In this paper I analyze Hegel’s concept of life in the Phenomenology of Spirit and Heidegger’s critical comments regarding this concept of life in his 1930/31 Lecture Course on Hegel’s Phenomenology of Spirit. I claim that Heidegger's lecture course shows his continued fascination with life, despite his official distance to Dilthey and the then contemporary life-philosophy. I argue that one of the fundamental tenets of life-philosophy, the opposition of "life" to "reason," still motivates Heidegger’s critique of Hegel’s supposedly logocentric concept (...) of life. I begin the paper with a brief review of Heidegger’s life-philosophical starting point after World War One (Section I)and, drawing on Hans Jonas, suggest some meta-reflections on the reasons behind the renewed interest in "life" in the last decades of the nineteenth and the first decades of the twentieth century (section II). After a sketch of Hegel’s concept of life in the Phenomenology of Spirit (Section III), I then turn to Heidegger’s interpretation of Hegel’s Phenomenology of Spirit in 1930/31 (Section IV), in particular Hegel’s conception of the correlation of life and time. (shrink)

: In this paper I analyze early Heidegger’s concept of history. First, I argue that early Heidegger makes use of three distinct concepts or spheres of history, namely (1) history as intergenerational process, (2) history as personal or autobiographical development, and (3) history as the real center and origin of all intentional acts in the intentional self. Second, I argue that an essential motif in Heidegger’s discussion is the re-appropriation of what he considers the externalized and expropriated historical reality in (...) all three spheres. I suggest that this constitutes an objective parallelism to similar moves in Marx and neo-Marxist thought, especially Lukaìcs and the Frankfurt School. I show that Heidegger is on his way towards an ethics of time. First, in opposition to theoretical historicism and historical aestheticism or determinism of his time, early Heidegger advocates the active historical participation in history, the engagement in one’s historical situation or praxis. Second, in opposition to the publically regimented and reified time frames, calendars and interpretations, Heidegger argues for the self-reflexive, historical shaping of one’s very own and unique lifetime. Third, because Heidegger finds the origin of all history in the historical enactments of intentions in the intentional self, he ultimately argues for the self-reflexive acknowledgment of this ultimate historicity at the very heart of human intentionality, calling for the always renewed accentuation of this inevitable and ultimate historicity as a necessary condition for authentic temporality. (shrink)

The dissertation is a historical and systematic study of Heidegger 's philosophizing at Freiburg between 1919 and 1923. It is shown that Heidegger pursues a philosophy of life directed at articulating how human life is lived from within, rather than how it is objectively thought about in the various positive sciences. Heidegger 's basic thesis that life is inextricably tied to the historical world and centered in the personal self leads him to experiment with various forms of relativism or historicism, (...) which, however, cannot be defended. Moreover, Heidegger 's search for a non-objective, non-theoretical method of describing life ultimately leads to a dead-end, although it does raise important questions about the theory of phenomenological description and concept formation. ; Heidegger 's extreme anti-objectivist phenomenology of life draws on and radicalizes strands in Bergson, Simmel, Jaspers, Kierkegaard, Dilthey, and Husserl. However, it also co-opts anti-objectivist impulses about the non-naturalist conceptuality of history and psychology, as pioneered by Natorp, Windelband, and Rickert. The conclusion is that Heidegger is not starting out as a philosopher of being, but as a philosopher of life, being driven by the life-philosophical ferment of the time. ;In addition, it is argued that Heidegger 's life-philosophy is a "philosophy of crisis," putting at center stage the fragility of life and the tendency to fall away from original self-being and the unique historical situation. It is suggested that this corresponds to the lived through "crisis" of World War One, and the political upheavals in the immediate post-war period. As a crisis philosopher, Heidegger embraces modernism and its skeptical distance to the normative powers of the tradition. ;Last but not the least, it is argued that, in the early twenties, Heidegger 's philosophy does not carry the slightest traces of overt or covert reactionary political motifs. (shrink)

Heidegger scholars consider the philosopher's recently published notebooks, including the issues of Heidegger's Nazism and anti-Semitism. For more than forty years, the philosopher Martin Heidegger logged ideas and opinions in a series of notebooks, known as the “Black Notebooks” after the black oilcloth booklets into which he first transcribed his thoughts. In 2014, the notebooks from 1931 to 1941 were published, sparking immediate controversy. It has long been acknowledged that Heidegger was an enthusiastic supporter of the Nazi Party in the (...) early 1930s. But the notebooks contain a number of anti-Semitic passages—often referring to the stereotype of “World-Jewry”—written even after Heidegger became disenchanted with the Nazis themselves. Reactions from the scholarly community have ranged from dismissal of the significance of these passages to claims that the anti-Semitism in them contaminates all of Heidegger's work. This volume offers the first collection of responses by Heidegger scholars to the publication of the notebooks. In essays commissioned especially for the book, the contributors offer a wide range of views, addressing not only the issues of anti-Semitism and Nazism but also the broader questions that the notebooks raise. Contributors Babette Babich, Andrew Bowie, Steven Crowell, Fred Dallmayr, Donatella Di Cesare, Michael Fagenblat, Ingo Farin, Gregory Fried, Jean Grondin, Karsten Harries, Laurence Paul Hemming, Jeff Malpas, Thomas Rohkrämer, Tracy B. Strong, Peter Trawny, Daniela Vallega-Neu, Friedrich-Wilhelm von Herrmann, Nancy A. Weston, Holger Zaborowski. (shrink)

