The commentaries by Rimé and Scherer underscore and extend many of the central themes discussed in our target article. This response filters the commentaries through the lens of our review article and highlights the core idea that relationships provide a vital context for the types of emotional responding outlined in the commentaries, including the social sharing of emotion as well as the link between emotional competence and physical health.

High-quality social relationships predict a range of positive health outcomes, but no broadly accepted theory can explain the mechanisms of action in this area. The central argument of this article is that affective science can provide keys for integrating the diverse array of theoretical models concerning relationships and health. From nine prominent theories, we cull four components of relational affect that link social resources to health-related outcomes. This component model holds promise for integrating research from the different theoretical perspectives and (...) for generating new, mechanistic questions about the connection between relationships and health. The article closes by outlining three empirical study ideas that illustrate ways in which the different components can be studied together in the context of mechanism-focused research. (shrink)

Among the four components proposed by Sbarra and Coan to guide the research aimed at understanding the role of emotion in the connection between social relationship and health, I view the fourth one, labeled “transactional dimensions,” as offering particularly rich promises in this regard. To illustrate, I sketch the example of individual, interpersonal, and collective effects entailed by the process of social sharing of emotion. The example rests on the bidirectional flow of transactions that develops continuously between these three levels.

A definition of emotion common to the affective sciences is an urgent desideratum. Lack of such a definition is a constant source of numerous misunderstandings and a series of mostly fruitless debates. There is little hope that there ever will be agreement on a common definition of emotion, given the sacred traditions of the disciplines involved and the egos of the scholars working in these disciplines. Our aim here is more modest. We propose a list of elements for a working (...) definition of emotion and discuss the justification for the inclusion of elements from our respective perspectives (philosophy and psychology). This working partial definition may at least serve as a litmus test to examine theories of emotion, old and new, across disciplinary boundaries. (shrink)