This chapter examines the series of drastic epistemological and methodological transformations in the status of hypotheses in British natural philosophy during the seventeenth century. It explains that hypotheses played a rather marginal role in Francis Bacon's methodological thought because he believed they lacked any physical content, although they occupied a centre stage in the Bacon-inspired natural philosophy program of Robert Boyle and Robert Hooke. The chapter mentions that Boyle and Hooke provided a new definition of hypothesis, which is that (...) of something conceived of as causally sufficient and probable explications of natural phenomena that stand in an evidential relation to the natural phenomena they serve to elucidate. (shrink)

This cross sectional study was carried out among the workers of British American Tobacco Company, Dhaka with a view to explore their nutritional status, personal hygiene and health seeking behavior as because they are working on a tobacco processing company. The sample size was 179 which were selected purposively. The study showed that out of 179 respondents 89 (49.7%) were in the age groups of 30-39 years and the mean age of the respondents were 31.99 ± 6.01 years. A (...) large number of respondents (55.9%) had monthly family income of Taka 10001-20000 and the mean family income was Taka 12776.54 ± 5230.13. Maximum respondents (73.7%) were Muslim, more than half (54.2%) were shift in charge, 39.1% of the respondents consisted of 4 family members, 43.6% respondents were accustomed to other type of eating habit and 38.5% respondents knew that malnutrition was the effect of lack of proper nutrition, 59.8% of the respondents knew that night blindness was the disease due to malnutrition, most of the respondents (91.6%) performed duties to maintain health, majority (62.0%) respondents used to do nothing to maintain healthcare for their children and 35.9% visited doctor’s single time in a month, 40.2% of the respondents told regular tooth brushing as type of healthy habits. Majority (64.8%) respondents used to brush twice a day, majority (50.8%) respondents used to wash hand after toileting, majority (62.08%) respondents used to bath daily, 43.0% and 31.8% of the respondents told that dysentery and diarrhea was due to eating without proper hand washing respectively. Majority (53.6%) respondents informed that they learned about personal hygiene from television, 45.8% respondents understood that use of safe water in every work as sanitation. Majority (50.84%) came from nuclear family; most (84.92%) had exercise habit and 40.22% had education level of class VIII. Most (75.42%) of the respondents had semi pucca houses and majority (69.83%) of the respondents used only water as materials for hand washing. This study provided some important information which might help the concerned authority to take appropriate measures to improve the health status of the workers. (shrink)

Organizations have neither a right to the vote nor a weighty right to life. We need not enfranchise Goldman Sachs. We should feel few scruples in dissolving Standard Oil. But they are not without rights altogether. We can owe it to them to keep our promises. We can owe them debts of gratitude. Thus, we can owe some things to organizations. But we cannot owe them everything we can owe to people. They seem to have a peculiar, fragmented moral (...) class='Hi'>status. What explains this? Individualistic views explain this in terms of individualistic notions alone. Such notions don’t invoke any distinctive features of organizations. They just invoke the features of individual members of organizations. Collectivistic views, instead, explain this in terms of collective notions alone. Such notions don’t invoke the features of individual members of organizations. They just invoke the features of those organizations. We argue that neither approach works. Instead, one needs to synthesize the two approaches. Some individual interests, we think, are distinctively collective. We, as individuals, have a distinctive interest in playing a part in successful collective action. From this, so we argue, flows the apparently peculiar, fragmented moral status of organizations. (shrink)

Intuitively, there is a close link between moral status and phenomenal consciousness. Taking the link seriously can serve as the basis of a proposal that appears to have a surprising number of theoretical benefits. This proposal is the moral option, according to which moral status is partly determinative of phenomenal consciousness, and phenomenal consciousness is sufficient for possession of a moral property I refer to as “moral status.” I argue for this view on the basis of its (...) ability to shed light on the distribution problem of determining which systems are phenomenally conscious. I explicate it by drawing on a theory of attributions of phenomenal consciousness, and considering its relationship to positions on the metaphysics of consciousness. I defend it against a series of objections, including three based on previous theories of the link between phenomenal consciousness and moral status. The moral option should, in my view, be a serious contender among theories of phenomenal consciousness. (shrink)

