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  1. Epistemology of Disagreement: The Good News.David Christensen - 2007 - Philosophical Review 116 (2):187-217.
    How should one react when one has a belief, but knows that other people—who have roughly the same evidence as one has, and seem roughly as likely to react to it correctly—disagree? This paper argues that the disagreement of other competent inquirers often requires one to be much less confident in one’s opinions than one would otherwise be.
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  • What We Owe to Each Other.Thomas Scanlon - 1998 - Belknap Press of Harvard University Press.
    In this book, T. M. Scanlon offers new answers to these questions, as they apply to the central part of morality that concerns what we owe to each other.
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  • Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals.Immanuel Kant - 1996 - In Practical Philosophy. Cambridge University Press. pp. 37-108.
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  • Reflection and Disagreement.Adam Elga - 2007 - Noûs 41 (3):478–502.
    How should you take into account the opinions of an advisor? When you completely defer to the advisor's judgment, then you should treat the advisor as a guru. Roughly, that means you should believe what you expect she would believe, if supplied with your extra evidence. When the advisor is your own future self, the resulting principle amounts to a version of the Reflection Principle---a version amended to handle cases of information loss. When you count an advisor as an epistemic (...)
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  • Morals by Agreement.David Copp - 1986 - Philosophical Review 98 (3):411-414.
  • The Logic of Leviathan. The Moral and Political Theory of Thomas Hobbes.David P. Gauthier - 1971 - Studia Leibnitiana 3 (4):293-296.
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  • A Theory of Rational Decision in Games.Michael Bacharach - 1987 - Erkenntnis 27 (1):17 - 55.
  • Disagreement Behind the Veil of Ignorance.Ryan Muldoon, Chiara Lisciandra, Mark Colyvan, Carlo Martini, Giacomo Sillari & Jan Sprenger - 2014 - Philosophical Studies 170 (3):377-394.
    In this paper we argue that there is a kind of moral disagreement that survives the Rawlsian veil of ignorance. While a veil of ignorance eliminates sources of disagreement stemming from self-interest, it does not do anything to eliminate deeper sources of disagreement. These disagreements not only persist, but transform their structure once behind the veil of ignorance. We consider formal frameworks for exploring these differences in structure between interested and disinterested disagreement, and argue that consensus models offer us a (...)
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  • A Treatise of Human Nature.David Hume & A. D. Lindsay - 1958 - Philosophical Quarterly 8 (33):379-380.
  • Moral Contractualism.Nicholas Southwood - 2009 - Philosophy Compass 4 (6):926-937.
    This article provides a critical introduction to contractualism as a moral or ethical theory, that is, as a theory of the rightness and wrongness of individual conduct – focusing specifically on the influential 'Kantian' version of contractualism due to T. M. Scanlon. I begin by elucidating the key features of Scanlon's contractualism: justifiability to others; reasonable rejectability; the individualist restriction; and mutual recognition. I then turn to discuss both its appeal and the main objections that have been raised to it (...)
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  • Constructivism, Representation, and Stability: Path-Dependence in Public Reason Theories of Justice.John Thrasher - 2019 - Synthese 196 (1):429-450.
    Public reason theories are characterized by three conditions: constructivism, representation, and stability. Constructivism holds that justification does not rely on any antecedent moral or political values outside of the procedure of agreement. Representation holds that the reasons for the choice in the model must be rationally explicable to real agents outside the model. Stability holds that the principles chosen in the procedure should be stable upon reflection, especially in the face of diversity in a pluralistic society. Choice procedures that involve (...)
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  • Reciprocity and the Social Contract.Ken Binmore - 2004 - Politics, Philosophy and Economics 3 (1):5-35.
    This article is extracted from a forthcoming book, ‘Natural Justice’. It is a nontechnical introduction to the part of game theory immediately relevant to social contract theory. The latter part of the article reviews how concepts such as trust, responsibility, and authority can be seen as emergent phenomena in models that take formal account only of equilibria in indefinitely repeated games. Key Words: game theory • equilibrium • evolutionary stability • reciprocity • folk theorem • trust • altruism • responsibility (...)
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  • Rawls’s Self-Defeat: A Formal Analysis.Hun Chung - 2020 - Erkenntnis 85 (5):1169-1197.
    One of John Rawls’s major aims, when he wrote A Theory of Justice, was to present a superior alternative to utilitarianism. Rawls’s worry was that utilitarianism may fail to protect the fundamental rights and liberties of persons in its attempt to maximize total social welfare. Rawls’s main argument against utilitarianism was that, for such reasons, the representative parties in the original position will not choose utilitarianism, but will rather choose his justice as fairness, which he believed would securely protect the (...)
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  • Disagreement.Jonathan Matheson & Bryan Frances - 2018 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
    This article examines the central epistemological issues tied to the recognition of disagreement.
