Karl Polanyi and Max Weber held radically different views of liberal capitalism, but they also came to differ in significant respects with their brothers Michael Polanyi and Alfred Weber. The first section provides an overview of some critical moments in the history of liberal capitalism as perceived by some historical witnesses. The second treats the views of the Weber brothers on the world economy before 1914. The third deals with Max Weber's overlooked treatment of G. F. Knapp's once famous state (...) theory of money. The fourth turns to the circle of cosmopolitan Austro-Hungarian intellectuals who passionately debated the future of liberal capitalism and almost all of whom became political refugees. (shrink)

This essay reviews historical records that set forth the discussions and interaction of Michael Polanyi and Karl Mannheim/rom 1944 until Mannheim’s death early in 1947. The letters describe Polanyi’s effort to assemble a book to be published in a series edited by Manneheim. Theyalso reveal the different perspectives these thinkers took about freedom and the historical context of ideas. Records of J.H. Oldham’s discussion group “the Moot” suggest that these and other differences in philosophy were debated in meetings of “the (...) Moot” attended by Polanyi and Mannheim in 1944. (shrink)

The ArgumentDavid Bloor often wrote that Karl Mannheim had “stopped short” in his sociology of knowledge, lacking the nerve to consider the natural sciences sociologically. While this assessment runs counter to Mannheim's own work, which responded in quite specific ways both to an encroaching “modernity” and a looming fascism, Bloor's depiction becomes clearer when considered in the light of his principal introduction to Mannheim's work — a series of essays by Robert Merton. Bloor's reading and appropriation of Mannheim emerged from (...) his background in experimental psychology and his attempts to supercede Merton's own structural-functionalist program for the sociology of knowledge. By retracing this extended trail of readings and re-readings, we may begin to understand the roots of Bloor's curious interpretation of Mannheim's sociology of knowledge, and inquire in a reflexive way about the present and future directions of science studies. (shrink)

This paper compares Hayek and Polanyi on spontaneous social order. Although Hayek is widely believed to have first both coined the name and explicated the idea of ?spontaneous order?, it is in fact Michael Polanyi who did so. Numerous differences emerge between the two thinkers. The characterisation of spontaneous order in Hayek, for example, involves different types of freedom to those advanced by Polanyi. Whereas Hayek (usually) portrays spontaneous order as a single entity, which is equivalent to free society as (...) a whole ? the free?catallactic society ? Polanyi by contrast is disposed to conceive of spontaneous orders as sub?units or components within free society as a whole. These and other aspects of their thought ? including the distinction between spontaneous and planned social orders ? are reviewed and criticised. (shrink)

Polanyi’s theory of spontaneous order is set in historical context, analyzed, and compared to Friedrich Hayek’s version.

This paper proposes a reconsideration of Karl Mannheim and his work from the viewpoint of the needs of sociological theory. It points out certain affinities between Mannheim and some contemporary theorists, such as Gramsci and Foucault, and then reflects on certain problems in Mannheim's work, particularly the response to "relativism" and the hope of creating new "syntheses" through the sociology of knowledge. Finally, it proposes ways to draw on the sociology of intellectuals, inspired by Mannheim, in order to advance the (...) understanding of social theory. (shrink)

In 1945, Michael Polanyi achieved, in Full Employment and Free Trade, the integration of Keynesian and monetarist economics that the economics profession did not ahieve until the 1970s. In yet another field, Polanyi saw the heart of important matters long before anyone else.

The relationship between Friedrich Hayek and Michael Polanyi is documented and explored with respect to philosophy and economics. Their respective positions on epistemology and science are shown to fundamentally govern their differences with regard to the efficacy of government policy with regard to the economy.

My personal relation with Polanyi, discussions with him in Oxford, contribution to the International Academy of the Philosophy of Science, the relevance of his innovative thought for Christian worship and theology, Magda and Michael in Oxford, the role of his literary executor.

Marxism and the philosophy of science: a critical history was first published in 1985 by Humanities Press International. This is the introduction to the 2nd edition published in 1993. The book attempts to give a historical account of the development of marxism as a philosophy of science as well as a philosophical account of the issues involved. It encompasses the 1st 100 years of the existence of marxism, beginning with the mid-1840s when the philosophical ideas of Marx and Engels began (...) to emerge in mature form, and ending with the mid-1940s with the dissolution of the Comintern and the end of WW2. It deals with both the mainstream of the marxist tradition in the development of dialectical materialism as a philosophy of science and with diverging currents advocating alternative philosophical positions. It shows the marxist tradition to be far more complex and differentiated than is usually imagined, characterised by sharp and lively controversies for contending paths of development at every step of the way. Essentially this work is about the shifting nexus of science, philosophy and politics within marxism. It examines the multiplicity of factors coming into play, including the impact of new scientific discoveries, new philosophical trends and new political formations upon the overall process. Among the most important philosophical issues arising are: the formation of world view vis-a-vis the process of scientific discovery; the relationship between dialectical materialism and communism; the notion of proletarian science; the concept of the dialectics of nature. As the work is unique, insofar as there is no other history of marxist philosophy of science covering the whole period in question, it abounds in original research and original conclusions. Where there is a body of secondary literature in existence, with respect to specific authors or specific periods, it surveys this literature and takes a specific interpretive position. On a number of matters of ongoing controversy, such as the Marx-Engels relationship and the relationship of the Oparin-Haldane hypothesis on the origin of life to marxist philosophy, a definite position is argued. The overall conclusion reached by the book is that this is a rich and significant history, rooted in the impulse to work out a philosophical world view grounded in the most advanced science of its day and integrally connected to the struggle to revolutionise its social matrix and to create a socialist social order. An audacious enterprise, it generated not only impressive achievements, but also tragic disasters. It is a history with a dark side as well as a bright one. An effort is made to see both in proper perspective. (shrink)