Gopal Sreenivasan’s “hybrid theory” states that a moral duty is directed toward an individual because her interests justify the assignment of control over the duty. An alternative “plain theory” states that the individual’s interests justify the duty itself. I argue that a strong moral status constraint explains Sreenivasan’s instrumentalization objection to a Razian plain theory but that his own model violates this constraint. I suggest how both approaches can be reformulated to satisfy the constraint, and I argue that a (...) reformulated plain theory can also avoid an insufficiency objection. The hybrid approach consequently has no clear advantage over the plain approach. (shrink)

Broadly speaking, an entity has moral status if and only if it or its interest matters morally for its own sake. Some philosophers, who think of moral status in terms of duties and rights owed to an entity, allow that moral status can come in degrees, with only some beings having status of the highest degree – that is, full moral status (FMS). We critically review the competing accounts of what qualifies one for FMS. Some (...) accounts demand cognitive sophistication, which excludes many children, while others are inclusive of children but fail by (a) putting children morally on a par with most animals (experiencing subject of a life), (b) invoking criteria of dubious moral relevance (potentiality, membership in a biological species), or (c) not securing impartial moral status (special relationships). We end with our own account, which attempts to rectify such problems, addressing specifically the moral status of children. (shrink)

The primitive conception is that the future already exists like a terra incognita which one can dimly make out with or without the help of the gods. This idea is at the basis of fatalism and of belief in prophets, oracles and astrologers. This ancient concept was replaced in the nineteenth century by the vocabulary of scientific determinism which said that actual beings can only function. If one knew in detail their structures and their movements, one could calculate the results (...) of their functioning with perfect precision. (shrink)

Herausgegeben von Walter Senner OP (Federf hrender Herausgeber), Kaspar Elm, Thomas Eggensperger OP, Isnard W. Frank OP, Ulrich Horst OP Mit neuen Methoden und Fragestellungen ist in den letzten Jahrzehnten die Erforschung der Geschichte der Bettelorden vorangetrieben und ihre ber die engere Ordens- und Kirchengeschichte hinausgehende Bedeutung f r Politik-, Wirtschafts- und Sozial-, f r Bildungs- und Geistesgeschichte herausgearbeitet worden. Zur Intensivierung und Koordinierung der sie ber hrenden Forschungen gibt die deutsche Dominikanerprovinz Teutonia die Reihe "Quellen und Forschungen zur Geschichte (...) des Dominikanerordens. Neue Folge" heraus. Auch in der Neuen Folge wird die Geschichte der Dominikaner im deutschen Sprachraum den Schwerpunkt bilden. Es werden auch wichtige Untersuchungen zur Ordensverfassung und Fr mmigkeit, zur Philosophie und Theologie aufgenommen, die f r den Dominikanerorden im Untersuchungsraum Verbindlichkeit oder Bedeutsamkeit hatten, selbst wenn die untersuchte Thematik ihrer Entstehung nach nicht speziell mit den deutschen Dominikanern und Dominikanerinnen zu tun hatte. Der Begriff Dominikanerorden wird in einem weiten Sinn verstanden. Alle Gemeinschaften, die nach rechtlicher Verfassung oder geistlicher Ausrichtung mit den Dominikanern zu tun hatten, werden ihm subsumiert: der Predigerorden, die dominikanischen Frauenkl ster und -gemeinschaften, die losen Verb nde der Dritten Orden sowie die verschiedenen Bruderschaften. Dem Zeitraum nach ist Forschungsgegenstand die Geschichte des Dominikanerordens von den Anf ngen bis in die unmittelbare Vergangenheit. Dabei ist auch gedacht an die Aufarbeitung von Entstehen und Geschichte der verschiedenen dominikanischen Frauengemeinschaften des 19. Jahrhunderts, die mit ihren religi sen und sozialen Aktivit ten in der sich rasch wandelnden Gesellschaft eine bedeutende, bisher meist untersch tzte Rolle spielten. Zum Lehrstuhl von P. Prof. Walter Senner OP: http: //philo.pust.op.org/prof/senner/index.html Zur Seite von Dr. theol. Thomas Eggensperger OP, M.A. http: //www.institut-chenu.eu. (shrink)

