The Aristotelian dictum that desire is the starting point of practical reasoning that ends in action can of course be denied. Its denial is a commonplace of moral theory in the tradition of Kant. But in this essay I am concerned with that issue only indirectly. I shall not contend that rational action always or necessarily does involve desire as its starting point; nor shall I deny it. My question concerns instead the possibility of its ever beginning in desire. For (...) there is a question whether it is even possible for reasoning to begin in desire, a question arising from the nature of desire and its objects, which to my knowledge has not been articulated. If we can see how desire can provide the arche of action, then we can consider later, and from that vantage point, whether it is necessary that it should do so. It will, I think, be possible eventually to argue that if practical reasoning has the character it must have, if it can begin in desire, then its starting point can be nothing but desire. (shrink)

In this lucid portrayal of human behavior, Fred Dretske provides an original account of the way reasons function in the causal explanation of behavior.

I compare two theories of motivation: The Socratic Theory of Motivation and Fred Dretske's attempt to vindicate the use of desires in folk-psychological explanations. I find that, although Socrates ' theory is, at first glance, counterintuitive, while Dretske's provides persuasive analyses of beliefs and desires, there is a way of developing Dretske's theory which produces a theory that is parallel to the Socratic Theory of Motivation. In fact, if we substitute "all desire is for homeostasis" for the thesis that "all (...) desire is for the good" in the Socratic Theory of Motivation, we can actually reduce much of the Socratic Theory from psychology to physiology. I call this parallel theory the Socratized Dretskean Theory of Motivation. As a consequence, I find that many features of the Socratized Dretskean Theory of Motivation are actually more consistent with our common sense physiological views than are our everyday folk-psychological assumptions concerning beliefs and desires. I conclude that, if we are to vindicate folk psychology, we should take a Socratic stance concerning such psychological entities as beliefs, desires and knowledge. (shrink)