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Knowledge and its limits.Timothy Williamson - 2000 - New York: Oxford University Press.details
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What is Justified Belief?Alvin I. Goldman - 1979 - In George Pappas (ed.), Justification and Knowledge: New Studies in Epistemology. Boston: D. Reidel. pp. 1-25.details
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In Defence of Objective Bayesianism.Jon Williamson - 2010 - Oxford University Press.details
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Statistical Reasoning with Imprecise Probabilities.Peter Walley - 1991 - Chapman & Hall.details
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Bertrand’s Paradox and the Principle of Indifference.Nicholas Shackel - 2007 - Philosophy of Science 74 (2):150-175.details
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Prior Probabilities.Edwin T. Jaynes - 1968 - Ieee Transactions on Systems and Cybernetics (3):227-241.details
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The Axioms of Subjective Probability.Peter C. Fishburn - 1986 - Statistical Science 1 (3):335-358.details
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Subjective Probabilities Should be Sharp.Adam Elga - 2010 - Philosophers' Imprint 10.details
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Theory of Games and Economic Behavior.John Von Neumann & Oskar Morgenstern - 1944 - Princeton, NJ, USA: Princeton University Press.details
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Probabilistic Knowledge.Sarah Moss - 2018 - Oxford, United Kingdom: Oxford University Press.details
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Representation theorems and realism about degrees of belief.Lyle Zynda - 2000 - Philosophy of Science 67 (1):45-69.details
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Knowledge and Its Limits.Timothy Williamson - 2005 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 70 (2):452-458.details
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Interest-Relative Invariantism. [REVIEW]Stephen Schiffer - 2007 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 75 (1):188 - 195.details
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How Must Knowledge Be Modally Related to What Is Known?Ernest Sosa - 1999 - Philosophical Topics 26 (1-2):373-384.details
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The Normative Role of Knowledge.Declan Smithies - 2011 - Noûs 46 (2):265-288.details
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The Accuracy and Rationality of Imprecise Credences.Miriam Schoenfield - 2017 - Noûs 51 (4):667-685.details
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The logic of probabilistic knowledge.Patricia Rich - 2020 - Philosophical Studies 177 (6):1703-1725.details
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Knowledge Dethroned.Andy Mueller & Jacob Ross - 2017 - Analytic Philosophy 58 (4):283-296.details
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How Does Epistemic Rationality Constrain Practical Rationality?Andy Mueller - 2017 - Analytic Philosophy 58 (2):139-155.details
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Epistemology Formalized.Sarah Moss - 2013 - Philosophical Review 122 (1):1-43.details
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Games and Decisions: Introduction and Critical Survey.R. Duncan Luce & Howard Raiffa - 1958 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 19 (1):122-123.details
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A defense of imprecise credences in inference and decision making1.James M. Joyce - 2010 - Philosophical Perspectives 24 (1):281-323.details
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A nonpragmatic vindication of probabilism.James M. Joyce - 1998 - Philosophy of Science 65 (4):575-603.details
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The Logic of Decision.Richard C. Jeffrey - 1965 - New York, NY, USA: University of Chicago Press.details
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Two Ways to Put Knowledge First.Alexander Jackson - 2012 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 90 (2):353 - 369.details
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Objective and subjective rationality and decisions with the best and worst case in mind.Simon Grant, Patricia Rich & Jack Stecher - 2020 - Theory and Decision 90 (3-4):309-320.details
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Warrant and action.Mikkel Gerken - 2011 - Synthese 178 (3):529-547.details
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The Re-evaluation of Logical Positivism.Michael Friedman - 1991 - Journal of Philosophy 88 (10):505-519.details
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A Plea for Falsehoods.Juan Comesaña - 2020 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 100 (2):247-276.details
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Subject‐Sensitive Invariantism and the Knowledge Norm for Practical Reasoning.Jessica Brown - 2008 - Noûs 42 (2):167-189.details
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Knowledge and practical reason.Jessica Brown - 2008 - Philosophy Compass 3 (6):1135-1152.details
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Is Safety In Danger?Fernando Broncano-Berrocal - 2014 - Philosophia 42 (1):1-19.details
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Should subjective probabilities be sharp?Seamus Bradley & Katie Siobhan Steele - 2014 - Episteme 11 (3):277-289.details
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Knowledge Under Threat.Tomas Bogardus - 2014 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 88 (2):289-313.details
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Rational Decisions.Ken Binmore - 2008 - Princeton University Press.details
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Statistical Decision Functions.Abraham Wald - 1950 - Wiley: New York.details
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Risk and Rationality.Lara Buchak - 2013 - Oxford, GB: Oxford University Press.details
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Knowledge First?Aidan McGlynn - 2014 - New York, NY: Palgrave Macmillian.details
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Rational Decisions.Ken Binmore - 2009 - Princeton University Press.details
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The Foundations of Statistics.Leonard J. Savage - 1954 - Wiley Publications in Statistics.details
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Williamson on Knowledge.Duncan Pritchard & Patrick Greenough (eds.) - 2009 - Oxford, GB: Oxford: Oxford University Press.details
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A Mathematical Theory of Evidence.Glenn Shafer - 1976 - Princeton University Press.details
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Tracking truth: knowledge, evidence, and science.Sherrilyn Roush - 2005 - New York: Oxford University Press.details
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Acting on Knowledge.Timothy Williamson - 2017 - In J. Adam Carter, Emma C. Gordon & Benjamin W. Jarvis (eds.), Knowledge First: Approaches in Epistemology and Mind. Oxford: Oxford University Press. pp. 163-181.details
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What is justified belief?Alvin I. Goldman - 1979 - In Steven Luper (ed.), Essential Knowledge: Readings in Epistemology. Longman. pp. 178.details
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The Foundations of Statistics.Leonard J. Savage - 1954 - Synthese 11 (1):86-89.details
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Knowledge and Its Limits.Timothy Williamson - 2003 - Philosophical Quarterly 53 (210):105-116.details
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Knowledge and its Limits.Timothy Williamson - 2000 - Tijdschrift Voor Filosofie 64 (1):200-201.details
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Rational fools: A critique of the behavioral foundations of economic theory.Amartya Sen - 1977 - Philosophy and Public Affairs 6 (4):317-344.details
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