In the chapter on ‘Plato and Aristotle’ of theLectures on the History of PhilosophyHegel praises Aristotle's work for displaying a principle of ‘pure subjectivity’ in a manner that he considers to be largely absent from the Platoniccorpus:In general, Platonic thinking [das Platonische] represents objectivity, but it lacks a principle of life, a principle of subjectivity; and this principle […], not in the sense of a contingent, merely particular subjectivity, but in the sense of pure subjectivity, is proper to Aristotle. Elsewhere, (...) Hegel refers to Aristotelian conceptions of organic life and of thinking as to the earliest speculative insights of Western philosophy. In § 378 of theEncyclopaedia he calls theDe Anima‘the best or even only work of speculative interest ever written on the philosophy of spirit’. In yet other places, however, Hegel attributes at least ‘intuitive’ forms of speculation to Plato as well.In a preliminary way, a 'speculative relation’ in Hegel's acceptation is instantiated by a subject's theoretical and practical relation to itself — that is, theoretical self-knowing and practical self-will. ‘Speculative’ is any concept which grasps as a unity what other kinds of cognition keep asunder: for example, the subjective and objective dimensions of a phenomenon or state of affairs. But even independently of a detailed analysis of what ‘the speculative’ entails, one is struck by the apparent inconsistency of these claims regarding Plato or Aristotle with Hegel's overall view of the logical necessity of philosophy's historical development. This view is synthetically expressed in the 1820 Introduction to these sameLectures. (shrink)

Une longue introduction précède les contributions de ces trois philosophes et théologiens à la querelle sur la distinction entre l'être et l'essence qui anima la Faculté de théologie de l'Université de Paris dans les années 1280.

In 1974, Winfried Fauser published his edition of Radulphus Brito’s commentary on the third book of Aristotle’s De anima. This contribution continues his project by providing an edition of Brito’s commentary on the first book and the first third of the second book. An analysis of this part of the commentary shows that Brito developed some original views that had an impact on the fourteenth-century commentary tradition.

Aristotle's highly influential work on the soul, entitled De anima, formed part of the core curriculum of medieval universities and was discussed intensively. It covers a range of topics in philosophical psychology, such as the relationship between mind and body and the nature of abstract thought. However, there is a key difference in scope between the so-called "science of the soul," based on Aristotle, and modern philosophical psychology. This book starts from a basic premise accepted by all medieval commentators, (...) namely that the science of the soul studies not just human beings but all living beings. As such, its methodology and approach must also apply to plants and animals. The Science of the Soul discusses how philosophers from Thomas Aquinas to Pierre d'Ailly dealt with the difficult task of giving a unified account of life and traces the various stages in the transformation of the science of the soul between 1260 and 1360. The emerging picture is that of a gradual disruption of the unified approach to the soul, which will ultimately lead to the emergence of psychology as a separate discipline. (shrink)

La Universidad de París en la Europa de finales del siglo XIII fue centro de acaloradas discusiones acerca del alma del hombre. La cuestión del alma es el punto doctrinal central y se muestra decisivo porque en la resolución de este único punto puede verse el trasfondo antropológico y metafísico de toda una cosmovisión filosófica e incluso teológica del universo. Una de las más problemáticas cuestiones que se plantearon acerca del alma es el problema de la unidad del intelecto para (...) todos los hombres. Parecería contradictorio pensar que todos los hombres piensan con un único intelecto, pero a su vez suena absurdo afirmar que un principio espiritual, inmaterial, se una a un cuerpo por un tiempo determinado para luego separarse. Ambas posiciones surgen de la consideración de nuevos textos llegados a las manos de los pensadores parisinos a través de autores árabes: los textos del De anima de Aristóteles. (shrink)

Como é que três eminentes Jesuítas comentadores de Aristóteles poderiam ler o método concebido por Inácio de Loyola nos Exercícios Espirituais, denominado “aplicação dos sentidos” externos? A resposta a esta hipotética questão, absolutamente inédita, será dada em três passos. Começando com a doutrina dos sentidos e tocando na passagem da ontologia para a semiótica, atender-‑se-‑á ao aparecimento do mundo – mediante uma segunda passagem, da psicologia para a cosmologia – em que o lugar do ser humano, entendido no espaço de (...) uma antropologia criatural, nos conduz a uma nova perceção das relações entre imaginação e espiritualidade mundana, na aceção de “incarnada”. (shrink)