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  • Justifying the State.David Schmidtz - 1990 - Ethics 101 (1):89-102.
  • A Vindication of the Equal Weight View.Thomas Bogardus - 2009 - Episteme 6 (3):324-335.
    Some philosophers believe that when epistemic peers disagree, each has an obligation to accord the other's assessment the same weight as her own. I first make the antecedent of this Equal-Weight View more precise, and then I motivate the View by describing cases in which it gives the intuitively correct verdict. Next I introduce some apparent counterexamples – cases of apparent peer disagreement in which, intuitively, one should not give equal weight to the other party's assessment. To defuse these apparent (...)
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  • A Theory of Justice.John Rawls - unknown
    Though the revised edition of A Theory of Justice, published in 1999, is the definitive statement of Rawls's view, so much of the extensive literature on Rawls's theory refers to the first edition.
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  • Twenty-Five On.David Gauthier - 2013 - Ethics 123 (4):601-624.
  • Book Review:Liberalism, Community, and Culture. Will Kymlicka. [REVIEW]James P. Sterba - 1992 - Ethics 103 (1):152-.
  • Moral Principles and Political Obligations.A. John Simmons - 1980 - Revue de Métaphysique et de Morale 87 (4):568-568.
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  • The Limits of Liberty Between Anarchy and Leviathan.James M. Buchanan - 1975 - Political Theory 4 (3):388-391.
  • The (Stabilized) Nash Bargaining Solution as a Principle of Distributive Justice.Michael Moehler - 2010 - Utilitas 22 (4):447-473.
    It is argued that the Nash bargaining solution cannot serve as a principle of distributive justice because (i) it cannot secure stable cooperation in repeated interactions and (ii) it cannot capture our moral intuitions concerning distributive questions. In this article, I propose a solution to the first problem by amending the Nash bargaining solution so that it can maintain stable cooperation among rational bargainers. I call the resulting principle the stabilized Nash bargaining solution. The principle defends justice in the form (...)
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  • Disagreement and the Ethics of Belief.Jonathan Matheson - 2015 - In James Collier (ed.), The Future of Social Epistemology: A Collective Vision. pp. 139-148.
    In this paper, I explain a challenge to the Equal Weight View coming from the psychology of group inquiry, and evaluate its merits. I argue that while the evidence from the psychology of group inquiry does not give us a reason to reject the Equal Weight View, it does require making some clarifications regarding what the view does and does not entail, as well as a revisiting the ethics of belief.
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  • Hobbes’s State of Nature: A Modern Bayesian Game-Theoretic Analysis.hun CHung - 2015 - Journal of the American Philosophical Association 1 (3):485--508.
    Hobbes’s own justification for the existence of governments relies on the assumption that, without a government, our lives in the state of nature would result in a state of war of every man against every man. Many contemporary scholars have tried to explain why universal war is unavoidable in Hobbes’s state of nature by utilizing modern game theory. However, most game-theoretic models that have been presented so far do not accurately capture what Hobbes deems to be the primary cause of (...)
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  • War or Peace?: A Dynamical Analysis of Anarchy.Peter Vanderschraaf - 2006 - Economics and Philosophy 22 (2):243-279.
    I propose a dynamical analysis of interaction in anarchy, and argue that this kind of dynamical analysis is a more promising route to predicting the outcome of anarchy than the more traditional a priori analyses of anarchy in the literature. I criticize previous a priori analyses of anarchy on the grounds that these analyses assume that the individuals in anarchy share a unique set of preferences over the possible outcomes of war, peace, exploiting others and suffering exploitation. Following Hobbes' classic (...)
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  • When Rational Disagreement is Impossible.Keith Lehrer - 1976 - Noûs 10 (3):327-332.
  • Hobbes and the Social Contract Tradition.Jean Hampton & Gregory S. Kavka - 1988 - Ethics 98 (4):793-805.
     
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  • Science et méthode.H. Poincaré - 1909 - Revue de Métaphysique et de Morale 17 (2):3-4.
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  • Anarchy, State, and Utopia.[author unknown] - 1980 - Noûs 14 (1):99-108.
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  • Works Cited.Gerald Gaus - 2016 - In The Tyranny of the Ideal: Justice in a Diverse Society. Princeton University Press. pp. 265-278.
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  • Rational Belief and Social Interaction.Daniel M. Hausman - 2003 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 26 (2):163-164.
    Game theory poses problems for modeling rational belief, but it does not need a new theory of rationality. Experimental results that suggest otherwise often reveal difficulties in testing game theory, rather than mistakes or paradoxes. Even though the puzzles Colman discusses show no inadequacy in the standard theory of rationality, they show that improved models of belief are needed.
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