A central area of current philosophical debate in the foundations of mathematics concerns whether or not there is a single, maximal, universe of set theory. Universists maintain that there is such a universe, while Multiversists argue that there are many universes, no one of which is ontologically privileged. Often model-theoretic constructions that add sets to models are cited as evidence in favour of the latter. This paper informs this debate by developing a way for a Universist to interpret talk that (...) seems to necessitate the addition of sets to V. We argue that, despite the prima facie incoherence of such talk for the Universist, she nonetheless has reason to try and provide interpretation of this discourse. We present a method of interpreting extension-talk (V-logic), and show how it captures satisfaction in `ideal' outer models and relates to impredicative class theories. We provide some reasons to regard the technique as philosophically virtuous, and argue that it opens new doors to philosophical and mathematical discussions for the Universist. (shrink)

We review different conceptions of the set-theoretic multiverse and evaluate their features and strengths. In Sect. 1, we set the stage by briefly discussing the opposition between the ‘universe view’ and the ‘multiverse view’. Furthermore, we propose to classify multiverse conceptions in terms of their adherence to some form of mathematical realism. In Sect. 2, we use this classification to review four major conceptions. Finally, in Sect. 3, we focus on the distinction between actualism and potentialism with regard to the (...) universe of sets, then we discuss the Zermelian view, featuring a ‘vertical’ multiverse, and give special attention to this multiverse conception in light of the hyperuniverse programme introduced in Arrigoni and Friedman (2013). We argue that the distinctive feature of the multiverse conception chosen for the hyperuniverse programme is its utility for finding new candidates for axioms of set theory. (shrink)

We review different conceptions of the set-theoretic multiverse and evaluate their features and strengths. In Sect. 1, we set the stage by briefly discussing the opposition between the ‘universe view’ and the ‘multiverse view’. Furthermore, we propose to classify multiverse conceptions in terms of their adherence to some form of mathematical realism. In Sect. 2, we use this classification to review four major conceptions. Finally, in Sect. 3, we focus on the distinction between actualism and potentialism with regard to the (...) universe of sets, then we discuss the Zermelian view, featuring a ‘vertical’ multiverse, and give special attention to this multiverse conception in light of the hyperuniverse programme introduced in Arrigoni-Friedman :77–96, 2013). We argue that the distinctive feature of the multiverse conception chosen for the hyperuniverse programme is its utility for finding new candidates for axioms of set theory. (shrink)

It is often assumed that concepts from the formal sciences, such as mathematics and logic, have to be treated differently from concepts from non-formal sciences. This is especially relevant in cases of concept defectiveness, as in the empirical sciences defectiveness is an essential component of lager disruptive or transformative processes such as concept change or concept fragmentation. However, it is still unclear what role defectiveness plays for concepts in the formal sciences. On the one hand, a common view sees formal (...) concepts to be protected against defects because of their precise and stable nature. On the other, studies going back as far as Lakatos (1963) showcase the changeability of such concepts. -/- In this paper, I will investigate if and how defectiveness based on the occurrence of inconsistencies can appear with formal concepts. To make the case as strong as possible, I employ a strict notion of formal concept that assumes the concept to have a fixed and definite extension. I will show that there are indeed certain types of defectiveness that cannot occur with such concepts; but that there are other types of defectiveness that do occur. This means that while formal concepts have to be treated differently than non-formal concepts, questions about defectiveness---as raised in the conceptual engineering debate and philosophy of science---can still be applied to them. I will highlight this point by showing how formal sciences have special strategies available to them that allow them to resolve defectiveness of their concepts in a flexible and informative manner. (shrink)

In this article we show that Morse-Kelley class theory provides us with an adequate framework for class forcing. We give a rigorous definition of class forcing in a model \documentclass[12pt]{minimal} \usepackage{amsmath} \usepackage{wasysym} \usepackage{amsfonts} \usepackage{amssymb} \usepackage{amsbsy} \usepackage{mathrsfs} \usepackage{upgreek} \setlength{\oddsidemargin}{-69pt} \begin{document} $$$$ \end{document} of MK, the main result being that the Definability Lemma can be proven without restricting the notion of forcing. Furthermore we show under which conditions the axioms are preserved. We conclude by proving that Laver’s Theorem does not hold for (...) class forcings. (shrink)

We survey recent developments in the theory of class forcing for- malized in the second-order set-theoretic setting.

This article addresses the question of fundamental entities in set theory. It takes up J. Hamkins’ claim that models of set theory are such fundamental entities and investigates it using the methodology of P. Maddy’s naturalism, Second Philosophy. In accordance with this methodology, I investigate the historical case study of the use of models in the introduction of forcing, compare this case to contemporary practice and give a systematic account of how set-theoretic practice can be said to introduce models as (...) new entities. In conclusion, I argue for a view that takes both sets and models to be fundamental entities in set theory. (shrink)

This collection documents the work of the Hyperuniverse Project which is a new approach to set-theoretic truth based on justifiable principles and which leads to the resolution of many questions independent from ZFC. The contributions give an overview of the program, illustrate its mathematical content and implications, and also discuss its philosophical assumptions. It will thus be of wide appeal among mathematicians and philosophers with an interest in the foundations of set theory. The Hyperuniverse Project was supported by the John (...) Templeton Foundation from January 2013 until September 2015. (shrink)

