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Reasons for reasons

Episteme 12 (2):241-247 (2015)

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  1. Dretske on epistemic entitlement.Michael Williams - 2000 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 60 (3):607-612.
    According to Fred Dretske, the debate between externalists and internalists in epistemology is about “Whether there are epistemic rights without corresponding duties or obligations. Externalists believe and internalists deny that there are such unjustified justifiers. Dretske’s first fundamental thesis is: externalists are right. Unjustified justifiers can be thought of as “given,” not because they are certain or indubitable, but because they are “free of justificational encumbrances.” Even knowledge—the supreme entitlement—requires no justification.
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  • How to think about fallibilism.Baron Reed - 2002 - Philosophical Studies 107 (2):143-157.
    Almost every contemporary theory of knowledge is a version of fallibilism, yet an adequate statement of fallibilism has not yet been provided. Standard definitions cannot account for fallibilistic knowledge of necessary truths. I consider and reject several attempts to resolve this difficulty before arguing that a belief is an instance of fallibilistic knowledge when it could have failed to be knowledge. This is a fully general account of fallibilism that applies to knowledge of necessary truths. Moreover, it reveals, not only (...)
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  • The role of reasons in epistemology.Hilary Kornblith - 2015 - Episteme 12 (2):225-239.
    The notion of a reason often plays a central role in epistemological theories. Justification is often explained in terms of the having of appropriate reasons, and a variety of epistemological distinctions are most naturally explained, it seems, by adverting to reasons. This paper examines the extent to which we may, instead, make do without appeal to such a notion. It is argued that the extent to which the notion of a reason should play an important role in epistemological theorizing will (...)
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  • Précis of M aking It Explicit: Reasoning, Representing, and Discursive Commitment.Robert Brandom & Robert B. Brandom - 1997 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 57 (1):153.
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  • 1991.Wilfrid Sellars - 1963 - In Robert Colodny (ed.), Science, Perception, and Reality. Humanities Press/Ridgeview.
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