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  1. Putting Logic in its Place: Formal Constraints on Rational Belief.David Christensen - 2004 - Oxford, England: Oxford University Press.
    What role, if any, does formal logic play in characterizing epistemically rational belief? Traditionally, belief is seen in a binary way - either one believes a proposition, or one doesn't. Given this picture, it is attractive to impose certain deductive constraints on rational belief: that one's beliefs be logically consistent, and that one believe the logical consequences of one's beliefs. A less popular picture sees belief as a graded phenomenon.
  • Quitting certainties: a Bayesian framework modeling degrees of belief.Michael G. Titelbaum - 2012 - Oxford: Oxford University Press.
    Michael G. Titelbaum presents a new Bayesian framework for modeling rational degrees of belief—the first of its kind to represent rational requirements on agents who undergo certainty loss.
  • Coherence as an ideal of rationality.Lyle Zynda - 1996 - Synthese 109 (2):175 - 216.
    Probabilistic coherence is not an absolute requirement of rationality; nevertheless, it is an ideal of rationality with substantive normative import. An idealized rational agent who avoided making implicit logical errors in forming his preferences would be coherent. In response to the challenge, recently made by epistemologists such as Foley and Plantinga, that appeals to ideal rationality render probabilism either irrelevant or implausible, I argue that idealized requirements can be normatively relevant even when the ideals are unattainable, so long as they (...)
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  • Elicitation of Personal Probabilities and Expectations.Leonard Savage - 1971 - Journal of the American Statistical Association 66 (336):783-801.
  • Coherent probability from incoherent judgment.Daniel Osherson, David Lane, Peter Hartley & Richard R. Batsell - 2001 - Journal of Experimental Psychology: Applied 7 (1):3.
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  • A nonpragmatic vindication of probabilism.James M. Joyce - 1998 - Philosophy of Science 65 (4):575-603.
    The pragmatic character of the Dutch book argument makes it unsuitable as an "epistemic" justification for the fundamental probabilist dogma that rational partial beliefs must conform to the axioms of probability. To secure an appropriately epistemic justification for this conclusion, one must explain what it means for a system of partial beliefs to accurately represent the state of the world, and then show that partial beliefs that violate the laws of probability are invariably less accurate than they could be otherwise. (...)
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  • Slightly more realistic personal probability.Ian Hacking - 1967 - Philosophy of Science 34 (4):311-325.
    A person required to risk money on a remote digit of π would, in order to comply fully with the theory [of personal probability] have to compute that digit, though this would really be wasteful if the cost of computation were more than the prize involved. For the postulates of the theory imply that you should behave in accordance with the logical implications of all that you know. Is it possible to improve the theory in this respect, making allowance within (...)
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  • Bayes or Bust?: A Critical Examination of Bayesian Confirmation Theory.John Earman - 1992 - MIT Press.
    There is currently no viable alternative to the Bayesian analysis of scientific inference, yet the available versions of Bayesianism fail to do justice to several aspects of the testing and confirmation of scientific hypotheses. Bayes or Bust? provides the first balanced treatment of the complex set of issues involved in this nagging conundrum in the philosophy of science. Both Bayesians and anti-Bayesians will find a wealth of new insights on topics ranging from Bayes’s original paper to contemporary formal learning theory.In (...)
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  • Change in View: Principles of Reasoning.Gilbert Harman - 1986 - Cambridge, MA, USA: MIT Press.
    Change in View offers an entirely original approach to the philosophical study of reasoning by identifying principles of reasoning with principles for revising one's beliefs and intentions and not with principles of logic. This crucial observation leads to a number of important and interesting consequences that impinge on psychology and artificial intelligence as well as on various branches of philosophy, from epistemology to ethics and action theory. Gilbert Harman is Professor of Philosophy at Princeton University. A Bradford Book.
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  • Bayes or Bust?: A Critical Examination of Bayesian Confirmation Theory.John Earman - 1992 - Bradford.
    There is currently no viable alternative to the Bayesian analysis of scientific inference, yet the available versions of Bayesianism fail to do justice to several aspects of the testing and confirmation of scientific hypotheses. Bayes or Bust? provides the first balanced treatment of the complex set of issues involved in this nagging conundrum in the philosophy of science. Both Bayesians and anti-Bayesians will find a wealth of new insights on topics ranging from Bayes's original paper to contemporary formal learning theory. (...)
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  • Two measures of incoherence: How not to Gamble if you must.Mark J. Schervish, Teddy Seidenfeld & Joseph B. Kadane - unknown
    The degree of incoherence, when previsions are not made in accordance with a probability measure, is measured by either of two rates at which an incoherent bookie can be made a sure loser. Each bet is considered as an investment from the points of view of both the bookie and a gambler who takes the bet. From each viewpoint, we define an amount invested (or escrowed) for each bet, and the sure loss of incoherent previsions is divided by the escrow (...)
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  • Varieties of Bayesianism.Jonathan Weisberg - 2011
    Handbook of the History of Logic, vol. 10, eds. Dov Gabbay, Stephan Hartmann, and John Woods, forthcoming.
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  • Change in View: Principles of Reasoning, Cambridge, Mass.Gilbert Harman - 1986 - Behaviorism 16 (1):93-96.
     
