PREFACE The first three of these lectures, or rather an abbreviated version of them, were first given as the Lindsay Memorial Lectures at the University of ...

Abstract Peters's views on moral education are to be found in several books and articles written over a period of about 20 years. Two essential elements of his ideas are what he calls procedural principles and basic rules. This article is an attempt to consider his recommendations, particularly in terms of any practical assistance that can be derived from them for those interested in moral education. Close examination reveals some inconsistencies, vagueness and difficulties which suggest problems for his procedural approach (...) and raise the issue of whether alternative, more positive efforts should be reconsidered. (shrink)

Abstract In this article, which is the first of two to examine the ideas of R. S. Peters on moral education, consideration is given to his justificatory arguments found in Ethics and Education. Here he employs presupposition arguments to show to what anyone engaging in moral discourse is committed. The result is a group of procedural principles which are recommended to be employed in moral education. This article is an attempt to examine the presupposition arguments Peters employs, to comment on (...) the procedural principles he believes are presupposed, and to consider the strength of the presupposition argument. My conclusion is that Peters's arguments fail to establish the conclusion he arrives at, and that any gains from the form of argument he uses are hollow. (shrink)

Abstract Two basic worries about moral education are considered. The first ?? whether there are or are not fundamental principles of reason and procedure which govern moral decision?making ?? is argued to be unnecessary, since there plainly are some such procedures. The second ?? how and in what direction pupils should be motivated to attend to such principles ?? is a more complex and difficult matter, which has to be tackled whatever one's particular philosophical views on morality. It is argued (...) that the proper object of motivation is primarily allegiance to certain principles of rationality and justice, natural sympathy or personal benevolence being regarded as desirable but too fragile. (shrink)