During the past half-century the patterns of publication in science have undergone radical change. A vast increment has occurred in the amount of scientific writing. And scientific findings are increasingly being disseminated through “non-traditional” publishing media such as mimeographing and microfilming. These two interrelated trends have had some notable effects upon science. 1. With the rapid increase in the number of publications the problem of maintaining continuity in science has become acute; the traditional scientific social structure seems quite incapable of (...) accomplishing this vital task. 2. An extensive organization is developing which seeks to provide the desired continuity, but its very existence poses dilemmas for the traditional scientific order. 3. Moreover, the changing publication patterns seem to be intensifying the “schisms” between the theoretician and the specialized researcher. 4. They are also challenging the older standards for evaluating scientists. We thus hypothesize that the volume and form of communication is a significant variable inducing modifications in the scientific social system. This theoretical orientation has in part been suggested by Harold Innis who, however, was concerned with broader systems—i.e., civilizations. The following analysis should point up some little-considered problems inherent in the research process. (shrink)

The line of thought from which contemporary Social Science has come forth was occupied with problems of public policy in a way which has since become very much less prominent in the work of social scientists. The classic figures of social thought —Aristotle, Plato, Adam Smith, Montesquieu, Jeremy Bentham, James and John Stuart Mill, Ricardo, Hobbes and Locke, Burke, Machiavelli and Hegel—were all involved in the consideration of the fundmental problems of policy from the point of view of the man (...) who had to exercise power and to make practical decisions. Even where they themselves lived in remoteness from practical affairs the clarification of the standards for the judgment and guidance of public policy was always close to the centre of their attention. The politician's problems, reduced to fundamentals, were their problems. The problem of maintaining order through the prince's exercise of power was the point of departure of classical political philosophy; it was extended by modern liberalism to the maintenance of liberty in a framework of order. Political philosophy was regarded by those who professed it, as a means of enlightening rulers—and citizens—as to the right ends and the approximate means. The great ancestor of modern empirical social research, Sir William Petty, who regarded his task as the quantitative matter-of-fact description of what existed, viewed his problem as set by the prince's need to safeguard and maximise his power. Early economic theory accepted the same task. Even after mercantalism gave way to liberalism, economic theory was still intended to be a guide to policy. (shrink)

In Executive Order No. 10521, March 17, 1954, President Eisenhower stated: “…only a small fraction of the Federal Funds is being used to stimulate and support the vital basic research which makes possible our practical scientific progress. I believe strongly that this Nation must extend its support of research in basic science.”.

The question of the relationship of the making of value judgments in a typically ethical sense to the methods and procedures of science has been discussed in the literature at least to that point which e. e. cummings somewhere refers to as “The Mystical Moment of Dullness.” Nevertheless, albeit with some trepidation, I feel that something more may fruitfully be said on the subject.

By dialectical fundamentalism I mean the view that maintains the inerrancy of the orthodox classical scriptures of dialectical materialism; by flexible scientific naturalism I mean the view recognizing the past heuristic value of dialectical materialism, but also the realization for the need to develop and change it along lines suggested by complementary philosophies relevant to the scientific outlook.

In recent years, philosophy of science has witnessed a significant increase in attention directed toward the field’s social relevance. This is demonstrated by the formation of societies with related agendas, the organization of research symposia, and an uptick in work on topics of immediate public interest. The collection of papers that follows results from one such event: a 3-day colloquium on the subject of socially engaged philosophy of science (SEPOS) held at the University of Cincinnati in October 2012. In this (...) introduction, we first survey the recent history of philosophy of science’s social involvement (or lack thereof) and contrast this with the much greater social involvement of the sciences themselves. Next, we argue that the field of philosophy of science bears a special responsibility to contribute to public welfare. We then introduce as a term of art “SEPOS” and articulate what we take to be distinctive about social engagement, with reference to the articles in this collection as exemplars. Finally, we survey the current state of social engagement in philosophy of science and suggest some practical steps for individuals and institutions to support this trajectory. (shrink)

The use that the scientist makes of his principles is well known. In the normal course of scientific investigation, a hypothesis which explains some physical phenomenon adequately in every particular, but which runs counter to, say, the laws of inertia, cannot be held without further experimentation. Such experimentation must continue until the irreconcilability of the hypothesis with the laws is resolved. In most cases the hypothesis will fail to submit to further tests, will be declared inadequate, and will give way (...) to a new one. (shrink)

