Start ing with Die Geburt der Tragödi (The Birth of Trag edy), Nietz sche crit i cizes the sub - ject of mo der nity mer ci lessly. The mod ern sub - ject, heir of the the o ret i cal and So cratic man, is the sub stance and cen ter of an objectified uni - verse. Con verted into thought and pur..

“A mouth that speaks, many ears, and half the hands that write. These are the ac a demic ap - pa ra tus, these are the ac tive ma chines of Bildung in the Uni ver sity”, as writen by Nietz sche.. What should we do? Nietz sche gave us some an swers, in his ha bit ual form: ques tions, met a phor..

The "Subject" of Nietzsche's Perspectivism CHRISTOPH COX FORMERLY TAKEN TO ENDORSE a profound skepticism and relativism, Nietz- sche's "doctrine of perspectivism" recently has been seen to fit within tradi- tional conceptions of epistemology and ontology? In the most recent and influential study of the matter, Maudemarie Clark maintains that, properly understood, perspectivism is "an obvious and nonproblematic doctrine. ''~ In a similar vein, Brian Leiter has recently argued that "perspectivism turns out to be much less radical than is (...) usually supposed," that, with this doctrine, "Nietz- sche.., is merely rehashing familiar Kantian themes, minus the rigor of Kant's exposition."~ According to both Clark and Leiter, perspectivism simply ' With occasional alterations, Nietzsche's texts will be quoted from the Kaufmann/Hollingdale translations and cited in the text according to standard abbreviations of their English titles fol- lowed by the section and/or paragraph number. The exception is "On Truth and Lies in a Nonmoral Sense," which is cited by page number from Philosophy and Truth: Selections from Nietz- sche's Notebooks of the Early x87os, ed. and trans. Daniel Breazeale , 79-9 x. Abbreviations are as follows: A: The Antichrist; BGE: Beyond Good and Evil; BT/SC: Birth of Tragedy, "Attempt at a Self-Criticism"; D: Daybreak; GM: On the Genealogy of Morals; GS: The Gay Science; TI: Twilight of the Idols;.. (shrink)

