To make behavioral choices that are in line with our goals and our moral beliefs, we need to gather and consider information about our current situation. Most information present in our environment is not relevant to the choices we need or would want to make and thus could interfere with our ability to behave in ways that reflect our underlying values. Certain sources of information could even lead us to make choices we later regret, and thus it would be beneficial (...) to be able to ignore that information. Our ability to exert successful self-governance depends on our ability to attend to sources of information that we deem important to our decision-making processes. We generally assume that, at any moment, we have the ability to choose what we pay attention to. However, recent research indicates that what we pay attention to is influenced by our prior experiences, including reward history and past successes and failures, even when we are not aware of this history. Even momentary distractions can cause us to miss or discount information that should have a greater influence on our decisions given our values. Such biases in attention thus raise questions about the degree to which the choices that we make may be poorly informed and not truly reflect our ability to otherwise exert self-governance. (shrink)

In this paper we argue that predictive processing (PP) theory cannot account for the phenomenon of affect-biased attention prioritized attention to stimuli that are affectively salient because of their associations with reward or punishment. Specifically, the PP hypothesis that selective attention can be analyzed in terms of the optimization of precision expectations cannot accommodate affect-biased attention; affectively salient stimuli can capture our attention even when precision expectations are low. We review the prospects of three recent attempts to accommodate affect (...) with tools internal to PP theory: Miller and Clark’s (2018) embodied inference; Seth’s (2013) interoceptive inference; and Joffily and Coricelli’s (2013) rate of change of free energy. In each case we argue that the account does not resolve the challenge from affect-biased attention. For this reason, we conclude that prediction error minimization is not sufficient to explain all mental phenomena, contrary to the claim that the PP framework provides a unified theory of all mental phenomena or the brain ‘s cognitive functioning. Nevertheless, we suggest that empirical investigation of the interaction between affective salience and precision expectations should prove helpful in understanding the limits of PP theory, and may provide new directions for the application of a Bayesian perspective to perception. (shrink)

We examined a large set of conditional inference data compiled from several previous studies and asked three questions: How is normative performance related to intelligence? Does negative conclusion bias stem from Type 1 or Type 2 processing? Does implicit negation bias stem from Type 1 or Type 2 processing? Our analysis demonstrated that rejecting denial of the antecedent and affirmation of the consequent inferences was positively correlated with intelligence, while endorsing modus tollens inferences was not; that the occurrence (...) of negative conclusion bias was related to the extent of Type 2 processing; and that the occurrence of implicit negation bias was not related to the extent of Type 2 processing. We conclude that negative conclusion bias is, at least in part, a product of Type 2 processing, while implicit negation bias is not. (shrink)

Redish et al. view addictions as errors arising from the weak access points of the system of decision-making. They do not analytically distinguish between addictions, on the one hand, and errors highlighted by behavioural decision theory, such as over-confidence, representativeness heuristics, conjunction fallacy, and so on, on the other. Redish et al.'s decision-making framework may not be comprehensive enough to capture addictions.

Attention is automatically allocated to stimuli that are opposite in valence to the current motivational focus (Rothermund, 2003; Rothermund, Voss, & Wentura, 2008). We tested whether this incongruency effect is due to affective–motivational counter-regulation or to an increased salience of stimuli that mismatch with cognitively activated information. Affective processing biases were assessed with a search task in which participants had to detect the spatial position at which a positive or negative stimulus was presented. In the motivational condition, positive (...) or negative affective–motivational states were induced by performance feedback after each trial. In the cognitive activation condition, participants memorised the word “good” or “bad” during the search task. The affective incongruency effect was replicated in the motivational condition, whereas an affective congruency effect obtained in the cognitive activation condition. These findings support an explanation of affective incongruency effects in terms of automatic counter-regulation that is motivational in nature. (shrink)

