This review essay examines the contribution of Legislated Rights (Webber et al, Cambridge 2018) to a central issue in constitutional theory: namely, how the institutional division of labour between the legislature and the judiciary with respect to the task of giving effect to constitutional rights is best understood and conceived. In doing so, the essay situates the work within contemporary scholarship and adopts a broadly comparative lens — a perspective that is mindful of key developments in constitutional law and theory (...) over the past several decades. Ultimately, it is suggested that a critical weakness of the capacity of Legislated Rights to contribute to contemporary debates about judicial review is its lack of engagement with these developments. As a result, the work’s intervention largely misses its mark. It speaks to an outdated view that does not reflect contemporary constitutional practice or scholarship. (shrink)

The power to appoint judges and the formal procedure for judicial appointments in Nigeria have been examined by writers, particularly in the context of separation of powers. Shortcomings in the conduct of some judicial officers and the poor performance of some courts continue to generate questions about the suitability of the current appointments process in the quest for a sound judiciary founded on integrity and competence. The article argues that what is missing is due regard for ethics in (...) the appointments process. This point, often overlooked or down played by writers, should be considered by the key players in the appointments process. The article examines the ethical dimensions of the judicial appointments process within the dynamics of the composition and operation of the special judicial bodies and other groups from which these bodies receive nominations for judicial appointments. (shrink)

This book examines the legal principle of judicial independence in comparative perspective with the goal of advancing a better understanding of the idea of an independent judiciary more generally. From an initial survey of judicial systems in different countries, it is clear that the understanding and practice of judicial independence take a variety of forms. Scholarly literature likewise provides a range of views on what judicial independence means, with scholars often advocating a preferred conception of a (...) model court for achieving 'true judicial independence' as part of a rule of law system. This book seeks to reorient the prevailing approach to the study of judicial independence by better understanding how judicial independence operates within domestic legal systems in its institutional and legal dimensions. It asks how and why different conceptualisations of judicial independence emerge over time by comparing detailed case studies of courts in two legally pluralistic states, which share inheritances of British rule and the common law. By tracing the development of judicial independence in the legal systems of Malaysia and Pakistan from the time of independence to the present, the book offers an insightful comparison of how judicial independence took shape and developed in these countries over time. From this comparison, it suggests a number of contextual factors that can be seen to play a role in the evolution of judicial independence. The study draws upon the significant divergence observed in the case studies to propose a refined understanding of the idea of an independent judiciary, termed the 'pragmatic and context-sensitive theory', which may be seen in contradistinction to a universal approach. While judicial independence responds to the core need of judges to be perceived as an impartial third party by constructing formal and informal constraints on the judge and relationships between judges and others, its meaning in a legal system is inevitably shaped by the judicial role along with other features at the domestic level. The book concludes that the adaptive and pragmatic qualities of judicial independence supply it with relevance and legitimacy within a domestic legal system. (shrink)

In January 2004 Baroness Brenda Hale became the first woman to sit on the Appellate Committee of the House of Lords. Five years on, she has brought to her judicial role a lightness of touch that belies her increasingly significant impact on the court’s jurisprudence. Early forecasts that she would be “just a bit different” from her male companions have proved prophetic. However such assessments have stemmed primarily from a focus on her decision-making on a case-by-case basis. But (...) what of her jurisprudence as a whole? This paper considers arguments for a more sustained and coherent methodological approach to analyses of Baroness Hale’s (and other judges’) jurisprudence as a framework through which to better understand and explore the potential of judicial difference and to better inform current debates about increasing judicial diversity in England and Wales. (shrink)

The judicial appointments regime in England and Wales is unbalanced. The pre-2005 appointments regime conferred excessive discretion on the Lord Chancellor, but the post-2005 regime has gone much too far in the opposite direction. Today, the Lord Chancellor is almost entirely excluded from the process of selecting lower level judges and enjoys only limited say over the selection of senior judges. In this article I argue that the current regime places too little weight on the sound reasons for involving (...) the minister in individual selection decisions, including the scope for ministerial input to enhance judicial independence, to supply political leadership on judicial diversity and to render more effective the discharge of the Lord Chancellor’s systemic responsibility for the justice system as a whole. I argue that shortlists reconcile the need to more fully involve the Lord Chancellor whilst at the same time ensuring that candidates satisfy a merit threshold. (shrink)