Es mag etwas seltsam erscheinen, daB sich eine Untersuchung mit dem Problem der Zeit bei Nietzsche befassen soUte. Die Philosophie Nietzsches enthaIt einen Reichtum von Begriffen und Gedanken, die fUr die verschiedensten Bereiche aufschluBreich sind und sich zu einer Mannigfaltigkeit von Auslegungen herge­ ben. Manche von Nietzsches Hauptgedanken, etwa der Tod Got­ tes, der Nihilismus, die Umwertung alier Werte, oder der Wille zur Macht sind ftir das sich wandelnde Verstandnis des Wesens des Menschen und der Welt ausschlaggebend gewesen. Sie sind (...) fruchtbare Gedanken in dem Sinne gewesen, daB sie weiter ver­ wandelt und auf anderes Denken bezogen werden konnten. Eine ausdriickliche Beschaftigung mit der Zeit als solcher aber scheint nicht in das Schema von Nietzsches Grundproblemen hineinzu­ passen. Er machte keine ausfUhrlichen genauen Analysen tiber sie, machte sie nie thematisch, wie es viele Denker sowohl vor als auch nach ihm taten. Es hat sogar zunachst den Anschein, als bewegten sich seine AuBerungen tiber sie in dem Bereich eines etwas oberflachlichen Verstandnisses und einer fraglosen 'Ober­ nahme der Analysen der Tradition. Man muB sich aber davor htiten, den absoluten Mangel an systematischem Prunk bei Nietz­ sche mit einer Art von Ungeduld und Unvermogen zu strengen Analysen zu verwechseln. J eder Denker von Rang hat seine eigene Art von Strenge, die seiner einmaligen Aufgabe und seiner eigen­ ttimlichen Verfahrensweise erwachst und tiber die vermittelst von MaBstaben, die einem anderen Denken und Problemzusammen­ hang entnommen worden sind, nichts entschieden werden kann. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:128 HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY Nietzsches Werke. Kritische Gesamtausgabe. Edited by Giorgio Colli and Mazzino Montinari. 30 vols. in 8 sections. (Berlin and New York: Walter de Gruyter Co.) In Print: Section IV. Vol. 1. Richard Wagner in Bayreuth. Nachgelassene Fragmente 1875-1876 (1967), 366 pp. DM. 38 Vol. 2. Menschliches, Alzumenschliches I. Nachgelassene Fragmente 1876-1877. (1967), 586 pp. DM. 56 Vol. 3. Menschliches, Alzumenschliches H. Nachgelassene Fragmente 1878-1879. (1967), 615 (...) pp. DM. 48 Vol. 4. Nachbericht zur vierten Abteilung, by M. Montinari (1969), 615 pp. DM. 58 Section V. Vol. I. Morgenr6te. Nachgelassene Fragmente 1880-1881 (1971), 772 pp. DM. 86 Section VI. Vol. 1. Also sprach Zarathustra 1883-1885 (1968), 412 pp. DM. 41 Vol. 2. lenseits yon Gut und Bi~se. Zur Genealogie der Moral 1886-1887 (1968), 430 pp. DM. 43 Vol. 3. Der Fall Wagner. G6tzen-Diimmerung. Der Antichrist. Ecce Homo. Dionysos-Dithyramben. Nietzsche contra Wagner. 1888-1889 (1969), 449 pp. DM. 45 Section VIII. Vol. 2. Nachgelassene Fragmente Herbst 1887 bis Miirz 1888 (1970), 478 pp. DM. 58 Now in press: VIII, 3. Nachgelassene Fragmente Friihjahr 1888 bis An[ang Januar 1889 (1972), ca. 400 pp. Scheduled /or 1972: III, 1. Geburt der Trag6die. Unzeitgemiil3e Betrachtungen. III, 2. Baseler Nachgelassene Schri#en und Fragmente 1870-1874 V, 2. Die/r6hliche Wissenschafl. Nachgelassene Fragmente 1881-1882 VII, 2. Nachgelassene Fragmente 1884 In 1959 two Italian scholars, Giorgio Colli (Piza) and Mazzino Montinari (Florence ), decided to make a new Italian translation of Nietz.sche's works. But the confusion surrounding the publication.of the posthumous fragments, particularly in the wake of the Schlechta-Edition controversy, caused the two men to question existing German editions. Montinari's visit to the Nietzsche Archive in Weimar in 1961 confirmed their growing conviction that the only way to eliminate the inaccuracies and BOOK REVIEWS 129 omissions with respect to the late fragments was to work from the original manuscripts. Since they had to go to Weimar anyway, they reasoned, why not take the bull by the horns and attempt a truly critical German edition of all of Niet.z.sche's writings as well? Now that nine of the planned thirty volumes of the German edition have been published, in particular IV, 4 (commentary to Section IV) and VIII, 2 (posthumous fragments of 1887-1888), it appears that the editors have an excellent chance of achieving not only a critical, but a definitive edition of Nietzsche's works. 1 Volumes IV, 4 and VIII, 2 are of special importance to our evaluation as, more than the other volumes published thus far, they reveal the critical and innovative features of the edition. It will pay to examine them in some detail. The first thing we encounter in volume IV, 4 is a statement of editorial principles. We learn that with regard to works which Nietzsche himself had published, both first editions and later editions approved by Nietzsche were consulted--a double-check was needed since Nietzsche with his bad eyesight was a poor proofreader. In the case of obvious printing errors that were retained through all the printed editions, final manuscripts were also referred to; usually several, as the scribes occasionally misunderstood Nietzsche when he dictated to them. The procedure is careful but it is also selective. What is to assure us that the editors made the right selection? This problem is dealt with in the 380 pages which collate all the variants found in the