Much as we would like to conceive empirical thought as rationally grounded in experience, pitfalls await anyone who tries to articulate this position, and ...

To introduce this collection of research studies, which stem from the pro grams conducted by The World Phenomenology Institute, we need say a few words about our aims and work. This will bring to light the significance of the present volume. The phenomenological philosophy is an unprejudiced study of experience in its entire range: experience being understood as yielding objects. Experi ence, moreover, is approached in a specific way, such a way that it legitima tizes itself naturally in immediate evidence. (...) As such it offers a unique ground for philosophical inquiry. Its basic condition, however, is to legitimize its validity. In this way it allows a dialogue to unfold among various philosophies of different methodologies and persuasions, so that their basic assumptions and conceptions may be investigated in an objective fashion. That is, instead of comparing concepts, we may go below their differences to seek together what they are meant to grasp. We may in this way come to the things them selves, which are the common objective of all philosophy, or what the great Chinese philosopher Wang Yang Ming called "the investigation of things". It is in this spirit that the Institute's programs include a "cross-cultural" dialogue meant to bring about a profound communication among philosophers in their deepest concerns. Rising above artificial cultural confinements, such dialogues bring scholars, thinkers and human beings together toward a truly human community of minds. Our Institute unfolds one consistent academic program. (shrink)

Human experience is not confined to waking life. Do experiences in dreams matter? Humans are not the only living beings who have experiences. Does nonhuman experience matter? The Buddhist philosopher Vasubandhu, writing during the late fourth and early fifth centuries C.E., argues in his work The Twenty Verses that these alternative contexts ought to inform our understanding of mind and world. Vasubandhu invites readers to explore experiences in dreams and to inhabit the experiences of nonhuman beings—animals, hungry ghosts, and beings (...) in hell. Other Lives offers a deep engagement with Vasubandhu’s account of mind in a global philosophical perspective. Sonam Kachru takes up Vasubandhu’s challenge to think with perspective-diversifying contexts, showing how his novel theory draws together action and perception, minds and worlds. Kachru pieces together the conceptual system in which Vasubandhu thought to show the deep originality of the argument. He reconstructs Vasubandhu’s ecological concept of mind, in which mindedness is meaningful only in a nexus with life and world, to explore its ongoing philosophical significance. Engaging with a vast range of classical, modern, and contemporary Asian and Western thought, Other Lives is both a groundbreaking work in Buddhist studies and a model of truly global philosophy. The book also includes an accessible new translation of The Twenty Verses, providing a fresh introduction to one of the most influential works of Buddhist thought. (shrink)

How do rational minds make contact with the world? The empiricist tradition sees a gap between mind and world, and takes sensory experience, fallible as it is, to provide our only bridge across that gap. In its crudest form, for example, the traditional idea is that our minds consult an inner realm of sensory experience, which provides us with evidence about the nature of external reality. Notoriously, however, it turns out to be far from clear that there is any viable (...) conception of experience which allows it to do the job. The original problem is to show that thought is rationally constrained by external reality. If sensory experience is to provide the solution--in particular, if it is to provide the answer to sceptical challenges--it must therefore meet two criteria. First, it must itself be `receptive'--i.e., appropriately constrained by external reality. Second, it must be the kind of thing that can enter into a logical or rational relationship with belief--it must already be `conceptual,' in other words. In arguing against the idea that anything could serve both roles, Wilfred Sellars termed this conception of experience "the Myth of the Given.". (shrink)

Quine has spoken of bringing our beliefs about the world before “the tribunal of experience.” In Mind and World, McDowell agrees that this is what we must do, but he argues forcefully that Quine’s conception of experience as nothing more than a neuronal cause of verbal responses loses the whole idea that experiences can justify beliefs. McDowell’s overarching aim is to determine conditions that experience must satisfy if it is to be genuinely a tribunal.

Much as we would like to conceive empirical thought as rationally grounded in experience, pitfalls await anyone who tries to articulate this position, and ...

