This book calls for a distinction between dangerous, elitist, hierarchizing myths such as Heidegger's and salutary, liberative, empowering myths that foster the humility of justice.

Max Deutsch’s new book argues against the commonly held ‘myth’ that philosophical methodology characteristically employs intuitions as evidence. While I am sympathetic to the general claim that philosophical methodology has been grossly oversimplified in the intuition literature, the particular claim that it is a myth that philosophers rely on intuitions as evidence is open to several very different interpretations. The plausibility and consequences of a rejection of the ‘myth’ will depend on the notion of evidence one employs, the notion of (...) intuition one holds, and how one understands the idea of ‘relying on’ or ‘employing’ something as evidence. I describe what I take to be the version of The Myth which is most plausibly undermined by Deutsch’s arguments; however, I also argue that the falsity of this myth has only minimal consequences for the viability of the experimental philosophy research project. (shrink)

The author Strielkova Yuliya A. in the article «Demythologization and existential theology: formation of paradigm» analyzed the conception of the demythologization of Sacred Scripture and Sacred translation as a fundamental setting not only within the dialectical theology of the twentieth century, but also for contemporary searches for the forms of correlation of philosophy and theology in the context of the scientific world pictur. The author outlines the heuristic potential of a reinterpretative approach to the concept of demythologization, (...) considered beyond the conceptual and chronological framework of dialectical theology. Also, attention was focused on clarifying the heuristic content of the concept of "demythologization" for the modern philosophical and theological tradition, as well as the nature of its genetic connection with the existential paradigm of philosophizing and christology. Particular attention is paid to the paradigmatic and formative aspects of the phenomenon of demythologization; the role of language practices and discursive models in the development of the contemporary picture of the world is accentuated. (shrink)

MARX AS POLITICIAN by David Felix Carbondale: Southern Illinois University Press, 1983. 308pp., $27.50.

Rudolf Bultmann aimed to make the revelation of Jesus a reality for people in the present, but fell short of his objective. In Demythologizing Revelation, Chester O’Gorman picks up where Bultmann left off by demythologizing the Christ event through the philosophy of provocative thinker Slavoj Žižek.

HEIDEGGER COULD NEVER RESIST A GOOD STORY. He could never resist giving what he had discovered about alëtheia and the oblivion of Being a narrative form. In Being and Time we were promised a story--which was to be written backwards--of the "destruction of the history of ontology." Beginning at the end, with Kant, it was to feel its way back through the tradition in a deconstructive gesture, looking for what had all along been blocking the discovery of the temporal meaning (...) of Being which had at last begun to emerge in Kant. In the later works this story is considerably recast. Again, the vantage point is the end, but now the end is the age of the Gestell, the enframing, the "end of philosophy," which holds us all in its grip. The end is not conceived as a modern breakthrough but as an eschaton, a dead end into which the West has run. The task of thought is to make its way back into the primordial "Beginning" in order to recapture that fleeting moment which will make it possible for us today to begin anew, to make the present into an "authentic" end, which means a transition to another beginning. (shrink)

In this paper, I address some puzzles about Frege’s conception of how we “grasp” thoughts. I focus on an enigmatic passage that appears near the end of Frege’s great essay “The Thought.” In this passage Frege refers to a “non-sensible something” without which “everyone would remain shut up in his inner world.” I consider and criticize Wolfgang Malzkorn’s interpretation of the passage. According to Malzkorn, Frege’s view is that ideas [Vorstellungen] are the means by which we grasp thoughts. My counter-proposal (...) is that language enables us to grasp thoughts (ideas are merely their baggage or “trappings,” as Frege puts it). One significant consequence of my interpretation is that it helps challenge the standard reading of Frege according to which he is a metaphysical platonist about thoughts. My interpretation thus provides support for the deflationary, anti-ontological reading spelled out by readers like Thomas Ricketts and Wolfgang Carl. As Ricketts puts it, Frege’s distinction between the objective and the subjective, rather than being an ontological doctrine, “lodges in the contrast between asserting something and giving vent to a feeling.”. (shrink)

