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  1. Truth Via Anaphorically Unrestricted Quantifiers.Jody Azzouni - 2001 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 30 (4):329-354.
    A new approach to truth is offered which dispenses with the truth predicate, and replaces it with a special kind of quantifier which simultaneously binds variables in sentential and nominal positions. The resulting theory of truth for a (first-order) language is shown to be able to handle blind truth ascriptions, and is shown to be compatible with a characterization of the semantic and syntactic principles governing that language. Comparisons with other approaches to truth are drawn. An axiomatization of AU-quantifiers and (...)
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  • Facts and Propositions.F. P. Ramsey - 1927 - Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 7 (1):153-170.
  • A Prosentential Theory of Truth.Dorothy L. Grover, Joseph L. Camp & Nuel D. Belnap - 1975 - Philosophical Studies 27 (1):73--125.
  • Propositional Quantifiers.Dorothy L. Grover - 1972 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 1 (2):111 - 136.
    In discussing propositional quantifiers we have considered two kinds of variables: variables occupying the argument places of connectives, and variables occupying the argument places of predicates.We began with languages which contained the first kind of variable, i.e., variables taking sentences as substituends. Our first point was that there appear to be no sentences in English that serve as adequate readings of formulas containing propositional quantifiers. Then we showed how a certain natural and illuminating extension of English by prosentences did provide (...)
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  • Conservative Deflationism?Julien Murzi & Lorenzo Rossi - 2020 - Philosophical Studies 177 (2):535-549.
    Deflationists argue that ‘true’ is merely a logico-linguistic device for expressing blind ascriptions and infinite generalisations. For this reason, some authors have argued that deflationary truth must be conservative, i.e. that a deflationary theory of truth for a theory S must not entail sentences in S’s language that are not already entailed by S. However, it has been forcefully argued that any adequate theory of truth for S must be non-conservative and that, for this reason, truth cannot be deflationary :493–521, (...)
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  • Disquotation and Infinite Conjunctions.Lavinia Picollo & Thomas Schindler - 2017 - Erkenntnis (5):1-30.
    One of the main logical functions of the truth predicate is to enable us to express so-called ‘infinite conjunctions’. Several authors claim that the truth predicate can serve this function only if it is fully disquotational, which leads to triviality in classical logic. As a consequence, many have concluded that classical logic should be rejected. The purpose of this paper is threefold. First, we consider two accounts available in the literature of what it means to express infinite conjunctions with a (...)
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  • Levity.Leon Horsten - 2009 - Mind 118 (471):555-581.
    In this article, the prospects of deflationism about the concept of truth are investigated. A new version of deflationism, called inferential deflationism, is articulated and defended. It is argued that it avoids the pitfalls of earlier deflationist views such as Horwich’s minimalist theory of truth and Field’s version of deflationism.
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  • Deflationism, Arithmetic, and the Argument From Conservativeness.Daniel Waxman - 2017 - Mind 126 (502):429-463.
    Many philosophers believe that a deflationist theory of truth must conservatively extend any base theory to which it is added. But when applied to arithmetic, it's argued, the imposition of a conservativeness requirement leads to a serious objection to deflationism: for the Gödel sentence for Peano Arithmetic is not a theorem of PA, but becomes one when PA is extended by adding plausible principles governing truth. This paper argues that no such objection succeeds. The issue turns on how we understand (...)
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  • Deflating the Conservativeness Argument.Hartry Field - 1999 - Journal of Philosophy 96 (10):533-540.
  • Proof and Truth: Through Thick and Thin.Stewart Shapiro - 1998 - Journal of Philosophy 95 (10):493-521.
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  • Maximal Consistent Sets of Instances of Tarski’s Schema.Vann McGee - 1992 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 21 (3):235 - 241.
  • A Completeness Theorem in Modal Logic.Saul A. Kripke - 1959 - Journal of Symbolic Logic 24 (1):1-14.
  • Truth and Disquotation.Richard Heck - 2005 - Synthese 142 (3):317--352.