Parallax, or the change in the position of an object viewed along two different lines of sight and more precisely, the assumption that this adjustment is not only due to a change of focus, but a change in that object's ontological status has been a key philosophical concept throughout history. Building upon Slavoj Žižek's The Parallax View, this volume shows how parallax is used as a figure of thought that proves how the incompatibility between the physical and the theoretical touches (...) not only upon the ontological, but also politics and aesthetics. With articles written by internationally renowned philosophers such as Frank Ruda, Graham Harman, Paul Livingston and Zizek himself, this book shows how modes of parallax remain in numerous modern theoretical disciplines, such as the Marxian parallax in the critique of political economy and politics; and the Hegelian parallax in the concept of the work of art, while also being important to debates surrounding speculative realism and dialectical materialism. Spanning philosophy, parallax is then a rich and fruitful concept that can illuminate the studies of those working in epistemology, ontology, German Idealism, political philosophy and critical theory. (shrink)

A critical discussion of: Mind and World, John Mcdowell.

John McDowell's Mind and World is widely acknowledged to be one of the most important contributions to philosophy in recent years. In this volume leading philosophers examine the nature and extent of McDowell's achievement in Mind and World and related writings. The chapters, most of which were specially commissioned for this volume, are divided into five parts. The essays in part one consider Mind and World 's location in the modern philosophical tradition, particularly its relation to Kant's critical project. Parts (...) two and three cover issues in epistemology and philosophy of mind, while in part four the focus turns to problems of rationality, realism and ethics. In the final part of the book McDowell responds to the contributors and further elaborates his own views. Together, the essays provide an indispensable resource for understanding McDowell's work and they offer a timely snapshot of the state of play in contemporary philosophy. Reading McDowell is an important and critical contribution to the debates in analytic philosophy and will be a valuable resource for all those interested in Mind and World , philosophy of mind, and epistemology. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Philosophy, Psychiatry, & Psychology 12.1 (2005) 77-78 [Access article in PDF] Language, Mind, and World Werdie (C. W.) Van Staden Keywords psychotherapy, linguistics, semantics, references, speech The paper by Mcconnell and Gillett touches, in a Lacanian way, on the connections between language, world, and the conscious and unconscious mind. Their paper brings together the influential ideas of Freud, philosophical phenomenology, existentialism, and structuralism in describing Lacan's approach to these (...) connections. Going further than Lacan's concerns in psychotherapy, their paper calls on us to consider the importance of these connections more generally in philosophy, psychiatry, and psychology.These connections matter substantially in the practice of psychiatry and psychology, for there we need to understand as much as possible of the ways in which language is intimately involved with the minds and brains of people and their biological and interpersonal worlds. Even at first glance, we can easily concede that people use language to express their troubled minds and their past, present, and anticipated relations with their biological and interpersonal worlds; that language use depends inescapably on brain functions (of the Broca and the Wernicke areas, for example); and that practitioners use language receptively and exploratively to access and examine the minds as well as the biological and interpersonal worlds of the people.Cognizant of the connections between language, mind, and world, language has received considerable attention in the psychotherapy literature and practice (e.g., Russell 1987), including from Lacan and his followers. In addition to these practices and theoretical expositions, empirical linguistic studies in psychotherapy have also been published recently (e.g., Van Staden in press; Van Staden and Fulford 2004; Spence 1995; Spence, Mayes, and Dahl 1994).There has been, furthermore, a growing interest in defining linguistic variables for empirical research in general psychiatry and psychology (Van Staden 2002; Thomas and Fraser 1994). The necessary and intimate role of language has also been reviewed recently in coming to a diagnostic understanding of people's difficulties (Van Staden 2003) and in conducting ethically sound assessments of mentally disordered people's capacity to give informed consent (Van Staden and Krüger 2003). Furthermore, the underlying connections between language, mind, and world, for example, have brought about the expectation that genetic factors in the etiology of schizophrenia would be related to the far-reaching capacity of human beings to use language (Crow 1997).A philosophical interest in the connections between language, mind, and world can be traced back to Plato. More recently, it has been taking a central place in analytic philosophy. The vast and sophisticated philosophical literature on this topic suggests that these connections are very [End Page 77] intricate and that we probably have an inchoate understanding of them. These connections are about theories of reference; theories of descriptions; semantic theories of truth; Kant's distinction between form and content; meaning; contextual content; linguistic pragmatism and speech act theories—all elaborate topics, of course, intertwined with various ontological commitments (cf. Luntley 1999).Lacan's contribution, driven by practical need albeit in the constrained area of psychotherapy, has not yet been taken up in analytic philosophy circles. The paper by McConnell and Gillett sets the scene for further philosophical examination that could determine whether Lacan's work does advance contemporary analytic philosophy on this topic. The most potential for such advance concerns probably, as indicated by McConnell and Gillet, insights about the unconscious mind.Notwithstanding a worthy philosophical examination of whether Lacan's work advances contemporary analytic philosophy on the connections between language, mind, and world, it may prove to be a challenging undertaking—probably even more challenging than the admirable groundwork done in the paper by McConnell and Gillett. The reason is, in my opinion, that the depth of Lacan's work is difficult to penetrate, in part because of the abundance of his esoteric terms, some of which are prima facie incommensurable with ordinary analytic language. The philosophical cogency of his work, moreover, is difficult to verify, because he often simply made conjectures, true as they might be, without explicating (sufficiently) the justification thereof.Lacan's work is commendable, however, even if... (shrink)