This paper offers several criticisms of the account of rightholding laid out in S. Matthew Liao’s recent paper “The Basis of Human Moral Status.” I argue that Liao’s account both does too much and too little: it grants rightholder status to those who may not deserve it, and it does not provide grounds for offering such status to those who arguably do deserve it. Given these troubling aspects of his approach, I encourage Liao to abandon his “physical (...) basis of moral agency” account of moral status and instead adopt a position closer to a traditional “speciesist” view. (shrink)

Many economists and philosophers assume that status quo bias is necessarily irrational. I argue that, in some cases, status quo bias is fully rational. I discuss the rationality of status quo bias on both subjective and objective theories of the rationality of preferences. I argue that subjective theories cannot plausibly condemn this bias as irrational. I then discuss one kind of objective theory, which holds that a conservative bias toward existing things of value is rational. This account (...) can fruitfully explain some compelling aspects of common sense morality, and it may justify status quo bias. (shrink)

If we were required to sacrifice our own interests whenever doing so was best overall, or prohibited from doing so unless it was optimal, then we would be mere sites for the realisation of value. Our interests, not ourselves, would wholly determine what we ought to do. We are not mere sites for the realisation of value — instead we, ourselves, matter unconditionally. So we have options to act suboptimally. These options have limits, grounded in the very same considerations. Though (...) not merely such sites, you and I are also sites for the realisation of value, and our interests (and ourselves) must therefore sometimes determine what others ought to do, in particular requiring them to bear reasonable costs for our sake. Likewise, just as my moral status grounds a requirement that others show me appropriate respect, so must I do to myself. (shrink)

Distrust in scientific experts can be surprisingly stubborn, persisting despite evidence supporting the experts’ views, demonstrations of their competence, or displays of good will. This stubborn distrust is often viewed as a manifestation of irrationality. By contrast, this article proposes a logic of “status distrust”: low-status individuals are objectively vulnerable to collective decision-making, and can justifiably distrust high-status scientific experts if they are not confident that the experts do not have their best interests at heart. In phenomena (...) of status distrust, social status is thus an indicator of distrust, and this has wider implications for the literatures on trust in science and on expert communication. (shrink)

Moral Status asks what creates moral obligations toward entities. Warren’s thesis is that attempts to ground moral status on a single criterion have been unsuccessful, as they inevitably lead to Procrustean measures to fit diverse values into a single mold. She proposes instead a “multi-criterial’ approach that promises to accommodate these values. In so doing, she expands and generalizes on a strategy she uses quite successfully in her 1990 article “The Moral Significance of Birth” to show why a (...) personhood approach to abortion need not imply the moral permissibility of infanticide. (shrink)

The study aims to analyze the changes in the status of rationality in the field of the New Rhetoric – the most influential direction in the modern theory of argumentation, which appeared in the 1960s with the scientific works of C. Perelman – L. Olbrechts – Titeka and S. Toulmin. The thesis presented is that the practices of contemporary public discourse find their most logical and comprehensive theoretical explanation in the teachings of the New Rhetoric, which change the traditional (...) status of rationality and transform it into a logic of practical philosophy. The novelties are ascertained by tracking the dynamics in the understanding of the main categories of argumentation – evidence, argumentation, deductive validity, evaluation criteria, arguments, facts, assumptions, values, consent. Perelman’s model of rational argumentation outlines the transition from logical to communicative rationality, which introduces the factors of contextuality and functionality; affirms the validity of a communicative reasonableness in which the mechanisms of thought are synchronized with the processes of language; introduces practical reasoning, which functions as a strategic interaction between logical thinking, imagination, and language. (shrink)

The field of mental health continues to struggle with the question of how best to structure its diagnostic systems. This issue is of considerable ethical importance, but the implications for public health approaches to mental health have yet to be explored in any detail. In this article I offer a preliminary treatment, drawing out several core issues while sounding a note of caution. A central strand of the debates over diagnosis has been the contrast between categorical and dimensional models, with (...) renewed attention due to recent publication of the DSM-5, launch of the RDoC, and ongoing work on the ICD-11. This dispute involves an interesting assortment of ethical and empirical considerations, many with direct relevance for public health. It has been proposed, for example, that dimensional diagnosis may be morally preferable because it can help reduce the stigma associated with mental disorder. This is a pressing concern, as preventive strategies are expanded in mental health, often operating under dimensional assumptions that target various risk factors. But this type of proposal relies upon an empirical claim and the scientific status of dimensionality remains unresolved, including its relation to stigma. I suggest, then, that the current state of the evidence does not yet warrant clear adjudication between competing frameworks, and thus any implications for public mental health remain highly provisional. More research is needed to help resolve these issues, including ethical analysis. (shrink)