    Hartry Field has suggested that we should adopt at least a methodological deflationism: [W]e should assume full-fledged deflationism as a working hypothesis. That way, if full-fledged deflationism should turn out to be inadequate, we will at least have a clearer sense than we now have of just where it is that inflationist assumptions ... are needed. I argue here that we do not need to be methodological deflationists. More pre-cisely, I argue that we have no need for a disquotational truth-predicate; (...)
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  • The Revision Theory of Truth.Vann Mcgee - 1996 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 56 (3):727-730.
  • Anaphorically Unrestricted Quantifiers and Paradoxes.Jody Azzouni - 2005 - In J. C. Beall & Bradley Armour-Garb (eds.), Deflationism and Paradox. Oxford University Press.
     
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  • Foundations Without Foundationalism: A Case for Second-Order Logic.Gila Sher - 1994 - Philosophical Review 103 (1):150.
  • The Thought: A Logical Inquiry.Gottlob Frege - 1956 - Mind 65 (259):289-311.
  • Introduction to Semantics.C. H. Langford - 1943 - Journal of Symbolic Logic 8 (1):36-37.
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  • Logic, Semantics, Metamathematics.L. Jonathan Cohen - 1958 - Philosophical Quarterly 8 (30):87-88.
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  • How Innocent Is Deflationism?Volker Halbach - 2001 - Synthese 126 (1):167-194.
  • Deflationism and Tarski’s Paradise.Jeffrey Ketland - 1999 - Mind 108 (429):69-94.
    Deflationsism about truth is a pot-pourri, variously claiming that truth is redundant, or is constituted by the totality of 'T-sentences', or is a purely logical device (required solely for disquotational purposes or for re-expressing finitarily infinite conjunctions and/or disjunctions). In 1980, Hartry Field proposed what might be called a 'deflationary theory of mathematics', in which it is alleged that all uses of mathematics within science are dispensable. Field's criterion for the dispensability of mathematics turns on a property of theories, called (...)
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  • Symposium: “Facts and Propositions.”.F. P. Ramsey & G. E. Moore - 1927 - Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 7 (1):153-206.
  • The Criterion of Truth.A. J. Ayer - 1935 - Analysis 3 (1-2):28-32.
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  • Truth.P. F. Strawson - 1948 - Analysis 9 (6):83-97.
  • Reducing Compositional to Disquotational Truth.Volker Halbach - 2009 - Review of Symbolic Logic 2 (4):786-798.
    Disquotational theories of truth, that is, theories of truth based on the T-sentences or similar equivalences as axioms are often thought to be deductively weak. This view is correct if the truth predicate is allowed to apply only to sentences not containing the truth predicate. By taking a slightly more liberal approach toward the paradoxes, I obtain a disquotational theory of truth that is proof theoretically as strong as compositional theories such as the Kripket probe the compositional axioms.
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  • Disquotationalism and Infinite Conjunctions.Volker Halbach - 1999 - Mind 108 (429):1-22.
    According to the disquotationalist theory of truth, the Tarskian equivalences, conceived as axioms, yield all there is to say about truth. Several authors have claimed that the expression of infinite conjunctions and disjunctions is the only purpose of the disquotationalist truth predicate. The way in which infinite conjunctions can be expressed by an axiomatized truth predicate is explored and it is considered whether the disquotationalist truth predicate is adequate for this purpose.
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  • The Criterion of Truth.A. J. Ayer - 1935 - Analysis 3 (1/2):28-31.
    The criterion of truth is the measure of the truthfulness and reliability of our knowledge. It is also the basis for determining the correctness of our concepts and how much our perceptions, ideas, and concepts accord with objective reality. Idealism holds to the idea that the criterion of truth does not involve the integration between theory as created by human intelligence and objective reality, but rather that the criterion of truth involves the "clarity and correctness" of perception, viewpoints, and concepts (...)
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  • Introduction to Semantics.Rudolf Carnap - 1942 - Philosophy of Science 9 (3):281-282.
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  • Philosophy of Logic.Michael Jubien & W. V. Quine - 1988 - Journal of Symbolic Logic 53 (1):303.
  • Deflation and Conservation.Stewart Shapiro - 2002 - In Volker Halbach & Leon Horsten (eds.), Principles of Truth. Dr. Hänsel-Hohenhausen. pp. 103-128.
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