One argument for deliberative democracy is that public deliberation enhances a sincere concern for the common good. Most of the theories of deliberative democracy fail to give a satisfying account of this process. One of the causes for this state of affairs is a preoccupation with autonomy, which tends to obscure that public deliberation is deliberation with others who are actually present. On such an interpretation of publicity, shame, or a concern for reputation, plays a crucial motivational role. Aristotle, by (...) acknowledging this role, is capable of constructing an account of the formation of deliberative character that is far more realistic than the standard answer of deliberative democrats. In particular, it is shown that public deliberation cannot discharge its edifying or civilizing function all by itself. To have the desired effect, the development of the deliberative capacity requires the acquisition of the virtues of character, especially that of truthfulness. (shrink)

Ecce Homo Videns, or How a Person Becomes What He Beholds: Synchronicity between Bourdieu and Sartori on Television and Democracy What role does television play in liberal democracy? This topical question is the focus of two essays, one by the French sociologist Pierre Bourdieu and another by the Italian political philosopher Giovanni Sartori. Bourdieu’s position, in short, is that the television medium manipulates information from which a structural corruption emerges. Sartori, in turn, argues that television modifies thought at best and (...) impoverishes it at worst. In this contribution, the essays of both authors are taken as the starting point for a comparison. First the article discusses the ‘primacy of the image’, and it elucidates how both thinkers relate to the ubiquitous visual culture. It then examines ‘tele-directed opinion’ and offers a deeper insight into the ‘public opinion’, and in turn the ‘opinion poll’. Here their thinking on what is called media logic unfolds: the idea that media, instead of merely reporting the course of things, influence it. In the third part, the article explores the question of what Bourdieu’s and Sartori’s insights imply for politics and democracy. It discusses the electoral and political influence that television exerts in their view. The article concludes the discussion by asking to what extent Bourdieu’s and Sartori’s essays are still relevant and whether their commentary on television can be applied one-to-one to social media. Thus, the authors are compared not only textually, but also temporally (1990s and 1920s). Despite their differences, we have found that there are striking resemblances between television and social media, especially when it comes to the influence both media have on society and liberal democracy. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Aristotle and the AppearancesPaul Nieuwenburg1.G. E. L. owen’s influential article Tithenai ta phainomena1 has had a very special efficacy in converting long-standing suspicions into the certainty of what one might call, without exaggeration, an orthodoxy. One of Owen’s arguments is widely thought to remove, in a quite definite way, all doubt surrounding the interpretation of the ambiguous term ta phainomena, usually rendered ‘the appearances,’ as it figures in one (...) of Aristotle’s reflections on ‘the methods of ethics.’2 And indeed, as the pun on Sidgwick’s The Methods of Ethics suggests,3 the argument paves the way for extracting from Aristotle’s instructions [End Page 551] a telos not unlike that of a certain modern conception of ethics—a coherent body of propositions wrought from our common-sense intuitions about moral matters.Point of departure is a quotation of the methodological reflection from the Nicomachean Ethics (EN 1145b2–7), the subject of the argument in question. The reflection sketches the procedure to be followed in the treatment of akrasia, or the phenomenon of, to put it in a rather slipshod manner, doing what one knows to be wrong. It will be helpful to comply with standard practice and to give Owen’s own translation of the bulk of this passage (b2–6), supplementing it with the missing final clause (b6–7).Here as in other cases we must set down [tithentas] the phainomena and begin by considering the difficulties [diaporêsantas], and so go on to vindicate if possible all the common conceptions [ta endoxa] about these states of mind [peri tauta ta pathê], or at any rate most of them and the most important; {for when both the difficulties are solved and the endoxa are left [kataleipêtaı], it would have been proven sufficiently [dedeigmenon hikanôs].} (EN 1145b2–7)Owen argues that W. D. Ross’ ‘empiricist’ construal of the term phainomena (‘observed facts’) cannot be consistently maintained in a dialectical examination of beliefs on moral matters—and we shall presently see why this should be so. Indeed, the term must be systematically ambiguous, referring to ‘hard’ empirical data in one context (notably APr 46a20) and to endoxa (or legomena [EN 1145b20]), i.e., ‘common conceptions’ in the other.As a consequence, the method outlined in this passage would look like this. First, you have to assemble and present a collection of beliefs (tithenai ta phainomena) on the relevant subject-matter. Since it is most likely that tensions will disfigure the set of endoxa you have garnered, you must, second, by way of preliminary exercise ‘go through the perplexities’ (diaporein) they raise, in order to pinpoint the inconsistencies and infelicities barring the way to endoxic coherence. The removal of these frictions will result in a ‘maximal consistent subset’ of endoxa on the matter, namely, when the perplexities (aporiai), or difficulties (duskherê), are solved. Sufficient proof has been given when all, most, or the most important (kuriôtata) endoxa reappear in this final set. “And then? And then nothing: your philosophical task is over. “4The intersubstitutability of ‘appearances’ (phainomena) and ‘reputable beliefs’ [End Page 552] (as I prefer to render endoxa)5 is buttressed by a fairly general consensus in contemporary Aristotelian scholarship. Many authors assume that in the text under consideration and, in its wake, in certain other ethical contexts, both terms have the same reference, without, however, being synonymous.6 Henceforth, I shall label this assumption (I) (for ‘intersubstitutability assumption’), covering both Owen’s conclusion and the argument leading up to it, on the obvious supposition that espousing the conclusion entails a commitment to the validity of the argument. Against all appearances, however, (I) is not as foolproof as its widespread acclaim suggests. Although extensions of (I) to other methodological contexts in Aristotle’s ethical writings (in particular EE 1214b28–1215a) prejudice a due understanding of Aristotelian ethics, the point is, I believe, worth arguing in its own right.In what follows, I shall first lay bare a ‘perplexity’ latent in (I). It will emerge that its premises do not as firmly support the conclusion as it has seemed to many writers. Therefore, I shall not side with those... (shrink)