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Philosophical Investigations.Ludwig Wittgenstein - 1953 - New York, NY, USA: Wiley-Blackwell. Edited by G. E. M. Anscombe.details
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Impossible possible worlds vindicated.Jaakko Hintikka - 1975 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 4 (4):475 - 484.details
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Knowledge and its limits.Timothy Williamson - 2000 - New York: Oxford University Press.details
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Reflective Equilibrium.Yuri Cath - 2016 - In Herman Cappelen, Tamar Gendler & John P. Hawthorne (eds.), The Oxford Handbook of Philosophical Methodology. Oxford, United Kingdom: Oxford University Press. pp. 213-230.details
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Truth and probability.Frank Ramsey - 2010 - In Antony Eagle (ed.), Philosophy of Probability: Contemporary Readings. New York: Routledge. pp. 52-94.details
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Belief and the Will.Bas C. van Fraassen - 1984 - Journal of Philosophy 81 (5):235-256.details
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Belief and the will.Bas C. van Fraassen - 2010 - In Antony Eagle (ed.), Philosophy of Probability: Contemporary Readings. New York: Routledge. pp. 235-256.details
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A subjectivist’s guide to objective chance.David K. Lewis - 2010 - In Antony Eagle (ed.), Philosophy of Probability: Contemporary Readings. New York: Routledge. pp. 263-293.details
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Inductive Logic.James Hawthorne - 2011 - The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.details
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The Stability of Belief: How Rational Belief Coheres with Probability.Hannes Leitgeb - 2017 - Oxford, United Kingdom: Oxford University Press.details
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A defense of abortion.Judith Jarvis Thomson - 1971 - Philosophy and Public Affairs 1 (1):47-66.details
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Famine, affluence, and morality.Peter Singer - 1972 - Philosophy and Public Affairs 1 (3):229-243.details
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Figures in a Probability Landscape.Bas van Fraassen - 1990 - In J. Dunn & A. Gupta (eds.), Truth or Consequences: Essays in Honor of Nuel Belnap. Boston, MA, USA: Kluwer Academic Publishers. pp. 345-356.details
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Expressivism, Normative Uncertainty, and Arguments for Probabilism.Julia Staffel - 2019 - Oxford Studies in Epistemology 6.details
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Imprecise Probabilities.Seamus Bradley - 2019 - In Claus Beisbart & Nicole J. Saam (eds.), Computer Simulation Validation: Fundamental Concepts, Methodological Frameworks, and Philosophical Perspectives. Springer Verlag. pp. 525-540.details
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A treatise on probability.John Maynard Keynes - 1921 - Mineola, N.Y.: Dover Publications.details
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Theories of Probability.Terrence Fine - 1973 - Academic Press.details
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In Defence of Objective Bayesianism.Jon Williamson - 2010 - Oxford University Press.details
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Statistical Reasoning with Imprecise Probabilities.Peter Walley - 1991 - Chapman & Hall.details
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Accuracy and the Laws of Credence.Richard Pettigrew - 2016 - New York, NY.: Oxford University Press UK.details
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Probability Theory. The Logic of Science.Edwin T. Jaynes - 2002 - Cambridge University Press: Cambridge. Edited by G. Larry Bretthorst.details
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Calcul des Probabilités.Joseph Louis François Bertrand - 1888 - Gauthier-Villars Et Fils.details
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Epistemic permissiveness.Roger White - 2005 - Philosophical Perspectives 19 (1):445–459.details
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Inferring probabilities from symmetries.Michael Strevens - 1998 - Noûs 32 (2):231-246.details
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Against Radical Credal Imprecision.Susanna Rinard - 2013 - Thought: A Journal of Philosophy 2 (1):157-165.details
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Accuracy, Risk, and the Principle of Indifference.Richard Pettigrew - 2016 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 92 (1):35-59.details
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What conditional probability could not be.Alan Hájek - 2003 - Synthese 137 (3):273--323.details
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The Axioms of Subjective Probability.Peter C. Fishburn - 1986 - Statistical Science 1 (3):335-358.details
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Subjective Probabilities Should be Sharp.Adam Elga - 2010 - Philosophers' Imprint 10.details
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A Theory of Justice: Revised Edition.John Rawls - 1999 - Harvard University Press.details
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Fact, Fiction, and Forecast.Nelson Goodman - 1965 - Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press.details
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Theory of Games and Economic Behavior.John Von Neumann & Oskar Morgenstern - 1944 - Princeton, NJ, USA: Princeton University Press.details
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Decision Theory with a Human Face.Richard Bradley - 2017 - Cambridge University Press.details
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Running risks morally.Brian Weatherson - 2014 - Philosophical Studies 167 (1):141-163.details
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Theory of Games and Economic Behavior.David Hawkins - 1945 - Philosophy of Science 12 (3):221-227.details
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Belief and the problem of Ulysses and the sirens.Bas C. van Fraassen - 1995 - Philosophical Studies 77 (1):7-37.details
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Conditionalization and observation.Paul Teller - 1973 - Synthese 26 (2):218-258.details
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Studies in the Methodology and Foundations of Service: Selected Papers from 1951 to 1969. [REVIEW]Harold D. Levin - 1974 - Journal of Philosophy 71 (4):112-123.details
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Belief Revision for Growing Awareness.Katie Steele & H. Orri Stefánsson - 2021 - Mind 130 (520):1207–1232.details
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Evaluation, uncertainty and motivation.Michael Smith - 2002 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 5 (3):305-320.details
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Strict coherence, sigma coherence and the metaphysics of quantity.Brian Skyrms - 1995 - Philosophical Studies 77 (1):39-55.details
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Coherence and the axioms of confirmation.Abner Shimony - 1955 - Journal of Symbolic Logic 20 (1):1-28.details
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What to Do When You Don't Know What to Do When You Don't Know What to Do….Andrew Sepielli - 2013 - Noûs 47 (1):521-544.details
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What to Do When You Don't Know What to Do When You Don't Know What to Do….Andrew Sepielli - 2013 - Noûs 48 (3):521-544.details
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Normative uncertainty for non-cognitivists.Andrew Sepielli - 2012 - Philosophical Studies 160 (2):191-207.details
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The Accuracy and Rationality of Imprecise Credences.Miriam Schoenfield - 2017 - Noûs 51 (4):667-685.details
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Deterministic Chance?Jonathan Schaffer - 2007 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 58 (2):113-140.details
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Conditionalization Does Not Maximize Expected Accuracy.Miriam Schoenfield - 2017 - Mind 126 (504):1155-1187.details
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Being for: evaluating the semantic program of expressivism.Mark Andrew Schroeder - 2008 - New York: Oxford University Press. Edited by Mark Schroeder.details
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