In this contribution the prototypical argumentative patterns are discussed in which pragmatic argumentation is used in the context of legal justification in hard cases. First, the function and implementation of pragmatic argumentation in prototypical argumentative patterns in legal justification are addressed. The dialectical function of the different parts of the complex argumentation are explained by characterizing them as argumentative moves that are put forward in reaction to certain forms of critique. Then, on the basis of an exemplary case, the famous (...) Holy Trinity case, the way in which the U.S. Supreme Court uses pragmatic argumentation in this case is discussed by showing how the court instantiates general prototypical argumentative patterns in light of the institutional preconditions of the justification in the context of the specific case. (shrink)

Many scholars believe that it is procedurally undemocratic for the judiciary to have an active role in shaping the law. These scholars believe either that such practices as judicial review and creative statutory interpretation are unjustified, or that they are justified only because they improve the law substantively. This Article argues instead that the judiciary can play an important procedurally democratic role in the development of the law. Majority rule by legislatures is not the only defining feature (...) of democracy; rather, a government is democratic to the extent to which it provides egalitarian forms of political participation. One such form of participation can be the opportunity to influence the law through the courts, either directly by participating in a case or indirectly by advocating litigation. Arguing from several examples, this Article shows that judicial decision-making allows different voices to be heard that may not necessarily have influence or power in majoritarian legislative structures or popular initiatives. Giving citizens the opportunity to change, to preserve, and to obtain authoritative clarification of the law through the courts can thus make a government procedurally more democratic. (shrink)

In this revised and updated edition of a classic text, one of America's leading constitutional theorists presents a brief but well-balanced history of judicial review and summarizes the arguments both for and against judicial activism within the context of American democracy. Christopher Wolfe demonstrates how modern courts have used their power to create new "rights" with fateful political consequences and he challenges popular opinions held by many contemporary legal scholars. This is important reading for anyone interested in the (...) role of the judiciary within American politics. Praise for the first edition of Judicial Activism: "This is a splendid contribution to the literature, integrating for the first time between two covers an extensive debate, honestly and dispassionately presented, on the role of courts in American policy. —Stanley C. Brubaker, Colgate University. (shrink)

Since the election of Philippine President Rodrigo Duterte in 2016, extra-judicial killings have become commonplace as a result of his administration’s declaration of war on drugs. Empirical cross-national work on examining determinants behind state repression remains scant especially in understanding the phenomenon at the sub-national level. This study investigates what accounts for variations on EJKs at the level of Philippine provinces. Using monthly panel-data for 62 provinces and employing various count-model regressions, the findings indicate that Philippine provinces which have (...) large populations, stronger state capacity, and are more affluent in terms of the human development index are more likely to exhibit higher rates of EJKs. Furthermore, the vote share of the President in the 2016 elections and presidential visits to specific provinces are correlated with higher incidences of EJKs—corroborating theories on delegative democracies and penal populism. Lastly, it is found that drug-prone provinces are more likely to experience a higher share of human rights violations in terms of EJKs, compared to provinces that have lower affectation rates. The implications suggest that the Philippine war on drugs seem to promote vertical accountability as international criticism and domestic opposition mounts. (shrink)

In this book, a distinguished international group of legal theorists re-examine legal positivism as a prescriptive political theory and consider its implications for the constitutionally defined roles of legislatures and courts. The issues are illustrated with recent developments in Australian constitutional law.

The main aim of this paper is to clarify the dispute over judicial discretion by distinguishing the different senses in which claims about judicial discretion can be understood and by examining the arguments for these various interpretations. Three different levels of dispute need to be recognized. The first concerns whether judges actually do exercise discretion, the second involves whether judges are entitled to exercise discretion, and the third is about the proper institutional role of judges. In this (...) context, the views of Dworkin, Raz, Perry, Greenawalt, and Sartorius are examined. Finally, it is suggested that a resolution of the judicial discretion controversy requires a satisfactory theory of the justification of judicial decisions. (shrink)

"The main argument of this paper is that there are reasons for judges not only to evaluate the substantive merit of legislation, but to advert to the fact that the place of elected legislatures in our scheme of government gives legislation a standing, an entitlement to consideration, that may go beyond judicial estimates of its intrinsic merit." [Is this just a statement of procedural legitimacy?] "To answer the question [of who assigns rights], courts must take a view as to (...) the proper role of courts vis-a-vis legislatures; they must take a view about the allocation of power in our legal/political system. In drawing this line, courts can take one of two approaches. First, they can make decisions solely on the basis of considerations internal to the relevant clauses of the Constitution, perhaps by giving them a moral reading. Second, they can include in their thinking institutional considerations regarding the role of popular decision-making bodies in our governmental structure." Claims that Dworkin advocates the first [which is false], and that we should accept the second, which is advocated by advocates of judicial restraint. It is appropriate for a judge to give weight to the fact that a decision was reached by a legislature. "Specifically, I think it appropriate that courts presume the constitutionality of such laws, understanding that their own role demands that they overturn them if they are not merely different from what the judges might have decided on their own, but are beyond acceptability." Reasons for the presumption of constitutionality: value of compromise, allocation of power ), appropriateness of humility, integrity and community. (shrink)

