Switch to: Citations

References in:

Better lie!

Analysis 74 (1):59-64 (2014)

Add references

You must login to add references.
  1. Liar!Jonathan Webber - 2013 - Analysis 73 (4):651-659.
    We have good reason to condemn lying more strongly than misleading and to condemn bullshit assertion less harshly than lying but more harshly than misleading. We each have good reason to mislead rather than make bullshit assertions, but to make bullshit assertions rather than lie. This is because these forms of deception damage credibility in different ways. We can trust the misleader to assert only what they believe to be true. We can trust the bullshitter not to assert what they (...)
    Direct download (8 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   30 citations  
  • The Distinctive Wrong in Lying.Alan Strudler - 2010 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 13 (2):171-179.
    In this essay I will argue, as does Bernard Williams, that lying and misleading are both commonly wrong because they involve an aim to breach a trust. I will also argue, contrary to Williams, that lying and misleading threaten trust differently, and that when they are wrong, they are wrong differently. Indeed, lying may be wrong when misleading is not.
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   22 citations  
  • Just go ahead and lie.Jennifer Saul - 2012 - Analysis 72 (1):3-9.
    The view that lying is morally worse than merely misleading is a very natural one, which has had many prominent defenders. Nonetheless, here I will argue that it is misguided: holding all else fixed, acts of mere misleading are not morally preferable to acts of lying, and successful lying is not morally worse than merely deliberately misleading. In fact, except in certain very special contexts, I will suggest that – when faced with a felt need to deceive – we might (...)
    Direct download (7 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   24 citations