did plato and aristotle have anything to say about belief? The answer to this question might seem blindingly obvious: of course they did. Plato distinguishes belief from knowledge in the Meno, Republic, and Theaetetus, and Aristotle does so in the Posterior Analytics. Plato distinguishes belief from perception in the Theaetetus, and Aristotle does so in the De anima. They talk about the distinction between true and false beliefs, and the ways in which belief can mislead and the ways in which (...) it can steer us aright. Indeed, they make belief a central component of their epistemologies.The view underlying these claims—one so widespread these days as to remain largely unquestioned—is that when Plato and Aristotle talk... (shrink)

A problem is posed: Is pleasure choiceworthy, or not? The answerer claims that yes, it is. The questioner must refute him by asking questions—by offering him premises to accept or reject. The questioner succeeds if he forces the answerer to accept a proposition contrary to the one he undertook to defend, and fails if the answerer always accepts or rejects premises in a way consistent with that proposition. To a first approximation, dialectic is the distinctive method of Aristotelian philosophy. At (...) the heart of dialectic is the dialectical deduction. This article discusses Aristotle's philosophical method, focusing on dialectical premises, endoxa, and aporiai. It also examines the uses of dialectic in intellectual training, ordinary discussion, and the philosophical sciences, as well as in regard to scientific starting points or first principles. The article concludes by returning to dialectic and philosophy and an important difference between them. (shrink)

The transmission of form and soul -- Desire, perception, and understanding -- Theoretical wisdom -- Virtue of character -- Practical wisdom -- Immortalizing beings -- Happiness -- The happiest life.

Forthcoming, Journal of Philosophy [pdf manuscript].

Review of Substantial Knowledge: Aristotle's Metaphysics, by C.D.C Reeve (Hackett: 2000).

This splendid book is a collection of twenty-three of John Cooper’s papers on Greek ethical philosophy: seven are on Socrates and Plato, twelve are on Aristotle and four are on the Hellenistics; nineteen have appeared elsewhere, two are newly written essays incorporating previously published material, and two are new essays written for this volume. Many of these papers are justly regarded as classics of contemporary scholarship and some of them are located in out of the way journals or volumes: we (...) thus have the usual reasons for being grateful that they are at last collected together in one place. But more important, bringing these papers together has synergistic effects: we see Cooper returning to related issues in different contexts and elaborating the scope and depth of his analyses. (shrink)

Belief and Truth: A Skeptic Reading of Plato explores a Socratic intuition about belief, doxa -- belief is "shameful." In aiming for knowledge, one must aim to get rid of beliefs. Vogt shows how deeply this proposal differs from contemporary views, but that it nevertheless speaks to intuitions we are likely to share with Plato, ancient skeptics, and Stoic epistemologists.

C. D. C. Reeve develops a powerful new account of the age-old argument over whether the just are happier than the unjust, drawing from a new understanding of Plato's conception of philosophy.