L’articolo si propone di mostrare alcuni aspetti della strategia platonica nella Repubblica. L’analisi è condotta ricostruendo in primo luogo il modo in cui si presentava a Platone la questione della giustizia, con particolare riferimento alla tradizione relativa a Dike e alla crisi della cultura cittadina ateniese, tra V e IV secolo; in secondo luogo segnala il rapporto ambivalente che Platone intrat¬tiene con la cultura socratica della giustizia interiore; si indirizza infine a mostrare le modalità costruttive con cui Platone propone di (...) risolvere il conflitto nell’anima e nella città, ricorrendo ad una poli¬tica delle emozioni che non necessariamente esclude la compas¬sione.This article intends to illustrate some aspects of the platonic strategy in the Republic. The analysis is carried out at first by revising the way in which Plato was faced with the question of justice, with particular emphasis on the Dike’s tradition and on the crisis of the Athenian urban culture, between the Vth and IVth centuries; secondly, it points out Plato’s ambivalent relationship with the Socratic culture of inner justice; it finally underlines the structural procedures according to which Plato intends to solve the conflict in the soul and in the city and to realize forms of social identity, resorting to a policy of emotions which does non necessarily exclude compassion. (shrink)

This multi-faceted collection of women's perspectives on the renaissance in philosophical practices provides an international overview on the professional practice of philosophical counseling as rooted in the ancient philosophical discipline of life and its essential difference from modern mainstream philosophy.

Premiere traduction francaise etablie sur l'edition critique du texte latin, cet ouvrage rend accessible a un plus large public la Summa de anima de Jean de la Rochelle qui revet un triple interet. Elle offre d'abord une presentation magistrale de l'enseignement portant sur l'ame dans les annees 1230-1235 a Paris. Elle permet de la sorte d'evaluer l'etat de la reflexion sur l'ame a l'oree de du travail de reinterpretation de l'aristotelisme tel que le vehiculait la tradition greco-arabe par Albert (...) le Grand et Thomas d'Aquin. Elle constitue enfin une tentative, emanant d'un des premiers maitres en theologie franciscains, d'integration de la philosophie greco-arabe (notamment celle d'Avicenne, qui rencontre ici le Pseudo-Augustin, Augustin, Jean Damascene et Philippe le Chancelier) a la reflexion theologique. Ce texte prepare ainsi les grandes syntheses des Sommes posterieures au premier rang desquelles figure evidemment la Summa fratris Alexandri qui incorpore, au livre II, des chapitres entiers. (shrink)

In 1991, Benoît Patar published a set of anonymous commentaries on Aristotle’s De anima. He argued that both works should be ascribed to John Buridan and, taken together, constitute the first of Buridan’s three series of lectures on De anima. Even though Patar’s proof of the authenticity of the commentaries has not been unanimously accepted, his attribution of the works to Buridan turned out to be persistent. This article examines the question of the authenticity of the two anonymous (...) commentaries. It argues that there is no conclusive reason to attribute the works to Buridan. The texts are closely related to works by Buridan, but they bear the same relation to commentaries written by Nicole Oresme. As a consequence, the works should be considered to be exactly what they are: anonymous commentaries on Aristotle’s De anima, written in the same context and around the same time in which the commentaries by John Buridan and Nicole Oresme were also written. (shrink)

This book is a reconsideration of spirituality as a lived experience in the lives of the contributors. The authors speak both as well-informed scholars and as individuals who experienced the lived spirituality they give voice to. The authors do not place themselves above and outside of what they are writing about but within that world. They speak of living psychospiritual traditions of healing both the self and the world; of traditions that have not disembedded the self from the wider world. (...) Those traditions are from indigenous North and South America (5 essays), a Buddhist/ Shakta from Bengal, an Indo-Persian Islamic psychoanalyst, a mystical Jewish feminist rabbi, and a historical essay about the extermination of the Renaissance worldview of Anima Mundi. (shrink)