Moral status is a vexing topic. Linked for so long to the unending debates about ensoulment and the morality of abortion, it has recently resurfaced in the embryonic stem cell controversy. In this new context, it should benefit from new insights originating in recent scientific advances. We believe that the recently observed capability of somatic cells to return to a pluripotential state (a capability we propose to name 'reversed potency') in a controlled manner requires us to modify the traditional (...) concept of moral status and to consider it as referring not only to intrinsic properties (like 'to possess reason' or 'to be a person'), but also to extrinsic or relational ones. (shrink)

Mary Anne Warren investigates a theoretical question that is at the centre of practical and professional ethics: what are the criteria for having moral status? That is: what does it take to be an entity towards which people have moral considerations? Warren argues that no single property will do as a sole criterion, and puts forward seven basic principles which establish moral status. She then applies these principles to three controversial moral issues: voluntary euthanasia, abortion, and the (...) class='Hi'>status of non-human animals. (shrink)

Traditions and transformations of legal ethics -- Conceptions of legal ethics -- Multi-dimensional theory of legal ethics -- Legal ethics and some theoretical models of law -- Legal ethics among legal sciences.

Some people contend that fetuses have moral status but less than that of paradigm persons. Many people hold views implying that sentient animals have moral status but less than that of persons. These positions suggest that moral status admits of degrees. Does it? To address this question, we must first clarify what it means to speak of degrees of moral status. The paper begins by clarifying the more basic concept of moral status and presenting two (...) models of degrees of moral status. It then sketches several significant considerations in favor of, and several against, the assertion of degrees of moral status. The paper concludes by drawing lessons from the discussion. (shrink)

This paper critically examines Coeckelbergh’s (2023) performative view of moral status. Drawing parallels to Searle’s social ontology, two key claims of the performative view are identified: (1) Making a moral status claim is equivalent to making a moral status declaration. (2) A successful declaration establishes the institutional fact that the entity has moral status. Closer examination, however, reveals flaws in both claims. The second claim faces a dilemma: individual instances of moral status declaration are likely (...) to fail because they do not conform to established moral discourse conventions, and reliance on declarations becomes both unnecessary and implausible for explaining widespread collective recognition of moral status. As for the first claim, accepting it undermines the potential for meaningful moral disagreement. As a remedy, this paper proposed a shift in perspective: interpreting moral status claims as assertions rather than declarations. This refined perspective provides a more plausible framework for understanding moral status and avoids the pitfalls associated with the performative view. (shrink)

The postwar welfare state provides social insurance against economic, health, and related risks in an uncertain world. Because everyone can envision themselves to be among the unfortunate, social insurance fuses self-interest and solidarism in a normative principle Friedman (2020) calls probabilistic justice. But there is a competing principle of status defense, where the aim is to erect boundaries between socioeconomic strata and discourage cross-class mobility. We argue that this principle dominates when inequality is high and uncertainty low. The current (...) moment is one of high inequality and high uncertainty, which results in intense status anxiety, yet does not rule out solidaristic solutions. Our contributions are to diagnose the causes of our current malaise, and to theorize the normative bases for the political choice facing contemporary western democracies. (shrink)

Some people contend that fetuses have moral status but less than that of paradigm persons. Many people hold views implying that sentient animals have moral status but less than that of persons. These positions suggest that moral status admits of degrees. Does it? To address this question, we must first clarify what it means to speak of degrees of moral status. The paper begins by clarifying the more basic concept of moral status and presenting two (...) models of degrees of moral status. It then sketches several significant considerations in favor of, and several against, the assertion of degrees of moral status. The paper concludes by drawing lessons from the discussion. (shrink)

