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The moral evil demons.Ralph Wedgwood - 2010 - In Richard Feldman & Ted A. Warfield (eds.), Disagreement. Oxford, GB: Oxford University Press.details
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The Epistemic Significance of Disagreement.Tom Kelly - 2005 - In Tamar Szabo Gendler & John Hawthorne (eds.), Oxford Studies in Epistemology Volume 1. Oxford University Press UK.details
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Epistemology of disagreement: The good news.David Christensen - 2007 - Philosophical Review 116 (2):187-217.details
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The Conflict of Evidence and Coherence.Alex Worsnip - 2018 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 96 (1):3-44.details
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Confidence, Evidence, and Disagreement.Katia Vavova - 2014 - Erkenntnis 79 (S1):173-183.details
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The argument from moral disagreement.William Tolhurst - 1987 - Ethics 97 (3):610-621.details
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The Level-Splitting View and the Non-Akrasia Constraint.Marco Tiozzo - 2019 - Philosophia 47 (3):917-923.details
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Ideal rationality and logical omniscience.Declan Smithies - 2015 - Synthese 192 (9):2769-2793.details
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How Doxastic Justification Helps Us Solve the Puzzle of Misleading Higher-Order Evidence.Paul Silva - 2016 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 98 (S1):308-328.details
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The epistemology of moral disagreement.Richard Rowland - 2017 - Philosophy Compass 12 (2):1-16.details
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The intelligibility of moral intransigence: A dilemma for cognitivism about moral judgment.Richard Rowland - 2018 - Analysis 78 (2):266-275.details
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What's wrong with Moore's argument?James Pryor - 2004 - Philosophical Issues 14 (1):349–378.details
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Contingency Anxiety and the Epistemology of Disagreement.Andreas L. Mogensen - 2017 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 98 (1):n/a-n/a.details
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Contingency Anxiety and the Epistemology of Disagreement.Andreas L. Mogensen - 2016 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 97 (4):590-611.details
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Ethics: Inventing Right and Wrong.John Leslie Mackie - 1977 - New York: Penguin Books.details
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Moral realism and the argument from disagreement.D. Loeb - 1998 - Philosophical Studies 90 (3):281-303.details
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Higher‐Order Evidence and the Limits of Defeat.Maria Lasonen-Aarnio - 2014 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 88 (2):314-345.details
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McGrath on Moral Knowledge.Nathan L. King - 2011 - Journal of Philosophical Research 36:219-233.details
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McGrath on Moral Knowledge.Nathan L. King - 2011 - Journal of Philosophical Research 36:219-233.details
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McGrath on Moral Knowledge.Nathan L. King - 2011 - Journal of Philosophical Research 36:219-233.details
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Epistemic Akrasia.Sophie Horowitz - 2013 - Noûs 48 (4):718-744.details
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Is it Safe to Disagree?Jaakko Hirvelä - 2017 - Ratio 30 (3):305-321.details
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Who is an epistemic peer?Axel Gelfert - 2011 - Logos and Episteme 2 (4):507-514.details
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Respecting the evidence.Richard Feldman - 2005 - Philosophical Perspectives 19 (1):95–119.details
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Reflection and disagreement.Adam Elga - 2007 - Noûs 41 (3):478–502.details
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On overrating oneself... And knowing it.Adam Elga - 2005 - Philosophical Studies 123 (1-2):115-124.details
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Higher Order Evidence.David Christensen - 2010 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 81 (1):185-215.details
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Pollock and Sturgeon on defeaters.Albert Casullo - 2018 - Synthese 195 (7):2897-2906.details
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Moral Realism: Facts and Norms. [REVIEW]David O. BRINK - 1991 - Ethics 101 (3):610-624.details
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Only All Naturalists Should Worry About Only One Evolutionary Debunking Argument.Tomas Bogardus - 2016 - Ethics 126 (3):636-661.details
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Irresolvable Disagreement and the Case Against Moral Realism.Thomas Bennigson - 2010 - Southern Journal of Philosophy 34 (4):411-437.details
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Irresolvable Disagreement and the Case Against Moral Realism.Thomas Bennigson - 2010 - Southern Journal of Philosophy 34 (4):411-437.details
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Unjustified Defeaters.David Alexander - 2017 - Erkenntnis 82 (4):891-912.details
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Knowing Right From Wrong.Kieran Setiya - 2012 - Oxford, GB: Oxford University Press.details
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Moral Disagreement.Folke Tersman - 2006 - New York: Cambridge University Press.details
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Moral Fictionalism.Mark Eli Kalderon - 2005 - Oxford, GB: Clarendon Press.details
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Epistemological puzzles about disagreement.Richard Feldman - 2006 - In Stephen Hetherington (ed.), Epistemology Futures. Oxford University Press. pp. 216-236.details
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Doubts about Philosophy? The Alleged Challenge from Disagreement.Thomas Grundmann - 2013 - In Tim Henning & David Schweikard (eds.), Knowledge, Virtue, and Action. Essays on Putting Epistemic Virtues to Work. Routledge. pp. 72-98.details
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The Importance of Being Rational.Errol Lord - 2013 - Dissertation, Princeton Universitydetails
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Rational Epistemic Akrasia.Allen Coates - 2012 - American Philosophical Quarterly 49 (2):113-24.details
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Moral Disagreement and Moral Expertise.Sarah McGrath - 2008 - In Russ Shafer-Landau (ed.), Oxford Studies in Metaethics: Volume Iii. Oxford University Press.details
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