The label idios apodeixis/logos «particular demonstration or argument» of Gorgias is known to us only from the third section of the little work attributed to Aristotle under the title De Melisso, Xenophane, Gorgia. Its authenticity seems to be unjustly questioned. We try to show that from the Aristotelian perspective we can properly understand the context of Gorgias’ own argument from his lost treatise On Not-Being or On Nature. Parmenides – using implicitly the polysemy of the verb ἔστιν/εἶναι – presented (...) a certain ontological argument «being is, because being is being». Gorgias, however, makes a parody of this by offering a meontological argument: «not-being is because not-being is not-being». Consequently Gorgias then attempts to demonstrate, by means of refutation, that «it is not either to be or not be», i.e. «nothing is». We propose, thus, a reconstruction of Gorgias’ account of meonological and nihilistic argumentation. In this context we find in Plato’s Sophist and in Aristotle’s writings certain allusions to Gorgias’ idios apodeixis, which have not been sufficiently recognized and properly interpreted. (shrink)

The aim of my paper is to investigate Gorgias’ argument against motion, which is found in his Peri tou meontos and preserved only in MXG 980a18. I tried to shed new light both on this specific reflection and on the reliability of Pseudo-Aristotle’s version. By exploring the so called “change argument” and the “argument from divisibility”, I focused on the particular strategy used by the Sophist in his synthetike apodeixis, which should be investigated in relation to the dispute between (...) monistic and pluralistic ontology. In this regard, the puzzle from “divisibility everywhere” and its connection with the void as not-being can provide new elements to grasp the philosophical background in which the Sophist moves. On the one hand, Gorgias’ argument against motion is part of a broader dispute on the divisibility/indivisibility of being; on the other, his original elaboration of this puzzle seems to be perfectly understandable within the controversy between Eleatics and Atomists, and coherent with the argumentative style of the Sophist. (shrink)

According to Aristotle, character (êthos) and emotion (pathos) are constitutive features of the process of phronetic practical deliberation: in order to render a determinate action-specific judgement, practical reasoning cannot be simply reduced to logical demonstration (apodeixis). This can be seen by uncovering an important structural parallel between the virtue of phronêsis and the art of rhetoric. This structural parallel helps to show how Aristotle's account of practical reason and deliberation, which constructively incorporates the emotions, illuminates key issues in contemporary (...) democratic theory concerning deliberation at the political level. (shrink)

