Relevance of research. The article investigates the values of sociocultural life of a person in the context of the characteristics of the formation of systems of subjective-personal meanings, analyzes the parameters of psychological, mental and cultural integrity of a person in the conditions of functioning of modern processes of socio-cultural reality. Setting objectives. The research emphasizes that sociocultural reality leads to the effect of cultural factors - values and values-semantic landmarks as carriers of the content of human existence, factors of (...) semantic content of individual consciousness and social practice of human life. Analysis of recent research and publications. The source of the research identifies the works of philosophical and culturological and philosophical and psychological orientation, in which the problem of the value measurement of the socio-cultural life of man is considered in aspects of understanding the nature of the value-and-meaning search of a person. Selection of unexplored parts of the general problem. The study focuses on the problem of intrapersonal development of a person with philosophical and cultural positions: the phenomenon of harmonization of the inner world of man is presented as a factor in ordering the system of relations "man - the world", the relationship of social nature. Methodology. The culturological plane of the study is covered with the help of methods of sociocultural and reflexive analysis within the framework of a value-ethical paradigm. Essential material. The article analyzes the value of the sociocultural life of a person, which is conditioned by the dialectical unity of the mental and axiological systems of the individual capable of synergetic self-organization and self-regulation, within which the new meanings and structures of the value hierarchy arise and develop, and which forms the basis of the expansion and modification of the forms, processes, phenomena of socio-cultural existence of a modern person. Conclusions. The work makes a generalization that the value-semantic personality positions lead to the development of important personal qualities, features, opportunities, contributing to the emergence of modern trajectories of the course of individual and collective life, the functioning of the world of everyday life. (shrink)

Heidegger's philosophical project is generally seen as atheoretical and anti-logical because he remarked on the subjective conditions of knowledge and the everydayness of human behaviors. To him, Dasein's everyday reasoning is coercively and inevitably framed by the present-at-hand modes of understanding. Heidegger alerts us about the possible origins of present-at-hand modes of everyday experience. One of them is Das Man that, is associated with a categorical otherness for Heidegger. It can be regarded as an origin of the primordial scheme of (...) experiences for Dasein that takes those experiences for granted as an axiological ground for their lives in the World. Heidegger sees that process as an inauthentic condition for Dasein's fundamental character. Everyday reasoning generates a variety of present-at-hand instruments to understand and interpret the World and Dasein itself; thus, Dasein moves between Das Man and authentic modes. With a Heideggerian approach, this article observes how the characters in the film Druk take themselves out of Das Man and go into the authentic mode and how they do this through alcohol. The primary data source is Druk and the four teacher characters in the film. In the movie, alcohol is not a ready- to-hand object but a tool motivating its users and pushing them to perform. It is an example equivalent to the Heideggerian analogy of the hammer. The movie is a well-fitting example of the Heideggerian position with the story of four teachers who experiment with having a certain amount of alcohol in their blood to achieve a better version of themselves. (shrink)

Taking as its starting-point Eva Illouz's sociological study Why Love Hurts, this paper develops a philosophical framework for understanding love and marriage, particularly in their contemporary manifestations. To begin with, premodern practices in love and marriage during the ancient Greek and Byzantine eras are outlined and contrasted with modern forms of love, whose overriding features are suffering and disappointment. To cast some light upon this great transformation in the fortunes of love the discussion takes an axiological and metaphysical turn by (...) placing the transformation within the context of the kind of relational morality and metaphysics proposed by many idealist philosophers. (shrink)

_Purpose._ The paper is aimed at identifying the ways of scientist’s influence on the development of modern society as compared to those of intellectuals. _Theoretical basis._ The socio-anthropological approach to the role of scientists in post-industrial society shows the leading role of people of science as a social group in present-day society. However, philosophical axiology reveals that scientists in today’s society do not have the appropriate social status: neither in state governance nor in the sphere of forming public opinion. (...) The classical doctrine concerning intellectuals has suffered a crisis in recent decades, which is due to the growing gap between the group of intellectuals recognized by society and the sphere of science. A new theoretical approach to determining the role of present-day research scientists as intellectuals is necessary. _Originality._ Successful development of modern society in conditions of growing social turbulence necessitates the access of research scientists to the sphere of public communication. This is required both by the needs of science advancement itself – to receive its adequate funding and win wide public recognition, and by society’s needs – as it is scientists who can provide reliable diagnostics of social problems and formulate well-grounded programs for overcoming them. _Conclusions._ For overcoming social barriers and getting access to public space, scientists themselves have to recognize themselves as a destitute social group – those who are unfairly deprived of making principal decisions in today’s society. For that, scientists should become modern intellectuals. Unlike media intellectuals, scientists are to interact not with social masses but, first and foremost, with public elites. The scientist has to gain his/her independent status by achieving the recognition of his/her own ideas among social elites rather than by winning wide personal popularity. Hence, scientists must aim at obtaining the status of the elite for elites – this would reveal in scientists the deepest potential of a modern man. (shrink)