principal manuscripts and editions. Whenever possible, the reason for having variants is given. The explanation of the critical apparatus is a model of painstaking thoroughness. So far authenticity and objectivity have been achieved to a high degree. However, a principal difficulty in editing Nietzsche's works is chronology, determining the order in which the fragments and manuscripts were written. How did the editors proceed here? There is a section eighteen pages long on manuscript chronology and genesis in which the editors detail their reasoning and conclusions. To back this up there are two additional sections: (1) a page-by-page inventory of every manuscript used, summarizing the content of each page and listing such facts as the designation number, the presumed scribe, the kind... (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:122 HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY the godlike in himself. No longer would his serf-alienation be put at a distance and reified so that it overpowers him. No longer would a world without aim and without meaning compel him to refer aim and meaning to transmundane powers, Transcendental aims and meanings are not known and are not needed: the innocence of becoming, whose moments are equally valuable or valueless since there (...) is nothing wherewith to measure them, is the higher condition of man. For only an as yet meaningless world is receptive to the bestowal of new meaning, and only in such a world can man discover his true self-image--as sole creator of meanings. All this is carefully pieced together and supported by well-chosen texts. Professor Wein is on shaky ground, however, when he claims that Christ, not Dionysus, is the proper symbol of Nietzschean affirmation. Wein observes, quite rightly, that Nietzsche's affirmations were never clearly conceptualized, that they find expression almost wholly in moments of poetic ecstasy. But Nietzsche's lyrical outbursts are thoroughly Dionysian in character. Moreover, not only is Nietz.sche's representation of Christ as immanentist yea-sayer extremely forced, but Nietzsche's own denigration of human mutuality, of which Wein is critical, cannot be reconciled even with the distorted image of Christ which Nietzsche cherished. But that is a minor flaw (in spite of the subtitle) in an otherwise sensitive and searching essay. Elucidations rather than obfuscations of "what Nietzsche meant" are hard to come by. PE'rER Fuss University of California, Riverside Dooyeweerd and the Amsterdam Philosophy. By R. H. Nash. (Grand Rapids, Michigan: Zondervan Publishing Co., 1962. $2.50.) Dooyeweerd and the Amsterdam Philosophy provides a brief synopsis and critical discussion of several of the major tenets of the new School of Augustinian philosophy set forth by the Dutch philosopher, Herman Dooyeweerd, in his four-volume work A New Critique of Theoretical Thought. The central thesis defended by Dooyeweerd is the assertion that philosophy cannot be religiously neutral. Theoretical insight into the coherence of the aspects of the temporal world can be acquired, if, and only if, the philosopher answers questions about the ultimate origin of the world and his own relation to that origin. To reach a decision with respect to the origin of the world, both in its diversity and unity, requires an act of religions faith. The motive of form and matter, which dominated the classical Greek world, arose out of the encounter between the pre-Homeric religion of life and the cultural religion of the Olympic gods. Modern humanism, in contrast, has absolutized the theoretical attitude of thought and secularized the Christian idea of creation and freedom, thereby giving rise to a polar tension between a "Faustian" passion to dominate reality by scientific method and the notion of freedom, expressed in the absolute sovereignty of human personality. Within humanism reason is made the origin of the world, the giver of law. The ascription of primacy to the ideal of science may lead to the hypostatization of the categorical imperative, or to the absolutization of special forms of scientific thought. However, when primacy is ascribed to the ideal of human personality, transcendental thought may BOOK REVIEWS 123 become the origin of the norms of moral freedom and the formal origin of the laws os nature. The totality of the world may be interpreted in terms of the homo noumenon, or in terms of a totality of values, in terms of feeling or as the historical stream of experience. The interrelationship between the various aspects of reality is misconstrued by humanism when the modal laws of the world are absolutized, and a single aspect is made the basic denominator of reality. The neo-Augustinian philosophy of Dooyeweerd recognizes the priority of faith and would unmask the alleged neutrality of theoretical reason as a dogma concealing the religious foundations of theoretical thought. The Archimedean point of Dooyeweerd's philosophy is not cogito ergo sum, nor vivo in [luxu continuo, etiam cogitans, but it is rather: Ego, in Christo regeneratus, etiam cogitans ex Christo vivo. The heart in its Biblical sense is the religious root and center of human existence... (shrink)

