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The Conscious Brain: How Attention Engenders Experience.Jesse Prinz - 2012 - , US: Oup Usa.details
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Transparent experience and the availability of qualia.Brian Loar - 2002 - In Aleksandar Jokic & Quentin Smith (eds.), Consciousness: New Philosophical Perspectives. New York: Oxford University Press.details
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Structuring Mind. The Nature of Attention and How it Shapes Consciousness.Sebastian Watzl - 2017 - Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press.details
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Transparency, qualia realism and representationalism.Michael Tye - 2014 - Philosophical Studies 170 (1):39-57.details
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Representationalism and the transparency of experience.Michael Tye - 2002 - Noûs 36 (1):137-51.details
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Phenomenal character.Sydney Shoemaker - 1994 - Noûs 28 (1):21-38.details
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Attention and Internal Monitoring: A Farewell to HOP.Wesley Sauret & William G. Lycan - 2014 - Analysis 74 (3):363-370.details
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I—The Presidential Address: Sensory Experience and Representational Properties.David Papineau - 2014 - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 114 (1pt1):1-33.details
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What’s so Transparent about Transparency?Amy Kind - 2003 - Philosophical Studies 115 (3):225-244.details
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Transparency and Representationalist Theories of Consciousness.Amy Kind - 2010 - Philosophy Compass 5 (10):902-913.details
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The intrinsic quality of experience.Gilbert Harman - 1990 - Philosophical Perspectives 4:31-52.details
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Top-down modulation: bridging selective attention and working memory.Adam Gazzaley & Anna C. Nobre - 2012 - Trends in Cognitive Sciences 16 (2):129-135.details
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Towards a cognitive neuroscience of consciousness: Basic evidence and a workspace framework.Stanislas Dehaene & Lionel Naccache - 2001 - Cognition 79 (1):1-37.details
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Qualia ain't in the head.Alex Byrne & Michael Tye - 2006 - Noûs 40 (2):241-255.details
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Intentionalism defended.Alex Byrne - 2001 - Philosophical Review 110 (2):199-240.details
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Intentionalism Defended.Alex Byrne - 2001 - Philosophical Review 110 (2):199-240.details
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The Grain of Vision and the Grain of Attention.Ned Block - 2012 - Thought: A Journal of Philosophy 1 (3):170-184.details
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Ten Problems of Consciousness: A Representational Theory of the Phenomenal Mind.Michael Tye - 1995 - MIT Press.details
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Naturalizing the Mind.Fred Dretske - 1995 - MIT Press.details
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Phenomenal Consciousness: A Naturalistic Theory.Peter Carruthers - 2000 - New York: Cambridge University Press.details
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Tracking Representationalism.David Bourget & Angela Mendelovici - 2014 - In Andrew Bailey (ed.), Philosophy of Mind: The Key Thinkers. Continuum. pp. 209-235.details
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The Intrinsic Quality of Experience.Gilbert Harman - 2003 - In John Heil (ed.), Philosophy of Mind: A Guide and Anthology. Oxford University Press.details
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How to believe in qualia.Amy Kind - 2008 - In Edmond Wright (ed.), The Case for Qualia. MIT Press. pp. 285--298.details
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Pure Intentionalism About Moods and Emotions.Angela Mendelovici - 2013 - In Uriah Kriegel (ed.), Current Controversies in Philosophy of Mind. Routledge. pp. 135-157.details
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Mental paint.Ned Block - 2003 - In Martin Hahn & B. Ramberg (eds.), Reflections and Replies: Essays on the Philosophy of Tyler Burge. MIT Press. pp. 165--200.details
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Phenomenal Consciousness: A Naturalistic Theory.Peter Carruthers - 2002 - Philosophical Quarterly 52 (207):265-268.details
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Naturalizing the Mind.Fred Dretske - 1995 - Philosophy 72 (279):150-154.details
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Davidson and forms of anti-individualism: Reply to Hahn.Tyler Burge - 2003 - In Martin Hahn & B. Ramberg (eds.), Reflections and Replies: Essays on the Philosophy of Tyler Burge. MIT Press.details
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Qualia and intentional content: Reply to Block.Tyler Burge - 2003 - In Martin Hahn & B. Ramberg (eds.), Reflections and Replies: Essays on the Philosophy of Tyler Burge. MIT Press. pp. 405--415.details
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