The science of the soul exceeds all other parts of philosophy not only in “dignity and exactness”, but also in “usefulness, necessity, charm, and, above all, in difficulty”.1 As the body is the subject of health and disease, so too the soul is the subject of virtue and vice; and just as the physician must devote great effort to knowing the body, anyone who treats morals “must take care to have a clear understanding of things pertaining to the scientia de (...) anima”.2 To be mistaken about the soul, in the way of materialists or the impious Averroes, is to leave “the good without reward, and evil without punishment”, and thus to “uproot all good morals, all laws and Republics”.3 The study of the soul is inescapably a prolegomenon to moral philosophy and to theology. But because it studies what is common to all living things, the science of the soul also prepares the way for the study of particular plants and animals, just as physics precedes the study of elements and mixtures.4 The natural philosopher deals with six kinds of bodies: the simple incorruptible bodies of the heavens, the simple but corruptible terrestrial elements, imperfect mixtures (ice, comets), perfect inanimate mixtures (metals and pre-. (shrink)

Avant-propos.--Notes: Y a-t-il eu un "avicennisme latin"? Guillaume d'Auvergne témoin de l'"Avicennisme latin." Avicenne et les décrets de 1210 et 1215. Un témoignage de Guillaume d'Auxerre. Un texte d'Albert le Grand. Le cas de Roger Bacon. La date, les sources et la doctrine du "Liber de causis primis et secundis."--Textes: Le "Liber de causis primis et secundis." La fin du "De anima" de Gundissalinus. Tables.

The present study propose a comparison between Origen and Ambrose with regard to Magnificat’s exegesis: Origen (HLc VIII) explain the hymn for above all to prove the manifestation of the Spirit in Mary and in Mary as well as in every perfect soul but the soul’s perfection be realized only by using virtuous life following the virtuous Mary’s example. Whereas the Ambrose’s exegesis (Exp. in Lc. 2,26-28) emphasize the Mary’s faith, model for our faith. “Anima mea magnificat Dominum” in (...) Origen’s exegesis convey primarily a psychic and spiritual typus while a ethic typus in Ambrose's interpretation. (shrink)

Questo lavoro verte essenzialmente sul concetto di novità ontologica delle persone umane, e difende una metafisica antimonistica e antidualistica della personhood: essere una persona umana non è avere una mente o un’anima sostanziale in un organismo biologico, non è neppure realizzare un certo insieme di funzioni mediante questo organismo biologico, non è neppure, semplicemente, essere un organismo di specie biologica homo sapiens.Essere una persona umana non è neppure soltanto essere un esemplare della specie suddetta, che in più gode di (...) uno status socialmente riconosciuto, essere cioè una realtà “nuova” solo perché “creata” da certi particolari atti di conferimento di status del tipo di quelli descritti da Searle in svariati scritti — una realtà che decadrebbe se questi atti fossero revocati. Essere una persona non è essere un oggetto sociale. (shrink)

Questo lavoro si propone di indagare le occorrenze del lessico femminile, in particolare γυνή e μήτηρ, nel Timeo, per far emergere la posizione di Platone riguardo alle donne che si può evincere dall’ermeneutica dei passi esaminati. Bisogna considerare anche i problemi relativi all’interpretazione degli scritti di Platone, come le strutture argomentative di cui si serve e la complessità di alcuni concetti. Le occorrenze nel Timeo, sebbene non numerose, sono contenutisticamente significative, data la natura di questo dialogo che si propone di (...) identificare la posizione e il ruolo nel cosmo dell’uomo e della sua anima. Nel prologo del Timeo, come anche nella Repubblica, Platone esprime posizioni più aperte riguardo al ruolo sociale delle donne; invece in altri passi, come quelli che trattano della trasmigrazione delle anime, Platone si serve di immagini relative alle donne per aiutare i suoi ascoltatori a comprendere questioni molto complesse. Tali immagini, per essere comprensibili, devono rispecchiare l’idea riguardo alle donne comune al tempo di Platone. (shrink)