This book looks at the ways in which conditionals, an integral part of philosophy and logic, can be of practical use in computer programming. It analyzes the different types of conditionals, including their applications and potential problems. Other topics include defeasible logics, the Ramsey test, and a unified view of consequence relation and belief revision. Its implications will be of interest to researchers in logic, philosophy, and computer science, particularly artificial intelligence.

This systematic review identified and evaluated instruments measuring patients' perceptions of patient‐centred nursing care. Of 2629 studies reviewed, 12 were eligible for inclusion. Four instruments were reported: The Individualized Care Scale, the Client‐Centred Care Questionnaire, the Oncology patients' Perceptions of the Quality of Nursing Care Scale and the Smoliner scale. These instruments cover themes addressing patient participation and the clinician–patient relationship. Instruments were shown to have satisfactory psychometric properties, although not all were adequately assessed. More research is needed regarding test–retest (...) reliability, convergent and discriminant validity, validity with known groups and structural validity using confirmatory factor analysis. (shrink)

One of the positive ways in which argumentation can improve political thinking is through providing definitions. We can establish definitions through argumentation, filtering out ideas that are irrelevant or unacceptable, and collecting features that offer a comprehensive understanding of a crucial concept. In this paper, we use argumentation to illuminate the concept of extremism. We proceed in this way: first, we discuss the relationship between argumentation and definitions. Second, we look at the current state of affairs by exploring contemporary definitions (...) of “extremism” and by identifying several problems in the definition literature. Third, we assume the burden of proof in providing a definition that avoids problems we have identified. Fourth, we discuss other closely-associated concepts and their definitions—terrorism, radicalism, and fundamentalism, explaining how these concepts are distinct from our definition of extremism. (shrink)

The history of Heidegger's relationship to the neo-Kantians is still largely unwritten, despite the fact that in his formative period Heidegger was very close to the neo-Kantian school, especially Windelband and Rickert, Lask and Natorp. With regard to the concept of history and the importance of historical philosophizing, it is the received view that Dilthey was early Heidegger's main and only source of inspiration. This paper argues against this one-sided view by showing the historical and systematic connections between early Heidegger's (...) views on history and the philosophy of history developed by Windelband and Rickert. (shrink)

Original and critical essays by leading scholars on the question of the human in the philosophy of Martin Heidegger.

In this paper we discuss Heidegger’s conception of philosophy in the Black Notebooks. In particular, we set out a reading of the Notebooks from the 1930s and early 1940s as exhibiting an extremist view of philosophy, and its concern with being, which accords it an absolute and exclusive priority above and beyond everything else. We argue that such overcompensation for philosophy’s declining fortune involves a willful turning away from the realities of human life, and from the multifarious symbolic and functional (...) worlds in which the meaning of being is articulated, refracted, and lived by individuals. In contrast, we suggest that Heidegger’s early Freiburg lecture courses already contain the basis for a critique of such an inflated notion of philosophy, and that the shift in Heidegger’s thinking in the late 1940s—away from an onto-historical and towards a topological understanding—is a consequence of Heidegger’s own reaction against the extremity of his thinking, and a turning back to the properly human dimensions of thinking and the matters that call for thinking. (shrink)

Jeff Malpas’ book Experience and Place has become a significant landmark in philosophy. I take the publication of the revised and extended second edition of the book in 2018 as an opportunity to re...

In this study Berkowitz challenges interpretations which claim Nietzsche as the "founding father of postmodernism" and its relativism and perspectivism. He argues that Nietzsche's commitment to a search for truth, wisdom, and virtue marks him as an ethicist proper, whose "break from traditional morality is by his own account, and is in fact, grounded in and a partial continuation of traditional morality".