Niche construction theory highlights the active role of organisms in modifying their environment. A subset of these modifications is the developmental niche, which concerns ecological, epistemic, social and symbolic legacies inherited by organisms as resources that scaffold their developmental processes. Since in this theory development is a situated process that takes place in a culturally structured environment, we may reasonably ask if implicit cultural biases may, in some cases, be responsible for maladaptive developmental niches. In this paper we wish (...) to argue for an affirmative answer. In order to do so, we first propose to conceptualize implicit bias as embodied perceptual habits, and then proceed to show that these habits are at least partially responsible for maladaptive developmental niches of children with Down syndrome and autism. With this framework we thus hope to bring together two fields of research that haven’t been explicitly connected: implicit bias and niche construction theory. Linking these two theories may bring benefits both to implicit bias researchers, who can extend this concept to characterize other sets of processes as biased, as well as to niche construction theorists, who will have a useful theoretical tool to diagnose maladaptive features of niches brought about by sociocultural biases. (shrink)

Algorithmic biases, or algorithmic unfairness, have been a topic of public and scientific scrutiny for the past years, as increasing evidence suggests the pervasive assimilation of human cognitive biases and stereotypes in such systems. This research is specifically concerned with analyzing the presence of discursive biases in the text generated by GPT-3, an NLPM which has been praised in recent years for resembling human language so closely that it is becoming difficult to differentiate between the human and (...) the algorithm. The pertinence of this research object is substantiated by the identification of race, gender and religious biases in the model’s completions in recent research, suggesting that the model is indeed heavily influenced by human cognitive biases. To this end, this research inquires: How does the Natural Language Processing Model GPT-3 replicate existing social biases?. This question is addressed through the scrutiny of GPT-3’s completions using Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA), a method which has been deemed as amply valuable for this research as it is aimed at uncovering power asymmetries in language. As such, the analysis is specifically centered around the analysis of gender and race biases in the model’s generated text. Research findings suggest that GPT-3’s language generation model significantly exacerbates existing social biases while replicating dangerous ideologies akin to white supremacy and hegemonic masculinity as factual knowledge. (shrink)

Research misconduct is of growing concern within the scientific community. As a result, organizations must identify effective approaches to training for ethics in research. Previous research has suggested that biases and compensatory strategies may represent important influences on the ethical decision-making process. The present effort investigated a training intervention targeting these variables. The results of the intervention are presented, as well as a description of accompanying exercises tapping self-reflection, sensemaking, and forecasting and their differential effectiveness on transfer to an (...) ethical decision-making task. (shrink)

For almost half a century dual-stream advocates have vigorously defended the view that there are two functionally specialized cortical streams of visual processing originating in the primary visual cortex: a ventral, perception-related ‘conscious’ stream and a dorsal, action-related ‘unconscious’ stream. They furthermore maintain that the perceptual and memory systems in the ventral stream are relatively shielded from the action system in the dorsal stream. In recent years, this view has come under scrutiny. Evidence points to two overlapping action pathways: (...) a dorso-dorsal pathway that calculates features of the object to be acted on, and a ventro-dorsal pathway that transmits stored information about skilled object use from the ventral stream to the dorso-dorsal pathway. This evidence suggests that stored information may exert significantly more influence on visually guided action than hitherto assumed. I argue that this, in turn, supports the notion of skilled automatic action that is nonetheless agential. My focus here will be on actions influenced by implicit biases (stereotypes/prejudices). Action that is biased in this way, I argue, is in an important sense intentional and agential. (shrink)

BackgroundThis study explored the proportion of variance in depressive symptoms explained by processes targeted by BA, and processes targeted by cognitive control training.MethodsFive hundred and twenty adults were recruited. They completed a spatial cueing task as a measure of attentional biases and a cognitive task as a measure of cognitive control and completed self-report measures of activation, behavioral avoidance, anticipatory pleasure, brooding, and depressive symptoms. With path analysis models, we explored the relationships between these predictors and depressive symptoms.ResultsBA processes (...) were significant predictors of depressive symptoms, and activation partially predicted anticipatory pleasure, which in turn predicted depressive symptoms. However, cognitive control and attentional biases predicted neither brooding nor depressive symptoms. A comprehensive model including all processes fit the data but did not explain more of the variance in brooding or depressive symptoms than a model including only BA processes.LimitationsThe spatial cueing task was associated with low reliability and the use of a non-clinical sample limited the generalizability of the conclusions.ConclusionActivation, behavioral avoidance, brooding, and anticipatory pleasure are relevant processes to target in order to reduce depressive symptoms, while cognitive control and attentional biases are not. (shrink)