How should judges deal with the manifestation of religious symbols in public educational institutions? In light of the important role of human rights in our legal and political system, courts should grant maximum protection under the freedom of religion or belief. The central thesis of this article is that the European Court of Human Rights fails to live up to this standard. In order to reach this conclusion, the article analyzes relevant case law of the European Court and compares (...) its case law with that of the high courts of Canada and South Africa. In addition, the article assesses the case law of all three courts from the angle of interpretation theory and particularly Cass R. Sunstein’s theory of judicial minimalism. Adoption of a more consistently minimalist methodology by the European Court might lead to a greater protection granted to individuals and groups. However, a wide and deep ruling is first required to overturn the current line of reasoning. The European Court can draw inspiration from Canada and South Africa for such a judgment. (shrink)

In this paper, I compare the extent of Anglo-American judicial engagement in response to civil disobedience with that of the French judiciary. I begin by examining what the civil disobedient can realistically expect to achieve in a court of law. I shall argue that his priority should be to require the judge, acting as a mouthpiece for the law, to respond to his complaints. To do this, the civil disobedient must be able to deny liability for the offence he (...) has allegedly committed by urging a different interpretation of the law on the basis of an alternative -- but plausible -- reading of constitutional or human rights. If the civil disobedient can do this, he can claim a victory of sorts, even if his claims are ultimately unsuccessful. But legal culture can present a further barrier. Judges have different roles in different jurisdictions and therein lie further difficulties for the French civil disobedient. (shrink)

In India, judicial review is not a static phenomenon. It has ensured that the Constitution is the supreme law of the land, and in situations when a law impinges on the rights and the liberties of citizens, it can be pruned or made void. This is a collection of scholarly essays demonstrating the different facets of judicial review based on the vast area of comparative constitutional law. Importantly, it honours the body of work of Upendra Baxi, legal scholar (...) and author, whose contributions have shaped our understanding of legal jurisprudence and expanded the scope of social transformation in India. This volume recognizes his role as an Indian jurist. Various constitutional law experts come together to reflect on his expositions on the role of the apex court, judicial activism, accountability of judiciary, laws on surrogacy and adultery and so on. (shrink)

This article refers to the issues associated with the crucial significance of the interpretation of tax law provisions made by administrative courts in the course of the judicial inspection of tax decisions, within the context of protecting the subjective rights of taxpayers. The analysis in that regard has been prepared based on the provisions of art. 153 of the Act of 25 July 2002 on Proceedings before Administrative Courts, which expresses the important rule of binding the court and the (...) administrative authority, whose act was the subject of an appeal, with a legal assessment and instructions regarding the further proceedings described in the decision of the administrative court. As a result of this rule, a decision of an administrative court exerts the results exceeding the scope of judicial administrative proceedings, while its effect also covers the future tax proceedings. If the legal assessment made by the court refers to the regulations that affect the subjective rights of a taxpayer, it means that the administrative court imposes the effects of “its” interpretation of those provisions on a tax authority. In turn, the tax authority is obliged to respect those rights in accordance with the opinions of the court, which usually affects the final resolution of a tax case. It should be borne in mind that a taxpayer, by submitting an appeal against a tax decision to an administrative court, demands not only an inspection of the acts of tax administration, but also - which should be emphasized - demands the execution of its rights, including its subjective rights. Therefore, we should not forget the crucial role of the administrative courts in the protection of the substantive rights of taxpayers. The instrument that allows the administrative courts to guard the subjective rights of taxpayers, consists in the procedural regulations included in the provisions on proceedings before administrative courts, and in particular art. 153 of the Act on Proceedings before Administrative Courts in Poland. (shrink)