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  • Accuracy and Coherence: Prospects for an Alethic Epistemology of Partial Belief.James Joyce - 2009 - In Franz Huber & Christoph Schmidt-Petri (eds.), Degrees of Belief. Synthese. pp. 263-297.
  • Dutch Book Arguments.Alan Hájek - 2008 - In Paul Anand, Prasanta Pattanaik & Clemens Puppe (eds.), The Oxford Handbook of Rational and Social Choice. Oxford University Press.
    in The Oxford Handbook of Corporate Social Responsibility, ed. Paul Anand, Prasanta Pattanaik, and Clemens Puppe, forthcoming 2007.
     
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  • Probabilistic coherence and proper scoring rules.Joel Predd, Robert Seiringer, Elliott Lieb, Daniel Osherson, H. Vincent Poor & Sanjeev Kulkarni - 2009 - IEEE Transactions on Information Theory 55 (10):4786-4792.
    We provide self-contained proof of a theorem relating probabilistic coherence of forecasts to their non-domination by rival forecasts with respect to any proper scoring rule. The theorem recapitulates insights achieved by other investigators, and clarifi es the connection of coherence and proper scoring rules to Bregman divergence.
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  • Proper scoring rules, dominated forecasts, and coherence.Teddy Seidenfeld - unknown
    De Finetti introduced the concept of coherent previsions and conditional previsions through a gambling argument and through a parallel argument based on a quadratic scoring rule. He shows that the two arguments lead to the same concept of coherence. When dealing with events only, there is a rich class of scoring rules which might be used in place of the quadratic scoring rule. We give conditions under which a general strictly proper scoring rule can replace the quadratic scoring rule while (...)
     
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  • Aggregating disparate estimates of chance.Daniel Osherson - manuscript
    We consider a panel of experts asked to assign probabilities to events, both logically simple and complex. The events evaluated by different experts are based on overlapping sets of variables but may otherwise be distinct. The union of all the judgments will likely be probabilistic incoherent. We address the problem of revising the probability estimates of the panel so as to produce a coherent set that best represents the group’s expertise.
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  • Aggregating Large Sets of Probabilistic Forecasts by Weighted Coherent Adjustment.Guanchun Wang, Sanjeev R. Kulkarni & Daniel N. Osherson - unknown
    Stochastic forecasts in complex environments can benefit from combining the estimates of large groups of forecasters (“judges”). But aggregating multiple opinions faces several challenges. First, human judges are notoriously incoherent when their forecasts involve logically complex events. Second, individual judges may have specialized knowledge, so different judges may produce forecasts for different events. Third, the credibility of individual judges might vary, and one would like to pay greater attention to more trustworthy forecasts. These considerations limit the value of simple aggregation (...)
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