Given a countable model of set theory, we study the structure of its generic multiverse, the collection of its forcing extensions and ground models, ordered by inclusion. Mostowski showed that any finite poset embeds into the generic multiverse while preserving the nonexistence of upper bounds. We obtain several improvements of his result, using what we call the blockchain construction to build generic objects with varying degrees of mutual genericity. The method accommodates certain infinite posets, and we can realize these embeddings (...) via a wide variety of forcing notions, while providing control over lower bounds as well. We also give a generalization to class forcing in the context of second-order set theory, and exhibit some further structure in the generic multiverse, such as the existence of exact pairs. (shrink)

Using a countable support product of creature forcing posets, we show that consistently, for uncountably many different functions the associated Yorioka ideals’ uniformity numbers can be pairwise different. In addition we show that, in the same forcing extension, for two other types of simple cardinal characteristics parametrised by reals, for uncountably many parameters the corresponding cardinals are pairwise different.

In a recent issue of the Journal of Medical Ethics, Svoboda and Van Howe commented on the 2012 change in the American Academy of Pediatrics policy on newborn male circumcision, in which the AAP stated that benefits of the procedure outweigh the risks. Svoboda and Van Howe disagree with the AAP conclusions. We show here that their arguments against male circumcision are based on a poor understanding of epidemiology, erroneous interpretation of the evidence, selective citation of the literature, statistical manipulation (...) of data, and circular reasoning. In reality, the scientific evidence indicates that male circumcision, especially when performed in the newborn period, is an ethically and medically sound low-risk preventive health procedure conferring a lifetime of benefits to health and well-being. Policies in support of parent-approved elective newborn circumcision should be embraced by the medical, scientific and wider communities. (shrink)

We reimplement the creature forcing construction used by Fischer et al. :1045–1103, 2017. https://doi.org/10.1007/S00153-017-0553-8. arXiv:1402.0367 [math.LO]) to separate Cichoń’s diagram into five cardinals as a countable support product. Using the fact that it is of countable support, we augment our construction by adding uncountably many additional cardinal characteristics, sometimes referred to as localisation cardinals.

We critically evaluate arguments in a recent Journal of Law, Medicine & Ethics article by Svoboda, Adler, and Van Howe disputing the 2012 affirmative infant male circumcision policy recommendations of the American Academy of Pediatrics. We provide detailed evidence in explaining why the extensive claims by these opponents are not supported by the current strong scientific evidence. We furthermore show why their legal and ethical arguments are contradicted by a reasonable interpretation of current U.S. and international law and ethics. After (...) all considerations are taken into account it would be logical to conclude that failure to recommend male circumcision early in infancy may be viewed as akin to failure to recommend childhood vaccination to parents. In each case, parental consent is required and the intervention is not compulsory. Our evaluation leads us to dismiss the arguments by Svoboda et al. Instead, based on the evidence, infant male circumcision is both ethical and lawful. (shrink)

This seems to me to be the proper attitude to take toward philosophical proposals about the way things are; they are "likely stories" or "likely accounts," although it is true some speculative philosophers, for example, Spinoza and Hegel, did not think of their systems in such a modest way. Now naturalism strives to be a systematic philosophy, an account of the way things are. Its expression as a philosophy is often loose, although frequent attempts are made to give it internal (...) consistency. One of the loosest and untidiest presentations of a naturalistic philosophy is found in Hans Christian Sandbeck's book, Nature and Destiny. And in another work by William R. Dennes, Some Dilemmas of Naturalism, we see an effort to examine some of the internal difficulties of the system. I intend to examine both in detail; in addition, I will offer some brief comments on Francis Haber's book, The Age of the World, which gives part of the history of naturalism. (shrink)

In The Promise of Modern Life Professor D. W. Gotshalk calls our attention to the sickness of modern society--its crises, panic, tensions and fears--and asks, "How did we get this way and what are the prospects of moving out?" He recognizes a disease, offers a diagnosis, and suggests a cure. The causes of our distressing condition lie, in part, in the past, that is, in the assumptions made by previous periods of society. In modern life we can distinguish three periods (...) each with a predominant value, namely, individuality, creativity, and interrelatedness. "We live today in an interrelational world, and the clue to maximum human good lies in developing the value possibilities of the interrelational principle." Individuality characterizes roughly the period of revolutionary changes following the medieval world to the late 18th century; creativity from the late 18th century to recent decades. Both individuality and creativity were heretical in the medieval value scheme, the first leading to pride, and the second to rebellion against established truth. Individuality is rather loosely defined as self-assertion and the striving for self-completeness; creativity seems to mean a kind of activity having a direction or aim, a striving for productive novelty. (shrink)

At the beginning of the twentieth century, philosophy in America and England began to respond to the rumors of unrest and dissatisfaction which were under way at the close of the nineteenth century. Many contemporary thinkers, who have had occasion to look backward, have remarked on the dominance of idealism at the turn of the period. Montague says it was “rampant” and points to the organization of the St. Louis school by W. T. Harris, the purpose being a study of (...) Hegelian thought. Lovejoy also remembers the total sweep of idealistic thought. “The metaphysics of the philosophical teachers whose influence was dominant in most of the American universities thirty-five years ago had one common and fundamental premise which was supposed to be established beyond the possibility of reasonable doubt; to question it was simply to betray one's want of a genuine initiation into philosophy. It was the proposition that, in Bradley's words, 'to be real, or even barely to exist, is to fall within sentience; sentient experience, in short, is reality, and what is not this is not real. There is no being or fact outside of that which is commonly called psychical existence.' As my first teacher in philosophy, George Holmes Howison, said, in summing up a memorable philosophical symposium in 1895: 'We are all agreed' in one 'great tenet;' which is 'the entire foundation of philosophy itself: the explanation of the world which maintains that the only thing absolutely real is mind; that all material and all temporal existences take their being from Consciousness that thinks and experiences; that out of consciousness they all issue, to the consciousness they are presented, and that presence to consciousness constitutes their entire reality.' With almost a whole generation of acute and powerful minds this passed for a virtual axiom.”. (shrink)