In Plato's "Philebus" Socrates and Protarchus dispute whether pleasure, like belief, can be false. Their dispute illustrates a broader pattern of disagreement between them about how to evaluate pleasure. Of two contrasting conceptions of false pleasure-derived from work by Bernard Williams and by Sabina Lovibond respectively-false pleasure of the Lovibond type best answers the challenge to which Protarchus' resistance gives rise. Socrates' own example of false pleasure may be read in this way, in contrast to its prevailing interpretation, and (...) this alternative reading seems better suited to the argument's context, both immediate and distant. (shrink)

A translation of Plato's dialogue on the nature of pleasure and its relation to thought and knowledge. It includes a cogent introduction, notes, and comprehensive bibliography.

At Philebus 23c4-26d10 Socrates makes a division into three kinds: Unbounded (apeiron), Bound (peras), and Mix (meikton). I review problems for the main interpretations of Unbounded and Mix and review kinds of scales defined in abstract measurement theory. Then I take 23c4-26d10 speech by speech, interpreting the Unbounded as a kind containing partial scales, Bound as the kind containing the relations and quantities needed to turn partial scales into appropriate ratio scales, and Mix as the kind containing ratio scales (...) appropriate for the good things that come to be in the world. (shrink)

Is virtue teachable? What should we value as an ideal? Is pleasure or perception the highest good that ought to be the object of our lives? Three of Plato's most important dialogues are brought together in a single volume to address these concerns which continue to occupy serious minds today. In the Protagoras Plato attempts to answer questions about the nature of virtue and whether it is inherent in humans or a subject capable of being taught. In the Philebus (...) he addresses the nature and content of the good and whether wisdom or pleasure is to be preferred. The Gorgias applies what is learned from the previous discussions to address larger issues, such as the proper functioning of society and the state and the individual's appropriate place within them. (shrink)

Plato's brainchild, the Philebus discusses the good human life and the claims of pleasure on the one hand and a cluster containing intelligence, wisdom, and right opinion on the other in connection with that life. The article talks about the notions of good human life and the pleasures surrounding it. Plato includes extended treatment of metaphysics and methodology: this is his typical supplement to the procedure of his own Socratic dialogues, which considered human questions in isolation from other issues. (...) Despite several interpretations, the text remains largely elusive. After a long discourse, both Socrates and Philebus arrive at a conclusion that a mixed life, containing both reason and pleasure is what we all should desire and it is the best option for all. (shrink)

The _Philebus _is the only Platonic dialogue that takes as its central theme the fundamental Socratic question of the good, understood as that which makes for the best or happiest life. This predominantly ethical theme not only involves an extended psychological and epistemological investigation of topics such as sensation, memory, desire, anticipation, the truth and falsity of pleasures, and types and gradations of knowledge, but also a methodological exposition of dialectic and a metaphysical schema, found nowhere else in the dialogues, (...) that is intended to illuminate the nature of mixture. In its interweaving of ethical, metaphysical, and epistemological topics, the _Philebus_ offers a unique opportunity to assess the relation of these topics in Plato’s mature thought and so to gain insight into his philosophical vision as a whole. An introduction that provides guidance in the reading of Platonic dialogues and of this dialogue in particular. Following the translation is an appendix of parallel passages from other Platonic dialogues as well as related material from Aristotle, the Stoics, and Epicurus. (shrink)

The sentence setting the stage for the philosophical investigation within the Philebus is, naively translated, “He says that to enjoy is good.” Instead of the predicate adjective “good,” most interpreters prefer to translate with a definite description, “the good,” with consequences that affect the interpretation of the dialogue as a whole. Part one defends the naïve translation, both in the context of Socrates’ first seven speeches and viewing the dialogue as a whole. Part two considers and rejects the reasons (...) given against the naïve translation on the basis of grammar, idiosyncratic Platonic style, immediate context, and later restatements. (shrink)

The _Philebus_ is hard to reconcile with standard interpretations of Plato’s philosophy and in this pioneering work Donald Davidson, seeks to take the _Philebus _at face value and to reassess Plato’s late philosophy in the light of the results. The author maintains that the approach to ethics in the _Philebus _represents a considerable return to the methodology of the earlier dialogues. He emphasizes Plato’s reversion to the Socratic elenchus and connects it with the startling reappearance of Socrates as the leading (...) voice in the _Philebus_. (shrink)

The Philebus is hard to reconcile with standard interpretations of Plato’s philosophy and in this pioneering work Donald Davidson, seeks to take the Philebus at face value and to reassess Plato’s late philosophy in the light of the results. The author maintains that the approach to ethics in the Philebus represents a considerable return to the methodology of the earlier dialogues. He emphasizes Plato’s reversion to the Socratic elenchus and connects it with the startling reappearance of Socrates (...) as the leading voice in the Philebus. (shrink)

In Plato’s Philebus, Socrates’ second account of ‘false’ pleasure (41d-42c) outlines a form of illusion: pleasures that appear greater than they are. I argue that these pleasures are perceptual misrepresentations. I then show that they are the grounds for a methodological critique of hedonism. Socrates identifies hedonism as a judgment about the value of pleasure based on a perceptual misrepresentation of size, witnessed paradigmatically in the ‘greatest pleasures’.