In the literature on social ontology, two perspectives on collective agency have been developed. The first is the internal perspective, the second the external one. The internal perspective takes the point of view of the members as its point of departure and appeals, inter alia, to the joint intentions they form. The idea is that collective agents perform joint actions such as dancing the tango, organizing prayer meetings, or performing symphonies. Such actions are generated by joint intentions, a topic which (...) has been investigated extensively in recent decades.1 The external perspective takes the point of view of outsiders as its point of departure. Here the idea is that outsiders ascribe certain properties to collections of individuals that thereby acquire a new status. An example that is discussed in some detail below is provided by universities that, at least initially, had to be recognized by the pope in order to perform the actions that are characteristic of universities, in particular the awarding of academic degrees. This perspective has received considerably less attention.2 In this paper I present and defend a new account of collective agents from the external perspective. I call it ‘the status account’. At the heart of this account lies the idea just mentioned. A collective agent can come into existence by outsiders granting a collection of individuals some kind of status. I call a collective agent for which this holds a ‘corporate agent’, because such an agent is or has been, in a sense to be explained, incorporated. I develop this idea by distinguishing between two kinds of rules: status rules and constitutive rules. Status rules explicate the normative attributes that are characteristic of a particular kind of corporate agent. Constitutive rules specify the conditions that have to be met for a certain collection of individuals to have those attributes. The status account shares some important features with John Searle’s social ontology.3 The advantages that my account has over Searle’s are discussed in section 2.2, immediately after the account has been introduced in section 2.1. Before doing that, however, I shall discuss the internal perspective.. (shrink)

Status in an organization is considered a significant antecedent to an employee's work-related behaviors. However, the relationship between knowledge workers' informal status and "taking charge" has been ignored in previous human resource management (HRM) research. Based on the self-consistency theory, this study examines the mechanisms underlying the influence of knowledge workers’ informal status on taking charge. Data were collected from 337 dyads of employees and their immediate supervisors in 24 enterprises and companies. Based on moderated mediation analysis, (...) results indicated that knowledge workers’ informal status is positively related to taking charge and organization-based self-esteem (OBSE). OBSE fully mediated the relationship between knowledge workers’ informal status and taking charge, while person-job fit (P-J fit) and person-supervisor fit (P-S fit) each moderated the relationship between knowledge workers’ informal status and OBSE, in addition to the indirect effect of knowledge workers’ informal status on taking charge. Specifically, the indirect effect was strongest when P-J fit or P-S fit was high. The theoretical and managerial implications of the findings, limitations of the study, and future research directions are discussed. (shrink)

This chapter contains sections titled: What is Moral Status? The Moral Agency Theory The Genetic Humanity Theory The Sentience Theory The Organic Life Theory Two Relationship‐based Theories Combining these Criteria Principles of Moral Status Human Zygotes, Embryos, and Fetuses Are All Animals Equal? Machines and Artificial Life‐forms Conclusion.

‘사마타(samatha, 止)’와 ‘위빠사나(vipassanā, 觀)’는 불교 명상을 의미하는 대표적인 술어의 하나로서 초기불교에서 후기불교의 경론에 이르기까지 지속적으로 나타나고 있다. 이것은 바로 ‘사마타/위빠사나’ 개념이 다양한 불교 명상법의 핵심적 의미를 드러내주는 위치에 있음을 보여주고 있다.BR 이 글은 지금까지 사마타/위빠사나 명상의 의미와 그 체계를 분석한 연구에서 초기아비달마의 문헌들에 대한 분석이 전혀 시도되지 않았던 사정을 고려하여 『구사론』과 『청정도론』 이전의 논의구조, 즉 ‘사마타/위빠사나’라는 불교명상의 해석 구도가 어떻게 전개되었는지를 살펴보려는 하나의 시도이다.BR 이 글에서는 남북 양전의 7론을 ‘초기아비달마 논서’로 부르며, 이들 문헌에 나타난 사마타/위빠사나의 개념 분석을 연구의 중심으로 삼는다. (...) 이는 초기불교 경전들에서 자리매김 된 사마타/위빠사나 명상법이 아비달마 시대에 와서 어떤 측면에서 동일성과 차별성이 드러나고 있는지에 주목하여 사상사적 추이를 분석하려는 작업이다. 이 결과는 사마타/위빠사나 명상의 의미와 그 위상을 파악하는 데 하나의 실마리를 제공할 수 있을 것이다.BR 초기 아비달마 문헌 분석의 결과를 정리하면, 먼저 사마타는 탐욕, 의도, 감정 등의 부적절한 마음 상태의 그침 또는 멈춤을 지향한다. 위빠사나는 좀 더 분명하고 구체적인 언어들을 동원하고 있는데 이들의 의미를 종합해보면, 앎, 반성적이고 철학적인 사유를 포괄하고, 명상수행이 실제로 전개되고 있는 바로 그 지점을 지속적으로 인지하여 수행이 원만하게 진행될 수 있도록 기능하는 역할을 감당하고 있는 것이다. (shrink)

