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  1. Gottlob Frege.Edward N. Zalta - 2008 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
    This entry introduces the reader to the main ideas in Frege's philosophy of logic, mathematics, and language.
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  • The Leibniz-Clarke Correspondence. Edited by H. G. Alexander New York: Philosophical Library, Inc., 1956. Pp. Lvi. 200. $4.75.Edward C. Moore - 1957 - Philosophy of Science 24 (4):367-369.
  • Transworld Depravity, Transworld Sanctity, & Uncooperative Essences.Alvin Plantinga - 2009 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 78 (1):178-191.
  • Transworld Depravity and Divine Omniscience.Sean Meslar - 2015 - International Journal for Philosophy of Religion 77 (3):205-218.
    This paper argues against the sufficiency of Alvin Plantinga’s free will defense, as presented in God, freedom, and evil as a response to the logical problem of evil. I begin by introducing the fundamental issues present in the problem of evil and proceed to present Plantinga’s response. Next, I argue that, despite the argument’s wide acceptance in the field, a central notion to the defense, transworld depravity, is internally inconsistent and that attempts to resolve the problem would result in an (...)
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  • Transworld Sanctity and Plantinga's Free Will Defense.Daniel Howard-Snyder & John Hawthorne - 1998 - International Journal for Philosophy of Religion 44 (1):1-21.
    A critique of Plantinga's free will defense.
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  • Plantinga, Presumption, Possibility, and the Problem of Evil.Keith Derose - 1991 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 21 (4):497 - 512.
    My topic is Alvin Plantinga’s ’solution’ to one of the many forms that the problem of evil takes: the modal abstract form. This form of the problem is abstract in that it does not deal with the amounts or kinds of evil which exist, but only with the fact that there is some evil or other. And it is modal in that it concerns the compossibility of the following propositions, not any evidential relation between them: God is omnipotent, omniscient, and (...)
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  • Might-Counterfactuals, Transworld Untrustworthiness and Plantinga’s Free Will Defence.Michael Bergmann - 1999 - Faith and Philosophy 16 (3):336-351.
    Plantinga’s Free Will Defense employs the following proposition as a premise:◊TD. Possibly, every essence is transworld depraved.I argue that he fails to establish his intended conclusion because the denial of ◊TD is epistemically possible. I then consider an improved version of the FWD which relies on◊TU. Possibly, every essence is transworld untrustworthy. I argue that the denial of ◊TU is also epistemically possible and, therefore, that the improved FWD fares no better than the original at establishing the compatibility of God (...)
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  • Could God Do Something Evil? A Molinist Solution to the Problem of Divine Freedom.R. Zachary Manis - 2011 - Faith and Philosophy 28 (2):209-223.
    One important version of the problem of divine freedom is that, if God is essentially good, and if freedom logically requires being able to do otherwise, then God is not free with respect to willing the good, and thus He is not morally praiseworthy for His goodness. I develop and defend a broadly Molinist solution to this problem, which, I argue, provides the best way out of the difficulty for orthodox theists who are unwilling to relinquish the Principle of Alternate (...)
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  • A Counterexample to Plantinga’s Free Will Defense.Alexander R. Pruss - 2012 - Faith and Philosophy 29 (4):400-415.
    Plantinga’s Free Will Defense is an argument that, possibly, God cannot actualize a world containing significant creaturely free will and no wrongdoings. I will argue that if standard Molinism is true, there is a pair of worlds w1 and w2 each of which contains a significantly free creature who never chooses wrongly, and that are such that, necessarily, at least one of these worlds is a world that God can actualize.
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  • On the Value of Freedom To Do Evil.Joshua Rasmussen - 2013 - Faith and Philosophy 30 (4):418-428.
    Theists typically think the freedom to choose between right and wrong is a great good . Yet, they also typically think that the very best being—God—and inhabitants of the very best place—heaven—lack this kind of freedom. The question arises: if freedom to choose evil is so good, then why is it absent from the best being and the best place? I discuss articulations of this question in the literature and point out drawbacks of answers that have been proposed. I then (...)
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  • The Prospects for the Free Will Defence.Bruce Langtry - 2010 - Faith and Philosophy 27 (2):142-152.
    My main conclusion is that the prospects for a successful Free Will Defence employing Alvin Plantinga’s basic strategy are poor. The paper explains how the Defence is supposed to work, and pays special attention both to the definition of Transworld Depravity and also to whether is is possible that God actualizes a world containing moral good.
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  • Is God “Significantly Free?”.Wesley Morriston - 1985 - Faith and Philosophy 2 (3):257-264.
    In an impressive series of books and articles, Alvin Plantinga has developed challenging new versions of two much discussed pieces of philosophical theology: the free will defense and the ontological argument.' His treatment of both subjects has provoked a tremendous amount of critical comment. What has not been generally noticed', however, is that when taken together, Plantinga's views on these two subjects lead to a very serious problem in philosophical theology. The premises of his version of the ontological argument, when (...)
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  • God’s Perfection and Freedom: A Reply to Morriston.Robert T. Lehe - 1986 - Faith and Philosophy 3 (3):319-323.