Science (episteme) -- Division of the sciences according to aims and objects -- Demonstration (apodeixis) -- The axioms of the sciences -- Being or substance (ousia) -- Being before aristotle -- Being in the categories -- The science of being: first philosophy -- Being in metaphysics zeta -- Nature (physis) -- Principles of change -- The four causes or explanations (aitiai) -- Defense of teleology -- Soul (psyche) -- Soul as substance, form and actuality -- What the student of (...) soul investigates -- Perception -- Thought -- Success (eudaimonia) -- The practical science of ethics -- The chief and final good for human beings -- Virtues of character -- Virtues of intellect. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:How Nietzsche Explains and WhyDaniel ToueyIt is very much a matter of debate whether we are experiencing the end of philosophy or, as others would rather say, simply enduring an aberrant period during which such extravagant claims are being inexplicably tolerated. This debate has been going on for some time now. It will generate additional inconclusive discourse as long as there are differing notions of what “philosophy” consists of, (...) what it means to be doing it, and what it means not to be doing it. But I think that it is quite plausible that philosophy is changing its nature and that a whole group of philosophical questions has at least shifted in emphasis for our time.I would like to examine, in a speculative way, what seems to me to be a fundamental reorientation in how we ask philosophical questions and what sort of answers we expect to be able to give them. I will be mainly concerned with what may be roughly called the philosophy of explanation—with what, in our ongoing inquiries, we take to be shifting, problematic, obscure, and in need of explanation and what, in turn, we take to be stable, foundational, and known, which acts as the means through which we account for the former. But I would like also to touch upon a second aspect of this reorientation—the implications of our philosophy of explanation for an ongoing interpretive and critical assessment of society. In both of these exercises I will be relying on the philosophy of Nietzsche, who is one of those figures who announced the shift that I am claiming has overtaken philosophy and who continues to be a useful exemplar for our attempt to conceptualize it.The Structure of ExplanationAristotle makes a basic point about the structure of explanation or demonstration (apodeixis) in the Metaphysics while arguing for the priority of the principle of noncontradiction.Some thinkers demand a demonstration even of this principle, but they do so because they lack education; for it is a lack of education [End Page 485] [apaideusia] not to know of what things one should seek a demonstration and of what he should not. For, as a whole, a demonstration of everything is impossible, for the process would go on to infinity, so that even in this manner there would be no demonstration. 1I take Aristotle’s meaning to be that in any demonstration, or explanation, we must take something as primary, as given and self-evident, before it can proceed. Elsewhere he says that the starting-point (arché) of an inquiry is “to hoti “—“the that” or the simple fact. Seeing its inherent validity is necessary for the inquiry to go on. 2 Aristotle believed that these primary assumptions which guided inquiry were not arbitrary, that they were rooted in the nature of things. But we do not have to hold that the metaphysical commitments which determine the basic structure of our inquiries are supported in such a way. Wittgenstein, who makes the same basic point about the need for privileging some things in order to make successful explanations, does not think that we have any absolute means for legitimating those choices.Can’t an assertoric sentence, which was capable of functioning as an hypothesis, also be used as a foundation for research and action? I.e. can’t it simply be isolated from doubt, though not according to any explicit rule? It simply gets assumed as a truism, never called in question, perhaps not even ever formulated. 3Both Wittgenstein and Aristotle describe how the validity of those fundamental, operative assumptions, which cannot be demonstrated because they are means by which everything else is demonstrated, is established in practice. Aristotle says that the foundations of thought and discourse, like the principle of noncontradiction, can be doubted only in speech. Someone can make the pretense of denying them, but if we push hard enough we can show him that he is continually making use of those principles which he believes he is rejecting. 4 Of a fundamental truth Wittgenstein says that “everything speaks in its favor, nothing against it.” 5 Both suggest that we discover how deeply entrenched and indispensable... (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Reviewed by:Aristotelian Explorations by G. E. R. LloydRosamond Kent SpragueG. E. R. Lloyd. Aristotelian Explorations. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996. Pp. ix + 242. Cloth, $49.95.Although the essays in this richly rewarding book were given as lectures and seminars in a variety of places over a period of eight years, they possess a unity of theme that welds them into a satisfying whole. Furthermore, by the judicious use of (...) postscripts and additional notes, the author keeps us abreast of current discussion. [End Page 126]Lloyd’s chief concern is to compare Aristotle’s theory (notably as expressed in the Posterior Analytics) with his practice (especially in the zoology). The topic may be, as he admits in his 1990 Boston Colloquium lecture, “The Theories and Practices of Demonstration,” a “hoary old chestnut,” but his response to it is not; as is evident from the very title of his paper, he adopts a pluralistic approach to Aristotle’s methodology. Lloyd’s minute and extensive knowledge of the texts, as when he studies passages in the Topics in which what is there called apodeixis does not meet the conditions laid down in Posterior Analytics, makes his view compelling. Again, a careful study of Parts of Animals I, 1 issues in the caveat that “we had better be careful when talking about demonstration in the physical treatises, to examine what mode or manner of demonstration is in question” (33); it could be the method of deduction of antecedents, for instance, where we start with what will be rather than what is. In general, it needs to be considered not just whether a particular theory of demonstration is applied, but whether it is applicable.In a chapter entitled “The Relationship of Psychology to Zoology,” Lloyd discusses Aristotle’s theory of matter, particularly “the problem of reconciling what is true of earth, water, air, and fire haplōs... and what is true of them as the constituent elements of living uniform parts” (64). This difficulty has its repercussions for his form/matter distinction: the difference between the two is best illustrated by artefacts (as, I might add, is evident to those who attempt to teach it), but the unity of the sonolon by the cases in which the soul is form and the matter a living body of which the soul is the actuality.In this connection Lloyd makes reference to Aristotle’s “top-down theory of life” as being one quite definitely held by him (64, 99). I think that this is only partially the case. A passage such as De Anima 415a25ff. in which not only animals but plants are said, through reproduction, to aim at the eternal and divine, suggests that a “bottom-up” theory of life is equally important in his psychology, especially in view of his pervasive desire to stress the final cause. I think that Lloyd’s own principle of plurality in relation to context could well be applied here. The overall structure of the De Anima illustrates Aristotle’s use of both methods: bottom-up from nutrition through sensation to thought, but top-down from sight to touch. It is, of course, true that the De Anima is not concerned to address the question of how life emerges from not-life, but its discussion of living things quite definitely begins at the bottom of the scala naturae, with plants. Again, at History of Animals 588b4ff. (a passage crucial to Lloyd’s consideration of borderline cases in his chapter entitled “Fuzzy Natures?”), we find that Nature proceeds from the inanimate to the animate, and that first after the inanimate come plants. It also strikes me as being of interest that, when Aristotle discusses the difficult topic of growth in Generation and Corruption 321b16ff., he does so at the level of flesh and not of hands, from the bottom up, that is.Of other topics on which Lloyd has things to say, that of spontaneous generation is of particular interest. Here he points out that spontaneously generated creatures are of regular kinds; they have determinate material causes. As to whether Aristotle’s recognition of such cases has driven him “into admitting a principle that offers a glaring... (shrink)