GENERAL PROBLEMS IN NIETZSCHE INTERPRETATION Every philosopher presents special problems of interpretation. With Nietzsche these problems are especially crucial. The very richness of Nietzsche's thought and expression becomes a trap for the incautious or imaginative mind. Perhaps the greatest temptation for the in terpreter of Nietzsche is to attempt to "systematize" his thought into a consistent whole. Any such attempt necessarily results in distortion, for there is a fluidity in Nietzsche's thought which does not lend itself to strict categorization. This (...) is not to deny that there are certain organic patterns in his philosophy. These patterns emerge, however, as Jaspers correctly insists, only upon careful, critical comparison of pertinent passages drawn from the entire corpus of Nietzsche's works. No single passage can be taken as a definitive statement of Nietzsche's views of any particular subject. Frequently, by presenting two or three especially relevant quotations from the author being considered, the correctness of his interpretation. With Nietz a critic can support sche, however, such a procedure is inadequate, for in many cases other passages can be found which will support an alternative, if not oppo site, interpretation. Nor is this difficulty alleviated by vast compi lations of relevant passages, for then one could gain just as much, and quite likely more, from re-reading Nietzsche's works themselves. (shrink)

Giving the foundation of his doctrine of the “Umwelten” v.Uexküll considersKants idealism as the best starting point. The present essay, to the contrary, tries to demonstrate, that the peculiarity of his problems rather corresponds to the logical and metaphysical position ofLeibniz's “monadology” and so shares its philosophical profundity as well as its ontological difficulties. Cardinal points of this correspondence are the following: 1) There is a plurality of subjective worlds=“Umwelten”=“monads”. 2) They are completely isolated one from another. 3) The subject (...) bilds up its reality quite autonomically according to an ideal and specific law=plan=conception. 4) The individual vital laws harmonize according to an optimal general plan. 5) The objective space is denied and regarded as the formalized system of living subjective centres=points of view. 6) Therefrom results the difficulty of explaining a causality of inconscious nature, which is independent from the subject. 7) From this follows the necessity of speculatively amplifying the conception of “subject” or “monad” as well as finally displacing the problem of reality into the metaphysical-religious sphere of a supreme monad or subject.En donnant les raisonnements de sa doctrine des „Umwelten”, M. v.Uexküll considère l'idéalisme deKant comme le meilleur point de départ. Par contre le présent essai cherche à démontrer que la disposition du problème effectivement en question le met plutÔt en parallèle, du point de vue du criticisme et de la métaphysique, avec la „monadologie” deLeibniz, à l'ampleur philosophique de laquelle elle participe aussi bien qu'à ses difficultés ontologiques. Les points cardinaux de cette concordance sont les suivants: 1) la pluralité des mondes subjectifs=„Umwelten” =„monades”; 2) leur intégral isolement réciproque; 3) l'autonomie du sujet quant à la construction de sa réalité, suivant une loi idéelle et spécifique; 4) l'harmonie de toutes les lois vitales et individuelles suivant un plan d'ensemble tendant à un optimum; s) le reniement de la réalité absolue de l'espace objectif et son interprétation comme système formalisé de centres subjectifs vivants ; 6) la difficulté qui en résulte pour l'admissibilité d'une causalité de la nature inconsciente, indépendante du sujet; 7) la nécessité, en découlant, d'une amplification spéculative de l'idée du „sujet” ou de la „monade”, ainsi que, finalement, le renvoi du problème de la réalité dans la sphère métaphysico-religieuse d'une monade suprÊme ou d'un suprÊme sujet. (shrink)

De tous les professeurs ayant participé à l'expérience viennoise, René Scherer apparaît comme le philosophe hospitalier par excellence, c'est-à-dire celui qui invite à philosopher ensemble dans une communauté de réflexion et de discussion. Mais ce recueil rappelle que la communauté homogène est impossible, fantasmatique du seul fait que l'homogène est la destruction de la communauté. C'est pourquoi le philosophe hospitalier convie à une "communauté de singularités" constituée par la diversité et la pluralité.