    In a recent article in Faith and Philosophy, Wesley Morriston argues that Plantinga’s Free Will Defense is incompatible with his version of the ontological argument because the former requires that God be free in a sense that precludes a requirement of the latter---that God be morally perfect in all possible worlds. God’s perfection, according to Morriston, includes moral goodness, which requires that God be free in the sense that entails that in some possible worlds God performs wrong actions. I argue (...)
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  • On Ockham’s Way Out.Alvin Plantinga - 1986 - Faith and Philosophy 3 (3):235-269.
    In Part I, I present two traditional arguments for the incompatibility of divine foreknowledge with human freedom; the first of these is clearly fallacious; but the second, the argument from the necessity of the past, is much stronger. In the second section I explain and partly endorse Ockham’s response to the second argument: that only propositions strictly about the past are accidentally necessary, and past propositions about God’s knowledge of the future are not strictly about the past. In the third (...)
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  • Divine Freedom and the Problem of Evil.Theodore Guleserian - 2000 - Faith and Philosophy 17 (3):348-366.
    The traditional theistic philosopher is committed to hold that God has a perfect will essentially, and that this is better than having a free will. It will be argued that God, being omnipotent, would have the power to create creatures who also have a perfect will essentially. This creates a problem for the traditional theist in solving the problem of moral evil. The problem of actual moral evil will not then be solvable by reference to the value of our moral (...)
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  • A Simpler Free Will Defence.C’Zar Bernstein & Nathaniel Helms - 2015 - International Journal for Philosophy of Religion 77 (3):197-203.
    Otte :165–177, 2009) and Pruss :400–415, 2012) have produced counterexamples to Plantinga’s famous free will defence against the logical version of the problem of evil. The target of this criticism is the possibility of universal transworld depravity, which is crucial to Plantinga’s defence. In this paper, we argue that there is a simpler and more plausible free will defence that does not require the possibility of universal transworld depravity or the truth of counterfactuals of creaturely freedom. We assume only that (...)
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  • Plantinga's Unfortunate God.Peter Y. Windt - 1973 - Philosophical Studies 24 (5):335 - 342.
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  • What is so Good About Moral Freedom&Quest.Wes Morriston - 2000 - Philosophical Quarterly 50 (200):344-358.
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  • The Essential Divine-Perfection Objection to the Free-Will Defence.Alexander R. Pruss - 2008 - Religious Studies 44 (4):433-444.
    The free-will defence (FWD) holds that the value of significant free will is so great that God is justified in creating significantly free creatures even if there is a risk or certainty that these creatures will sin. A difficulty for the FWD, developed carefully by Quentin Smith, is that God is unable to do evil, and yet surely lacks no genuinely valuable kind of freedom. Smith argues that the kind of freedom that God has can be had by creatures, without (...)
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  • On Creating Worlds Without Evil – Given Divine Counterfactual Knowledge.Josh Rasmussen - 2004 - Religious Studies 40 (4):457-470.
    An important question raised in the Molinist debate is, ‘Given God's access to counterfactual knowledge, could God create a world in which free creatures always refrain from evil?’ An affirmative answer suggests that God cannot possess counterfactual knowledge since such knowledge would allow God to create seemingly more desirable worlds than the actual world. However, Alvin Plantinga has argued that it is at least possible that every possible person is transworld depraved – meaning that each person would perform some wrong (...)
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  • Power, Liability, and the Free-Will Defence: Reply to Mawson.Wes Morriston - 2005 - Religious Studies 41 (1):71-80.
    Tim Mawson argues that the ability to choose what one knows to be morally wrong is a power for some persons in some circumstances, but that it would be a mere liability for God. The lynchpin of Mawson 's argument is his claim that a power is an ability that it is good to have. In this rejoinder, I challenge this claim of Mawson 's, arguing that choosing a course of action is always an exercise of power, whether or not (...)
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  • The Defeat of Good and Evil.Roderick Chisholm - 1968 - Proceedings and Addresses of the American Philosophical Association 42:21 - 38.
  • The Mind Argument and Libertarianism.Alicia Finch & Ted A. Warfield - 1998 - Mind 107 (427):515-28.
    Many critics of libertarian freedom have charged that freedom is incompatible with indeterminism. We show that the strongest argument that has been provided for this claim is invalid. The invalidity of the argument in question, however, implies the invalidity of the standard Consequence argument for the incompatibility of freedom and determinism. We show how to repair the Consequence argument and argue that no similar improvement will revive the worry about the compatibility of indeterminism and freedom.
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  • The Essential Divine-Perfection Objection to the Free-Will Defence: Alexander R. Pruss.Alexander R. Pruss - 2008 - Religious Studies 44 (4):433-444.
    The free-will defence holds that the value of significant free will is so great that God is justified in creating significantly free creatures even if there is a risk or certainty that these creatures will sin. A difficulty for the FWD, developed carefully by Quentin Smith, is that God is unable to do evil, and yet surely lacks no genuinely valuable kind of freedom. Smith argues that the kind of freedom that God has can be had by creatures, without a (...)
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