In the early 1950s Grant McConnell, Jr., called for a political adjudication of our environmental and political visions. He pointed out the arbitrary nature of Gifford Pinchot's noble-sounding formula (“The greatest good for the greatest number over the longest time”), noting that such a determination depended on whom you asked. No technocrat can determine the greatest good on the basis of some secret expertise or privileged knowledge. We need to resolve our disparate visions of the uses of nature and human (...) beings politically, without recourse to privileged knowledge.But does such a political adjudication imply the unimpeded domination of the will of the majority? Not necessarily, because there is no overall majority for a total “bundle” of policies and programs — these must be horse-traded and haggled over on the basis of shifting coalitions. Yet, can it not be argued that even so, some very deeply held values of minorities will be trounced and trampled? It would be dishonest not to admit to such a danger. What we must do is try to define and develop a workable conception of baseline human rights that will be inviolable by the will of temporary majorities, and this itself is a tenuous political process which we have only just embarked on in recent times.The danger of Valentin Rasputins, Vernadskii cultists, and Deep Ecologists everywhere is that they are arguing from privileged knowledge. “We know what is really best for you, what will cure you,” they assert. They alone know the distinction between natural harmony and disorder, social health and corruption, pollution and purity, alienation and unity. They do not recognize the social construction of their ethical beliefs and political visions; they absolutize their individual truths. They may be right, but what if they are not...?It is therefore all the more important for those of us who wish to preserve a maximum of biotic and human diversity for our-selves and for future humans (and nonhumans) to be explicit about the moral and political agendas we embrace. The soundest way for us to prevail is to persuade our neighbors on this planet that our visions have something of value for them, too. We must keep in mind the fact that in a world where there exists more than one fanaticism, peaceful coexistence is in principle impossible.And if fanaticisms, including ecological ones, are the products of the fear or the fact of material, cultural, or spiritual dispossession, then we must work harder to make a world in which each of us and our interests are treated with equal respect. We cannot get there through the tainted means of absolutizing individual truths.Aldo Leopold, in his testament Sand County Almanac, as much as called for a new myth, for us to “think like a mountain.”57 He called for a new myth because he believed that humans were dangerous (to ourselves, first of all, and to the planet), and that inculcating a myth was the only way to effect a deep behavioral change on a massive enough scale to save the situation.58 It is my belief that myths are often more dangerous than the situations they seek to remedy. We need to cultivate a taste of de-mythologizing, of making our lives more self-aware. We need to become aware of our needs and our value preferences and to take responsibility for them as individual preferences. Then we will be in a good position indeed to respect and compromise with the preferences of our neighbors all around this planet, just as we would have them respect and compromise with ours. *** DIRECT SUPPORT *** A8402064 00005 *** DIRECT SUPPORT *** A8402064 00006 *** DIRECT SUPPORT *** A8402064 00007. (shrink)

John Caputo’s Demythologizing Heidegger represents an important, distinctive, and intriguing attempt to make sense of Heidegger’s notorious involvement with Nazism. Where others have tended to emphasize biographical and sociological factors in understanding Heidegger’s involvement with Nazism, Caputo traces that involvement to fateful turns in Heidegger’s development as a thinker. While I am sympathetic with such an undertaking, I find Caputo’s account highly questionable and even self-opposed, especially as regards hisapparent valorization of Kierkegaard and of biblical faith as influences that could (...) have saved Heidegger from Nazism had he not turned away from them in favor of Nietzsche and the presocratic Greeks. (shrink)

, Philip Kitcher has argued that science ought to meet both the epistemic goals of significant truth and the nonepistemic goals of serving the interests of a democratic society. He opposes this science as servant model to both the theology of science as source of salvific truth and the theology of science as anti-Christ. In a recent critical comment, Paul A. Roth argues that Kitcher remains entangled in the theology of salvific truth, not realizing that its goal is either vacuous (...) or unattainable. Instead of theologies, Roth proposes demythologization. In the end, science attains neither truth nor value, for these goals are incomprehensible and unattainable. Consequently, science’s goals are entirely pedestrian and without special interest. Adopting Kitcher’s own scientific naturalistic epistemology, the author argues for a naturalized theology of science, using a science as mediator model, in which both nature and scientist have a role in the acquisition of significant truth. Key Words: epistemic values • Kitcher • nonepistemic values • Roth • science and values • scientific realism • scientific truth. (shrink)

In Science, Truth and Democracy, Philip Kitcher has argued that science ought to meet both the epistemic goals of significant truth and the nonepistemic goals of serving the interests of a democratic society. He opposes this science as servant model to both the theology of science as source of salvific truth and the theology of science as anti-Christ. In a recent critical comment, Paul A. Roth argues that Kitcher remains entangled in the theology of salvific truth, not realizing that its (...) goal is either vacuous or unattainable. Instead of theologies, Roth proposes demythologization. In the end, science attains neither truth nor value, for these goals are incomprehensible and unattainable. Consequently, science’s goals are entirely pedestrian and without special interest. Adopting Kitcher’s own scientific naturalistic epistemology, the author argues for a naturalized theology of science, using a science as mediator model, in which both nature and scientist have a role in the acquisition of significant truth. (shrink)

An attempt to defend Bultmann's existentialist re-interpretation of Protestant Theology against its critics. The major areas of disagreement center around the existentialists' rejection of the subject-object scheme in epistemology, rival conceptions of history, and the relation of faith to the Bible as an historical document. Provides an interesting view of the troubled waters of contemporary Protestant Theology.--R. G. S.

