal science," for example, fits the dialectical explanation (...) of revolutions. While some Soviet scholars have found fault with Kuhn's perceived historical relativism, his apparent simplification of the mechanisms of scientific revolutions, and his belief in the "incommensurability" of research paradigms, many others believe that he has captured the essence of the struggle between competing scientific theories. These scholars call for the improvement or emendation of Kuhn's theory, not its wholesale rejection. (shrink)

Kuhnʼs influential book, The Structure of Scientific Revolutions,1 is often viewed as a revolt against empiricist philosophy of science. However, Friedman has reminded us lately2 that the book was commissioned by logical positivists, who were delighted with the result. In fact, the book was part of the International Encyclopedia of United Science initiated by members of the Vienna Circle, whose first volumes were published in 1938.3 The project aimed at providing a systematic positivist perspective on all the (...) sciences, from logic and mathematics through linguistics and on to psychology and sociology. The publication of Structure as volume 12 of the encyclopedia was greeted enthusiastically by the editor, Carnap, as can be learned from the letters he wrote to Kuhn. There are several reasons for this reaction. First, as noted by Friedman, there is a resemblance between Kuhnʼs notion of changing paradigms and Carnapʼs philosophical ideas. Logical empiricism is “logical” because of its central tenet that scientific knowledge is the organization of facts within a conceptual structure; the existence of an appropriate conceptual structure is a precondition for the very possibility of scientific inquiry. Unlike Kant, however, the logical empiricists believed that the conceptual. (shrink)

Thomas Kuhn’s The Structure of Scientific Revolutions offers an insightful and engaging theory of science that speaks to scholars across many disciplines. Though initially widely misunderstood, it had a profound impact on the way intellectuals and educated laypeople thought about science. K. Brad Wray traces the influences on Kuhn as he wrote Structure, including his ‘Aristotle epiphany’, his interactions, and his studies of the history of chemistry. Wray then considers the impact of Structure on the (...) social sciences, on the history of science, and on the philosophy of science, where the problem of theory change has set the terms of contemporary realism/anti-realism debates. He examines Kuhn’s frustrations with the Strong Programme sociologists’ appropriations of his views, and debunks several popular claims about what influenced Kuhn as he wrote Structure. His book is a rich and comprehensive assessment of one of the most influential works in the modern sciences. (shrink)

The aim of the paper is to clarify Kuhn’s theory of scientific revolutions. We propose to discriminate between a scientific revolution, which is a sociological event of a change of attitude of the scientific community with respect to a particular theory, and an epistemic rupture, which is a linguistic fact consisting of a discontinuity in the linguistic framework in which this theory is formulated. We propose a classification of epistemic ruptures into four types. In the paper, (...) each of these types of epistemic ruptures is illustrated by examples from physics. The classification of epistemic ruptures can be used as a basis for a classification of scientific revolutions and thus for a refinement of our view of the progress of science. (shrink)

I examine the influence of James B. Conant on the writing of Kuhn’s Structure of Scientific Revolutions. By clarifying Conant’s influence on Kuhn, I also clarify the influence that others had on Kuhn’s thinking. And by identifying the various influences that Conant had on Kuhn’s view of science, I identify Kuhn’s most original contributions in Structure. On the one hand, I argue that much of the framework and many of the concepts that figure in Structure (...) were part of Conant’s picture of science, a picture that figured prominently in the general education natural science courses that Conant taught at Harvard. On the other hand, I show that Kuhn’s Structure contains important contributions that do not figure in Conant’s picture of science. I argue that the following three themes in Structure do not originate with Conant: (1) the concept of “normal science”; (2) “the problem of scientific revolutions,” that is, the apparent threat posed by radical changes of theory in science; and (3) Kuhn’s emphasis on the social dimensions of science, specifically the social structure of research communities. (shrink)

Chiefly proceedings of a conference held in Aug. 2008 in Athens, Greece.

In his book Struktura rewolucji relatywistycznej i kwantowej w fizyce (The Structure of the Relativistic and Quantum Revolution in Physics, 2020), Wojciech Sady presents his vision of the two greatest scientific revolutions in the 20th century. The book provides an illuminating account of the way these revolutions proceeded and strongly supports the thesis that, contrary to Thomas Kuhn’s famous suggestions, the revolutions involved no breaches in the continuity in scientific development but progressed in an (...) evolutionary (although swift) step-by-step way, and were products of collective interactive processes in the scientific community rather than individual achievements of geniuses. On the other hand, it makes a number of controversial claims. In this article, I contest Sady’s claims that new scientific theories (including the most revolutionary ones) logically follow from the theoretical and experimental knowledge already available (the Entailment thesis) or, at least, their emergence is necessary, inevitable, given the available knowledge, the thought style of the scientific community, and some minimally necessary conditions for the development of science (the Necessitation thesis), and that the role of extra-logical and extra-empirical factors, that can be designated as “creative imagination,” in the development of science is either negative or neglectable. (shrink)

In this essay I argue that Kuhn's account of science, as it was articulated in The Structure of Scientific Revolutions, was mainly defended on philosophical rather than historical grounds. I thus lend support to Kuhn's later claim that his model can be derived from first principles. I propose a transcendental reading of his work and I suggest that Kuhn uses historical examples as anti-essentialist Wittgensteinian "reminders" that expose a variegated landscape in the development of science.

On scientific and moral revolutions -- Using the dead for the living: the benthamite moral revolution -- Immoralizing and criminalizing abortion: the doctors revolution -- Irredentism and counter-revolutions in geology and abortion -- The american bioethics revolution -- The structure of moral revolutions.