S. 39: "My project in this paper is to develop the initial distinction which I have drawn between recognition and appraisal respect into a more detailed and specific account of each. These accounts will not merely be of intrinsic interest. Ultimately I will use them to illuminate the puzzles with which this paper began and to understand the idea of self-respect." 42 " Thus, insofar as respect within such a pursuit will depend on an appraisal of the participant from the (...) perspective of whatever standards are held to be appropriate to the pursuit, such respect will depend on a judgement to which excellences of character are thought relevant. Note that exactly what aspect of the person's character is thought to be relevant in this instance is his recognition respect (or lack of it) for the standards of the pursuit." 44 "This attitude fails of being appraisal respect in that my having it toward the person is conditional on those traits being such as to make him server a particular purpose that I happen to have" 44 - 45 "To sum up: Appraisal respect is an attitude of positibe appraisal of a person either judged as a person or as engaged in some more specific pursuit. In the first case, the appropriate grounds are features of the person's character: dispositions to act for particular reasons or a higher-level disposition to act for the best reasons. In the second case, though features of character do not exhaust the appropriate grounds for appraisal respect, some such character traits will be relevant (recognition respect for the standards of a particular pursuit). Also, the other features which constitute the appoprate excellences of the pursuit must be related to traits of character in the way specified. In both cases, the positive appraisal of the person, and of his traits, must be categorical. It cannot depend on the fact that the person, because of his traits, serves an interest or purpose of one's own." 45 "To have recognition respect for someone as a person is to give appropriate weight to the fact that he or she is a person by being willing to constrain one's behaviour in ways required by that fact." 45 "This is rather different from having an attitude of appraisal respect for someone as a person. The latter is a positive appraisal oif an individual made with regard ti those features which are excellences of persons. As such, it is not owed to everone, for it may or may not be merited. When it is, what is merited is just the positive appraisal itself." 47 "Second, the only beings who are approriate objects of appraisal respect are those who are capable of acting for reasons and hence capable of conceiving of various facts as meriting more or less consideration in deliberation.". (shrink)

The result is nothing less than a fundamental reorientation of moral theory that enables it at last to account for morality's supreme authority--an account that ...

English summary: When we are ashamed, we are ashamed of something in front of somebody. We can also be made to feel ashamed by others and can make others feel ashamed. We can be ashamed for others and be ashamed of ourselves. In her phenomenological studies, Hilge Landweer establishes the relationship between such everyday experiences and the social character of shame. Under what circumstances does shame originate and how does it change? Can shame be understood as a sanction? How closely (...) are shame and power connected? Hilge Landweer shows that the recognition of norms of action can be described as a process of power and that it is expressed by shame. German description: Wenn wir uns schamen, so schamen wir uns fur etwas vor jemandem. Wir konnen von anderen beschamt werden und unsererseits andere beschamen. Wir konnen uns fur andere und vor uns selbst schamen. An solche Alltagserfahrungen knupft Hilge Landweer in ihren phanomenologischen Untersuchungen der Sozialitat von Scham an. Unter welchen Bedingungen kann Scham entstehen und verandert werden? Kann Scham als Sanktion aufgefasst werden? Wie eng sind Scham und Macht verbunden? Hilge Landweer zeigt, dass die Anerkennung von Handlungsnormen als Machtprozess beschrieben werden kann. Normen werden uber Scham leiblich im Individuum verankert und dadurch bestatigt. Die Hauptwirkung der Machtprozesse besteht dabei weniger in akuter Scham als in der Schamvermeidung. In genauen Beschreibungen und Strukturanalysen der Scham untersucht Hilge Landweer Grenzen der Veranderbarkeit dieses Gefuhls. Dabei verbindet sie unterschiedliche Diskussionsfelder der Philosophie, auf denen Gefuhle thematisiert werden: die Phanomenologie der Gefuhle, die analytische Debatte um die Rationalitat der Gefuhle und die moralphilosophische Diskussion um deren normenfundierende Rolle. Mit ihrem erweiterten phanomenologischen Instrumentarium greift sie klarend in die interdisziplinare Diskussionen von Ethnologie, Soziologie und Psychoanalyse der Scham ein. (shrink)

In this history of the development of ideas of honor in Western philosophy, Peter Olsthoorn examines what honor is, how its meaning has changed, and whether it can still be of use. Political and moral philosophers from Cicero to John Stuart Mill thought that a sense of honor and concern for our reputation could help us to determine the proper thing to do, and just as important, provide us with the much-needed motive to do it. Today, outside of the military (...) and some other pockets of resistance, the notion of honor has become seriously out of date, while the term itself has almost disappeared from our moral language. Most of us think that people ought to do what is right based on a love for justice rather than from a concern with how we are perceived by others. Wide-ranging and accessible, the book explores the role of honor in not only philosophy but also literature and war to make the case that honor can still play an important role in contemporary life. (shrink)

This book examines the notion of honor with an eye to dissecting its intellectual demise and with the aim of making a case for honor’s rehabilitation. Western intellectuals acknowledge honor’s influence, but they lament its authority. For Western democratic societies to embrace honor, it must be compatible with social ideals like liberty, equality, and fraternity. Cunningham details a conception of honor that can do justice to these ideals. This vision revolves around three elements—character , relationships , and activities and accomplishment (...) . Taken together, these elements articulate a shared aspiration for excellence. We can turn the tables on traditional ills of honor—serious problems of gender, race, and class—by forging a vision of honor that rejects lives predicated on power and oppression. (shrink)