Abstract.Biotechnology deals not only with new types of therapies for preventing and curing diseases but also with the creation of new technologies for the production of human flesh. Its ultimate aim is to create a new human body, a new person. Biotechnology wears the cloak not only of a new scientific paradigm but also of a kind of messianic religion. To develop new therapies, to destroy illnesses, to transform the human body into a nonmortal one—these are some of the promises (...) it makes. In time, many of these promises will undoubtedly prove to be illusory, but they will nevertheless continue to have a significant impact on the way people think. Through a process that I call biotechnotheological analysis I show that biotechnology could eventually become not only a type of secular religion but even a type of mythic para‐Christian religion, one that incorporates the two most significant processes at work in every mythical religion: the process of mimesis and the ritual of the scapegoat. The essay is an attempt to understand biotechnological achievements, especially in stem‐cell research, in this new biotechnotheological way. (shrink)

The review offers a critical examination of P.N. Kondrashov’s monograph, Nine Myths of Karl Marx’s Philosophy: From Demythologization to the Reconstruction of the Original Ideas. Kondrashov employs an expansive definition of myth, encompassing any distorted interpretation of Marx’s philosophy that is prevalent within certain groups. Kondrashov posits that these distortions primarily stem from misattributions to Marx, decontextualization of his statements, and subsequent reinterpretations that invert their original meaning. However, the book’s author can only partially substantiate the existence and prevalence (...) of these distortions. As a result, his understanding of the “degree of prevalence” affords him almost unlimited discretion to classify as myths both widespread misconceptions and contentious interpretations known only to a narrow circle of specialists. Consequently, the debunking of these “myths,” which in many cases can only loosely be classified as such, transforms into a critique of revisionism and other forms of “bourgeois ideology and propaganda.” Kondrashov often “reconstructs” what he perceives to be “myths about Marx’s philosophy,” only to subsequently refute them, thereby reaffirming his own interpretations of contentious aspects of Marx’s philosophy. In conclusion, while Kondrashov’s primary contribution lies in his positive exposition of the reconstructed ideas of Marx, the framing of this process as “demythologization” could potentially lead to confusion. (shrink)

The rise of modern science and the proclaimed 'death' of God in the nineteenth century led to a radical questioning of divine action and authorship - Bultmann's celebrated 'demythologizing'. Remythologizing Theology moves in another direction that begins by taking seriously the biblical accounts of God's speaking. It establishes divine communicative action as the formal and material principle of theology, and suggests that interpersonal dialogue, rather than impersonal causality, is the keystone of God's relationship with the world. This original contribution to (...) the theology of divine action and authorship develops a new vision of Christian theism. It also revisits several long-standing controversies such as the relations of God's sovereignty to human freedom, time to eternity, and suffering to love. Groundbreaking and thought-provoking, it brings theology into fruitful dialogue with philosophy, literary theory, and biblical studies"--Provided by publisher. (shrink)

Two of the most brilliant German thinkers of the twentieth century were Karl Jaspers and Rudolf Bultmann. Jaspers, the philosopher, and Bultmann, the theologian, were both influenced by the philosophy of Martin Heidegger and the rise of the existentialist movement. Late in their careers they interacted on the subject of Bultmann's attempt to divest Christianity of its mythical components and make sense of it in more modern terms. This work is a compilation of articles by Jaspers and Bultmann that formed (...) a running debate originally published in various scholarly journals. The first half of the book is Jaspers' lengthy and critical analysis of Bultmann's interpretation of Christianity, in which Jaspers essentially rejects the premise that Christianity or any other religion can or should be understood without its mythical framework. Jaspers charges that Bultmann has radically misunderstood the nature of myth and that myth is an irreplaceable form of symbolic communication. In the second part, Bultmann defends his approach, suggesting that Jaspers has not really understood his intent or meaning. Contemporary people today, schooled in the scientific tradition, are likely to reject the biblical texts because of their miraculous claims and supernatural content. Bultmann insists that the scholarly, scientific study of the Bible is a legitimate way to reveal its true message, apart from all the supernatural trappings. Finally, in response, Jaspers accepts some of Bultmann's clarifications but takes him to task on the subject of 'justification by faith', which he feels Bultmann defines too narrowly and too exclusively. This stimulating work by two penetrating minds will give anyone interested in perennial philosophical and theological questions much to ponder. (shrink)