Prospective memory (PM) enables people to remember to complete important tasks in the future. Failing to do so can result in consequences of varying severity. Here, we investigated how PM error-consequence severity impacts the neural processing of relevant cues for triggering PM and the ramification of that processing on the associated prospective task performance. Participants role-played a cafeteria worker serving lunches to fictitious students and had to remember to deliver an alternative lunch to students (as PM cues) who (...) would otherwise experience a moderate or severe aversive reaction. Scalp-recorded, event-related potential (ERP) measures showed that the early-latency frontal positivity, reflecting the perception-based neural responses to previously learned stimuli, did not differ between the severe versus moderate PM cues. In contrast, the longer-latency parietal positivity, thought to reflect full PM cue recognition and post retrieval processes, was elicited earlier by the severe than the moderate PM cues. This faster instantiation of the parietal positivity to the severe-consequence PM cues was then followed by faster and more accurate behavioral responses. These findings indicate how the relative importance of a PM can be neurally instantiated in the form of enhanced and faster PM cue recognition and processing and culminate into better PM. (shrink)

ABSTRACTThis is the first study to investigate multiple cognitive biases in adolescence simultaneously, to examine whether anxiety and depression are associated with biases in attention and interpretation, and whether these biases are able to predict unique variance in self-reported levels of anxiety and depression. A total of 681 adolescents performed a Dot Probe Task, an Emotional Visual Search Task, and an Interpretation Recognition Task. Attention and interpretation biases were significantly correlated with anxiety. Mixed results were reported (...) with regard to depression: evidence was found for an interpretation bias, and for an attention bias as measured with the EVST but not with the DPT. Furthermore, interpretation and attention biases predicted unique variance in anxiety and depression scores. These results indicate that attention and interpretation biases are unique processes in anxiety and depression. They also suggest that anxiety and depression are partly based on similar underlying... (shrink)

Heuristics are efficient cognitive processes that ignore information. In contrast to the widely held view that less processing reduces accuracy, the study of heuristics shows that less information, computation, and time can in fact improve accuracy. We review the major progress made so far: the discovery of less-is-more effects; the study of the ecological rationality of heuristics, which examines in which environments a given strategy succeeds or fails, and why; an advancement from vague labels to computational models of heuristics; (...) the development of a systematic theory of heuristics that identifies their building blocks and the evolved capacities they exploit, and views the cognitive system as relying on an “adaptive toolbox;” and the development of an empirical methodology that accounts for individual differences, conducts competitive tests, and has provided evidence for people’s adaptive use of heuristics. Homo heuristicus has a biased mind and ignores part of the available information, yet a biased mind can handle uncertainty more efficiently and robustly than an unbiased mind relying on more resource-intensive and general-purpose processing strategies. (shrink)

Is our case strong enough to go to trial? Will interest rates go up? Can I trust this person? Such questions - and the judgments required to answer them - are woven into the fabric of everyday experience. This book, first published in 2002, examines how people make such judgments. The study of human judgment was transformed in the 1970s, when Kahneman and Tversky introduced their 'heuristics and biases' approach and challenged the dominance of strictly rational models. Their work (...) highlighted the reflexive mental operations used to make complex problems manageable and illuminated how the same processes can lead to both accurate and dangerously flawed judgments. The heuristics and biases framework generated a torrent of influential research in psychology - research that reverberated widely and affected scholarship in economics, law, medicine, management, and political science. This book compiles the most influential research in the heuristics and biases tradition since the initial collection of 1982. (shrink)