It is commonly held that our thoughts, beliefs, desires and feelings - the mental phenomena that we instantiate - are constituted by states and processes that occur inside our head. The view known as externalism, however, denies that mental phenomena are internal in this sense. The mind is not purely in the head. Mental phenomena are hybrid entities that straddle both internal state and processes and things occurring in the outside world. The development of externalist conceptions of the mind is (...) one of the most controversial, and arguably one of the most important, developments in the philosophy of mind in the second half of the twentieth century. Yet, despite its significance most recent work on externalism has been highly technical, clouding its basic ideas and principles. Moreover, very little work has been done to locate externalism within philosophical developments in both analytic and continental traditions. In this book, Mark Rowlands aims to remedy both these problems and present for the reader a clear and accessible introduction to the subject grounded in wider developments in the history of philosophy. Rowlands shows that externalism has significant and respectable historical roots that make it much more important than a specific eruption that occurred in late twentieth-century analytic philosophy. (shrink)

Jeffrey Barrett presents the most comprehensive study yet of a problem that has puzzled physicists and philosophers since the 1930s.

Why is the human mind able to perceive and understand the truth about reality; that is, why does it seem to be the mind's specific function to know the world? Sean Kelsey argues that both the question itself and the way Aristotle answers it are key to understanding his work De Anima, a systematic philosophical account of the soul and its powers. In this original reading of a familiar but highly compressed text, Kelsey shows how this question underpins Aristotle's inquiry (...) into the nature of soul, sensibility, and intelligence. He argues that, for Aristotle, the reason why it is in human nature to know beings is that 'the soul in a way is all beings'. This new perspective on the De Anima throws fresh and interesting light on familiar Aristotelian doctrines: for example, that sensibility is a kind of ratio, or that the intellect is simple, separate, and unmixed. (shrink)

It would be very desirable to have an account of the relation between mind and world that sustained the integrity of each. In this paper, we will argue that a theory of cognition which is broadly Thomistic can do just that. Many commentators recognize that cognitio is Aquinas’s basic epistemic concept, and that it designates knowledge in the broadest and most basic sense, as distinguished from scientia, or knowledge in the paradigmatic sense. There are several important consequences of this distinction (...) which are relevant to a proper understanding of the way in which a theory of knowledge which is in the Aristotelian-Thomistic tradition approaches the issue of the relation between the mind and the world. First and foremost, knowledge cannot be construed as a univocal concept in the A/t context. There are different senses of knowledge and we should not expect there to be a theory which supplies necessary and sufficient conditions for “S knows that p” that satisfies all the different senses of knowledge. It is perplexing that the contemporary discussion seems to miss this point, for the same sort of systematic ambiguity of the term ‘knowledge’ seems to hold in English. Second, the A/t theory of knowledge is not an epistemological theory in the modern sense, if by “epistemological” we mean one which is clearly demarcated from a metaphysical, psychological, or even semantical theory. The A/t theory is a metaphysics of knowledge. Third, a Thomistic theory of knowledge begins with a theory of cognition which provides the grounds of knowledge across the board, including even that of scientia. (shrink)

This book carries forward the discourse on the mind’s engagement with the world. It reviews the semantic and metaphysical debates around internalism and externalism, the location of content, and the indeterminacy of meaning in language. The volume analyses the writings of Jackson, Chomsky, Putnam, Quine, Bilgrami and others, to reconcile opposing theories of language and the mind. It ventures into Cartesian ontology and Fregean semantics to understand how mental content becomes world-oriented in our linguistic communication. Further, the author explores the (...) liaison between the mind and the world from the phenomenological perspective, particularly, Husserl’s linguistic turn and Heidegger’s intersubjective entreaty for Dasein. The book conceives thought as a biological and socio-linguistic product which engages with the mind-world question through the conceptual and causal apparatuses of language. A major intervention in the field of philosophy of language, this book will be useful for scholars and researchers interested in philosophy, phenomenology, epistemology, and metaphysics . (shrink)