Для Макса Вебера «рациональная бюрократия» есть идеальный тип организации общества. Однако идеальный тип не позволяет заполнить провал между властью и обществом, который называется отчуждением. Это - миф, и когда Макс Вебер говорит о рациональности, то в основе этого лежат не требования научности, но отсылка к некоей культурной аксиологии. Этот миф можно критиковать, анализируя конкретное поведение бюрократов, обычно мало рациональное, но также ставя под вопрос и саму культуру, которая хочет быть или даже претендует быть рационалистической. В России чудовищность бюрократии является следствием (...) кризиса культуры. Pour Max Weber la « bureaucratie rationnelle » est un type idéal d’organisation de la société. Mais ce type idéal ne permet pas de combler le hiatus entre pouvoir et société, lequel s’appelle aliénation. C’est un mythe, et si Max Weber parle de rationalité, ce n’est pas en vertu d’une exigence scientifique mais par référence à une axiologie culturelle. On peut donc le critiquer en analysant le comportement concret des bureaucrates -lequel est souvent fort peu rationnel -mais également en mettant en question une culture qui se veut ou se prétend rationaliste. En Russie, la monstruosité de la bureaucratie est la conséquence d’une crise de la culture. According to Max Weber, “rational bureaucracy” is an ideal-type of social organization. But this ideal-type cannot bridge the gap between power and society, something we could call alienation. It is a myth, and if Max Weber resorts to the concept of rationality, it is not because of any scientific need, but by reference to a cultural axiology. He can therefore be criticized by analyzing the actual behavior of bureaucrats, which often is less than rational, but also by challenging a culture that wants or claims to be rationalistic. In Russia, the monstrosity of bureaucracy is the consequence of a crisis of culture. (shrink)

The present paper is an attempt to study the acts and intentions which set up for the subject, and for the community of subjects, a set of values and disvalues which impose themselves as valid upon everyone, and which everyone must tend to prescribe, or to warn against, for everyone. The acts which set up a formal apophantic and ontology have been studied by Husserl in his Formal and Transcendental Logic , but he has not set out a comparable theory (...) of the acts which set up a universally valid system of values and disvalues. He has not done so because he does not believe in such a system, because his thought goes no further than the values set up for and felt to hold in a given group or society. It is my view that there is an ineluctable progress from these relativistic group-values to a set of values and disvalues holding for everyone, and that moreover in their relation to everyone, and that these values and disvalues have definite and undeniable shapes and locations, even if these shapes also have somewhat nebulous contours. The views I am expounding on this occasion are not new: they are fully set out in my Values and Intentions and my Axiological Ethics and in other writings. Ideas, however, require restatement at intervals, with a suitable change of idiom and emphasis. And I feel my views on this topic to have a claim to truth simply because, quite differently from my views on other topics, and despite constant reflection, they have hardly changed over the last two decades. The inspiration for these views was only in part Husserlian, as I do not think that the emotional and the axiological are really Husserl's strong suit. Strangely enough, that dry thinker Meinong would seem to have had a much richer emotional life and the ability to frame a theory to fit it, than the much easier and at times effusive thinker Husserl. Meinong's 1917 Austrian Imperial Academy treatise, On Emotional Presentation , recently translated for the Northwestern Phenomenology series, is a much more systematic investigation of the presuppositions of value-theory than any writing of a professed phenomenologist. What I have to say will build considerably on Meinong, always a major influence in my thought. But I have also been much influenced in my approaches to value-theory by the transcendental methods of Kant. Kant, I think, could very well have worked out a transcendental deduction of the heads of value and disvalue, a deduction much more illuminating than the dogmatic intuitionism of Scheler and Hartmann, instead of producing the arid triad of categorical imperatives that were all that he actually deduced. Imperatives, I consider, are secondary structures in value-constitution: the primary structures are the ultimate objects of necessary, rational pursuit and avoidance which Kant wrongly thought of as involving heteronomy and a corruption of pure form by matter. There is, I shall argue, nothing more free from extraneous, pathological material than the objects of the pursuits and avoidances in question. (shrink)

