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Peer Disagreement and Higher Order Evidence.Thomas Kelly - 2010 - In Richard Feldman & Ted A. Warfield (eds.), Disagreement. Oxford, GB: Oxford University Press.details
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The Epistemic Significance of Disagreement.Tom Kelly - 2005 - In Tamar Szabo Gendler & John Hawthorne (eds.), Oxford Studies in Epistemology Volume 1. Oxford University Press UK.details
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Bridges from Classical to Nonmonotonic Logic.David Makinson - 2005 - London: College Publications.details
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Truth without contra(di)ction.Elia Zardini - 2011 - Review of Symbolic Logic 4 (4):498-535.details
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What Is an Inconsistent Truth Table?Zach Weber, Guillermo Badia & Patrick Girard - 2016 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 94 (3):533-548.details
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Axiomatizing Kripke’s Theory of Truth.Volker Halbach & Leon Horsten - 2006 - Journal of Symbolic Logic 71 (2):677 - 712.details
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In contradiction: a study of the transconsistent.Graham Priest - 1987 - New York: Oxford University Press.details
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Belief merging and the discursive dilemma: an argument-based account to paradoxes of judgment aggregation.Gabriella Pigozzi - 2006 - Synthese 152 (2):285-298.details
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Deliberative Democracy and the Discursive Dilemma.Philip Pettit - 2001 - Noûs 35 (s1):268-299.details
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Deliberative Democracy and the Discursive Dilemma.Philip Pettit - 2001 - Philosophical Issues 11 (1):268-299.details
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Aggregating sets of judgments: Two impossibility results compared.Christian List & Philip Pettit - 2004 - Synthese 140 (1-2):207 - 235.details
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Aggregating sets of judgments: An impossibility result.Christian List & Philip Pettit - 2002 - Economics and Philosophy 18 (1):89-110.details
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Outline of a theory of truth.Saul Kripke - 1975 - Journal of Philosophy 72 (19):690-716.details
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On the Plenitude of Truth. A Defense of Trivialism. [REVIEW]Claudia Olmedo-García & Luis Estrada-González - unknowndetails
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Structural Reflexivity and the Paradoxes of Self-Reference.Rohan French - 2016 - Ergo: An Open Access Journal of Philosophy 3.details
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Epistemological Nonfactualism and the a Prioricity of Logic.Hartry Field - 1998 - Philosophical Studies 92 (1):1-24.details
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What’s Wrong with Tonk.Roy T. Cook - 2005 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 34 (2):217 - 226.details
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Reaching Transparent Truth.Pablo Cobreros, Paul Égré, David Ripley & Robert van Rooij - 2013 - Mind 122 (488):841-866.details
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On the Ternary Relation and Conditionality.Jc Beall, Ross T. Brady, J. Michael Dunn, A. P. Hazen, Edwin D. Mares, Robert K. Meyer, Graham Priest, Greg Restall, David Ripley, John Slaney & Richard Sylvan - 2012 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 41 (3):595 - 612.details
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Axiomatic Theories of Truth.Volker Halbach - 2010 - Cambridge, England: Cambridge University Press.details
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Primer in Social Choice Theory.Wulf Gaertner - 2006 - Oxford University Press UK.details
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Bridges from Classical to Nonmonotonic Logic.David Makinson - 2005 - King's College Publications.details
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Axiomatic theories of truth.Volker Halbach - 2008 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.details
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Methods for distance-based judgment aggregation.M. K. Miller & D. Osherson - unknowndetails
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Bridges from Classical to Nonmonotonic Logic.David Makinson - 2008 - Studia Logica 89 (3):437-439.details
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Arrow's theorem in judgment aggregation.Franz Dietrich & Christian List - 2007 - Social Choice and Welfare 29 (1):19-33.details
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A generalised model of judgment aggregation.Franz Dietrich - 2007 - Social Choice and Welfare 4 (28):529-565.details
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Disagreement and Belief Dependence: Why Numbers Matter.Jennifer Lackey - 2013 - In David Phiroze Christensen & Jennifer Lackey (eds.), The Epistemology of Disagreement: New Essays. Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press. pp. 243-268.details
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