Benet Perera was not the first Jesuit to comment Aristotle’s De Anima. In Portugal there was already the tradition of doing it, and the so-called Coimbra Course may be seen as the culmination of such a tradition. Moreover, its approach to philosophy is also different from Perera’s. This paper first of all focuses on the place of scientia de anima, the importance physics has in such a science, and the division of metaphysics or its unity. Secondly, it is (...) stated that if Perera could have taken sides with a theological anthropology, Góis took a different approach. Lastly, when discussing the immortality of the soul Perera and Álvares differ over the weight of human capacities in duly evidencing immortality. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:The "Thinking of Thinking" in MetaphysicsA.9 JOSEPH G. DE FILIPPO a+~6v &Qa voE[, e~eQ ~o~t ~6 XQ&~O~OV, xetl. I~o~tv ~1VdOloLgvo1]o~t0g v6"qotg. (A.9, 1o74b33-34) Therefore it thinks itself, if indeed it is most powerful, and its thinking is the thinking of thinking. Thus culminates Aristotle's treatment of God's activity in the twelfth book of the Metaphysics. The conclusion seems transparent. God is an intellect (vo~Sg); since he is also the (...) best thing, and it is absurd that he should think anything worse than himself, he therefore thinks himself. And since he is nothing other than a thinking (v6"qotg), what he thinks of is thinking (vo~loEe0g). "Thinking of thinking," however, is a notion that is as ambiguous in ancient Greek as it is in English. It is just not clear what sort of thing such a reflexively self-thinking mind would be, though it might seem natural to construe the activity of Aristotle's God as somehow an act of pure self-awareness, self-consciousness or self-knowledge. On such an understanding God would be a separately existing consciousness, with himself or his activity as the only object of that consciousness. In 196 9 R. Norman published a paper which disputed this sort of interpretation.' He argued that when one considers Aristotle's theory of, R. Norman, "Aristotle's Philosopher-God," Phronesis 14 (1969): 63-74 (reprinted in Articles on Aristotle, vol. 4, ed. J. Barnes, M. Schofield and R. Sorabji [London, 1979], 93-1o2). While I a-m indebted to Norman's basic approach, my treatment of God's self-thought differs substantially from his in two respects. First, although it isessential to recognize that in Aristotle human thought too thinks itself, this does not justify the conclusion that God's thinking is "of the same kind as our own normal abstract thought" (73). As 1shall argue below in section 4, the characterization of the Prime Mover as v6"qoLgvo~o~t0g is meant specifically to differentiate its activity from the selfthinking of human volSg;human thought could never be characterized as v6"qotgvofioEt0g.Secondly, Norman does not isolate the real source of A.9's argument, which, as l shall argue, is the potential conflict between Aristotle's own physical and psychological theories. M. Wedin, Mind and Imagination in Aristotle (New Haven, 1988), 229-45, also argues against Norman's thesis that human and divine thought are the same in kind. [543] 544 JOURNAL OF THE HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY 33:4 OCTOBER 1995 volSg from De Anima III.4-8, it is clear that the conception of God as a selfthinking mind does not entail that he engages in self-contemplation in the normal sense of the term. On Norman's interpretation, God thinks himself because he thinks a definite content with which he is numerically identical, according to the well-known Aristotelian doctrine of the unity of vo~g with its object of thought (vo~lx6v). To describe this act simply as self-contemplation belies the fact that its object must have an intelligible content, which in the case of God is not adequately described as his "self," for this self would indeed be nothing more than an act of self-contemplation. While many commentators have followed Norman in recognizing that the description of God as "thinking himself" is drawn from the De Anima's characterization of self-thinking, there has persisted a tendency to interpret Aristotle 's God as engaged in an act of pure self-awareness or under some similar description.' The reason for this persistence is due, I believe, to a crucial difference between chapters 7 and 9 of book A. Whereas both chapters characterize the Prime Mover (PM) as a self-thinker, in