In this article we introduce and study hyperclass-forcing in the context of an extension of Morse-Kelley class theory, called MK∗∗. We define this forcing by using a symmetry between MK∗∗ models and models of ZFC− plus there exists a strongly inaccessible cardinal. We develop a coding between β-models ℳ\documentclass[12pt]{minimal} \usepackage{amsmath} \usepackage{wasysym} \usepackage{amsfonts} \usepackage{amssymb} \usepackage{amsbsy} \usepackage{mathrsfs} \usepackage{upgreek} \setlength{\oddsidemargin}{-69pt} \begin{document} $$\mathcal {M}$$ \end{document} of MK∗∗ and transitive models M+ of SetMK∗∗ which will allow us to go from ℳ\documentclass[12pt]{minimal} \usepackage{amsmath} \usepackage{wasysym} \usepackage{amsfonts} \usepackage{amssymb} (...) \usepackage{amsbsy} \usepackage{mathrsfs} \usepackage{upgreek} \setlength{\oddsidemargin}{-69pt} \begin{document} $$\mathcal {M}$$ \end{document} to M+ and vice versa. So instead of forcing with a hyperclass in MK∗∗ we can force over the corresponding SetMK∗∗ model with a class of conditions. For class-forcing to work in the context of ZFC− we show that the SetMK∗∗ model M+ can be forced to look like Lκ∗[X]\documentclass[12pt]{minimal} \usepackage{amsmath} \usepackage{wasysym} \usepackage{amsfonts} \usepackage{amssymb} \usepackage{amsbsy} \usepackage{mathrsfs} \usepackage{upgreek} \setlength{\oddsidemargin}{-69pt} \begin{document} $$L_{\kappa ^*}[X]$$ \end{document}, where κ∗ is the height of M+, κ strongly inaccessible in M+ and X ⊆ κ. Over such a model we can apply definable class forcing and we arrive at an extension of M+ from which we can go back to the corresponding β-model of MK∗∗, which will in turn be an extension of the original ℳ\documentclass[12pt]{minimal} \usepackage{amsmath} \usepackage{wasysym} \usepackage{amsfonts} \usepackage{amssymb} \usepackage{amsbsy} \usepackage{mathrsfs} \usepackage{upgreek} \setlength{\oddsidemargin}{-69pt} \begin{document} $$\mathcal {M}$$ \end{document}. Our main result combines hyperclass forcing with coding methods of Beller et al. and Friedman to show that every β-model of MK∗∗ can be extended to a minimal such model of MK∗∗ with the same ordinals. A simpler version of the proof also provides a new and analogous minimality result for models of second-order arithmetic. (shrink)

Penelope Maddy’s Second Philosophy is one of the most well-known ap- proaches in recent philosophy of mathematics. She applies her second-philosophical method to analyze mathematical methodology by reconstructing historical cases in a setting of means-ends relations. However, outside of Maddy’s own work, this kind of methodological analysis has not yet been extensively used and analyzed. In the present work, we will make a first step in this direction. We develop a general framework that allows us to clarify the procedure and (...) aims of the Second Philosopher’s investigation into set-theoretic methodology; pro- vides a platform to analyze the Second Philosopher’s methods themselves; and can be applied to further questions in the philosophy of set theory. (shrink)

In the late 1940s and early 1950s Lorenzen developed his operative logic and mathematics, a form of constructive mathematics. Nowadays this is mostly seen as the precursor to the more well-known dialogical logic and one could assumed that the same philosophical motivations were present in both works. However we want to show that this is not always the case. In particular, we claim, that Lorenzen’s well-known rejection of the actual infinite as stated in Lorenzen (1957) was not a major motivation (...) for operative logic and mathematics. In this article, we claim that this is in fact not the case. Rather, we argue for a shift that happened in Lorenzen’s treatment of the infinite from the early to the late 1950s. His early motivation for the development of operativism is concerned with a critique of the Cantorian notion of set and related questions about the notion of countability and uncountability; only later, his motivation switches to focusing on the concept of infinity and the debate about actual and potential infinity. (shrink)

In the late 1940s and early 1950s, Lorenzen developed his operative logic and mathematics, a form of constructive mathematics. Nowadays this is mostly seen as a precursor of the better-known dialogical logic, and one might assume that the same philosophical motivations were present in both works. However, we want to show that this is not everywhere the case. In particular, we claim that Lorenzen’s well-known rejection of the actual infinite, as stated in Lorenzen, was not a major motivation for operative (...) logic and mathematics. Rather, we argue that a shift happened in Lorenzen’s treatment of the infinite from the early to the late 1950s. His early motivation for the development of operationism is concerned with a critique of the Cantorian notion of set and with related questions about the notions of countability and uncountability; it is only later that his motivation switches to focusing on the concept of infinity and the debate about actual and potential infinity. (shrink)

Rhetoric as a persuasive technique, school subject and social practice has determined our literary and social linguistic life since the 5th century BC. Its history is the history of the production of speech under changing social conditions. Rhetoric has managed to re-establish itself as an academic subject at German universities since the 1960s, and today, in our advanced media society, it plays an outstanding role in advertising, sales and the social technology of management. - The Rhetoric Yearbook summarises rhetoric research (...) in Germany and presents new publications in an extended review section. A current bibliography provides information on all German-language publications related to rhetoric.Contributions are published in English, French and German. (shrink)