Hermeneutical Heidegger critically examines and confronts Heidegger's hermeneutical approach to philosophy and the history of philosophy. Heidegger's work, both early and late, has had a profound impact on hermeneutics and hermeneutical philosophy. The essays in this volume are striking in the way they exhibit the variety of perspectives on the development and role of hermeneutics in Heidegger's work, allowing a multiplicity of views on the nature of hermeneutics and hermeneutical philosophy to emerge. As Heidegger argues, the rigor and strength of (...) philosophy do not consist in the development of a univocal and universal method, but in philosophy's ability to embrace—not just tolerate—the questioning of its basic concepts. The essays in Hermeneutical Heidegger are exemplars of this kind of rigor and strength. (shrink)

BackgroundThis study aimed to translate the negative and positive items of the Psychological Consequences Questionnaire into German, to adapt this version to the context of screening for cirrhosis and fibrosis of the liver, and to test its psychometric properties.Materials and methodsThe three subscales were translated into German using a forward-backward translation method. Furthermore, we adapted the wording to the context of liver diseases. In sum, the PCQ comprises twelve negative items and ten positive items. We tested the acceptability, distribution properties, (...) internal consistency, scale structure, and the convergent validity using an analysis sample of 443 patients who were screened for cirrhosis or fibrosis of the liver.ResultsWe found low non-response and non-unique answer rates on the PCQ items in general. However, positive items had higher non-response rates. All items showed strong floor effects. McDonald’s Omega was high for both the negative and the positive PCQ scale, as well as for the total PCQ scale. Confirmatory factor analysis could reproduce the three dimensions that the PCQ intends to measure. However, it suggests not summing up a total PCQ score and instead treat the subscales separately considering a higher order overall construct. Convergent validity with the short form of the Spielberger State-Trait Anxiety Inventory was acceptable.ConclusionOverall, our study results report a successful adaptation of the German PCQ with good performance in terms of acceptability, internal consistency, scale structure, and convergent validity. Floor-effects limit the content validity of the PCQ, which needs to be addressed in future research. However, the German version of the PCQ is a useful measurement for both negative and positive screening consequences - even in a non-cancer setting. (shrink)

Diego Bubbio, Ingo Farin and Glenda Satne have advanced a range of comments, questions and challenges relating to the ideas and arguments set out in the new edition of my Place and Experience (2018). Rather than address each of my interlocutors separately, my responses here are organized around four main topics: the relation between space and place, including the nature of space; the relation between place and subjectivity, and the foundational role of place; the relation between place and conceptuality; and (...) the relation between place and normativity. (shrink)

Bob Sandmeyer - The Basic Problems of Phenomenology. From the Lectures, Winter Semester, 1910-11 - Journal of the History of Philosophy 45:2 Journal of the History of Philosophy 45.2 338-339 Muse Search Journals This Journal Contents Reviewed by Bob Sandmeyer University of Kentucky Edmund Husserl. The Basic Problems of Phenomenology. From the Lectures, Winter Semester, 1910–11. Translated by Ingo Farin and James G. Hart. Edmund Husserl Collected Works, Volume 12. Dordrecht: Springer, 2006. Pp. xi + 179. Cloth, $119.00. Husserl's seminal (...) lectures on the phenomenological reduction and transcendental theory of empathy have finally been translated into English. Known by the title of the course, The Basic Problems of Phenomenology presents some of Husserl's most important innovations in the theory of the phenomenological.. (shrink)

Qu'on ne doit pas observer une totale obeissance passive vis-a-vis de n'importe quel pouvoir civil, mais que la soumission au gouvernement doit etre mesuree et limitee par le bien commun de la societe; que donc les sujets peuvent legitimement resister a l'autorite supreme dans le cas precis ou le bien commun parait clairement l'exiger; que dis-je! qu'il est du devoir des sujets de resister dans la mesure ou ils se trouvent tous dans la necessaire obligation de faire fleurir l'interet commun: (...) puisque ces idees et d'autres de la meme farine, que je ne puis m'empecher de juger pernicieuses pour le genre humain et contraires a la droite raison, ont ete cultivees avec assiduites ces dernieres annees par de talentueux hommes de science, il a paru necessaire d'armer contre elles les jeunes gens de notre Universite et de veiller a ce qu'ils fassent leur entree dans le monde fourbis de bons principes. (shrink)

