We argue that the common attribution to Zhuangzi of both perspectivalism or relativism on the one hand, and scepticism on the other is fundamentally mistaken. While granting that it is reasonable to construe Zhuangzi as offering a perspectiva! position on judgement, we argue that Zhuangzi's perspectivalism does not commit him to a relativist position on truth or to scepticism about human knowledge. Rather, we maintain that Zhuangzi's attacks on the concepts of truth and knowledge are better seen as his articulation (...) of a species of epistemological nihilism which rejects, as ultimately meaningless, the concepts of truth, reality, and knowledge. (shrink)

Zhuangzi often is portrayed as a kind of ethical relativist. This popular reading has been challenged by Philip Ivanhoe, who argues that Zhuangzi is not a relativist but rather that Zhuangzi articulates a normative theory of benignity. In this paper we argue against Ivanhoe’s interpretation. We further argue that Zhuangzi is an ethical nihilist, who rejects all ethical positions.

Locke believes that every mental act, event or state essentially involves ideas and that our only access to the world is through ideas. The theory of ideas, thus, is central to his philosophy, and understanding the epistemological and metaphysical positions developed in the Essay requires addressing it. This chapter discusses the importance of recognizing the theory's status as a proposed contribution to natural science. It emphasizes that ideas are representational contents of states of consciousness; this does not imply that they (...) are something distinct from those states; rather, they are those aspects or features of mental states which point beyond themselves. The chapter focuses on Locke's thesis that all of one's ideas are derived from experience. It highlights that the operation of comparing is dependent upon the brute ability of discernment, one of the simplest mental operations. (shrink)

Despite his protests, there have been numerous efforts to enroll Davidson in the deflationist program. Michael Williams has recently continued this enterprise, arguing that a truth‐theoretic Davidsonian approach to meaning can be harnessed to a deflationary approach to truth. It is our contention that Williams’ attempt is unsuccessful.

Much of the abortion debate has revolved around questions of the ontological status of the fetus: many liberals and conservatives agree that if the fetus is a person in the fullest sense of “person”, it would require very weighty reasons to justify killing it; if, on the other hand, the fetus is not a person in the fullest sense, considerations of less moment should suffice to justify killing it. Resolution of questions about the morality of abortion, thus, should be quite (...) straightforward: stipulate criteria of personhood and determine whether fetuses, in general, or some particular fetus satisfies those criteria. If a fetus satisfies them, it is a person in the fullest sense and has the same right to life as any other person; if it fails to satisfy those criteria, it is not a person in the fullest sense and, thus, does not have the same right to life as a person. Unfortunately, such a programme is easier envisaged than achieved. The literature is laden with controversial analyses of personhood, none of which are acceptable to all parties to the abortion controversy, and, thus, discussions of the morality of abortion continue at a shrill level; unable to find any common ground from which to initiate reasoned discourse the two sides talk past each other and no progress is made. (shrink)

Much of the abortion debate has revolved around questions of the ontological status of the fetus: many liberals and conservatives agree that if the fetus is a person in the fullest sense of “person”, it would require very weighty reasons to justify killing it; if, on the other hand, the fetus is not a person in the fullest sense, considerations of less moment should suffice to justify killing it. Resolution of questions about the morality of abortion, thus, should be quite (...) straightforward: stipulate criteria of personhood and determine whether fetuses, in general, or some particular fetus satisfies those criteria. If a fetus satisfies them, it is a person in the fullest sense and has the same right to life as any other person; if it fails to satisfy those criteria, it is not a person in the fullest sense and, thus, does not have the same right to life as a person. Unfortunately, such a programme is easier envisaged than achieved. The literature is laden with controversial analyses of personhood, none of which are acceptable to all parties to the abortion controversy, and, thus, discussions of the morality of abortion continue at a shrill level; unable to find any common ground from which to initiate reasoned discourse the two sides talk past each other and no progress is made. (shrink)

The theme of this book is that Hobbes's philosophy of language is best understood as part of his larger materialist program. Contemporary material in philosophy of language and philosophy of mind is used to argue for this interpretation of Hobbes.

BOOK REVIEWS 3oi phy with a capacity to produce "sudden illumination" - Relatively rarely does her own study offer the kind of original interpretation of specific propositions and doc- trines that frequently dominates the concerns of systematic commentators on Spinoza. Even when it does so, Lloyd generally provides little textual or argumentative defense for her reading. As a result, it would be difficult to cite a single proposition of the Ethics as one whose specific meaning must be interpreted differently as (...) a result of this book. What the book does instead, however, is something equally valuable: it regularly pro- duces the kind of "sudden illumination" that results not in a new interpretation of the narrow content of a particular proposition, but rather in a better understanding of the full significance of whole sets of propositions. For this reason, the book is an important contribution to our understanding of Spinoza -- and of ourselves. DON GARRETT University of Utah Vere.. (shrink)

This, paper argues that the debate between Mencius and Xunzi, as to whether human nature is intrinsically good or evil, represents not so much a disagreement as to the empirical facts of human nature as a disagreement over the nature of morality. Specifically, it argues that Mencius holds a virtue-theoretic conception of morality while Xunzi subscribes to a rule-based conception of morality. These differences in their conceptions of morality lead the two philosophers to radically different evaluations of human nature although (...) they are in substantial agreement as to the empirical facts of human nature. (shrink)