Debates about the moral status of social robots (SRs) currently face a second-order, or metatheoretical impasse. On the one hand, moral individualists argue that the moral status of SRs depends on their possession of morally relevant properties. On the other hand, moral relationalists deny that we ought to attribute moral status on the basis of the properties that SRs instantiate, opting instead for other modes of reflection and critique. This paper develops and defends a pragmatic approach which (...) aims to reconcile these two positions. The core of this proposal is that moral individualism and moral relationalism are best understood as distinct deliberative strategies for attributing moral status to SRs, and that both are worth preserving insofar as they answer to different kinds of practical problems that we face as moral agents. (shrink)

One striking oddity about Democritus and Epicurus is that, even though Epicurus' theory of perception is largely the same as that of Democritus, Democritus and his followers draw skeptical conclusions from this theory of perception, whereas Epicurus declares that all perceptions are true or real. I believe that the dispute between Democritus and Epicurus stems from a question over what sort of ontological status should be assigned to sensible qualities. In this paper, I address three questions: 1) Why were (...) Democritus and his followers skeptical? 2) How did Epicurus modify Democritus' metaphysics in order to avoid these skeptical conclusions? and 3) How successful was he? -/- 1) I argue that Democritus allows only the intrinsic properties of atoms into his ontology, and then runs into skeptical difficulties because of the relativity of perception. 2) I propose that Epicurus modifies Democritus' ontology by allowing dispositional and relational properties as real properties of bodies. Sensible qualities are conceptualized as dispositional properties of bodies to cause certain experiences in percipients. 3) I argue that Epicurus does not run into the same problems as Democritus. Finally, I consider how my interpretation of Epicurus' ontology helps to make sense of his claim that all perceptions are alethes--'true' or 'real.'. (shrink)

This article discusses what is involved in having full moral status, as opposed to a lesser degree of moral status and surveys different views of the grounds of moral status as well as the arguments for attributing a particular degree of moral status on the basis of those grounds.

In this article, we discuss Beauchamp and Childress’s treatment of the issue of moral status. In particular, we introduce the five different perspectives on moral status that Beauchamp and Childress consider in Principles of Biomedical Ethics and explain their alternative to those perspectives, raise some critical questions about their approach, and offer a different way to think about one of the five theories of moral status that is more in line with what we believe some of its (...) leading advocates affirm. (shrink)

Summary Recent research has highlighted the risk of HIV infection for married teenage women compared with their unmarried counterparts (Clark, 2004). This study assesses whether a relationship exists, for women who have completed their adolescence (age 20–29 years), between HIV status with age at first marriage and the length of time between first sex and first marriage. Multivariate analysis utilizing the nationally representative 2004 Cameroon Demographic and Health Survey shows that late-marrying women and those with a longer period of (...) pre-marital sex have the highest risk of HIV. Although women in urban areas overall marry later than their rural counterparts, the positive relationship between age at marriage and HIV risk is stronger in rural areas. The higher wealth status and greater number of lifetime sexual partners of late-marrying women contribute to their higher HIV risk. Given that the age at first marriage and the gap between first marriage and first sex have increased in recent years, focusing preventive efforts on late-marrying women will be of much importance in reducing HIV prevalence among females. (shrink)

Consciousness has an important role in ethics: when a being consciously experiences the frustration or satisfaction of its interests, those interests deserve higher moral priority than those of a behaviourally similar but non-conscious being. I consider the relationship between this ethical role and an a posteriori (or “type-B”) materialist solution to the mind-body problem. It is hard to avoid the conclusion that, if type-B materialism is correct, then the reference of the concept of phenomenal consciousness is radically indeterminate between a (...) neuronal-level property that is distinctive to mammals and a high-level functional property that is much more widely shared. This would leave many non-mammalian animals (such as birds, fish, insects and octopuses) with indeterminate moral status. There are ways to manage this radical moral indeterminacy, but all of these ways lead to profoundly troubling consequences. (shrink)