In this article I describe the analytic approach adopted by Peters, his colleagues and followers of the ?London line? in the 1960s and 1970s and argue that, even in those times, other approaches to philosophy of education were being valued and practised. I show that Peters and his colleagues later became aware of the need for philosophy of education to become aware of and take in hand a new set of agendas and address the list of substantive issues inherent in (...) the contexts and political considerations beginning to impinge on education in the 1980s and beyond. I argue that there is much to be said for adopting a postempiricist problem-solving approach and point to the ways in which an evolutionary epistemology may be usefully applied to many of the problems of modern educational discourse. But I also seek to show how the abiding axiological concerns of Peters may still serve as the substantive background and definition of the value emphasis of the aims and directions in which philosophers of education are currently still working. (shrink)

Although Nicolai Hartmann's Ethics is one of the most important works on ethics in this century, it is still little known in the English-speaking world, and most probably suffers from the same negligence on the European continent. Eva Cadwallader's book, I hope, will succeed in generating some interest in Hartmann's Ethics. Her book is a very competent exposition of Hartmann's Platonistic theory of values. It is also a critical study. She takes great pains to bring out the exact points of (...) some of Hartmann's highly subtle theses, assesses some of his arguments in order to bring out their strengths and weaknesses, and compares Hartmann's Platonism to other contemporary Platonistic theories, especially G. E. Moore's. On the whole she succeeds, in my view, in making a variety of value Platonism a credible philosophical thesis. Nicolai Hartmann's Platonism--in value theory as much as in his general ontology--is a most unusual combination of seemingly incompatible theses. Cadwallader distinguishes between various theses defended by value Platonists, and shows perspicuously which of them Hartmann accepts and which of them he rejects. A particularly interesting aspect of Hartmann's theory is his combination of Platonism with an open-ended pluralism of values, an axiological fallibilism, a sort of axiological relativism and a rejection of the view that moral issues can always be "objectively" resolved. In fact, although as a Platonist Hartmann maintains that values have an objective Ansichsein, he also insists that there are "objective" conflicts among values--which provides him with one ground for rejecting the resolutionism thesis. Generally, Platonism is combined with a cognitivist theory of values. Here again Hartmann's position is unconventional. He shares with Max Scheler the view that values are "apprehended" in appropriate emotional experiences, and he also argues for the objectivity of values in a Kantian sort of transcendental manner. Cadwallader discusses these aspects of Hartmann's theory in great detail and with competence. In his Introduction to the book, Werkmeister points out Hartmann's differing attitudes towards ethical and aesthetic values.--J. N. Mohanty, Temple University. (shrink)