In this paper we attempt to formulate logical foundations for a theory of actions or performance. Human beings act in various ways, and their actions are intimately interrelated with their use of language. But precisely how actions and the use of language are interrelated is not very clear. One of the reasons is perhaps that we have no precise vocabulary in terms of which such interrelations may be handled. There is need for developing a systematic theory in which different kinds (...) of actions may be discussed, contrasted, and compared. Then the various interrelations between actions and linguistic usage may perhaps be discussed rather more carefully and thoroughly than heretofore. Although much important preliminary work has been done in the analysis of actions, no one it seems has attempted to develop a strict logical theory for such analysis. A few tentative and programmatic steps were taken in the author's Toward a Systematic Pragmatics. Let us attempt here to improve those and take a few more. Any first attempts of this kind are of course fraught with difficulties. There inevitably will be some oversimplification or some overelaboration here or there. Ultimately of course we are interested in interrelating performance with various notions from syntax, semantics, and quantitative pragmatics. But this is not easy and only a few tentative suggestions toward such a development can be given here. In section 1 the distinction between action-kinds and action-events is drawn, and the character of the primitive or primitives needed for the theory of performance is discussed. In section 2 some further notions are then defined. Certain Rules of Performance are suggested in section 3. In section 4 there is discussion of the somewhat tenuous notion of acceptance as a basis for action. In section 5 the fundamental notions required for Parsons and Shils' theory of social action is discussed briefly. In section 6 we attempt to define the two basic notions required in Leonard's recent papers concerning authorship and purpose. Finally, in section 7, the theory of performance is interrelated with von Wright's deontic logic, in which such notions as permission and obligation are considered. (shrink)

“Ethics and science,” wrote Poincaré, “have their own domains, which touch but do not interpenetrate. The one shows us to what goal we should aspire, the other, given the goal, teaches us how to attain it.” Poincare’ may be mistaken in supposing that science has nothing to contribute to the selection of goals. He is surely right, however, in insisting on the relevance of the results of science to the choice of policies for realising goals already selected.

ABSTRACTThis paper is concerned with the reasons for the emergence and dominance of analytic philosophy in America. It closely examines the contents of, and changing editors at, The Philosophical Review, and provides a perspective on the contents of other leading philosophy journals. It suggests that analytic philosophy emerged prior to the 1950s in an environment characterized by a rich diversity of approaches to philosophy and that it came to dominate American philosophy at least in part due to its effective promotion (...) by The Philosophical Review’s editors. Our picture of mid-twentieth-century American philosophy is different from existing ones, including those according to which the prominence of analytic philosophy in America was basically a matter of the natural affinity between American philosophy and analytic philosophy and those according to which the political climate at the time was hostile towards non-analytic approaches. Furthermore, our reconstruction suggests a new perspective on the nature of 1950s analytic philosophy. (shrink)

This paper shows that during the first half of the 1960s The Journal of Philosophy quickly moved from publishing work in diverse philosophical traditions to, essentially, only publishing analytic philosophy. Further, the changes at the journal are shown, with the help of previous work on the journals Mind and The Philosophical Review, to be part of a pattern involving generalist philosophy journals in Britain and America during the period 1925-1969. The pattern is one in which journals controlled by analytic philosophers (...) systematically promote a form of critical philosophy and marginalise rival approaches to philosophy. This pattern, it is argued, helps to explain the growing dominance of analytic philosophy during the twentieth century and allows characterising this form of philosophy as, at least during 1925-1969, a sectarian form of critical philosophy. (shrink)

In a recent paper Copi has argued for the admission of the term “essence” into scientific terminology. His primary reason is that the increasing adequacy of scientific theories is evidence of a gradual approximation to the real essences of things. Copi is aware that the laws of modern science are not to be taken as formulations of essences. But, he claims, “that is an ideal towards which science strives… Centuries hence wiser men will have radically different and more adequate theories, (...) and their notions will be closer approximations than ours to the real essences of things.”. (shrink)

This study is an attempt partially to describe the sociological foundations of modern science. When the question is put, under what social circumstances did the idea of science develop, one sees that there is here an inadequately explored sociological area. Perhaps a definition and a contrast will make this clearer. By the idea of science is meant simply the proposition that the valid source of human knowledge is to be found in the analysis of experience. But knowledge in this sense (...) was not a problem in the medieval period. In the first place, it was then taken for granted that the universe was intelligible to man on the basis of divinely revealed principles. Secondly, man constituted the center of the universe, which in its entirety was thought to be subordinate to man's destiny. Thirdly, not only was the universe which existed for man then known by him, but it was endowed with human qualities. The categories of interpretation were substance, essence, form, matter, quality, and purpose. The reason why rain fell upon the earth was to grow crops; the purpose of the moon and the stars was to light the earth at night, and to act as guideposts for him on his travels. Bodies tended to their proper places, light ones upward, heavy ones earthward. Quantitative differences were inferred from these qualitative ones. It is well-known, for example, how tenaciously was the knowledge held, that heavier objects fall more quickly than lighter ones. And finally, the universe was religious. If the world existed for the benefit of man, man existed for the glory of God. Human sojourn upon the earth was merely preparation for permanent residence in eternity. (shrink)