Part I Describing and Prescribing He to whom thou was sent for ease, being by name Legality, is the son of the Bond-woman . . . how canst thou expect by ...

My concern in this paper will be to explore and develop a version of nonsocratic skepticism about weakness of will. In my view, socratism is incorrect, but like Socrates, I think that the common understanding of weakness of will raises serious problems. Contrary to socratism, it is possible for a person knowingly to act contrary to his or her better judgment. But this description does not exhaust the common view of weakness. Also implicit in this view is the belief that (...) actions which are contrary to one's better judgment are free in the sense that the agent could have done otherwise. To take seriously the possibility of acting contrary to one's better judgment is at the same time to raise problems about the distinction between weakness and compulsion. I argue that the common view, according to which the differentiating feature is that the weak are able to conform their behavior to their practical judgments, is unjustified. Instead, I have proposed that weakness of will involves the failure to develop certain normal capacities of self-control, whereas compulsion involves desires which even the possession of such capacities would not enable one to resist. (shrink)

Richard Holton has developed a view of the nature of weak-willed actions, and I have done the same for akratic actions. How well does this view of mine fare in the sphere of weakness of will? Considerably better than Holton’s view. That is a thesis of this article. The article’s aim is to clarify the nature of weak-willed actions. Holton reports that he is "trying to give an account of our ordinary notion of weakness of will" (1999, p. 262). One (...) way to get evidence about ordinary notions is to conduct survey studies with ordinary people. I conducted four such studies on weakness of will. (shrink)

The prelims comprise: To Kalon as Effective Teleological Order The Visibility of the Fine Pleasure and Praise The Value of the Fine Conclusion Acknowledgments Notes References Further reading.

Philosophical orthodoxy identifies weakness of will with akrasia: the weak willed person is someone who intentionally acts against their better judgement. It is argued that this is a mistake. Weakness of will consists in a quite different failing, namely an over-ready revision of one's intentions. Building on the work of Bratman, an account of such over-ready revision is given. A number of examples are then adduced showing how weakness of will, so understood, differs from akrasia.

This paper is an analysis of Aristotle's "Nicomachean Ethics 7.3." Aristotle's discussion in this chapter is motivated by the Socratic doctrine, elaborated in Plato's "Protagoras," according to which it is impossible to know what is good and act against this knowledge. Aristotle wants to rebut this doctrine and show that there is a sense of "know" such that this is possible. I argue that this is all that he wants to do in EN 7.3, and that his discussion is not (...) meant to provide an explanation of akrasia, as is usually supposed by commentators. Since the akratic knows that the action she is performing is not good for her, and actions are particulars, the akratic's knowledge is about a particular. I argue that Aristotle's discussion in EN 7.3 adds strength to the idea that knowledge of a particular is explainable only in terms of knowledge of a universal. More determinately, knowledge of a particular is explainable in terms of the actualization or use of knowledge of a universal, and such an actualization is in turn explainable by means of the syllogistic form. Thus, I argue that syllogisms in 7.3 (esp. at 1146 35-1147 10) are not "practical syllogisms", but that their function is epistemological: they are meant to reveal the structure and content of the akratic's knowledge, not to explain her actions. (shrink)

This book was first published in 1984, as the revised edition of a 1979 original. The text is composed of studies in a descending sequence from perfect rationality, through imperfect and problematical rationality, to irrationality. Specifically human rationality is characterized by its capacity to relate strategically to the future, in contrast to the myopic 'gradient climbing' of natural selection. There is trenchant analysis of some of the parallels proposed in this connection between the biological and the social sciences. In the (...) chapter on imperfect rationality the crucial notion is that of 'binding oneself', as Ulysses did before setting out to the Sirens, when weakness of will may prevent us from using our capacity for perfect rationality. The second half of the book deals with rational-actor theory, comparing its logical power and success to rival approaches, and with the varieties of irrationality expressed in contradictory beliefs and desires. (shrink)

This is a collection of published and unpublished essays by distinguished philosopher Michael E. Bratman of Stanford University. They revolve around his influential theory, know as the "planning theory of intention and agency." Bratman's primary concern is with what he calls "strong" forms of human agency--including forms of human agency that are the target of our talk about self-determination, self-government, and autonomy. These essays are unified and cohesive in theme, and will be of interest to philosophers in ethics and metaphysics.

Among scholars it is common to assume that Aristotle’s practical syllogism does two jobs. It is often taken to explain both animal motion and human deliberation. I will call this the “two-jobs view of the practical syllogism”. In what follows, I will argue that the two-jobs view of the practical syllogism is not working. I will then try to give a very brief and incomplete sketch of how to conceive of a non-two-jobs view of the Aristotelian practical syllogism. Finally, I (...) will discuss two possible problems for the non-two-jobs view. (shrink)

In this chapter, I articulate the structure of a general concept of autonomy and then reply to possible objections with reference to Ulysses arrangements in psychiatry. The line of argument is as follows. Firstly, I examine three alternative conceptions of autonomy: value-neutral, value-laden, and relational. Secondly, I identify two paradigm cases of autonomy and offer a sketch of its concept as opposed to the closely related freedom of action and intentional agency. Finally, I explain away the autonomy paradox, to which (...) the previously identified pair of paradigm cases seems to give rise in the context of mental disorder. By addressing this paradox, we learn two valuable lessons. The first is about the relationships between the three conceptions of autonomy above. The second is about the relationship between autonomy and mental disorder. (shrink)

In Section 1, a pair of arguments for the nonexistence of strict akratic action are criticized with a view to setting the stage for a more general discussion of the lay of the land. In Sections 2 and 3, it is argued that the worry to which this essay is addressed is inflated.

Le présent article vise à définir le rôle de l'imagination dans la philosophie aristotélicienne de l'action. Aristote dit souvent que les fins de l'action humaine sont déterminées par le désir, mais il fait aussi de l'intellect un facteur déterminant dans la production de l'action. Cette apparente incompatibilité est en grande partie réduite si l'on considère l'ensemble des facultés mentales qui interviennent dans la production de l'action et en particulier le rôle joué par les différentes formes d'imagination. This paper is arguing (...) that imagination plays an important role in Aristotle's philosophy of action. Aristotle often says that the ends of human action are determined by desire alone. But, on the other side, he gives intellect a real function in the production of actions. This apparent difficulty can be solved if we take into account the mental faculties, and especially the different forms of imagination, which play a part in the production of action. (shrink)