Scholars have characterised the trial of the life of pleasure in Philebus 20b-21d as digressive or pejorative. I argue that it is neither: it is a thought experiment containing an important argument, in the form of a reductio, of the hypothesis that a life could be most pleasant without cognition. It proceeds in a series of steps, culminating in the precisely chosen image of the jellyfish. Understanding the intended resonance of this creature, and the sense in which it is (...) deprived, is critical for reconstructing the argument, and yields new insight into Plato’s views on the minimal conditions for pleasure. (shrink)

A clear accurate translation of one of Plato's most facinating dialogues, with an extensive philosophical commentary.

Plato's Philebus contains an intricate difficulty. Plato seems to hold both (a) that all pleasures are processes of becoming, a crucial premise in the argument that no pleasure is good (53c?55c) and (b) that some pleasures contribute in their own right to the goodness of the best life (64c?67b). Since it seems also plausible that only things which are good can contribute to the goodness of the best life in their own right, Plato's view seems to be inconsistent. Interpreters (...) usually reject either (a) or (b). As Plato seems firmly committed to both (a) and (b), I propose a third way of dealing with the inconsistency. The apparent inconsistency highlights a vital contrast between what is independently good (good per se), what is dependently good (good through participating in what is independently good), and what is derivatively good (good through standing in a certain relation to dependent goods). I argue that while pleasure's being a process of becoming marks it out as derivatively good, some kinds of pleasure are also dependent goods in virtue of their objects ? irrespective of their being processes of becoming. (shrink)

This paper extracts and articulates the account of normativity in Plato’s Philebus. Central to this account is the concept of measure, which plays both an ontological and a normative role. With regard to the former, measure is what makes particular things to be the specific kind of thing they are; with regard to the latter, measure supplies the appropriate standard for determining whether or not those things are good or bad instances of their kind. As a result of measure (...) playing these two roles, normative evaluation is grounded in the ontological structure of the thing being evaluated. (shrink)

In the Philebus, Plato considers pleasure to be part of the good life. Always despises pleasure, Plato, however, no longer insists on extreme rationalism, instead, he reconciles reason and pleasure with the fundamental principle of ‘measure’ In the Philebus, Plato considers ‘measure (μέτρον)’ to be of the highest value. He not only argues for the concrete application of ‘measure’ in the sensual world, but also confirms the metaphysical ground of ‘measure’. Many scholars have discussed the application of ‘measure’ (...) from different perspectives, but the deep logical principle of ‘measure’ has not been clarified clearly yet. Actually, the thought of ‘measure’ involves the relationship between ideas and sensual things. On the basis of the redefinition of this relationship, Plato proposes that a life that mixes reason and pleasure is a good one. On the one hand, ‘measure’ gives a certain rationalistic color to pleasure, and on the other hand, ‘measure’ protects pleasure from being replaced by reason. In this way, Plato turns to moderate rationalism, pioneers the principle of ‘measure’ in dealing with ethical issues, and draws a line between the gods and man. (shrink)

This translation with introduction and commentary of Plato's Philebus was originally issued under the title Plato's Examination of Pleasure and first reprinted as Plato's Philebus. This dialogue, generally agreed to be one of Plato's latest and most sophisticated, analyses in detail the nature of pleasure - its meaning, its varieties and importance. Professor Hackforth here translates the dialogue for the student and general reader. There is a running commentary on the course of the argument and the meaning of (...) key Greek terms and a full introduction to explain the philosophical background and the place of this work among Plato's writings. (shrink)

At Philebus 53c4–55a12, Plato’s Socrates identifies pleasure as an ontologically inferior “becoming” (γένεσις) rather than a “being” (οὐσία) and then uses this information to infer that pleasure, somehow, lacks value. This paper argues that Plato’s γένεσις argument is not about the goodness of individual, particular episodes of pleasure but instead targets the identification of pleasure as the good around which we ought to organize our lives. It also shows that the argument is made up of two subarguments—the argument from (...) finality and the argument from a life not worth living—both of which conclude that, as a γένεσις, pleasure cannot be the good our life as a whole is aimed at reaching. Read in this way, the much maligned γένεσις argument turns out to be more cogent and more interesting than is usually thought. (shrink)