chapter 9 he is also said to be ~1 v61]otg vo~loec0g V6tlOtg (the thinking of thinking), which understandably appears to be a much more specific delineation of his thought content. A. 7 tells us that the PM is a vofJg that thinks itself (to72b18-3o); according to De Anima III. 4 that simply is what voa)g does at the highest level of actuality, since it... (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:The "Thinking of Thinking" in MetaphysicsA.9 JOSEPH G. DE FILIPPO a+~6v &Qa voE[, e~eQ ~o~t ~6 XQ&~O~OV, xetl. I~o~tv ~1VdOloLgvo1]o~t0g v6"qotg. (A.9, 1o74b33-34) Therefore it thinks itself, if indeed it is most powerful, and its thinking is the thinking of thinking. Thus culminates Aristotle's treatment of God's activity in the twelfth book of the Metaphysics. The conclusion seems transparent. God is an intellect (vo~Sg); since he is also the (...) best thing, and it is absurd that he should think anything worse than himself, he therefore thinks himself. And since he is nothing other than a thinking (v6"qotg), what he thinks of is thinking (vo~loEe0g). "Thinking of thinking," however, is a notion that is as ambiguous in ancient Greek as it is in English. It is just not clear what sort of thing such a reflexively self-thinking mind would be, though it might seem natural to construe the activity of Aristotle's God as somehow an act of pure self-awareness, self-consciousness or self-knowledge. On such an understanding God would be a separately existing consciousness, with himself or his activity as the only object of that consciousness. In 196 9 R. Norman published a paper which disputed this sort of interpretation.' He argued that when one considers Aristotle's theory of, R. Norman, "Aristotle's Philosopher-God," Phronesis 14 (1969): 63-74 (reprinted in Articles on Aristotle, vol. 4, ed. J. Barnes, M. Schofield and R. Sorabji [London, 1979], 93-1o2). While I a-m indebted to Norman's basic approach, my treatment of God's self-thought differs substantially from his in two respects. First, although it isessential to recognize that in Aristotle human thought too thinks itself, this does not justify the conclusion that God's thinking is "of the same kind as our own normal abstract thought" (73). As 1shall argue below in section 4, the characterization of the Prime Mover as v6"qoLgvo~o~t0g is meant specifically to differentiate its activity from the selfthinking of human volSg;human thought could never be characterized as v6"qotgvofioEt0g.Secondly, Norman does not isolate the real source of A.9's argument, which, as l shall argue, is the potential conflict between Aristotle's own physical and psychological theories. M. Wedin, Mind and Imagination in Aristotle (New Haven, 1988), 229-45, also argues against Norman's thesis that human and divine thought are the same in kind. [543] 544 JOURNAL OF THE HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY 33:4 OCTOBER 1995 volSg from De Anima III.4-8, it is clear that the conception of God as a selfthinking mind does not entail that he engages in self-contemplation in the normal sense of the term. On Norman's interpretation, God thinks himself because he thinks a definite content with which he is numerically identical, according to the well-known Aristotelian doctrine of the unity of vo~g with its object of thought (vo~lx6v). To describe this act simply as self-contemplation belies the fact that its object must have an intelligible content, which in the case of God is not adequately described as his "self," for this self would indeed be nothing more than an act of self-contemplation. While many commentators have followed Norman in recognizing that the description of God as "thinking himself" is drawn from the De Anima's characterization of self-thinking, there has persisted a tendency to interpret Aristotle 's God as engaged in an act of pure self-awareness or under some similar description.' The reason for this persistence is due, I believe, to a crucial difference between chapters 7 and 9 of book A. Whereas both chapters characterize the Prime Mover (PM) as a self-thinker, in chapter 9 he is also said to be ~1 v61]otg vo~loec0g V6tlOtg (the thinking of thinking), which understandably appears to be a much more specific delineation of his thought content. A. 7 tells us that the PM is a vofJg that thinks itself (to72b18-3o); according to De Anima III. 4 that simply is what voa)g does at the highest level of actuality, since it... (shrink)