Constitutional and judicial law-making is increasingly beginning to find its reflection not only in the Anglo-Saxon, but also in the Romano-Germanic legal family. However, the prerequisites for the use of this legal instrument are different, which determines the relevance of conducting a comparative analysis regarding the provision of such a mechanism in the USA and Kazakhstan. The purpose of the research is to identify common and distinctive features in the process of implementation of constitutional and judicial law-making in (...) countries belonging to different legal systems. The article uses the methods of analysis, synthesis, comparison, deduction and generalization. As a result, the specificity of ensuring the mechanism of constitutional law-making in the USA was expressed, taking into account various forms of law-making activity. It has been established that the development of constitutional provisions in the United States takes place with the help of the constitutional doctrines of the Supreme Court of the United States, which provide for the introduction of amendments to constitutional provisions without a formal procedure. As a result of the study of the experience of Kazakhstan, it was established that special priority was given to the role of precedent, in particular, the decision of the Supreme Court of the Republic of Kazakhstan. This is explained by the integrative nature of the Romano-Germanic legal system, which allows effective development of national legislation as a whole and its provisions. The obtained results can be used during the professional training of judges in the Republic of Kazakhstan. (shrink)

This paper analyses the role of a code of ethics for judges in connection to a contemporary definition of responsive ‘T-shaped’ judicial professionalism and the professional-ethical questions which can arise in judicial decision-making regarding politically and societally controversial issues. The paper’s case study focuses on climate-change related litigation in Dutch courts. First, a theoretical framework which conceptualises practical and ethical elements of T-shaped judicial professionalism as ‘virtuous judgecraft’, building on the work of Kritzer and Van Domselaar, (...) addresses the knowledge, skills, and ethical mindset that judges need for fulfilling their roles in relation to this notion of professionalism. Next, the paper analyses to what extent connections with guidelines of the Dutch Guide to Judicial Conduct (GJC), considered in light of the developed framework of virtuous judgecraft, can be recognised in the approaches of judges in the landmark Urgenda judgments. Based on this analysis, the paper presents conclusions regarding the value of the GJC for enhancing judicial performance and for explaining judgments, in particular those which involve complex societal issues, to parties and the general public. (shrink)

Courts play a key role in deciding on public health controversies, but the legitimacy of judicial intervention remains highly controversial. In this article I suggest that we need to carefully distinguish between different reasons for persistent disagreement in the domain of public health. Adjudicating between public health controversies rooted in factual disagreements allows us to investigate more closely the epistemic capacities of the judicial process. While the critics typically point out the lack of appropriate expertise of judges—in (...) particular with respect to health and public health—we should not move too fast in inferring from this a generalized competence problem. This article offers four reasons for vindicating the importance of judicial intervention in factual disagreements: the relative independence of judges from the political establishment, the judicial commitment to evidence, the specific nature of judicial reasoning and an additional voice for the people in the policy-making process. (shrink)

Judicial process is an integral part of legal systems. The process rests primarily on established principles of constitutional governance and responsibility. In the last ten years, the dynamism within judicial institutions and the judicial process has gained considerable attention. The dynamism is often viewed in light of the diversity of claims being addressed, the openness of courts to foreign material, and the use of non-legal studies and findings in court proceedings. How one views the judicial process (...) in the traditional sense, and in the light of the new experiences is an important question today. Also, what new theories explain this public sphere of activity? -/- In this regard, Dr. Pathak’s book "Judicial Process" is a noteworthy contribution. The book explores the complex nature of the judicial process, along with its wider constitutional, political, and social relevance. The book builds on an understanding that the judicial process, the courts, and the judges are central to constitutional governance. With that backdrop, it engages with four aspects of the judicial process, including (1) the nature of the judicial process, (2) the engagements and interactions within the judiciary, (3) the engagements and interactions between the courts and other institutions, and (4) the protection of rights and redressal of violations function performed by courts. -/- The book includes a detailed discussion on key concepts, practices, tests, and principles. The following chapters and discussions are particularly interesting. Chapter one involves a jurisprudential take on the subject while referring to the works of Blackstone, Holmes, and Cardozo. Particularly relevant in chapter one are Indian cases that have cited Cardozo while determining important judicial matters. Further, the chapter includes foreign case law which has been cited by the Indian courts to discuss the nature of the judicial process. Chapter three on Judicial Review discusses the scope of judicial review in India and its centralizing force in constitutional governance. The author carefully explores the expansion in a judicial capacity for review. The chapter highlights the dynamism attached to the practice of judicial review, moving from the review of constitutional amendments, to that of laws, administrative actions, and policy. Further, the chapter includes a discussion on the basic structure of the Indian Constitution. Chapter four on Law of Precedent includes a discussion on stare decisis, which the author refers to as a principle conferring legitimacy and stability to the judicial system. Recent scholarship on the nature of obiter dicta of higher courts and persuasive quality of foreign case law in domestic cases has been cited. Chapter five covers the Independence of the Judiciary debates in India. It discusses the issue of post-retirement appointments of judges and recusal from judicial matters. Chapter eight Judicial Activism traces the development of the concept from its early days to the present times. The chapter adopts the five core meanings offered by Keenan Kmiec to substantiate the old and the new avatars of judicial activism. The chapter discusses the role of social action litigation in India and its hand in defining the judiciary as a protector of rights and constitutional values. -/- The book provides sufficient guidance to study the nature of the judicial process. It also makes one curious about the changing nature of the judicial process and the new waves of constitutional ethics and governance. The following are some of the themes not attended to in the book. First, the judgments of the courts. The written judgments constitute an integral part of the judicial process. The judgments constitute public law reaching out to beneficiaries including litigants, people at large, as well as foreign institutions and courts. That being said, a discussion on judgements and the written or unwritten standards governing the same needs attention. Also included in this point is the role of dissenting judgments. How should one view or study dissent in judgments of constitutional significance? A normative framework to study the same is much needed. Second, the tools and indicators to measure judicial impact. The judicial impact can include (a) the impact of judicial decisions on the law, policy, and society (b) the impact of law/legislation on the judicial process, and (c) the impact of technological and scientific advancements on the judicial process. Tools like judicial impact assessment have been widely argued to be important to the working of the courts. Further, parameters to study compliance, policy integration, and the impact of judicial decisions on other state institutions have gained attention. (shrink)

