This new translation of _De Caelo_ fits seamlessly with other volumes in the New Hackett Aristotle series, enabling Anglophone readers to study Aristotle’s work in a way previously not possible. The Introduction describes the book that lies ahead, explaining what it is about, what it is trying to do, how it goes about doing it, and what sort of audience it presupposes. Sequentially numbered endnotes provide the information most needed at each juncture, while a detailed Index indicates the places where (...) focused discussion of key notions occurs. (shrink)

This paper is chiefly aimed at individuating some deep, but as yet almost unnoticed, similarities between Aristotle's syllogistic and the Stoic doctrine of conditionals, notably between Aristotle's metasyllogistic equimodality condition and truth-conditions for third type conditionals. In fact, as is shown in §1, Aristotle's condition amounts to introducing in his metasyllogistic a non-truthfunctional implicational arrow '', the truth-conditions of which turn out to be logically equivalent to truth-conditions of third type conditionals, according to which only the impossible follows from the (...) impossible. Moreover, Aristotle is given precisely this non-Scotian conditional logic in two so far overlooked passages of Themistius' Paraphrasis of De Caelo. Some further consequences of Aristotle's equimodality condition on his logic, and notably on his syllogistic, are pointed out and discussed at length. A extension of Aristotle's condition is also discussed, along with a full characterization of truth-conditions of fourth type conditionals. (shrink)

This new translation of _De Caelo_ fits seamlessly with other volumes in the New Hackett Aristotle series, enabling Anglophone readers to study Aristotle’s work in a way previously not possible. The Introduction describes the book that lies ahead, explaining what it is about, what it is trying to do, how it goes about doing it, and what sort of audience it presupposes. Sequentially numbered endnotes provide the information most needed at each juncture, while a detailed Index indicates the places where (...) focused discussion of key notions occurs. (shrink)

Averroes defended philosophy by returning to the true Aristotle. For this purpose, Aristotle's book in which he explained the eternity, uniqueness and movement of the universe, occupied a place of special importance. But the Aristotelian philosopher had a hard time holding his own in the face of contradictions within the book and with respect to Aristotle's later works. In his early Compendium, later Paraphrase, and final Long Commentary of De Caelo, Ibn Rushd continued the efforts of the Hellenistic commentators (...) in order to integrate all the elements of his doctrine into a unified system, to harmonize his early cosmology with his later Metaphysics and to uphold his models of homocentric planetary spheres against the mathematical paradigm of Ptolemaic astronomy. By insisting throughout on demonstrative arguments based on rational principles, he asserted the philosophers' claim to irrefutable truth. (shrink)

Aristotle is asking why the heaven revolves in one direction rather than the other. His answer is based on his earlier proof that the Universe has a top and a bottom, a right and a left. The upper region, as the place of divinity, is prior or superior to the lower; so upward motion is prior to downward motion. Right is similarly prior and superior to left. The present problem can be solved by supposing that the world has also a (...) front and a back, and hence a forward motion, which will be prior and superior to backward motion. Since Nature always follows the best course, the reason for the direction of the heaven's revolution will be that that direction is forward and therefore better. (shrink)

Plato's Timaeus is taken as a background for certain views presented by Aristotle in his On the Heavens. The author discusses possible arguments for introducing a new (“fifth”) element.

This article uses the two prose Lives of Cuthbert written by an anonymous monk of Lindisfarne and by Bede in the first half of the eighth century to illustrate how an understanding of the impact of biblical language and its accompanying exegetical tradition may help in the interpretation of hagiographical works. After an examination of recent scholarly work on the relationship scripture and hagiography and the impact of signa upon the early medieval thought‐world, the paper examines the incidents that are (...) recorded as happening during Cuthbert's time as a hermit on Farne. Looking first at the Lindisfarne account, the potential symbolism inherent in miracles concerning building materials such as rock, stone and wood, as well as living water and ravens are examined by outlining biblical parallels and then looking at the development of the symbols in the exegetical tradition. It thus becomes apparent that the writer was using a shared Christian symbolic language to make statements about Cuthbert as builder of the Northumbrian Church. A similar process is undertaken with Bede's account, noting differences and additions, and reaching the conclusion that it is more developed, showing Cuthbert as a teacher and pastor. In both cases the writers were using the events to foreshadow Cuthbert's imminent episcopal career, thus connecting the contemplative preparation with the subsequent active ministry. The article concludes that the hagiographers believed that God continued to speak to His Church through signa as He had spoken in the Bible and that it was natural His words should coincide with their own polemical and didactic concerns and intentions. (shrink)

The main concern of this paper is the problem of method in De Caelo, which has been recently invigorated by the supposition of Aristotle’s acceptance of two standards of justification. Whereas the φυσικῶς argument comes close to demonstrative knowledge, the εὐλόγως argument relies on more general assumptions and allegedly points towards argumentative justification. With a view to better understanding how empirical criteria for theories, teleological principles, and the resolution of difficulties are laid down to provide as much causal explanations (...) as possible, we take side here in the debate about the very purpose of Aristotle’s using of justification by argument in scientific contexts. Our main claim is that although only reasonable proofs can be worked out in empirically underdetermined domains, this in no way amounts to endorsing an alternative to the norms of inquiry Aristotle upholds in natural science. (shrink)