Vers la fin de sa vie, Claude Lévi-Strauss pensait que l'espèce humaine s'était condamnée elle-même par sa propre voracité ; il nous comparait à des vers à farine dans un bocal. Oui! Nous sommes bien aujourd'hui à un tournant non pas seulement de notre civilisation, niais de l'histoire humaine. Globalement, pour la grande majorité d'entre nous notre monde est devenu insupportable par une minorité prête à tout pour accroître ses gains et son pouvoir. Il est clair que si nous persistons (...) dans cette voie nous ne pourrons plus sortir de ce processus d'autodestruction ou de suicide collectif. Il nous est peut-être encore temps d'envisager une autre manière d'être humain, de faire homme, comme disait Montaigne. Mais pour cela, tout doit être réexaminé, réévalué, rien ne doit rester tabou. C'est l'ensemble des fondements sur lesquels nous avons construit notre monde que nous devons réinterroger et réévaluer. Nous devons pour cela apprendre à trouver une totale liberté de penser, sans préjugés, et en nous appuyant sur ce que nous avons inventé et acquis progressivement de phis précieux : le respect universel des droits humains. En n'oubliant jamais le vieux mot de Terence : "Rien d'humain ne m'est étranger". Nous devrions alors être capables d'apprendre à dépasser les notions de nation, de culture, de religion, de moeurs, de coutumes. Non pour les nier mais pour qu'elles soient, avant tout, le bagage que chacun apporte dans la fondation d'un vivre ensemble humain. C'est ce qu'il nous faudrait dès maintenant envisager et construire. Renonçons à tout espoir et commençons par agir, si nous en sommes capables... (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Hume Against Spinoza and Aristotle1 Frank J. Leavitt It is always good to try to make peace, to try to resolve differences between whatsomebelieveare conflictingpoints ofview. Nevertheless, sometimes the points ofview which are believed to be opposed to each other really do oppose one another and so the most ingenious attempts at reconciliation turn out to have been ill-conceived. Wim Klever has brought considerable scholarship to bear in his (...) attempt to show that Hume and Spinoza were not so far apart as we thought.2 It was an especially pleasant surprise to see the comparison of their views on personal identity,3 for example. And he has made a convincing case for doubt that Hume's "sharp anti-Spinözistic utterings"4 in Treatise 1.4.5 were really sincere. In my opinion, however, Klever has gone too farin trying to bring together what should have been left asunder. Some ofhis points ofthe purportedly common ground shared by Hume and Spinoza are based on what I believe to be a blatant misreading ofSpinoza. Other points show a failure to appreciate a fundamental disagreement between Hume and Spinoza on central issues in the old Aristotelian tradition. Hume and Spinoza, like other philosophersofthe seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, can be best understood when one is aware ofthe Aristotelian background against which they were writing and with which they expected their readers to be familiar. Hume shows familiarity with Aristotelianism in his discussion of the "antient philosophy" at Treatise 1.4.3 as well as in his various remarks about scholasticism.6Spinoza'srelationshipto ChristianAristotelianism has been discussed by Wolfson6 and by myself,7 among others. And his relationship to Maimonides, who was his link to Jewish Aristotelianism, has been discussed by Harvey.8 1 shall base my claim that Hume and Spinoza were much further apart than Klever makes them out to be upon an attempt to identify some scholastic and Aristotelian issues and doctrines with respect to which Hume and Spinoza took very different stands. The firstthing which I wanttodraw attention toisKlever'sreading ofthe scholia to 2 Ethics 40, which bears on medieval disputes over the nominalistic, conceptualistic and realistic approaches to Aristotle's treatment of the problem of the universels. Since Spinoza allows that universal notions "are notformed by all men in the same way,"9 Klever Volume XVII Number 2 203 FRANK J. LEAVITT makes him out to be holding the same position which Hume expresses when he adopts Berkeley's opinion that "all general ideas are nothing but particular ones, annexed to a certain term" (T 17). And Klever claims "Hume and Spinoza are both thorough nominalists."10 But Klever misses the point that Hume denies that there are, in addition to particular ideas, universal ones, that is, common notions, while Spinoza clearly admits, in the second scholium to 11 Ethics 40, the difference which Hume denies. According to Spinoza we have (1> confused representations of particular things, and (2) remembered ideas which are "similar to those through which we imagine things." These latter are ideas of the sort which Hume recognized. But in addition tothese two, which Spinoza calls "opinion" and "imagination," Spinoza claims that we have (3) "notions common to all men, and adequate ideas ofthe properties ofthings." These are notions of"those things which are common to all, and which are equallyin a part and in the whole [and which] cannotbe conceived exceptadequately"(2Ethics 38). These notions, which parallel Descartes' "clear and distinct ideas" are the general abstract ideas which Hume denies in Treatise 1.1.7. There Hume denies that ideas can be general "in their nature" but allows that they can be general "in their representation." To the extent to which Hume's position can be called "nominalism," the passages to which I have referred show that Spinoza, who basically accepted the Cartesian doctrine ofclear and distinct ideas, was not a nominalist. Aristotle drew a sharp distinction between imagination and thought in De anima 2.3. Descartes preserved the distinction between imagination and intellection at the beginningofthe fourth Meditation, among other places. The passage from the second scholium to 2 Ethics 40, which I have already cited adheres to this distinction, which was already... (shrink)