The majority of the excerpts traditionally taken to derive from a planned book 8 of Clement of Alexandria’s Stromateis concern the theory of demonstration (apodeixis) and related matters of logic. The suspension of judgement (epochē), a recognisably sceptical response to disagreement and a lack of demonstrative certainty, receives two brief treatments in this context. Apart from an attempted refutation of scepticism which points to the allegedly self-refuting character of universal epochē (5.15.2–16.3), the text also includes an account of the (...) causes that lead one to suspend judgement (7.22.1–4). ... First, I will give a brief overview of both the argument from self-refutation employed in the first Clementine excerpt and Sextus Empiricus' rejection of a related argument. I will argue that the comparison does not support definite claims about the origin of the Clementine material (section 1). Then I will discuss the second excerpt, which offers a series of remarks on the causal origin of epochē (section 2). I will then contrast it to Sextus’s account of the origin of suspensive disposition in terms of originative principles (archai) rather than causes (aitiai), arguing that Sextus’s formulation allows for a more nuanced sceptical position (section 3). In conclusion, I will briefly consider possible views on the relevance of this material, or the lack thereof, for Clement’s Christian project (section 4). (shrink)

In an earlier article (s. J Gen Philos Sci 40:341-355, 2009), I have rejected an interpretation of Aristotle's syllogistic which (since Patzig) is predominant in the literature on Aristotle, but wrong in my view. According to this interpretation, the distinguishing feature of perfect syllogisms is their being evident. Theodor Ebert has attempted to defend this interpretation by means of objections (s. J Gen Philos Sci 40:357-365, 2009) which I will try to refute in part [1] of the following article. I (...) want to show that (1) according to Aristotle's Prior Analytics perfect and imperfect syllogisms do not differ by their being evident, but by the reason for their being evident, (2) Aristotle uses the same words to denote proofs of the validity of perfect and imperfect syllogisms („apodeixis”, "deiknusthai" etc.), (3) accordingly, Aristotle defines perfect syllogisms not as being evident, but as "requiring nothing beyond the things taken in order to make the necessity evident", i.e. as not "requiring one or more things that are necessary because of the terms assumed, but that have not been taken among the propositions" (APr. I. 1), (4) the proofs by which the validity of perfect assertoric syllogisms can be shown according to APr. I. 4 are based on the Dictum de omni et nullo, (5) the fact that Aristotle describes these proofs only in rough outlines corresponds to the fact that his proofs of the validity of other fundamental rules are likewise produced in rough outlines, e.g. his proof of the validity of conversio simplex in APr. I. 2, which usually has been misunderstood (also by Ebert): (6) Aristotle does not prove the convertibility of E-sentences by presupposing the convertibility of I-sentences; only the reverse is true. (shrink)

The author explores Aristotle’s theory of signification by contrasting it to Plato’s theory of language, which is interpreted, rather uncritically, as a theory of "natural" signification. She discusses Aristotle’s position on the meaning of sentences and sentential parts, and his theory of reference. She then considers Aristotle’s concept of philosophical language as the language of demonstration, in contrast to the saying of myths, and compares apodeixis to rhetoric and poetry. "Clarity" is required in philosophical discourse, and is defined by (...) contrast with equivocation, ambiguity and metaphor. It is good to have a collection of Aristotle’s remarks on these important items, but the author seems not to draw much philosophical capital from them: "clarity" seems to be taken as little more than "careful writing." Finally some passages from the Metaphysics are examined to give an example of how Aristotle uses language in philosophy. The book contains interesting remarks, but the general problem seems misplaced: we are to be shown that Aristotle is "not concerned solely with linguistic clarification but with positive knowledge of nonlinguistic reality", but such a dichotomy is certainly not Aristotelian. Neither is the problem raised in this sentence, "It is difficult to say whether Aristotle thinks men are social because they have the power of speech or the converse". Again, the author says "poetry is the imitation of things" when she means tragedy is the imitation of action.—R. S. (shrink)