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  1. Attentional inhibition mediates inattentional blindness.Preston P. Thakral & Scott D. Slotnick - 2010 - Consciousness and Cognition 19 (2):636-643.
    Salient stimuli presented at unattended locations are not always perceived, a phenomenon termed inattentional blindness. We hypothesized that inattentional blindness may be mediated by attentional inhibition. It has been shown that attentional inhibition effects are maximal near an attended location. If our hypothesis is correct, inattentional blindness effects should similarly be maximal near an attended location. During central fixation, participants viewed rapidly presented colored digits at a peripheral location. An unexpected black circle was concurrently presented. Participants were instructed to maintain (...)
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  • What you see is what you set: Sustained inattentional blindness and the capture of awareness.Steven B. Most, Brian J. Scholl, Erin R. Clifford & Daniel J. Simons - 2005 - Psychological Review 112 (1):217-242.
  • Why visual attention and awareness are different.Victor A. F. Lamme - 2003 - Trends in Cognitive Sciences 7 (1):12-18.
  • Introspective physicalism as an approach to the science of consciousness.Anthony I. Jack & T. Shallice - 2001 - Cognition 79 (1):161-196.
    Most ?theories of consciousness? are based on vague speculations about the properties of conscious experience. We aim to provide a more solid basis for a science of consciousness. We argue that a theory of consciousness should provide an account of the very processes that allow us to acquire and use information about our own mental states ? the processes underlying introspection. This can be achieved through the construction of information processing models that can account for ?Type-C? processes. Type-C processes can (...)
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  • Towards a cognitive neuroscience of consciousness: Basic evidence and a workspace framework.Stanislas Dehaene & Lionel Naccache - 2001 - Cognition 79 (1):1-37.
    This introductory chapter attempts to clarify the philosophical, empirical, and theoretical bases on which a cognitive neuroscience approach to consciousness can be founded. We isolate three major empirical observations that any theory of consciousness should incorporate, namely (1) a considerable amount of processing is possible without consciousness, (2) attention is a prerequisite of consciousness, and (3) consciousness is required for some specific cognitive tasks, including those that require durable information maintenance, novel combinations of operations, or the spontaneous generation of intentional (...)
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  • Conscious, preconscious, and subliminal processing: A testable taxonomy.Stanislas Dehaene, Jean-Pierre Changeux, Lionel Naccache, Jérôme Sackur & Claire Sergent - 2006 - Trends in Cognitive Sciences 10 (5):204-211.
    Amidst the many brain events evoked by a visual stimulus, which are specifically associated with conscious perception, and which merely reflect non-conscious processing? Several recent neuroimaging studies have contrasted conscious and non-conscious visual processing, but their results appear inconsistent. Some support a correlation of conscious perception with early occipital events, others with late parieto-frontal activity. Here we attempt to make sense of those dissenting results. On the basis of a minimal neuro-computational model, the global neuronal workspace hypothesis, we propose a (...)
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  • The role of perceptual load in inattentional blindness.Ula Cartwright-Finch & Nilli Lavie - 2007 - Cognition 102 (3):321-340.
  • Consciousness, Accessibility, and the Mesh between Psychology and Neuroscience.Ned Block - 2007 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 30 (5):481--548.
    How can we disentangle the neural basis of phenomenal consciousness from the neural machinery of the cognitive access that underlies reports of phenomenal consciousness? We can see the problem in stark form if we ask how we could tell whether representations inside a Fodorian module are phenomenally conscious. The methodology would seem straightforward: find the neural natural kinds that are the basis of phenomenal consciousness in clear cases when subjects are completely confident and we have no reason to doubt their (...)
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  • Gorillas in our midst: Sustained inattentional blindness for dynamic events.Daniel J. Simons & Christopher F. Chabris - 1999 - Perception 28 (9):1059-1074.
  • Inattentional amnesia.Jeremy Wolfe - 1999 - Journal of Mental Imagery 29 (3-4):71-94.
  • Motor Area Activity During Mental Rotation Studied by Time-Resolved Single-Trial fMRI.Wolfgang Richter, Randy Summers, Seong-Gi Kim & Carola Tegeler - unknown
    & The functional equivalence of overt movements and dynamic imagery is of fundamental importance in neuroscience. Here, we investigated the participation of the neocortical motor areas in a classic task of dynamic imagery, Shepard and Metzler's mental rotation task, by time-resolved single-trial functional Magnetic Resonance Imaging (fMRI). The subjects performed the mental-rotation task 16 times, each time with different object pairs. Functional images were acquired for each pair separately, and the onset times and..
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  • Control of goal-directed and stimulus-driven attention in the brain.M. Corbetta & G. L. Shulman - 2002 - Nature Reviews Neuroscience 3 (3):201-215.
  • Separate neural definitions of visual consciousness and visual attention: A case for phenomenal awareness.Victor A. F. Lamme - 2004 - Neural Networks 17 (5):861-872.
  • Neural correlates of consciousness in humans.Geraint Rees, G. Kreiman & Christof Koch - 2002 - Nature Reviews Neuroscience 3 (4):261-270.
  • Consciousness and neuroscience.Francis Crick & Christof Koch - 1998 - Cerebral Cortex.
  • Are we aware of neural activity in primary visual cortex.Francis Crick & Christof Koch - 1995 - Nature 375:121-23.
  • Neural correlates of the contents of visual awareness in humans.Geraint Rees - 2008 - In Jon Driver, Patrick Haggard & Tim Shallice (eds.), Mental Processes in the Human Brain. Oxford University Press.
  • Cerebral mechanisms of word masking and unconscious repetition priming.Stanislas Dehaene, Lionel Naccache, L. Jonathan Cohen, Denis Le Bihan, Jean-Francois Mangin, Jean-Baptiste Poline & Denis Rivière - 2001 - Nature Neuroscience 4 (7):752-758.
  • Primary visual cortex and visual awareness.Frank Tong - 2003 - Nature Reviews Neuroscience 4 (3):219-229.
  • Ongoing spontaneous activity controls access to consciousness: A neuronal model for inattentional blindness.Jean-Pierre Changeux & Stanislas Dehaene - 2005 - PLoS Biology 3 (5):e141.
    1 INSERM-CEA Unit 562, Cognitive Neuroimaging, Service Hospitalier Fre´de´ric Joliot, Orsay, France, 2 CNRS URA2182 Re´cepteurs and Cognition, Institut Pasteur, Paris, France.
     
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  • Neural correlates of change detection and change blindness.Diane Beck, Geraint Rees, Christopher D. Frith & Nilli Lavie - 2001 - Nature Neuroscience 4 (6):645-650.
  • Global workspace theory of consciousness: Toward a cognitive neuroscience of human experience?Bernard J. Baars - 2006 - In Steven Laureys (ed.), Boundaries of Consciousness. Elsevier.