El artículo analiza la justificación deliberativa de la revisión judicial a partir los originales aportes de la obra de Carlos Nino. Propone que el deliberativismo solo puede defender consistentemente un rol para la revisión judicial si esta se orienta radicalmente a las condiciones justificatorias y deliberativas de las decisiones, prácticas y políticas públicas, y no a la evaluación sustantiva de su consistencia con los derechos fundamentales, incluso los que sean considerados precondiciones democráticas. Argumenta que la versión más difundida (...) de las tesis de Carlos Nino caía en una inconsistencia -al tratar de preservar un ámbito sustantivo para la revisión judicial relacionado con los derechos a priori- y reconstruye una versión alternativa y menos conocida, articulada en uno de sus últimos libros, en la que la revisión judicial es articulada en clave radicalmente procedimental-justificatoria. The paper analyzes the deliberative justification of judicial review centered on the original contribution of Carlos Nino’s work. It proposes that deliberativism can only defend, consistently, a role for judicial review in a democracy if the institution is radically oriented to the justificatory and deliberative conditions of public policies, practices and decisions, abandoning any substantive evaluation of their consistency with fundamental rights, even those that are considered as democratic preconditions. The paper argues that the most known version of Carlos Nino’s thesis on the subject was partially inconsistent -while trying to preserve some room for substantive judicial review related to a priori rights- and considers an alternative and less known version, presented in one of nino’s last books, where judicial review is constructed with that radically procedimental-justificatory approach. (shrink)

US courts regulate civil advocates in two ways. First, state judiciaries adopt rules of professional conduct that include provisions governing lawyers' work in civil litigation. Additionally, in the course of ruling on sanctions motions in civil lawsuits, courts develop and enforce standards of conduct on an ad hoc basis in common law fashion. Sometimes rules of conduct incorporate the case law and sometimes the case law builds on professional conduct rules, but other times the rules and case law diverge. This (...) article discusses the role of rules and case law in regulating US civil advocates, the relationship between rules and case law, and the comparative advantages of each. (shrink)

This paper takes as starting point the relative indeterminateness of current legal systems. This circumstance determines from the point of view of judicial activity a substantial freedom for judges, which translates into the existence of different interpretive possibilities. For this reason the role of argumentationin judicial activity has been reinforced, but at the same time the question arises of how to control the judges and what kind of responsibility they have in exercising their functions.

