According to the Perceptual Symbols Theory of cognition (Barsalou, 1999), modality‐specific simulations underlie the representation of concepts. A strong prediction of this view is that perceptual processing affects conceptual processing. In this study, participants performed a perceptual detection task and a conceptual property‐verification task in alternation. Responses on the property‐verification task were slower for those trials that were preceded by a perceptual trial in a different modality than for those that were preceded by a perceptual trial in the same modality. (...) This finding of a modality‐switch effect across perceptual processing and conceptual processing supports the hypothesis that perceptual and conceptual representations are partially based on the same systems. (shrink)

Pupillary responses and associated vergence eye movements were monitored during imagery of objects of differing sizes (“large” or “small”) from varying distances (“near” or “far”). Objects’ imagined size and distance affected oculomotor behavior. Objects visualized as “far” resulted in the larger pupil dilations and smaller visual angle, while small objects imagined “near” were associated with smaller pupils in contrast to relatively larger pupils when imagined as “far” away. Furthermore, near objects resulted in larger visual angle, and particularly, vergence adjustments were (...) observed that were dependent on imagined size and distance of the small objects. The findings are consistent with the idea that imagery emulates perception, also at the embodied level of oculomotor behaviors. (shrink)

A basic claim of the embodiment framework is that all psychological processes are influenced by body morphology, sensory systems, motor systems, and emotions. As such, the framework holds the promise of providing a unifying perspective for psychological research. This article begins with a sketch of several arguments, from evolution to philosophy, as to why the embodiment framework is a good bet. These arguments are followed by a review of approaches to embodiment, including those from cognitive linguistics, perceptual symbol theory, and (...) action-based theories. Finally, examples are provided for how a unifying perspective might work for cognition (including language and memory), cognitive and social development, social psychology, neuroscience, clinical psychology, and psychology applied to education. (shrink)

ABSTRACTThe present study describes the development and validation of a facial expression database comprising five different horizontal face angles in dynamic and static presentations. The database includes twelve expression types portrayed by eight Japanese models. This database was inspired by the dimensional and categorical model of emotions: surprise, fear, sadness, anger with open mouth, anger with closed mouth, disgust with open mouth, disgust with closed mouth, excitement, happiness, relaxation, sleepiness, and neutral. The expressions were validated using emotion classification and Affect (...) Grid rating tasks [Russell, Weiss, & Mendelsohn, 1989. Affect Grid: A single-item scale of pleasure and arousal. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 57, 493–502]. The results indicate that most of the expressions were recognised as the intended emotions and could systematically represent affective valence and arousal. Furthermore, face angle and facial motion information influenced emot... (shrink)

This reinterpretation of acting theories in light of the history of science examines acting styles from the seventeenth century to the twentieth century and measures them against prevailing conceptions of the human body and its inner workings.

While philosophers of mind have been arguing over the status of mental representations in cognitive science, cognitive scientists have been quietly engaged in studying perception, action, and cognition without explaining them in terms of mental representation. In this book, Anthony Chemero describes this nonrepresentational approach, puts it in historical and conceptual context, and applies it to traditional problems in the philosophy of mind. Radical embodied cognitive science is a direct descendant of the American naturalist psychology of William James and John (...) Dewey, and follows them in viewing perception and cognition to be understandable only in terms of action in the environment. Chemero argues that cognition should be described in terms of agent-environment dynamics rather than in terms of computation and representation. After outlining this orientation to cognition, Chemero proposes a methodology: dynamical systems theory, which would explain things dynamically and without reference to representation. He also advances a background theory: Gibsonian ecological psychology, "shored up" and clarified. Chemero then looks at some traditional philosophical problems through the lens of radical embodied cognitive science and concludes that the comparative ease with which it resolves these problems, combined with its empirical promise, makes this approach to cognitive science a rewarding one. "Jerry Fodor is my favorite philosopher," Chemero writes in his preface, adding, "I think that Jerry Fodor is wrong about nearly everything." With this book, Chemero explains nonrepresentational, dynamical, ecological cognitive science as clearly and as rigorously as Jerry Fodor explained computational cognitive science in his classic work The Language of Thought. (shrink)

The Embodied Mind provides a unique, sophisticated treatment of the spontaneous and reflective dimension of human experience.

In Supersizing the Mind, Andy Clark argues that the human mind is not bound inside the head but extends into body and environment.