Description courte (Électre, 2019) : Une étude d'un des principaux axes de réflexion du philosophe des sciences et de la nature Raymond Ruyer (1902-1987). À la lumière des découvertes de l'embryogenèse et en s'appuyant par ailleurs sur la théorie de l'information, il proposa une interprétation des concepts unificateurs de la cybernétique mécaniste. -/- Short Descriptor (Electre 2019): A study of one of the main axes of reflection of the French philosopher of science and of nature Raymond Ruyer (1902-1987). Relying on (...) the discoveries about embryogenesis, and also with the use of information theory, Ruyer proposed an interpretation of the main unifying concepts of mechanistic cybernetics. -/- Cet ouvrage propose une étude fouillée d'un des principaux axes de réflexion du philosophe des sciences et de la nature français Raymond Ruyer (1902–1987) : la cybernétique. Après avoir proposé une philosophie structuraliste, Ruyer la modifia à la lumière des découvertes de l'embryogenèse, puis il proposa une interprétation des concepts unificateurs de la cybernétique mécaniste. Réfléchissant sur cette dernière et sur la théorie de l'information, en particulier sur l'origine de l'information, il défendit que cette cybernétique n'était qu'une lecture inversée de la vraie cybernétique, qui nous donnerait de lire dans l'expérience même les traces du pouvoir morphogénétique, appréhendé comme un champ axiologique. Dans un texte résumant son propre parcours, Ruyer affirma finalement que la critique de la théorie de l'information « peut donner […] l'espoir d'aboutir à quelque chose comme une nouvelle théologie. » Les idées directrices de Ruyer sont tout particulièrement contextualisées ici à partir de la question du développement des formes en biologie, et de celles de la génétique, de la genèse stochastique de l'ordre, et de l'identification mentale ou physique de l'information. Il se termine en départageant ce qui est théologique et axiologique dans ce projet de métaphysique qui, bien que resté inachevé, n'en représente pas moins le plus impressionnant conçu en France au siècle dernier. – This book offers an in-depth study of one of the main axes in the reflection of French philosopher of science and nature Raymond Ruyer. In a text summarising his own development, Ruyer stated about the philosophical critique of information theory that it "is what can give the most long-lasting hope of getting to something like a new theology." After propounding a structuralist philosophy, and distinguishing between form and structure, to then modify it in the light of discoveries in embryogenesis, Ruyer offered a re-evaluation of the unifying concepts of mechanistic cybernetics. Thinking about it and about information theory, he defended the idea that this cybernetics was in reality an inverted reading of the real one, which would allow us to read in experience itself traces of the morphogenetic power, apprehended as the axiological field. On some transversal points, the development of forms in biology and genetics, the stochastic genesis of order, the identification of information with either psychological and mental, or physical reality, behaviour, and the access to meaning, this work exposes the main ideas of Ruyer while situating them in the context of the breadth of others' contributions. It ends by determining what is theological and axiological in this project for a metaphysics which, although unfinished, is nevertheless the most impressive effort done in France in the last century. – Available on i6doc dot com (ISBN 978-2-930517-56-8 ; pdf 978-2-930517-57-5). (shrink)

An axiological analysis of the basis of the 1997 Constitution of the Republic of Poland, determined mainly in the Preamble, makes it possible to put forward a thesis that this axiology is not, at least in reference to the principle, eclectic. In respect of the meta-axiological settlements, this is a tradition of natural-law type, recognizing the objective grounding of values and law. The accepted solutions are also convergent with the axiology typical of the international protection of human rights. (...) -/- Résumé L’analyse des fondements axiologiques de la Constitution polonaise de 1997, inscrits avant tout dans le préambule, permet de formuler la thèse selon laquelle cette axiologie n’est pas, en principe, éclectique. La réflexion sur les valeurs s’inscrit dans la vision classique des fondements du droit, remontant à l’antiquité. Partant de là, se dégage une tradition juridique appuyée sur le droit naturel, reconnaissant la force objective des valeurs et du droit. Ces conclusions rejoignent l’axiologie classique de la protection internationale des droits de l’Homme. -/- Zusammenfassung Die Analyse der vor allem durch die Präambel definierten axiologischen Grundlagen der Verfassung der Republik Polen von 1997 ermöglicht die Aufstellung der These, dass diese Axiologie nicht eklektisch ist, zumindest nicht prinzipiell. Hier enthüllt sich ein Denken von den Werten, das sich in die klassische, bis in die Antike zurückreichende Reflexion über die Grundlagen des Rechts einfügt. Wegen der metaaxiologischen Entscheidungen ist das eine Tradition naturrechtlichen Typs, die die objektive Begründung der Werte und des Rechts anerkennt. Die angenommenen Lösungen stimmen auch mit der für den internationalen Schutz der Menschenrechte typischen Axiologie überein. (shrink)

L’article présente les propositions principales de la métaphysique du réalisme axiologique de Tadeusz Czeżowski, l’un des représentants éminents de l’École de Lvov-Varsovie. La thèse soutenue par Czeżowski est que les valeurs ne sont pas des propriétés de n’importe quel genre, mais qu’elles constituent des notions transcendentales au sens de Duns Scot (et pas au sens de Thomas d’Aquin). Une des conséquences de cette position est que le réalisme de Czeżowski a la forme d’un non-naturalisme. La position prise par Czeżowski n’est (...) pas tout à fait claire ni élaborée en détails ; pour des raisons discutées dans le présent texte, il est possible de considérer les valeurs comme des sortes d’états de choses non-naturels, qui sont les correspondants des phrases axiolo-giques pertinentes. (shrink)

