Recent interpretations of Locke's primary/secondary quality distinction have tended to emphasize Locke's relationship to the corpuscularian science of his time, especially to that of Boyle. Although this trend may have corrected the unfortunate tendency to view Locke in isolation from his scientific contemporaries, it nevertheless has resulted in some over- simplifications and distortions of Locke's general enterprise. As everyone now agrees, Locke was attempting to provide a philosophical foundation for English corpuscularianism and one must therefore look not only at the (...) current scientific hypotheses but also at the nature of the philosophical foundation Locke was attempting to erect. In particular, Locke made an attempt, based on epistemological principles, to give a philosophical justification of atomistic corpuscularianism. Moreover, he was not content to give this justification post hoc—the epistemological foundation was prior to, and determined the framework for, the details of the correct scientific theory. Locke's epistemology made legitimate an atomistic theory, one making crucial use of the notion of solidity in the definition of the elementary particles, although it did not prejudge the details of this theory. (shrink)

Locke was once supposed to have argued that since the colours, sounds, odours, and other ‘secondary’ qualities things appear to have can vary greatly according to the state and position of the observer, it follows that our ideas of the ‘secondary’ qualities of things do not ‘resemble’ anything existing in the objects themselves. And Berkeley has been credited with the obvious objection that similar facts about the ‘relativity’ of our perception of ‘primary’ qualities show that they do not ‘resemble’ anything (...) existing in the objects either, so that both ‘primary’ and ‘secondary’ qualities exist only ‘in the mind’. The falsity of this view of Locke has been amply demonstrated in recent years, but no corresponding revision has been made in what remains the standard interpretation of Berkeley's criticisms of Locke. His objections therefore appear to be based on misunderstanding and to be irrelevant to what is now seen to be Locke's actual view and his reasons for holding it. I think this account of Berkeley, like the old view of Locke, is a purely fictional chapter in the history of philosophy, and in this paper I try to show that Berkeley's criticisms involve no misunderstanding and amount to a direct denial of the view Locke actually held. (shrink)

During the past thirty years, scholars and commentators have produced a flood of articles and books on almost every aspect and feature of Berkeley's work. There are, however, very few points on which these commentators agree. Since the debate shows no signs of abating, Walter Creery has gathered together a collection of the more significant articles in this extremely useful and accessible form. These three volumes gather together eighty-seven articles on Berkeley's views on the central issues of the philosophy of (...) language, the theory of vision, qualities, general ideas, matter, the theory of mind, and notions. The collection contains articles both harshly critical of Berkeley as well as those sympathetic with the philosopher's views, and there has been an attempt to balance the selection between the immaterialist and idealist theories. (shrink)

George Berkeley is one of the most prominent philosophers of the eighteenth century. His _Principles of Human Knowledge_ has become a focal point in the understanding of empiricist thought and the development of eighteenth century philosophy. This volume introduces and assesses: * Berkeley's life and the background to the _Principles_ * The ideas and text in the _Principles_ * Berkeley's continuing importance to philosophy.

The thoughts of three philosophers on three topics: meaning, causality, and objectivity, are the focus of this study.