This paper examines the emergence of a new approach to stratigraphic complexity, first in geology and then, following its creative appropriation, in paleobiology. The approach was associated with a set of models that together transformed stratigraphic geology in the decades following 1970. These included the influential models of depositional sequences developed by Peter Vail and others at Exxon. Transposed into paleobiology, they gave researchers new resources for studying the incompleteness of the fossil record and for removing biases imposed by (...) the processes of sedimentary accumulation. In addition, they helped reconfigure the cultural landscape of paleobiology, consolidating a growing emphasis on fieldwork and eroding the barrier that had been erected in the 1970s between “paleontology” and “paleobiology.” This paper traces these developments, paying special attention to the simulation models of stratigraphic paleobiologist Steven Holland. It also considers how the integration of sequence and event stratigraphy and paleobiology has begun to influence long-running discussions of incompleteness and bias in the fossil record. (shrink)

Previous research has shown that algorithmic decisions can reflect gender bias. The increasingly widespread utilization of algorithms in critical decision-making domains (e.g., healthcare or hiring) can thus lead to broad and structural disadvantages for women. However, women often experience bias and discrimination through human decisions and may turn to algorithms in the hope of receiving neutral and objective evaluations. Across three studies (N = 1107), we examine whether women’s receptivity to algorithms is affected by situations in which they believe that (...) their gender identity might disadvantage them in an evaluation process. In Study 1, we establish, in an incentive-compatible online setting, that unemployed women are more likely to choose to have their employment chances evaluated by an algorithm if the alternative is an evaluation by a man rather than a woman. Study 2 generalizes this effect by placing it in a hypothetical hiring context, and Study 3 proposes that relative algorithmic objectivity, i.e., the perceived objectivity of an algorithmic evaluator over and against a human evaluator, is a driver of women’s preferences for evaluations by algorithms as opposed to men. Our work sheds light on how women make sense of algorithms in stereotype-relevant domains and exemplifies the need to provide education for those at risk of being adversely affected by algorithmic decisions. Our results have implications for the ethical management of algorithms in evaluation settings. We advocate for improving algorithmic literacy so that evaluators and evaluatees (e.g., hiring managers and job applicants) can acquire the abilities required to reflect critically on algorithmic decisions. (shrink)

How can self-deception avoid intention and conscious recognition? Nine processes of self-deception seem to involve biased links between plausible ideas. These processes allow self-deceivers to regard individual conclusions as fair and reasonable. Bias is only detected by comparing broad patterns, which individual self-deceivers will not do.

Biases in cognition are ubiquitous. Social psychologists suggested biases and stereotypes serve a multifarious set of cognitive goals, while at the same time stressing their potential harmfulness. Recently, biases and stereotypes became the purview of heated debates in the machine learning community too. Researchers and developers are becoming increasingly aware of the fact that some biases, like gender and race biases, are entrenched in the algorithms some AI applications rely upon. Here, taking into account several (...) existing approaches that address the problem of implicit biases and stereotypes, we propose that a strategy to cope with this phenomenon is to unmask those found in AI systems by understanding their cognitive dimension, rather than simply trying to correct algorithms. To this extent, we present a discussion bridging together findings from cognitive science and insights from machine learning that can be integrated in a state-of-the-art semantic network. Remarkably, this resource can be of assistance to scholars (e.g., cognitive and computer scientists) while at the same time contributing to refine AI regulations affecting social life. We show how only through a thorough understanding of the cognitive processes leading to biases, and through an interdisciplinary effort, we can make the best of AI technology. (shrink)