Judicial bias in sexual assault cases is generally associated with the conduct of sitting judges who engage in victim blaming and reserve the full protection of the law to ideal victims. However, this paper seeks to examine the role of the Canadian Judicial Council (CJC) in perpetuating sexist stereotypes in the legal realm. It does so by juxtaposing the CJC’s handling of two judicial misconduct complaints, one in which a male judge exhibited bias against women while (...) adjudicating a sexual assault trial and a second in which graphic, sexual pictures of a female judge were posted on the internet without her knowledge or consent. The proposition offered is that the CJC’s gendered record in disposing of the two judicial misconduct cases was similarly informed by the notional ideal victim, further perpetuating sexism both in Canadian courtrooms and among the judiciary. (shrink)

"In this paper I shall attempt to sketch a defense of the plain man's view that the job of the judge, qua judge is to apply the law." What seems to have lead to the other view is the pervasive role of policy and principle in the justification of judicial decisions. This is no argument, however, for the existence of discretion: "For while it must be admitted that judges are entitled to appeal to certain general policies and principles, (...) this by no means implies that they are entitled to exercise discretionary judgment in the formulation of such standards." With Dworkin, distinguishes weak and strong discretion: the former means merely final or controversial; the latter implying that judges are at some point free to reach decisions not controlled by authoritative standards. Agrees with Dworkin that non-rule standards are part of law. "Both Dworkin and I are in agreement that law is a system of entitlements, although, as we shall see, we differ as to what is their basis." "At any rate, we share the view that a litigant before a court of law is not in the position of one begging a favor from a potential benefactor, but rather in that of one demanding a particular decision as a matter of right, as something to which the law entitles him. Such a demand has two aspects: a claim that a right exists which the law recognizes; a claim that this right takes precedence over any competing legal rights or obligations involved. Let us refer to these two sorts of claims respectively as ones involving decisions as to recognition, and weight.:" Argues that we cannot distinguish between legal moral principles and non-legal moral principles without a rule of recognition. The same is true for the problem of establishing weight between various principles - here we have to consider how well a principle coheres with the institutional practice of a legal system. "[I]t is the distinctive feature of the institutionalized role of the judiciary, in contrast to the legislative, that it may not directly base decisions on substantive considerations of the value of competing social policies." "The theoretical possibility of the law being indeterminate with regard to what it requires...does not imply any correspondign indeterminacy with regard to what is required of the judge.". (shrink)

Desde el retorno a la democracia, la apropiación de niños y niñas ha sido uno de los pocos delitos juzgados de forma ininterrumpida por el Poder Judicial. Sin embargo, en estas causas, las apropiadoras han recibido sistemáticamente condenas menores que los apropiadores. Partiendo del interrogante acerca de por qué varones y mujeres obtuvieron distintas condenas frente a los mismos crímenes, el artículo analiza los modos en que los discursos maternalistas y los roles de género fueron esgrimidos por las apropiadoras (...) en sus declaraciones públicas. De este modo, se estudia con perspectiva de género los discursos de estas mujeres con el fin de examinar qué imagen buscaron construir ante el Poder Judicial, así como las intervenciones de los/las jueces/juezas en relación a la palabra de las apropiadoras y la cuestión de género. (shrink)

Judicial activism is in serious, though undeserved, trouble. The current impasse over its role in constitutional discourse pits two opposed positions committed to different paradigms of judicial activism against one another. One side condemns activist judges for engaging in ultra vires adjudication by reading their idiosyncratic values into the Constitution. In this view, the charge of judicial activism has significant content and should be deployed to restrain renegade judges. The other side insists that calling someone a (...) "judicial activist" has only emotive content and is used merely as an empty epithet denouncing judges with whom one disagrees. This Article redirects the controversy over judicial activism by distinguishing between two different, but interrelated, levels of constitutional discourse: the surface level and the deep level. The problem of judicial activism exists on the surface level of constitutional discourse and will remain irresolvable on that level. However, once we attend to the deep level of constitutional discourse, the role of judicial activism becomes clear. The presence of judicial activism on the surface structure of constitutional discourse reveals on the deep structure reasonable disagreement over the meaning of key constitutional provisions. The idea of "reasonable disagreement" is profitably explicated by combining what social theorist W.B. Gallie called "essentially contested concepts" with the political philosopher John Rawls' important categorization of "the burdens of judgment." These obstacles to rational consensus are endemic to a republican democracy. Consequently, reasonable disagreement over key constitutional provisions should not be regarded negatively; it is an inevitable and positive feature of any society championing liberty, equality, and pluralism. However, the inevitability and desirability of reasonable disagreement has institutional consequences for constitutional review. When reasonable disagreement is inevitable, legislatures, not courts should have the last word on constitutional meaning. (shrink)