L’article présente les propositions principales de la métaphysique du réalisme axiologique de Tadeusz Czeżowski, l’un des représentants éminents de l’École de Lvov-Varsovie. La thèse soutenue par Czeżowski est que les valeurs ne sont pas des propriétés de n’importe quel genre, mais qu’elles constituent des notions transcendentales au sens de Duns Scot (et pas au sens de Thomas d’Aquin). Une des conséquences de cette position est que le réalisme de Czeżowski a la forme d’un non-naturalisme. La position prise par Czeżowski n’est (...) pas tout à fait claire ni élaborée en détails ; pour des raisons discutées dans le présent texte, il est possible de considérer les valeurs comme des sortes d’états de choses non-naturels, qui sont les correspondants des phrases axiolo-giques pertinentes. (shrink)

The research is devoted to the morphology that V.N. Ilyin developed in the work Static and Dynamics of Pure Form and other archival texts. Morphology is central to the philosophy of V.N. Ilyin, but it remains an unexplored subject. The article’s author explores the morphology of the philosopher from a historical and philosophical point of view. In addition to apparent influences (G.W. Leibniz, E. Husserl, N. Lossky), the article’s author revealed the connection of V.N. Ilyin’s ideas with the history of (...) Western European philosophy and his attitude to medieval thinkers. The author considered how V.N. Ilyin understood and assessed his modern philosophy and its results by the middle of the twentieth century. V.N. Ilyin especially paid attention to phenomenology and its connection with morphology, analyzing phenomenology's influence on existential philosophy. In addition to phenomenology, V.N. Ilyin highly appreciated the intuitism of H. Bergson and N. Lossky. The third main philosophical direction in the twentieth century for V.N. Ilyin was religious philosophy (Neo-Thomists and followers of H. Bergson), which aimed at creating axiology, a new system of values. V.N. Ilyin sought to combine various philosophical ideas in the project of morphology based on logic and scientific methodology. He stated the need to reform formal logic and create “metalogic” that would be more consistent with the philosophical tasks of the twentieth century. The morphology of V.N. Ilyin is based on the idea of synthesis and focuses on creating universal science. The comparison of various philosophical ideas of the twentieth century with morphology makes it possible to understand better his philosophical worldview, the course of his reflections, and the meaning of the morphological project. (shrink)

A compilation of lectures by the liberal thinker Armando P. Ribas, which reflect the political philosophy in his historical, ethical, political and economic analysis. Dr. Ribas exposes the correct axiological order, thus demonstrating that the economy is merely consequential and dependent on ethics, politics, and the legal system derived from them.

Upon doing something generous for someone with whom you are close, some kind of reciprocity may be appropriate. But it often seems wrong to actually request reciprocity. This chapter explores the wrongness in making these requests, and why they can nevertheless appear appropriate. After considering several explanations for the wrongness at issue (involving, e.g. distinguishing oughts from obligation, the suberogatory, imperfect duties, and gift-giving norms), a novel proposal is advanced. The requests are disrespectful; they express that their agent insufficiently trusts (...) the hearer to recognize their own reasons to reciprocate, and the close relationship between them morally requires this kind of trust. This proposal is articulated and situated in the recent discussion of the normativity of requests. The chapter concludes by explaining how these requests may appear appropriate. Agents in these relationships often have standing to make requests, though the standing is lacking in these particular cases. (shrink)

Chinese philosphy of cults, Falun Gong and Indian mysticism.

Монография представляет собой исследование философских взглядов одного из представителей второй половины XIX века, мыслителя, публициста, литературного критика, переводчика, издателя, Н. Н. Страхова.

Монография представляет собой исследование философских взглядов одного из представителей второй половины XIX века, мыслителя, публициста, литературного критика, переводчика, издателя, Н. Н. Страхова.

Ethics and Humanity pays to tribute to Jonathan Glover, a pioneering figure whose thought and personal influence have had a significant impact on applied ...

On concept of Jīva in Hindu philosophy and Vedic literature.

Contribution of Rāhula Sāṅkr̥tyāyana, 1893-1963, Hindi to Buddhist philosophy and literature; includes description of his travel to various places.

Works of Tran Duc Thao, a Vietnamese philosopher.