Esiste un confine certo tra vita e morte? Il volume ripercorre, con un approccio transculturale, la storia della definizione di morte e le vicende connesse alle tecniche di accertamento del decesso dall'antichità ai giorni nostri. Da sempre, infatti, medici, filosofi e teologi si sono sforzati di individuare il momento preciso dell'exitus, l'istante in cui, secondo la tradizione, l'anima avrebbe lasciato il corpo. Nondimeno, soglie e parametri stabiliti da una generazione furono spesso posti in discussione e ridisegnati dalla successiva. Alimentato (...) dai successi conseguiti nelle tecniche rianimative e nella trapiantologia, il dibattito ha conosciuto una fase di grande vivacità proprio negli ultimi decenni, tanto che, pur avendo in genere abbandonato - o, perlomeno, ridimensionato - considerazioni su principi metafisici, la definizione di morte appare ancor oggi come un oggetto di negoziazione scientifica e bioetica. (shrink)

Para elaborar sua profetologia, Maimônides retoma conceitos relativos às teorias do intelecto de Al-Fārābī e de Avicena, que, por sua vez, se baseiam nas noções sobre a alma de Aristóteles. Dessa perspectiva, a Revelação divina deve ser considerada um fato natural inserido na totalidade da natureza criada por Deus. Compreender a Revelação significa, portanto, compreendê-la a partir do homem, uma vez que o profeta, apesar de se tratar de alguém que se destaca do conjunto da humanidade, é sempre um ser (...) humano, possuidor de uma natureza humana. Desse modo, a doutrina da profecia – central no "Guia dos Perplexos" ‒ é elaborada a partir da natureza humana à luz da filosofia racional greco-árabe. Os falāsifa – filósofos muçulmanos helenizantes – já ensinavam que a profecia é possível graças a certa perfeição da natureza humana . Esse ensinamento está fundamentado na teoria do intelecto apresentada por Aristóteles em "De Anima" III, 5, 430a 10 et seq. Contudo, para os filósofos de expressão árabe , a profecia é resultante de certas condições físicas e psíquicas determinadas pelo fluxo necessário das emanações, cuja teoria deriva da "Teologia Pseudo-Aristotélica", um tratado neoplatônico atribuído ao Estagirita que, durante a Idade Média, circulou amplamente nos ambientes filosóficos tanto dos judeus quanto dos muçulmanos. Na cosmovisão neoplatônica adotada por eles, o intelecto do profeta reflete a luz e o conhecimento divino derramado pelo fluxo emanatório do Ser primeiro no mundo celeste, composto pelas dez inteligências separadas, suas almas e esferas. No processo emanatório, a faculdade da imaginação do profeta recebe da última inteligência, o Intelecto Agente, as verdades dos preceitos positivos e culturais da religião, que a imaginação transforma em alegorias e símbolos a serem transmitidos para a humanidade. Maimônides faz da imaginação a pedra de toque de sua profetologia. To elaborate his prophetology, Maimonides uses concepts relating to Al-Fārābī and Avicenna's theories of the intellect which, in turn, are based on Aristotle's notions of the soul. Within this perspective, divine Revelation should be considered a natural fact within the totality of nature created by God. Understanding Revelation therefore means understanding it from a human standpoint, since the prophet ‒ despite being a figure who is set apart from the rest of humanity – is always a human being, with a human nature. Thus, the doctrine of prophecy ‒ central to "The Guide of the Perplexed" ‒ is elaborated based on human nature in light of the rational Greco-Arabic philosophy. The falāsifa – the Hellenizing Muslim philosophers – taught that prophecy is possible thanks to certain perfection of the human nature . This teaching is based on the theory of the intellect, as presented by Aristotle in "De Anima" III, 5, 430a 10 et seq. Therefore, for the philosophers of Arabic expression , prophecy is the result of certain physical and psychic conditions determined by the necessary flow of emanations, whose theory is derived from the "Pseudo-Aristotelian Theology", a Neoplatonic treatise attributed to the Stagyrite which, in the Middle Age, widely circulated in the philosophical milieu, among both Jewish and Muslim. In the Neoplatonic cosmic vision which they adopted, the prophet's intellect reflects the divine light and knowledge overflowing from the emanatory flow from the first Being in the celestial world, which is composed of the ten separate intelligences, their souls and their spheres. In the emanatory process, the prophet's faculty of imagination receives from the ultimate intelligence, the Active Intellect, the truths of the positive and cultural precepts of religion, which the imagination transforms into allegories and symbols to be transmitted to humanity. Maimonides makes the imagination the cornerstone of his prophetology. (shrink)

Aristotle was usually thought to have given two definitions of the soul in the second book of De Anima. The second of these calls it “that by which we live, feel, and think”.1 Of the soul’s three par ts, the vegetative is that by which we live, the sensitive that by which we feel, the rational that by which we think. Human souls have all three parts; animals the vegetative and sensitive; plants only the vegetative.

Uma passagem do Livro VII da Ética a Nicômaco e uma outra do De Anima de Aristóteles nos permitem mostrar que o Filósofo está muito próximo da "solução" que Espinosa oferece ao problema da acrasia. Ao circunscrever tal problema no campo do apetite e do prazer, introduzindo a noção de desejo como motor da ação prática, Aristóteles aponta para uma idéia de conhecimento afetivo, que no entanto que só será plenamente desenvolvida bem mais tarde, pela teoria dos afetos presente (...) na Ética de Espinosa. Veremos que nesta última o problema da acrasia ganha outro estatuto e uma "solução". Mas se a solução do problema não foi formulada plenamente por Aristóteles, tentaremos mostrar que, embrionária, ela já estava lá, e Artistóteles pode então ser visto como um precursor da teoria do conhecimento de Espinosa. (shrink)