This paper articulates an egalitarian conception of judicial humility and justifies its value on the grounds that it importantly advances the legal and political ideal of fraternity. This account of the content and value of the virtue of humility stands in sharp contrast with the dominant view of judicial humility as deference or judicial restraint. The paper concludes by discussing some ways in which the account of humility and of its value provided in the paper furthers our (...) understanding of the judicial virtues and of the political implications of giving virtue a role in adjudication. (shrink)

Judicial review of statutes on constitutional grounds is affected by a cluster of doctrinal practices that are generally accepted, but not very well explained, by the courts and not entirely consistent with each other. Courts usually judge statutes rather than as written; 1 they favor of valid applications of statutes from invalid or possibly invalid applications when possible; 2 and they interpret statutes in ways that avoid constitutional difficulty. 3 These overlapping practices presumably are intended to preserve legislation, and (...) hence are associated with a modest conception of the role of courts in government. Yet they are not always modest in operation. 4. (shrink)

The transitory and ever-evolving process of law making plays a role of primal importance in the regulation of human conduct of society. It goes without saying that in this entire process, judges have a participation. The power entrusted by law and the nature of judicial process, make judges the prime mover of the development of law. It matters how judges decide cases. It matters most to people unlucky or litigious or wicked or saintly enough to find themselves in (...) court... The effect emanating from the decision of a case affects the life of a person in many ways that at times has far reaching impact...When the law in question happens to be criminal law, it requires a cautious consideration to see how the interpretive tools used by judges affect the life of a litigant in ways both seen and unseen... Several areas concerning adjudication and judicial interpretation have been the subject matter of study. This paper includes a discussion on the principle of non- retrospectivity in light of judicial adjudication in criminal matters. (shrink)

This article engages legal positivism conceived of as a political project rather than as a descriptive account of law. Jeremy Waldron’s ‘democratic jurisprudence’ represents such a politicized legal positivism—a normative argument for legal positivism rather than a non-normative claim that legal positivism is true. Unsurprisingly, the essential institutional elements of this democratic jurisprudence turn out to be the familiar features of classical legal positivism, and the case Waldron makes against judicial review grows out of his overarching political position. But, (...) consequently, if there are reasons to doubt the strength of Waldron’s case against judicial review, there are surely reasons to doubt the normative bases of his case for positivism, and in turn, descriptive or conceptual positivism more generally. This article investigates this claim, noting that Waldron’s political case for positivism is based on Kantian notions about moral autonomy given circumstances of moral disagreement, but that Waldron’s conclusions about the role of judges undermine both these Kantian foundations and the aims of democratic jurisprudence. While Waldron’s arguments revive a tradition of political positivism that goes back to Bentham, engagement with those arguments suggests that legal positivism ultimately must embrace a radical democratic form of anti-constitutionalism. (shrink)

Courts are increasingly obliged to adjudicate upon challenges to allocative decisions in healthcare, but their involvement continues to be regarded with unease, imperilling the legitimacy of the judicial role in this context. A central reason for this is that judges are perceived to lack sufficient expertise to determine allocative questions. This article critically appraises the claim of lack of judicial expertise through an examination of the various components of a limit-setting decision. It is argued that the inexpertise (...) argument is weak when compared with other rationales for judicial restraint, such as the procedural unsuitability and lack of constitutional competence of courts. (shrink)

This book, formed as a series of essays in honour of Professor Carl Baudenbacher, addresses the very art of judicial reasoning, and features contributions from many of the foremost current or former national, supranational, or international judges. This unique volume is intended first and foremost for legal scholars, but its approachable style makes it readily accessible for students and for those with a general interest in the application of the law and justice in today's multi-layered world. The collection of (...) essays is rather more philosophical and reflective as opposed to doctrinal. Each contribution focuses on the nature and operation of justice, the independence of the judiciary, and on judicial style primarily from the perspective of the judges themselves. The book provides perspectives on what it means to be accountable and independent as a judge, the role of language and languages in the quest for justice, while other contributions acquaint readers with the some of the structures of courts themselves, or indeed question for whom judgments are written. Each chapter has been written by a presiding judge, or head of an institution and the book is divided into three parts: - Part I Art and Method - Part II Justice and the Judiciary - Part III Reasoning and Language(s). (shrink)

This paper investigates the role of (DIS)RESPECT a value premise in two landmark civil rights cases given by the United States Supreme Court. It adopts a corpus-assisted approach whereby a keyword analysis and the analysis of key semantic domains are used to identify potential values relied upon by judges in their justifications. The two categories of NO RESPECT and RESPECTED have been selected and examined as one domain of (DIS)RESPECT. (DIS)RESPECT turns out to be the only value marked by (...) strong evaluative polarity and it is found in the majority, as well as in dissenting opinions. The analysis shows how the notion of (DIS)RESPECT has been integrated into the arguments of judges and it highlights the central importance of values and the related evaluative language for legal argumentation. (shrink)

