Men do not want solely the obedience of women; they want their sentiments. All men, except the most brutish, desire to have, in the woman most nearly connected with them, not a forced slave but a willing one, not a slave merely, but a favourite. They have therefore put everything in practice to enslave their minds. The masters of all other slaves rely, for maintaining obedience, on fear; either fear of themselves, or religious fears. The masters of women wanted more (...) than simple obedience, and they turned the whole force of education to effect their purpose. All women are brought up from the very earliest years in the belief that their ideal of character is the very opposite to that of men; not self-will, and government by self-control, but submission, and yielding to the control of others. All the moralities tell them that it is the duty of women, and all the current sentimentalities that it is their nature, to live for others; to make complete abnegation of themselves, and to have no life but in their affections.— John Stuart Mill, The Subjection of Women. (shrink)

This article reappraises Zhu Xi's philosophy of women. First, it examines Zhu's descriptive texts. Second, it analyzes Zhu's didactic texts on li, qi, yin, yang, and gender. It finds that (i) surprisingly Zhu exhibited a level of flexibility toward women on subjects of education, property rights, and household management; (ii) his view on the male/yang and female/yin relationship was inconsistent; and (iii) improvement on Zhu's social-political teaching on women's role could result from a more consistent development of his metaphysics. When (...) thus modified, his metaphysics of yin-yang and li-qi could make a considerable contribution to contemporary feminist discourse. (shrink)

This article reappraises Zhu Xi's philosophy of women. First, it examines Zhu's descriptive texts. Second, it analyzes Zhu's didactic texts on li, qi, yin, yang, and gender. It finds that (i) surprisingly Zhu exhibited a level of flexibility toward women on subjects of education, property rights, and household management; (ii) his view on the male/yang and female/yin relationship was inconsistent; and (iii) improvement on Zhu's social-political teaching on women's role could result from a more consistent development of his metaphysics. When (...) thus modified, his metaphysics of yin-yang and li-qi could make a considerable contribution to contemporary feminist discourse. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:GOOD MEN'S WOMEN: HUME ON CHASTITY AND TRUST At the very heart of Hume's philosophy in the Treatise, namely between his discussion of the artificial and the natural virtues, he places a short chapter entitled "Of Chastity and Modesty." Its central position is appropriate, since these supposed virtues present something of a test case for Hume's account of the relation between nature and artifice, and, more generally, beyond his (...) moral philosophy, for his views on regularity and constancy in and out of individual lives. For these theoretical reasons, as well as for the calm realism of his treatment of sexual inequality, the chapter warrants more attention than it has received. Perhaps Hume's most important contribution to moral philosophy is his account of the difference between natural virtues, displayed in actions which do good one by one, each act having value independently of whether similar acts are performed by oneself and others on other occasions, and artificial virtues displayed in acts in essential conformity to established socially useful conventions, which do good only in so far as they are supported by general conformity. Hume does not, like Kant, insist that we always see morally good action as obedience to law, nor does he neglect the importance of those areas where good can be done only if acts are correctly seen as conforming to general laws, general conformity to which is not only willed by the agent but assumed by him to be in effect. Hume gives a subtle and elaborate account of when we do and when we do not need moral and social conformity, of which virtues are and which virtues are not mediated by changeable public will or convention. Conventions must operate before any act can count as property-respecting, but there is no need to ask 'can I will this as universal law?' before comforting a frightened child. Whatever the conventions, whatever others do, such an act does some good, and is the sort of 2. act which displays the natural virtue of kindness. Hume requires of a virtuous act not merely that it be helpful or agreeable to someone (or some public) but that it display a durable character trait in the agent. An uncharacteristic act of kindness to a child may do good without displaying a virtue or a good character. Approval is given, according to Hume, to persons on account of theii durable character traits, as displayed in their actions and reactions. The natural response to virtue is to welcome its possessor: His company is a satisfaction to me (T588), and virtue in rags will be the exception in a smoothly functioning society. The fact that Hume's ethics is an agent ethics, and that the concept of welcome virtue is more fundamental to it than that of a useful action, commits Hume, throughout his moral philosophy and especial!, in his treatment of the natural virtues, to an emphasis on consistency or integrity of character, to a search for durable character traits and so for characteristic actions. Now a person might be characteristically kind, yet on occasion, under stress, give expression to unaccustomed malice. The uncharacteristic malicious act may weaken but not destroy the virtue of kindness which kind acts have both expressed and infixed (T411). When the malicious act is known, the person's reputation for benevolence may be slightly sullied, but certainly not ruined. Both within one person's life, and within one population, there will be reason to encourage consistently virtuous action, but no reason to feel that all is lost or spoiled if lapses from the natural virtues occur. Even when cruelty is the norm, the rare kind act may be appreciated, if not rewarded, the rare kind person may be welcome, if also exploited and victimized. With the artificial virtues there is a stronger demand and need for uniformity in a population, since the value of any one just act, or one person's character trait, depends upon the support received from the similar acts and 3. traits of others. Every single act is performed in the expectation that others are to perform the like (T498). To display artificial virtues, actions must be seen as rule... (shrink)

This is a study of the most significant debate in Korean Neo-Confucianism between the two most eminent Neo-Confucian thinkers, summarizing their philosophies and providing refreshing insights into Confucian language and culture.

The earliest Analects yet discovered, this work provides us with a new perspective on the central canonical text that has defined Chinese culture--and clearly illuminates the spirit and values of Confucius.

Rachel Cohon offers an original interpretation of the moral philosophy of David Hume, focusing on two areas.

According to Hume, humans, unlike other group-living animals, cannot accommodate their natural sexual appetite naturally; this is a Rawlsian 'circumstance of justice'. Humans have to formulate conventions or artifices to govern their reproductive relations in order to maintain their group or social life. Hume implicitly addresses this issue in his discussion of chastity. The paper explicates his argument. This argument, and its underlying philosophical anthropology, is seen to embody a distinctive approach to a striking feature of the human condition -- (...) sexual relations are universal but not uniform. (shrink)