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  1. Political Liberalism and the Radical Consequences of Justice Pluralism.Kevin Vallier - 2019 - Journal of Social Philosophy 50 (2):212-231.
    Political liberalism’s central commitments to recognizing reasonable pluralism and institutionalizing a substantive conception of justice are inconsistent. If reasonable pluralism applies to conceptions of justice as it applies to conceptions of the good, then some reasonable people will reject even many liberal conceptions of justice as unreasonable. If so, then imposing these conceptions of justice on citizens violates the liberal principle of legitimacy and related public justification requirements. This problem of justice pluralism requires that political liberals abandon their commitment to (...)
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  • Justification, Coercion, and the Place of Public Reason.Chad Van Schoelandt - 2015 - Philosophical Studies 172 (4):1031-1050.
    Public reason accounts commonly claim that exercises of coercive political power must be justified by appeal to reasons accessible to all citizens. Such accounts are vulnerable to the objection that they cannot legitimate coercion to protect basic liberal rights against infringement by deeply illiberal people. This paper first elaborates the distinctive interpersonal conception of justification in public reason accounts in contrast to impersonal forms of justification. I then detail a core dissenter-based objection to public reason based on a worrisome example (...)
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  • Disagreement Behind the Veil of Ignorance.Ryan Muldoon, Chiara Lisciandra, Mark Colyvan, Carlo Martini, Giacomo Sillari & Jan Sprenger - 2014 - Philosophical Studies 170 (3):377-394.
    In this paper we argue that there is a kind of moral disagreement that survives the Rawlsian veil of ignorance. While a veil of ignorance eliminates sources of disagreement stemming from self-interest, it does not do anything to eliminate deeper sources of disagreement. These disagreements not only persist, but transform their structure once behind the veil of ignorance. We consider formal frameworks for exploring these differences in structure between interested and disinterested disagreement, and argue that consensus models offer us a (...)
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  • Perfectionism: Political Not Metaphysical.Collis Tahzib - 2019 - Philosophy and Public Affairs 47 (2):144-178.
  • On Two Critics of Justificatory Liberalism: A Response to Wall and Lister.Gerald Gaus - 2010 - Politics, Philosophy and Economics 9 (2):177-212.
    In replying to Steven Wall’s and Andrew Lister’s thoughtful essays on my account of justificatory liberalism in this issue, I respond to many of their specific criticisms while taking the opportunity to explicate the foundations of justificatory liberalism. Justificatory liberalism takes seriously the moral requirement to justify all claims of authority over others, as well as all coercive interferences with their lives. If we do so, although we are by no means committed to libertarianism, we find that that many of (...)
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  • Why Public Reasoning Involves Ideal Theorizing.Blain Neufeld - 2017 - In Political Utopias: Contemporary Debates. New York, USA: pp. 73-93.
    Some theorists—including Elizabeth Anderson, Gerald Gaus, and Amartya Sen—endorse versions of 'public reason' as the appropriate way to justify political decisions while rejecting 'ideal theory'. This chapter proposes that these ideas are not easily separated. The idea of public reason expresses a form of mutual 'civic' respect for citizens. Public reason justifications for political proposals are addressed to citizens who would find acceptable those justifications, and consequently would comply freely with those proposals should they become law. Hence public reasoning involves (...)
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  • On the Emergence of Descriptive Norms.Ryan Muldoon, Chiara Lisciandra, Cristina Bicchieri, Stephan Hartmann & Jan Sprenger - 2014 - Politics, Philosophy and Economics 13 (1):3-22.
    A descriptive norm is a behavioral rule that individuals follow when their empirical expectations of others following the same rule are met. We aim to provide an account of the emergence of descriptive norms by first looking at a simple case, that of the standing ovation. We examine the structure of a standing ovation, and show it can be generalized to describe the emergence of a wide range of descriptive norms.
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  • Liberal Perfectionism and Quong’s Internal Conception of Political Liberalism.Paul Billingham - 2017 - Social Theory and Practice 43 (1):79-106.
    Debates between political liberals and liberal perfectionists have been reinvigorated by Jonathan Quong’s Liberalism Without Perfection. In this paper I argue that certain forms of perfectionism can rebut or evade Quong’s three central objections – that perfectionism is manipulative, paternalistic, and illegitimate. I then argue that perfectionists can defend an ‘internal conception’ of perfectionism, parallel in structure to Quong’s ’internal conception’ of political liberalism, but with a different conception of the justificatory constituency. None of Quong’s arguments show that his view (...)
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  • Political Liberalism by John Rawls. [REVIEW]Philip Pettit - 1994 - Journal of Philosophy 91 (4):215-220.