This article addresses the pressing issue of what process courts should use to identify those questions whose resolution lies beyond their appropriate capacity and legitimacy. The search for such a process is a basic constitutional problem that has defied a clear answer for well over a hundred years. The chequered history of earlier attempts illustrates why commentators have once again begun to gravitate towards institutional approaches. The general features of institutional approaches include emphasis on uncertainty, judicial fallibility, systemic impact, (...) collaboration between branches of government and incrementalism in judging. These features, however, are relied upon in support of two conflicting views of the role of judges in public law adjudication. One is restrictive, and advocates sharp limitations to the ambit of judicial review. The other is contextual, and, in stark contrast, it proposes to expand the ambit of review in reliance on the idea of using principles of restraint to structure the exercise of judicial discretion. While this article does not take sides between them, it nonetheless seeks to refine the contextual institutional approach by outlining a general framework for reasoning with principles of restraint, and by addressing some of the key difficulties such a reasoning process would face. (shrink)

This article explores the impact of judicial empowerment on social movement politics and public policy using a case study of the lesbian and gay rights movement in Canada before and after the 1982 constitutional entrenchment of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms. The expanded role of courts in the Canadian political system has had substantial effects on public policy in the lesbian and gay rights area over a twenty-year period, putting Canada in the forefront of this area (...) of human rights. (shrink)

We examine the relationship between scientific knowledge and the legal system with a focus on the exclusion of expert testimony from trial as ruled by the Daubert standard in the US.We introduce a simple framework to understand and assess the role of judges as “gatekeepers”, monitoring the admission of science in the courtroom. We show how judges face a crucial choice, namely, whether to limit Daubert assessment to the abstract reliability of the methods used by the expert witness or (...) also to check whether the application of those methods was correct. Undesirable outcomes result from both choices, thereby giving rise to the “gatekeeper’s dilemma.” We illustrate the dilemma by analyzing in some detail two well-known cases of Daubert challenges to economic experts. Finally, we present reasons for the absence of straightforward solutions to the dilemma and for its likely endurance. (shrink)

The paper takes a closer look at the role of knowledge and evidence in legal theory. In particular, the paper examines a puzzle arising from the evidential standard Preponderance of the Evidence and its application in civil procedure. Legal scholars have argued since at least the 1940s that the rule of the Preponderance of the Evidence gives rise to a puzzle concerning the role of statistical evidence in judicial proceedings, sometimes referred to as the Problem of Bare (...) Statistical Evidence. While this puzzle has led to the development of a multitude of accounts and approaches in the legal literature, I argue here that the problem can be resolved fairly straightforwardly within a knowledge-first framework. (shrink)

Legal scholars have been inspired by the dialogic approach and rallied around it as the solution to constitutional conflict in domestic constitutional orders and the transnational legal landscape. This paper aims to show that the gravitation towards judicial dialogue in contemporary constitutional theory misses the point, given the ambiguities surrounding it. My investigation reveals that the dialogic approach does not succeed in guiding the inter-departmental or inter-regime interactions in a way that no single power would exert unilateral domination. The (...) emergence of judicial supremacy in both national and transnational constitutional orders further suggests that underlying those ostensible examples of judicial dialogue is a transfigured conception of sovereignty. As it is the rise of judicial sovereignty that drives the move towards judicial dialogue in contemporary constitutional developments, I suggest that legal scholars shift focus of attention from the idea of dialogue to the enhanced judicial role in the new constitutional era. (shrink)

This collection addresses the concept and role of judge, the act of judging and the requirements and potential abuses inherent in the system and process of sitting in judgement. It considers the issues and questions involved in establishing a framework for assessing judicial morality.

This paper examines the functions of narrative within legal argumentation. My purposes are these: 1) to repudiate common assumptions that differentiate ‘argumentation’ and ‘storytelling’ in the law; 2) to begin to theorize anew how legal argumentation functions; 3) to explore the difficulties of evaluating the law's argumentative narratives; and 4) to trace some of the anxiety that judges themselves reveal about their roles as storytellers. I conclude that narrative is necessary to law's claims to authority, even as it complicates our (...) understandings about how legislative policy decisions produce effects, and even as judges themselves seek to mask its importance. (shrink)