This paper presents a new solution to the well-known exchange paradox, or what is sometimes referred to as the two-envelope paradox. Many recent commentators have analyzed the paradox in terms of the agent’s biased concern for the contents of his own arbitrarily chosen envelope, claiming that such bias violates the manifest symmetry of the situation. Such analyses, however, fail to make clear exactly how the symmetry of the situation is violated by the agent’s hypothetical conclusion that he ought to switch (...) envelopes on the assumption that his own envelope contains some specific amount of money. In this paper, I offer an explanation of this fact based on the idea that the agent’s deliberations are not only constrained by the epistemic symmetry reflected in the agent’s uniform ignorance as to the contents of the two envelopes, but also by a deeper methodological symmetry that manifests itself in the intuition that the two envelopes constitute equally legitimate sources of potential information. I interpret this intuition as implying that the agent’s final decision should reflect a point of rational equilibrium arrived at through an iterated process of counterfactual self-reflection, whereby the agent takes account of what he would have thought had he instead chosen the other envelope. I provide a formal model of this method of counterfactual self-reflection and show, in particular, that it cannot issue in the paradoxical conclusion that the agent ought to switch regardless of how much money is in his envelope. In this way, by correcting for the bias in the agent’s reasoning, the paradox is resolved. (shrink)

This article argues that basic ethical principles of U.S. journalism as described in the Society of Professional Journalists' Code of Ethics are the result of, and a response to, cognitive bias and error. Cognitive biases and errors necessitate journalistic best practices to correct or attenuate them. Social cognitive processes explored include stereotyping, confirmation bias, and attribution. These concepts are noteworthy because each may be activated by the practice of journalism, and each has been shown to be susceptible to attenuation (...) through specific practices. The article concludes with ideas for integrating cognition into journalism education. (shrink)

The origin and evolutionary dynamics of the spatial heterogeneity in genomic base composition have been debated since its discovery in the 1970s. With the recent availability of numerous genome sequences from a wide range of species it has been possible to address this question from a comparative perspective, and similarities and differences in base composition between groups of organisms are becoming evident. Ample evidence suggests that the contrasting dynamics of base composition are driven by GC‐biased gene conversion (gBGC), a process (...) that is associated with meiotic recombination. In line with this hypothesis, base composition is associated with the rate of recombination and the evolutionary dynamics of the recombination landscape, therefore, governs base composition. In addition, and at first sight perhaps surprisingly, the relationship between demography and genomic base composition is in agreement with the gBGC hypothesis: organisms with larger populations have higher GC content than those with smaller populations. (shrink)

Machine learning systems have shown great potential for performing or supporting inferential reasoning through analyzing large data sets, thereby potentially facilitating more informed decision-making. However, a hindrance to such use of ML systems is that the predictive models created through ML are often complex, opaque, and poorly understood, even if the programs “learning” the models are simple, transparent, and well understood. ML models become difficult to trust, since lay-people, specialists, and even researchers have difficulties gauging the reasonableness, correctness, and reliability (...) of the inferences performed. In this article, we argue that bridging this gap in the understanding of ML models and their reasonableness requires a focus on developing an improved methodology for their creation. This process has been likened to “alchemy” and criticized for involving a large degree of “black art,” owing to its reliance on poorly understood “best practices”. We soften this critique and argue that the seeming arbitrariness often is the result of a lack of explicit hypothesizing stemming from an empiricist and myopic focus on optimizing for predictive performance rather than from an occult or mystical process. We present some of the problems resulting from the excessive focus on optimizing generalization performance at the cost of hypothesizing about the selection of data and biases. We suggest embedding ML in a general logic of scientific discovery similar to the one presented by Charles Sanders Peirce, and present a recontextualized version of Peirce’s scientific hypothesis adjusted to ML. (shrink)

This article conceptualizes the evolution of the German political economy as the codevelopment of technological and institutional change. The notion of skill-biased liberalization is introduced to capture this process and contrasted with the two dominant theoretical frameworks employed in contemporary comparative political economy scholarship—dualization and liberalization. Integrating theories from labor economics, the article argues that the increasing centrality of high skills complementary in production to information and communications technology has weakened the traditional complementarity among specific skills, regulated industrial relations, and (...) generous social protection in core sectors. The liberalization of industrial relations and social protection is shown in fact to be instrumental for high-end exporting firms to concentrate wages and benefits on increasingly important high-skilled workers. Strong evidence based on descriptive statistics, union and industry documents, and twenty-one elite interviews is found in support of the article’s alternative perspective. (shrink)