Jeffrey Barrett presents the most comprehensive study yet of a problem that has puzzled physicists and philosophers since the 1930s. The standard theory of quantum mechanics is in one sense the most successful physical theory ever, predicting the behaviour of the basic constituents of all physical things; no other theory has ever made such accurate empirical predictions. However, if one tries to understand the theory as providing a complete and accurate framework for the description of the behaviour of all physical (...) interactions, it becomes evident that the theory is ambiguous, or even logically inconsistent. The most notable attempt to formulate the theory so as to deal with this problem, the quantum measurement problem, was initiated by Hugh Everett III in the 1950s. Barrett gives a careful and challenging examination and evaluation of the work of Everett and those who have followed him. His informal approach, minimizing technicality, will make the book accessible and illuminating for philosophers and physicists alike. Anyone interested in the interpretation of quantum mechanics should read it. (shrink)

Jeffrey Barrett presents the most comprehensive study yet of a problem that has puzzled physicists and philosophers since the 1930s. Quantum mechanics is in one sense the most successful physical theory ever, accurately predicting the behaviour of the basic constituents of matter. But it has an apparent ambiguity or inconsistency at its heart; Barrett gives a careful, clear, and challenging evaluation of attempts to deal with this problem.

This article addresses recent claims made by Richard Rorty about antirepresentationalist theories of meaning. Rorty asserts that a faithful rendering of the core antirepresentationalist assumptions precludes even revised pieces of representationalist semantics like "refers" or "true" and epistemological correlates like "answering to the facts." Rorty even asserts that such notions invite reactionary authoritarian elements that would impede the development of a democratic humanism. I reject this claim and assert that such notions (suitably constructed) pose no greater threat to democratic humanism (...) than the alternatives and in fact are crucial to its maintenance and continuing success. These notions (suitably constructed) reflect a metatheoretical stance that I call "openness," which I believe lies at the heart of both democratic humanism and the pragmatism from which Rorty claims to take his inspiration. (shrink)

In Mind and World, John McDowell intends to make the diagnosis of a fundamental philosophical anxiety, whose hard core, from his point of view, is deeply rooted in the relationship that usually occurs between mind and world, as the title suggests. Moreover, assuming entirely the clinical consequences of metaphor, McDowell’s main aim is to point towards a cure. This therapy, as we shall see, doesn’t have an effective Wittgensteinian direction, in contrast with McDowell’s assertions. On the other hand, I will (...) show, in particular on the issue of skepticism, a contrasting vision of «analytical» and «phenomenological» approaches to the problems of knowledge. (shrink)

There has been a lot of interest over the last fifteen years or so in no-collapse interpretations of quantum mechanics. The Bohm interpretation of quantum mechanics has received several thorough accounts, perhaps most notably by Bohm himself.

The rapid advancement of artificial intelligence (AI) has led to renewed ambitions of developing artificial general intelligence. Alongside this has been a resurgence in the development of virtual and augmented reality (V/AR) technologies, which are viewed as “disruptive” technologies and the computing platforms of the future. V/AR effectively bring the digital world of machines, robots, and artificial agents to our senses while entailing the transposition of human activity and presence into the digital world of artificial agents and machine forms of (...) intelligence. The intersection of humans and machines in this shared space brings humans and machines into ontological continuity as informational entities in a totalizing informational environment, which subsumes both cyber and physical space in an artificially constructed virtual world. The reconstruction of mind (through AI) and world (through V/AR) thus has significant epistemological, ontological, and anthropological implications, which constitute the underlying features in the artificialization of mind and world. (shrink)

Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics is central to John McDowell’s classic Mind and World. In Lectures IV and V of that work, McDowell makes three claims concerning Aristotle’s ethics: first, that Aristotle did not base his ethics on an externalist, naturalistic basis (including a theory of human nature); second, that attempts to read him as an ethical naturalist are a modern anachronism, generated by the supposed need to ground all viable philosophical claims on claims analogous to the natural sciences; and third, that (...) a suitably construed Aristotelian conception of “second nature” can form the basis of a viable contemporary philosophy of mind, world, and normativity. This paper challenges each of these three claims. Aristotle’s ethics, we will claim alongside Terence Irwin, Bernard Williams, Philippa Foot, and many premodern commentators, is based in the kind of physics, metaphysics, and metaphysical biology that McDowell says it cannot be. Historically, we will argue that McDowell’s argument that Aristotle’s ethical reasoning is “autonomous” or “self-standing” is distinctly modern, citing evidence from the leading medieval commentators on the Nicomachean Ethics. The felt need to which McDowell responds, of reading Aristotle’s ethical or political thought as wholly non-metaphysical, arises from out of the successes of the natural sciences in the modern world, which he agrees discredit the Aristotelian, teleological account of nature. In the final part of the paper, we propose that McDowell’s account of normativity, rooted in the non-metaphysical “second nature” he reads into Aristotle, we will contend, is as it stands inescapably relativistic. On a different note, we need also to recognize, as McDowell does not, that this is a new Aristotle, one shaped by our requirements and space of reasons, not the mind and world of the Greek Philosopher himself.
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The Labyrinth of Mind and World: Beyond Externalism–Internalism. By Chakraborty Sanjit.

Critics of John McDowell's Mind and World have by and large failed to take sufficient notice of the transcendental context within which McDowell situates his work—a failure that has adversely affected their criticisms. In this paper, I make clear this transcendental context and show how it figures in the transcendental argument I see McDowell offering in Mind and World. Interpreting McDowell's argument in this way, I further argue, helps to answer some of the most pressing objections to what he is (...) doing in Mind and World, particularly certain objections made by Robert Brandom and Hilary Putnam. (shrink)

Since Descartes, the mind has been thought to be "in the head," separable from the world and even from the body it inhabits. In The Mind and its World , Gregory McCulloch considers the latest debates in philosophy and cognitive science about whether the thinking subject actually requires an environment in order to be able to think. McCulloch explores the mind/body duality from the Enlightenment to the 20th century. He examines such figures as Descartes, Frege, Locke, and Wittgenstein. His method (...) is comparative, and his insights are illuminating. By pitting Descartes against such thinkers as Wittgenstein and Frege, McCulloch produces a dynamic account of the implications of the Descartian argument about consciousness and the mind. The contrast evolves into McCulloch's original theory of externalism, the notion that the mind is not in the head, and is constituted by environmental, and linguistic object relations. The Mind and its World is a clearand compelling reading of the one of the dominant elements and debates within Western philosophy. Its synthesis of the arguments and controversies will make this book necessary reading for the general reader who is interested in the claims the Enlightenment and its aftermath have made about consciousness, our "minds", and even our brains._. (shrink)

William Whewell’s 19th century philosophy of science is sometimes glossed over as a footnote to Kant. There is however a key feature of Whewell’s account worth noting. This is his appeal to Aristotle’s form/matter hylomorphism as a metaphor to explain how mind and world merge in successful scientific inquiry. Whewell’s hylomorphism suggests a middle way between rationalism and empiricism reminiscent of experience pragmatists like Steven Levine’s view that mind and world are entwined in experience. I argue however that Levine does (...) not adequately explain exactly how mind and world entwine. He could nonetheless do so if he appealed to Whewell’s hylomorphic metaphor. We may prefer a reductive metaphysical explanation, but I suggest that pragmatists only have recourse to metaphor in this case. Both reductive and metaphorical explanations can enjoy great explanatory power if they exhibit a suitable measure of what I will call sematic distance. Semantic distance measures how close or how far apart explanandum and explanans are from each other in meaning. Metaphorical explanation - as evident in Whewell’s hylomorphism and as detailed via the notion of semantic distance - presents a valuable new explanatory tool to those who hold that mind and world are entwined sans recourse to metaphysics. (shrink)

This slim volume derives from the John Locke Lectures delivered in Oxford in 1991 and expands and develops the themes presented there and in a series of influential articles published during the last decade and a half. McDowell offers the prospect of "re-enchanting" a world laid bare by reductive "bald" naturalism, drawing support in this effort from Aristotle, Kant, Hegel, Wittgenstein, and Sellars. Others who feature prominently are Donald Davidson, Gareth Evans, Richard Rorty, and Sir Peter Strawson.