_ Source: _Volume 61, Issue 1, pp 33 - 42 _De caelo_ 2.6 describes irregular motion differently from the discussion at _Physics_ 5.4. The desire to make the one discussion congrue with the other has strained interpretation of the _De caelo_ passage. Aristotle provides a theory of irregular motion that is tripartite and the passage ought to be interpreted in such a way as to explain this tripartite motion. _Akmē_ is not a ‘top speed’ as it is generally translated, but (...) a point in an object’s motion when _epitasis_ must become _anesis_. Although the terms _epitasis_ and _anesis_ cover ‘acceleration’ and ‘deceleration’ they cannot be reduced to them. (shrink)

This article examines three passages of De caelo in order to discuss Aristotle’s epistemological attitude towards the theories advanced by him and towards the possibility of progress in the scientific research of the celestial world. I argue that, although the possibility of progress in scientific investigation is not central in Aristotle’s reflections, progress is not ruled out either as impossible or as undesirable.

Scholars have long considered de Philosophia and de Caelo to be in contradiction regarding the nature of the heavenly bodies, particularly with respect to the activity proper to the element composing them. According to the accounts we have of de Philosophia, Aristotle seems to have put forth that stars move because they have minds, and, according to Cicero’s account of the lost text, they choose their actions out of free will. In de Caelo, however, Aristotle seems only to (...) consider that stars engage in the activity of circular motion because it is in their nature to do so, as it is in the nature of, e.g. fire to move upwards or Earth to move downwards. In this paper, I argue against the longstanding view that there is an incompatibility between these two “early” cosmological texts of Aristotle. I aim to show that these two texts endorse complementary, not contradictory, views of the heavenly bodies. I argue that in de Philosophia, Aristotle attributes to stars the intellective counterpart of the spatial motion which is developed in greater depth in de Caelo, while in de Caelo, we see hints of Aristotle’s view in de Philosophia that the stars are also minds and are able to rationally cognize their particular good – a point which is shown in de Caelo 292a18–293a14, where Aristotle attributes both life and praxis to the heavenly bodies. The overarching view which I present of these two texts is that while de Caelo approaches the heavenly bodies qua bodies and de Philosophia approaches them qua minds, they are still examining one and the same substance and that Aristotle has not changed his mind regarding the basic nature of such a substance in the (supposed) interim between writing de Philosophia and de Caelo. Rather, we find echoes of de Caelo in de Philosophia, and echoes of de Philosophia in de Caelo, which speaks to the fact that Aristotle maintains one view of the heavenly bodies which he presents over the course of these two texts. (shrink)

Thetext of the de Caelo was the subject of an interesting article in the Rivista Storia Antica, N.S. IX, by Dr. R. Rubrichi; he showed that where the manuscriptsdiverge, we ought to bring in the evidence of Simplicius, and that when we look closely into the sense, the commentator's reading is in most cases decidedly preferable; he also established a fact which is familiar from editions of the othér physical treatises, namely that there is some specially close affinity between (...) the text of E and that used by Simplicius. (shrink)

: The article discusses two issues implied by the structure of De caelo I.9: Aristotle’s further defence of the uniqueness of the universe and, in more detail, the general question of whether the cosmology of De caelo overlaps, or is even compatible, with Aristotle’s theology including the notion of the Prime Mover. It offers an analysis of several long-standing difficulties including the question of whether the lines 279a18–22 imply an external mover of the heavens. The negative answer that (...) I will defend does however not solve the problem of how Aristotle conceives the source of natural cosmic motion. In this respect, the article pays close attention to the peculiar conception of the animate supralunary matter and to De caelo II.3, 286a7–21 as a text that complements I.9 by relying on the holistic self-motion that implies no Prime Mover, but requires the separation of the supralunary and the sublunary spheres. The article also concludes that Arist otle, despite his rejection of the unceasingly revolving world soul, inherits some Platonic difficulties that arise once we make the notion of the divine life irreducible to divine thinking. (shrink)

In De Caelo III 2, Aristotle observes that each element is determined by an intrinsic principle to move to its proper place: earth downward, fire upward, and water and air to their respective places in the middle. However, how are we to determine the cause of elemental motion? Aristotle admits that this ranks among the most difficult problems (μάλιστα δ’ ἀπορεῖται) as it is directly related to the argument of Physics VIII 4, which defends the view that whatever is (...) in motion is moved by something. The question of how the elements move is not resolved until we are presented with his definition of inclination (ῥοπή) in De Caelo IV 1. Inclination is the nature of each element to move to its proper place. Aristotle concludes that the principle of inclination is a cause of motion continuously orienting the elements toward their proper places by activating that which is potentially heavy or potentially light. In what follows, I shall demonstrate the internal coherence of Aristotle’s natural philosophy by deploying inclination as a principle of motion and rest to define the nature of each element. This account of inclination as a principle of motion is consistent with Aristotle’s definition of nature in Physics II 1. As an active principle of motion, inclination is identified with the activity (ἐνέργεια) of the element enacting and maintaining its own end (ἐντελέχεια) by being at rest in its proper place. As a passive principle of motion, inclination is identified with the passivity of the element to be moved to its proper place by another element insofar as the respective element undergoes generation or substantial change. (shrink)