- Change in View: Principles of Reasoning.Gilbert Harman - 1986 - Cambridge, MA, USA: MIT Press.details
|
|
Truth and probability.Frank Ramsey - 2010 - In Antony Eagle (ed.), Philosophy of Probability: Contemporary Readings. New York: Routledge. pp. 52-94.details
|
|
Working Without a Net: A Study of Egocentric Epistemology.Richard Foley - 1998 - Noûs 32 (2):265-275.details
|
|
Credence and Correctness: In Defense of Credal Reductivism.Matthew Brandon Lee - 2017 - Philosophical Papers 46 (2):273-296.details
|
|
The Epistemic Role of Consciousness.Declan Smithies - 2019 - New York, USA: Oxford University Press.details
|
|
Eliminative Materialism and the Propositional Attitudes.Paul M. Churchland - 1981 - Journal of Philosophy 78 (2):67-90.details
|
|
Dracula Meets Wolfman: Acceptance vs. Partial Belief.Richard Jeffrey - 1970 - In Marshall Swain (ed.), Induction, acceptance, and rational belief. Dordrecht,: Reidel. pp. 157-185.details
|
|
Change in view: Principles of reasoning.Gilbert Harman - 2008 - In . Cambridge University Press. pp. 35-46.details
|
|
Subjective Probabilities Should be Sharp.Adam Elga - 2010 - Philosophers' Imprint 10.details
|
|
The Rational Mind.Scott Sturgeon - 2020 - Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press.details
|
|
Probabilistic Knowledge.Sarah Moss - 2018 - Oxford, United Kingdom: Oxford University Press.details
|
|
Knowledge and Its Limits.Timothy Williamson - 2005 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 70 (2):452-458.details
|
|
Outright Belief.Ralph Wedgwood - 2012 - Dialectica 66 (3):309–329.details
|
|
Can we do without pragmatic encroachment.Brian Weatherson - 2005 - Philosophical Perspectives 19 (1):417–443.details
|
|
Reason and the grain of belief.Scott Sturgeon - 2008 - Noûs 42 (1):139–165.details
|
|
Do animals have beliefs?Stephen P. Stich - 1979 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 57 (1):15-28.details
|
|
How do Beliefs Simplify Reasoning?Julia Staffel - 2019 - Noûs 53 (4):937-962.details
|
|
Fallibilism and concessive knowledge attributions.Jason Stanley - 2005 - Analysis 65 (2):126-131.details
|
|
Can there be reasoning with degrees of belief?Julia Staffel - 2013 - Synthese 190 (16):3535-3551.details
|
|
Accuracy for Believers.Julia Staffel - 2017 - Episteme 14 (1):39-48.details
|
|
Knowing Full Well.Ernest Sosa - 2010 - Princeton University Press.details
|
|
The Normative Role of Knowledge.Declan Smithies - 2011 - Noûs 46 (2):265-288.details
|
|
A Generalised Lottery Paradox for Infinite Probability Spaces.Martin Smith - 2010 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 61 (4):821-831.details
|
|
How to embed an epistemic modal: Attitude problems and other defects of character.Alex Silk - 2017 - Philosophical Studies 174 (7):1773-1799.details
|
|
The unreliability of naive introspection.Eric Schwitzgebel - 2006 - Philosophical Review 117 (2):245-273.details
|
|
Précis of The Things We Mean.Stephen Schiffer - 2006 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 73 (1):208-210.details
|
|
Expressivism concerning epistemic modals.Benjamin Schnieder - 2010 - Philosophical Quarterly 60 (240):601-615.details
|
|
Expressing Credences.Daniel Rothschild - 2012 - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 112 (1pt1):99-114.details
|
|
Belief, Credence, and Pragmatic Encroachment.Jacob Ross & Mark Schroeder - 2014 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 88 (2):259-288.details
|
|
Epistemology and probability.John L. Pollock - 1983 - Noûs 17 (1):65-67.details
|
|
Epistemology and probability.John L. Pollock - 1983 - Synthese 55 (2):231-252.details
|
|
Counterfactuals and Epistemic Probability.R. Otte - 2006 - Synthese 152 (1):81-93.details
|
|
Epistemology Formalized.Sarah Moss - 2013 - Philosophical Review 122 (1):1-43.details
|
|
A new puzzle about belief and credence.Andrew Moon - 2019 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 49 (2):272-291.details
|
|
Unconscious Evidence.Jack Lyons - 2016 - Philosophical Issues 26 (1):243-262.details
|
|
Who Cares What You Accurately Believe?Clayton Littlejohn - 2015 - Philosophical Perspectives 29 (1):217-248.details
|
|
Foundations of Everyday Practical Reasoning.Hanti Lin - 2013 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 42 (6):831-862.details
|
|
Noncognitivism and the Frege‐Geach Problem in Formal Epistemology.Benjamin Lennertz - 2019 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 102 (1):184-208.details
|
|
Reducing belief simpliciter to degrees of belief.Hannes Leitgeb - 2013 - Annals of Pure and Applied Logic 164 (12):1338-1389.details
|
|
Subjective probability and acceptance.Mark Norris Lance - 1995 - Philosophical Studies 77 (1):147 - 179.details
|
|
What 'must' and 'can' must and can mean.Angelika Kratzer - 1977 - Linguistics and Philosophy 1 (3):337--355.details
|
|
Credence as doxastic tendency.Dominik Kauss - 2020 - Synthese 197 (10):4495-4518.details
|
|
Decision theory as philosophy.Mark Kaplan - 1983 - Philosophy of Science 50 (4):549-577.details
|
|
Levi on causal decision theory and the possibility of predicting one's own actions.James M. Joyce - 2002 - Philosophical Studies 110 (1):69 - 102.details
|
|
How Belief-Credence Dualism Explains Away Pragmatic Encroachment.Elizabeth Jackson - 2019 - Philosophical Quarterly 69 (276):511-533.details
|
|
Belief, Credence, and Evidence.Elizabeth Jackson - 2020 - Synthese 197 (11):5073-5092.details
|
|
Belief and Credence: Why the Attitude-Type Matters.Elizabeth Grace Jackson - 2019 - Philosophical Studies 176 (9):2477-2496.details
|
|
Epistemic Possibility.Michael Huemer - 2007 - Synthese 156 (1):119-142.details
|
|
Troubles for Bayesian Formal Epistemology.Terry Horgan - 2017 - Res Philosophica 94 (2):1-23.details
|
|
Partial belief, partial intention.Richard Holton - 2008 - Mind 117 (465):27-58.details
|
|