Uprkos proklamovanim emancipacijskim namerama, mehanizam ideje o jedinstvenoj povesti covecanstva sa Hajdegerovog stanovista delovao je kao zagovornik niveliranja autenticnog tubivstvovanja, sluzeci tako pre njegovom porobljavanju nego njegovom oslobadjanju. Hajdegerova rasprava o povesnosti pociva na odbacivanju pojma povesti, odnosno Hegelovog pojma svetske povesti. Opravdanje te korekcije pronadjeno je u neizbeznoj opoziciji izmedju saznanja povesti i ispitivanja povesnog bivstvovanja, cija vlastita struktura lezi u egzistencijalno-vremenskim mogucnostima dogadjanja. U tvrdnji da izvorno razumevanje ne moze ponuditi opste znanje za sve, otvara se celokupna problematicnost (...) Hajdegerove pozicije. Ona naime pociva na tezi da svet javnosti ne nudi racionalnost i da s obzirom na javnost tubivstvovanje nema nista, na sta bi se moglo osloniti. (shrink)

Excerpt from Die Kant'sche Erkenntnisslehre Widerlegt vom Standpunkt der Empirie: Ein Vorbereitender Beitrag zur Begrundung Einer Physiologischen Naturauffassung Man moge es dem ungestumen Eifer eines N eulings verzeihen, wenn derselbe sich so verwegen gezeigt hat, gleich den gewaltigsten der Gegner zum Einzelkampf sich auszuwahlen. Aber der Ernst und die Grundlichkeit, mit welchen dieser uberaus tiefsinnige, gediegene Forscher seine Sache vertritt, haben nicht verfehlt auch auf mich eine machtige Anziehung auszuuben. Und da nun doch einmal angegriffen werden musste, so war (...) es nur natur lich, dass ich beim ersten Ansatz gleich auf ihn und auf keinen anderen zugesturzt bin. About the Publisher Forgotten Books publishes hundreds of thousands of rare and classic books. Find more at www.forgottenbooks.com This book is a reproduction of an important historical work. Forgotten Books uses state-of-the-art technology to digitally reconstruct the work, preserving the original format whilst repairing imperfections present in the aged copy. In rare cases, an imperfection in the original, such as a blemish or missing page, may be replicated in our edition. We do, however, repair the vast majority of imperfections successfully; any imperfections that remain are intentionally left to preserve the state of such historical works. (shrink)

Im Folgenden wird versucht zu erläutern, wie die Bergson’sche Methode an einem konkreten Problem in der Philosophie funktioniert: Wie ist es möglich, Gefühle zu messen? Bergson erklärt, dass ein Gefühl kein psychologisches Objekt ist, da das, was es ist, davon abhängt, wie es auf uns wirkt. Dann ist es nicht nur vorgestellt, sondern auch gelebt. Jede Gefühlsmessung fügt dem Gemessenen ein neues Gefühl hinzu . Dieses spezifische Gefühl steht mit nichts anderem als der Dauer in Verbindung. Unser erstes Ziel (...) ist es aufzuweisen, dass dieses alte epistemologische Problem auch heute noch attraktiv ist. Wir wissen nicht genau, wie wir Gefühle messen sollten, sei es mit zusätzlichen oder mit regulären Messvorgängen.Wir möchten jedoch auch erklären, wie metaphysische Intuition in Bergsons erstem Werk funktioniert. Sie kommt nicht zuerst. Sie erfolgt immer nach der Überprüfung eines spezifischen wissenschaftlichen Problems, da philosophische Einsichten immer mittelbar entstehen. Es ist unmöglich, Bergsons Auffassung zu teilen, dass Wissenschaft nicht denke. Wichtig ist nur zu bemerken, dass Wissenschaft nicht alleine denkt. Sie bedarf der kritischen Aktion der Philosophie. (shrink)

Anthropocentrism and the fact that some animals are just considered a means to an end while others are loved are often subject to criticism in animal ethics. Drawing on the psychoanalytic theories of Jacques Lacan, the author examines how the apparent ambivalence in human–animal relationships is based on different forms of enjoyment. Referring to the Real, the Symbolic and the Imaginary, which according to Lacan define human reality, the author shows how enjoyment and its limits shape, for example, how we (...) think about pets, farm animals or wild animals. This alternative perspective will contribute to a better understanding of the challenges in human–animal relationships. (shrink)

