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Knowledge and its limits.Timothy Williamson - 2000 - New York: Oxford University Press.details
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A reply to my critics.George Edward Moore - 1942 - In Paul Arthur Schilpp (ed.), The philosophy of G. E. Moore. New York,: Tudor Pub. Co..details
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Knowledge and belief.Jaakko Hintikka - 1962 - Ithaca, N.Y.,: Cornell University Press.details
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Commonplace Book, 1919-1953.George Edward Moore (ed.) - 1962 - New York: Routledge.details
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Knowing and asserting.Timothy Williamson - 1996 - Philosophical Review 105 (4):489-523.details
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``Knowing and Asserting".Timothy Williamson - 1996 - Philosophical Review 105 (4):489-523.details
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``Must we Know What we Say?".Matt Weiner - 2005 - Philosophical Review 114 (2):227-251.details
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Must we know what we say?Matthew Weiner - 2005 - Philosophical Review 114 (2):227-251.details
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Ignorance: A Case for Scepticism.Peter K. Unger - 1975 - Oxford [Eng.]: Oxford University Press.details
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Contextualism and warranted assertion.Jim Stone - 2007 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 88 (1):92–113.details
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Knowledge and practical interests.Jason Stanley - 2005 - New York: Oxford University Press.details
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Précis of Knowledge and Practical Interests.Jason Stanley - 2007 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 75 (1):168-172.details
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Testimony, knowledge, and epistemic goals.Steven L. Reynolds - 2002 - Philosophical Studies 110 (2):139 - 161.details
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Norms of assertion.Jennifer Lackey - 2007 - Noûs 41 (4):594–626.details
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Assertion, Knowledge, and Lotteries.Jonathan L. Kvanvig - 2009 - In P. Greenough & D. Pritchard (eds.), Williamson on Knowledge. Oxford University Press. pp. 140--160.details
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Moore's Paradox, Assertion and Knowledge.O. R. Jones - 1991 - Analysis 51 (4):183 - 186.details
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Knowledge and Lotteries.John Hawthorne - 2005 - Philosophical Quarterly 55 (219):353-356.details
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Knowledge and lotteries.John Hawthorne - 2004 - New York: Oxford University Press.details
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Assertion, Knowledge, and Rational Credibility.Igor Douven - 2006 - Philosophical Review 115 (4):449-485.details
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Assertion, knowledge, and rational credibility.Igor Douven - 2006 - Philosophical Review 115 (4):449-485.details
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Epistemic possibilities.Keith DeRose - 1991 - Philosophical Review 100 (4):581-605.details
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Assertion, knowledge, and context.Keith DeRose - 2002 - Philosophical Review 111 (2):167-203.details
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``Assertion, Knowledge, and Context".Keith DeRose - 2002 - Philosophical Review 111 (2):167-203.details
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Blindspots.Roy A. Sorensen - 1988 - New York: Oxford University Press.details
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Knowledge and Practical Interests.Jason Stanley - 2006 - Critica 38 (114):98-107.details
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Ignorance : a case for scepticism.Peter Unger - 1975 - Revue Philosophique de la France Et de l'Etranger 166 (3):371-372.details
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Assertion and the semantics of force-markers.Manuel Garcia-Carpintero - 2004 - In Claudia Bianchi (ed.), The Semantics/Pragmatics Distinction. CSLI Publications. pp. 133--166.details
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Knowledge and Its Limits.Timothy Williamson - 2003 - Philosophical Quarterly 53 (210):105-116.details
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Knowledge and its Limits.Timothy Williamson - 2000 - Tijdschrift Voor Filosofie 64 (1):200-201.details
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Ignorance: A Case for Scepticism.Peter Unger - 1975 - Philosophy 50 (194):489-490.details
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Blindspots.Roy Sorensen - 1990 - Mind 99 (393):137-140.details
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