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Knowledge and its limits.Timothy Williamson - 2000 - New York: Oxford University Press.details
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The Normative Web: An Argument for Moral Realism.Terence Cuneo - 2007 - New York: Oxford University Press.details
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Truth and Objectivity.Crispin Wright - 1992 - Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press.details
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Unbelievable Errors: An Error Theory About All Normative Judgments.Bart Streumer - 2017 - Oxford, United Kingdom: Oxford University Press.details
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Truth and objectivity.Crispin Wright - 1992 - Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press.details
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Truth and Objectivity.Crispin Wright - 1992 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 56 (4):883-890.details
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Mathematics, Morality, and Self‐Effacement.Jack Woods - 2016 - Noûs 52 (1):47-68.details
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Knowledge and Its Limits.Timothy Williamson - 2005 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 70 (2):452-458.details
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Evolution and the Normativity of Epistemic Reasons.Sharon Street - 2009 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 39 (S1):213-248.details
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Are There Irreducibly Normative Properties?Bart Streumer - 2008 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 86 (4):537-561.details
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Moral realism: a defence.Russ Shafer-Landau - 2003 - New York: Oxford University Press.details
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How truth governs belief.Nishi Shah - 2003 - Philosophical Review 112 (4):447-482.details
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What Not to Multiply Without Necessity.Jonathan Schaffer - 2015 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 93 (4):644-664.details
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Rescuing Companions in Guilt Arguments.Richard Rowland - 2016 - Philosophical Quarterly 66 (262):161–171.details
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Moral Error Theory and the Argument from Epistemic Reasons.Richard Rowland - 2012 - Journal of Ethics and Social Philosophy 7 (1):1-24.details
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What can debunking do for us (sceptics and nihilists)?Jonas Olson - 2019 - Ratio 32 (4):290-299.details
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Do evolutionary debunking arguments rest on a mistake about evolutionary explanations?Andreas L. Mogensen - 2016 - Philosophical Studies 173 (7):1799-1817.details
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Evolutionary debunking arguments and the proximate/ultimate distinction.Andreas L. Mogensen - 2015 - Analysis 75 (2):196-203.details
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Deliberative Indispensability and Epistemic Justification.Tristram McPherson & David Plunkett - 2015 - In Oxford Studies in Metaethics. Oxford University Press. pp. 104-133.details
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Relax? Don’t Do It! Why Moral Realism Won't Come Cheap.Sarah McGrath - 2014 - Oxford Studies in Metaethics 9.details
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Ethics: Inventing Right and Wrong.John Leslie Mackie - 1977 - New York: Penguin Books.details
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Theory of knowledge.Keith Lehrer - 1990 - Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press.details
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The Myth of Morality.Hallvard Lillehammer - 2004 - Mind 113 (452):760-763.details
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Epistemic Akrasia.Sophie Horowitz - 2013 - Noûs 48 (4):718-744.details
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The Nature of Morality: Introduction to Ethics by Gilbert Harman. [REVIEW]Toni Vogel Carey - 1979 - Journal of Philosophy 76 (2):88-91.details
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The nature of morality: an introduction to ethics.Gilbert Harman - 1977 - New York: Oxford University Press.details
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On the genuine queerness of moral properties and facts.Richard T. Garner - 1990 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 68 (2):137 – 146.details
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Pain for the Moral Error Theory? A New Companions-in-Guilt Argument.Guy Fletcher - 2018 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 96 (3):474-482.details
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Ethics: Inventing Right and Wrong.Fred Feldman & J. L. Mackie - 1979 - Philosophical Review 88 (1):134.details
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Why companions in guilt arguments still work: Reply to Cowie.Ramon Das - forthcoming - Philosophical Quarterly:pqv078.details
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Bad News for Moral Error Theorists: There Is No Master Argument Against Companions in Guilt Strategies.Ramon Das - 2017 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 95 (1):58-69.details
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The normative web: an argument for moral realism.Terence Cuneo - 2007 - New York: Oxford University Press.details
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Truth in ethics.Crispin Wright - 1995 - Ratio 8 (3):209-226.details
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Why Companions in Guilt Arguments Won't Work.C. Cowie - 2014 - Philosophical Quarterly 64 (256):407-422.details
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Good News for Moral Error Theorists: A Master Argument Against Companions in Guilt Strategies.Christopher Cowie - 2016 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 94 (1):115-130.details
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Moral Epistemology: The Mathematics Analogy.Justin Clarke-Doane - 2012 - Noûs 48 (2):238-255.details
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Might All Normativity be Queer?Matthew S. Bedke - 2010 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 88 (1):41-58.details
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Ockham's razor and the anti-superfluity principle.E. C. Barnes - 2000 - Erkenntnis 53 (3):353-374.details
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Theory of Knowledge.Keith Lehrer - 1990 - Boulder, Colo.: Routledge.details
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Theory of Knowledge.Keith Lehrer - 1990 - Boulder, Colo.: Routledge.details
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Theory of Knowledge.Keith Lehrer - 1990 - Boulder, Colo.: Routledge.details
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Moral Error Theory: History, Critique, Defence.Jonas Olson - 2014 - Oxford: Oxford University Press.details
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The Myth of Morality.Richard Joyce - 2001 - New York: Cambridge University Press.details
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Taking Morality Seriously: A Defense of Robust Realism.David Enoch - 2011 - Oxford, GB: Oxford University Press UK.details
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Being Realistic About Reasons.Thomas Scanlon - 2014 - Oxford: Oxford University Press.details
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Without Justification.Jonathan Sutton - 2007 - MIT Press.details
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Ethical Intuitionism: Re-Evaluations.Philip Stratton-Lake (ed.) - 2002 - Oxford University Press UK.details
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The Evolution of Morality.Richard Joyce - 2005 - Bradford.details
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From Metaphysics to Ethics: A Defence of Conceptual Analysis.Frank Jackson - 1998 - New York: Oxford University Press.details
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