Der Leipziger Pietist Chr. A. Crusius setzt sich mit dem von Leibniz und Wolff festgelegten „Satz vom zureichenden Grund“ auseinander, nach dem nicht nur jedes Naturgeschehnis, sondern auch jede Handlung des Menschen a priori determiniert zu verstehen ist. Zunächst kritisiert Crusius die Vieldeutigkeit des Begriffs „Grund“, wo er zunächst zwischen „Realgrund“ und „Erkenntnisgrund“ unterscheidet, und weiterhin ersteren in „wirkende Ursache“ und „Existentialgrund“, und letzteren in „Erkenntnisgrund a priori“ und „Erkenntnisgrund a posteriori“ einteilt. Nach Crusius hat menschliche freie Handlung keinen eindeutig (...) determinierenden Grund, sondern nur wirkende Ursache, die jeder seinerseits ablehnen kann. Crusius gründet seinen Freiheitsbegriff auf die Wahrscheinlichkeitslehre, nach der freie Handlungen wegen der Endlichkeit des Menschen nur a posteriori erkannt werden. In meinem Beitrag versuche ich zu zeigen, dass im Freiheitsbegriff von Crusius, der „Grundtätigkeit der Freiheit“, ein Muster der Vereinbarkeit von der empirisch orientierten Freiheit und dem Determinismus einzusehen ist. (shrink)

The eminent radiochemist Friedrich Paneth (1887–1958) tried to come to terms with the following epistemological problem: On the one hand chemical elements are characterized empirically as indestructible material species, on the other hand they are characterized theoretically as having the same number of protons in the nuclei of their atoms. Paneth used the dualistic Kantian epistemology (using Eduard von Hartmann's interpretation) in order to describe the combination of these two aspects, applying the terms “Grundstoff”, fundamental matter, to the latter and (...) “einfacher Stoff”, simple matter, to the former. The present paper discusses the applicability of Kant's philosophy – in the interpretation of Paneth – to the (modern) philosophy of chemistry. (shrink)

The eminent radiochemist Friedrich Paneth (1887–1958) tried to come to terms with the following epistemological problem: On the one hand chemical elements are characterized empirically as indestructible material species, on the other hand they are characterized theoretically as having the same number of protons in the nuclei of their atoms. Paneth used the dualistic Kantian epistemology (using Eduard von Hartmann's interpretation) in order to describe the combination of these two aspects, applying the terms “Grundstoff”, fundamental matter, to the latter and (...) “einfacher Stoff”, simple matter, to the former. The present paper discusses the applicability of Kant's philosophy – in the interpretation of Paneth – to the (modern) philosophy of chemistry. (shrink)

Name der Zeitschrift: Kant-Studien Jahrgang: 106 Heft: 2 Seiten: 286-325.

Reviewer gives a survey of the new phylogenetic theory of language recently published by Prof. Dr. G. Révész, founder and director of the Laboratory for experimental psychology of the University of Amsterdam (see notes under)). The starting-point of the theory is the conception of "contact", defined by the author as the innate trend to be together or to co-operate, common to all socially living beings. This "theory of contact" is developed by the author in different directions and gives rise to (...) the distinction 1. of three degrees of communication: cry (Zuruf), call (Anruf) and word (Wort) ("Dreistufentheorie"), 2. of three periods in the development of language: a pre-phase (Vorphase), a primevalphase (Frühphase) and a final phase (Vollphase ("Dreiphasentheorie") and 3. of three main functions of language: impelling (Aufforderung), indication (Mitteilung) and interrogation (Frage) ("Dreifunktionstheorie"), and leads to the conclusion that most probably the oldest form of human intercourse was restricted to the function of impelling ("Imperativsprache"). Prof. R. lays great stress on the in his opinion unsurmountable barrier between human and animal forms of communication. (shrink)

t. 1. Étoiles.--t. 2. Schémas. Point.