  • The Tyranny -- Or the Democracy -- Of the Ideal?Blain Neufeld & Lori Watson - 2018 - Cosmos + Taxis 5 (2):47-61.
  • Three Concepts of Political Stability: An Agent-Based Model.Kevin Vallier - 2017 - Social Philosophy and Policy 34 (1):232-259.
    Public reason liberalism includes an ideal of political stability where justified institutions reach a kind of self-enforcing equilibrium. Such an order must be stable for the right reasons — where persons comply with the rules of the order for moral reasons, rather than out of fear or self-interest. John Rawls called a society stable in this way well-ordered. In this essay, I contend that a more sophisticated model of a well-ordered society, specifically an agent-based model, yields a richer and more (...)
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  • Exploring Tradeoffs in Accommodating Moral Diversity.Ryan Muldoon - 2017 - Philosophical Studies 174 (7):1871-1883.
    This paper explores the space of possibilities for public justification in morally diverse communities. Moral diversity is far more consequential than is typically appreciated, and as a result, we need to think more carefully about how our standard tools function in such environments. I argue that because of this diversity, public justification can be divorced from any claim of determinateness. Instead, we should focus our attention on procedures—in particular, what Rawls called cases of pure procedural justice. I use a modified (...)
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  • Rational Reasonableness: Toward a Positive Theory of Public Reason.Gillian K. Hadfield & Stephen Macedo - 2012 - Law and Ethics of Human Rights 6 (1):7-46.
    Why is it important for people to agree on and articulate shared reasons for just laws, rather than whatever reasons they personally find compelling? What, if any, practical role does public reason play in liberal democratic politics? We argue that the practical role of public reason can be better appreciated by examining the confluence of normative and positive political theory; the former represented here by liberal social contract theory of John Rawls and others, and the latter by rational choice or (...)
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  • Rational Reasonableness: Toward a Positive Theory of Public Reason.Gillian K. Hadfield & Stephen Macedo - 2012 - The Law and Ethics of Human Rights 6 (1).
  • Liberalism Without Perfection: Replies to Gaus, Colburn, Chan, and Bocchiola.Jonathan Quong - 2012 - Philosophy and Public Issues - Filosofia E Questioni Pubbliche 2 (1):51-79.
  • On Jonathan Quong’s Sectarian Political Liberalism.Kevin Vallier - 2017 - Criminal Law and Philosophy 11 (1):175-194.
    Jonathan Quong’s book, Liberalism without Perfection, provides an innovative new defense of political liberalism based on an “internal conception” of the goal of public justification. Quong argues that public justification need merely be addressed to persons who affirm liberal political values, allowing people to be coerced without a public justification if they reject liberal values or their priority over comprehensive values. But, by extensively restricting members of the justificatory public to a highly idealized constituency of liberals, Quong’s political liberalism becomes (...)
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  • What is the Point of Public Reason?Jonathan Quong - 2014 - Philosophical Studies 170 (3):545-553.
    Jerry Gaus is the most important philosopher of public reason since John Rawls. His path-breaking work on this topic has deeply influenced a large group of moral and political philosophers, a group to which I happily belong. In this short paper I examine one feature of the account developed in his incredibly rich and illuminating book, The Order of Public Reason.Gaus (2011), cited hereafter as OPR. I argue Gaus’s theory struggles to resolve a crucial question: how can we be confident (...)
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  • Consensus, Convergence, Restraint, and Religion.Paul Billingham - 2018 - Journal of Moral Philosophy 15 (3):345-361.
    This essay critically assesses the central claim of Kevin Vallier’s Liberal Politics and Public Faith: that public religious faith and public reason liberalism can be reconciled, because the values underlying public reason liberalism should lead us to endorse the ‘convergence view’, rather than the mainstream consensus view. The convergence view is friendlier to religious faith, because it jettisons the consensus view’s much-criticised ‘duty of restraint’. I present several challenges to Vallier’s claim. Firstly, if Vallier is right to reject the duty (...)
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  • Expanding the Justificatory Framework of Mill's Experiments in Living.Ryan Muldoon - 2015 - Utilitas 27 (2):179-194.
    In On Liberty, Mill introduced the concept of . I will provide an account of what Mill saw to be the basic problem he was addressing – the extensive pressure to fit in with the crowd, and how this bred mediocrity. I connect this to worries about public reason models of justification. I argue that a generalized version of Mill's argument offers us a better path to political justification stemming from experimentation. Rather than grounding political justification on shared political reasons, (...)
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  • Democratic Procedures and Liberal Consensus.George Klosko - 2000 - Philosophy 75 (294):622-626.
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  • 8 On Rawls and Political Liberalism1.Burton Dreben - 2003 - In Samuel Richard Freeman (ed.), The Cambridge Companion to Rawls. Cambridge University Press. pp. 316.
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