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Peer Disagreement and Higher Order Evidence.Thomas Kelly - 2010 - In Richard Feldman & Ted A. Warfield (eds.), Disagreement. Oxford, GB: Oxford University Press.details
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Epistemology of disagreement: The good news.David Christensen - 2007 - Philosophical Review 116 (2):187-217.details
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Who has scientific knowledge?K. Brad Wray - 2007 - Social Epistemology 21 (3):337 – 347.details
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Collective Belief And Acceptance.K. Brad Wray - 2001 - Synthese 129 (3):319-333.details
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Group beliefs.Raimo Tuomela - 1992 - Synthese 91 (3):285-318.details
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Epistemic risk and relativism.Wayne D. Riggs - 2008 - Acta Analytica 23 (1):1-8.details
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A higher-order approach to disagreement.Mattias Skipper Rasmussen, Asbjørn Steglich-Petersen & Jens Christian Bjerring - 2018 - Episteme 15 (1):80-100.details
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Deliberative Democracy and the Discursive Dilemma.Philip Pettit - 2001 - Noûs 35 (s1):268-299.details
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Deliberative Democracy and the Discursive Dilemma.Philip Pettit - 2001 - Philosophical Issues 11 (1):268-299.details
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What Scientists Know Is Not a Function of What Scientists Know.P. D. Magnus - 2013 - Philosophy of Science 80 (5):840-849.details
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Some remarks on the probability of cycles - Appendix 3 to 'Epistemic democracy: generalizing the Condorcet jury theorem'.Christian List - 2001 - Journal of Political Philosophy 9 (3):277-306.details
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Group Knowledge and Group Rationality: A Judgment Aggregation Perspective.Christian List - 2005 - Episteme 2 (1):25-38.details
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Epistemic democracy: Generalizing the Condorcet jury theorem.Christian List & Robert E. Goodin - 2001 - Journal of Political Philosophy 9 (3):277–306.details
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Aggregating sets of judgments: An impossibility result.Christian List & Philip Pettit - 2002 - Economics and Philosophy 18 (1):89-110.details
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On the seriousness of mistakes.Isaac Levi - 1962 - Philosophy of Science 29 (1):47-65.details
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On the Rationality of Belief-Invariance in Light of Peer Disagreement.Barry Lam - 2011 - Philosophical Review 120 (2):207-245.details
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A Game-Theoretic Approach to Peer Disagreement.Remco Heesen & Pieter van der Kolk - 2016 - Erkenntnis 81 (6):1345-1368.details
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Judgment aggregation and the problem of tracking the truth.Stephan Hartmann & Jan Sprenger - 2012 - Synthese 187 (1):209-221.details
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Experts: Which ones should you trust?Alvin I. Goldman - 2001 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 63 (1):85-110.details
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Modelling collective belief.Margaret Gilbert - 1987 - Synthese 73 (1):185-204.details
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What is the “Equal Weight View'?Branden Fitelson & David Jehle - 2009 - Episteme 6 (3):280-293.details
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Reflection and disagreement.Adam Elga - 2007 - Noûs 41 (3):478–502.details
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Conciliation, Uniqueness, and Rational Toxicity.David Christensen - 2014 - Noûs 50 (3):584-603.details
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Group Peer Disagreement.J. Adam Carter - 2014 - Ratio 27 (3):11-28.details
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Group Peer Disagreement.J. Adam Carter - 2014 - Ratio 29 (1):11-28.details
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A Role for Judgment Aggregation in Coauthoring Scientific Papers.Liam Kofi Bright, Haixin Dang & Remco Heesen - 2018 - Erkenntnis 83 (2):231-252.details
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Group agency: the possibility, design, and status of corporate agents.Christian List & Philip Pettit - 2011 - New York: Oxford University Press. Edited by Philip Pettit.details
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Peer disagreement and higher order evidence.Thomas Kelly - 2010 - In Alvin I. Goldman & Dennis Whitcomb (eds.), Social Epistemology: Essential Readings. Oxford University Press. pp. 183--217.details
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Updating on the Credences of Others: Disagreement, Agreement, and Synergy.Kenny Easwaran, Luke Fenton-Glynn, Christopher Hitchcock & Joel D. Velasco - 2016 - Philosophers’ Imprint 16 (11):1-39.details
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With All Due Respect: The Macro-Epistemology of Disagreement.Benjamin Anders Levinstein - 2015 - Philosophers' Imprint 15.details
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